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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The contrast between the theory and practice of Islamic banking is generally 
acknowledged by many scholars. After more than three decades in operation, 
the rapid growth of the Islamic banking industry is, in reality being driven by 
the application of the debt-like contracts (e.g. murÁbaÎah and ijÁrah) rather than 
the profit and loss sharing contracts (e.g. muÃÁrabah and mushÁrakah). As the 
adaptation of the former contracts creates "unauthentic" Islamic financial 
products, many have questioned their compliance with sharÐÝah principles. The 
present study analyses this issue by examining the application of muÃÁrabah 
rules in Malaysian Islamic banking practices. It evaluates the extent to which 
the current practices fulfil the principles and the ethical framework of the 
muÃÁrabah contract as propounded by the classical jurists. The study also 
analyses the justifications of Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars for modification of the 
doctrine, adapting it to the modern banking business. The study found that the 
local sharÐÝah scholars have adopted an incoherent legal methodology when 
making their ijtihÁd. They can be very rigid, concentrating solely on the legal 
technicality and at the same time be very flexible, adapting an unregulated 
doctrine of maÒlaÎah. Therefore, some of their resolutions could be seen as 
contradictory to the rulings found in classical fiqh.     
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INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 
 
RibÁ is undeniably forbidden in the Islamic legal tradition. The prohibition is 
clearly declared in the Qur’Án as evidenced in the verses 2:275-281: 
“God has permitted trading and prohibited ribÁ”. 
“God destroys ribÁ and nourishes charity”. 
“O believers fear God and forego what still remains in the 
ribÁ if you really believe. But if you do not, then beware the 
declaration of war from God and His Messenger. And if you 
repent, you shall keep your principal”1. 
 
Although the prohibition is unequivocally stipulated in the above verses, the 
exact meaning of ribÁ is not clearly elaborated. The definition of ribÁ is 
therefore derived from the ÎadÐth of the Prophet. Based on the analysis of 
several aÎadÐth (plural form of ÎadÐth), the majority of jurists classified ribÁ 
into two types; (1) ribÁ in loan (ribÁ al-nasÐÞah) and (2) ribÁ in sale (ribÁ al-
faÃl). RibÁ in loan is the act of extending delay to a debtor in return for an 
increase in the borrowed principal. It was widely practised at the time of the 
Prophet and thus regarded as a clear object of the Qur’anic prohibition of ribÁ2. 
One of the examples of ribÁ al-nasÐÞah during the pre-Islamic period was 
recorded by MÁlik (d.179/795) in al-MuwaÔÔa’. Based on the authority of Zayd 
b. Aslam, he narrated:  
RibÁ in the jahiliyya (pre-Islam) was when a man gave a loan 
to a man for a set term. When the term was due, he (the 
lender) would say, 'Will you pay it off or increase [it for] 
me?' If the borrower paid, he took it. If not, the lender 
increased the debt and lengthened the term for the borrower3. 
 
The prohibition of ribÁ al-nasÐÞah indicates that any compensation for the loan 
was prohibited in early Islam, irrespective whether the loan is intended for 
consumption or production purposes. As for a consumption loan, the practice of 
charging ribÁ was viewed as undermining the charitable attitudes and human 
kindness among Muslims. It opposes early Islamic teaching that encourages the 
                                                 
1 ÝAliÝAbdullah YÙsuf (trans.), The Meaning of the Holy QurÞÁn. Bretwood, Md.: Amana, 1991. 
2 Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes III, Islamic Law and Finance, Religion, Risk and 
Return, London: Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 73. 
3 MÁlik b. Anas, al-MuwaÔÔa', ÎadÐth no. 1965, Beirut: DÁr al-Gharb al-IslÁmÐ, vol.2, 1997, 
pp.204.  
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support of the poor by the rich. Muslims are asked by the Qur'Án to sacrifice the 
possibility of a profitable opportunity when giving loans to others. In addition, 
Muslims are also recommanded to extend the time to the borrowers when they 
are having problems in repaying their loans4. On the other hand, a loan which 
constituted compensation for production is also banned because money 
(capital) is not recognised as one of the factors of production within an Islamic 
economic framework5. The Islamic legal tradition rejects the notion that 
‘money could yield money’ without bearing any risk. For money to generate 
money, it must be linked with a certain degree of risk i.e. involved in trade.  
 
The linking of the lawfulness of gain to risk-taking is based on two classical 
legal maxims. The legal maxims state that (1) al-kharÁj bi-ÃhamÁn - gain comes 
with the liability for loss and (2) al-ghunmu bi al-ghurmi - gain is the result of 
risk taking. These legal maxims are derived from ÎadÐth. The first legal maxim 
is actually a saying of the Prophet reported in the five major Sunni ÎadÐth 
collections (ÑahÐh al-Muslim (d.261/875), Sunan Ibn MÁjah (d.273/887), Sunan 
AbÐ DÁwÙd (d.275/889), Sunan al- TirmidhÐ (d. 279/893) and Sunan al-NasÁ’Ð 
(d.303/916)6. The second legal maxim is derived from the understanding of 
ÎadÐth on pledge (al-rahn) narrated by al-DÁraquÔnÐ (d.385/995)7 and al-HÁkim 
(d.405/1015).  The risk-taking principle is strongly recommended within the 
Islamic business framework because it leads to justice and fairness. In contrast, 
guaranteed return on investment is seen as more likely to bring injustice to the 
borrower (entrepreneur). This is because the borrower is obliged to repay the 
lender regardless of his business outcome.    
 
On the other hand, the meaning of ribÁ al-faÃl is derived from a number of 
aÎÁdÐth. One of them was narrated by AbÙ SaÝÐd al-KhudrÐ: 
                                                 
4 Qur'Án 2:280. 
5 Umer Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System, Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1985, 
pp.64.  
6 Ibn Íajar al-ÝAsqalÁnÐ, BulÙgh al-MarÁm min Adillat al-AÎkÁm; KitÁb al-BuyuÝ, ÎadÐth no.37, 
Mecca: Maktabah an-NahÃah al-ÍadÐthah, 1979, pp. 183.  
7 DÁraquÔnÐ ÝAli ibn ÝUmar, Sunan al-DÁraquÔnÐ; KiÔÁb al-BuyÙÝ, ÎadÐth no. 125-129, Cairo: DÁr 
al-MaÎasin, vol. 3-4, 1980, pp.32-33.   
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Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for 
barley, dates for dates, salt for salt,  like for like, equal for 
equal, hand to hand. If these types differ then sell them as you 
wish, if it is hand to hand.8 
 
Based on this ÎadÐth, the classical jurists formulated rules on ribÁ in sale. The 
ÎadÐth stipulates that equality and spot transactions are necessary when 
exchanging similar ribawÐ items. For example, exchange of the same quality of 
dates is permitted only in equal amount (e.g. one kilogramme for one 
kilogramme) and performed without any time interval. If the ribawi items are 
dissimilar (e.g. gold for barley), the exchange must be done unequally. The 
question arises then, why restrict the exchange of ribawÐ items to exactly equal 
quantities? What is the rationale for exchanging dates, for example, with 
similar characteristics?  
 
It is argued that the rule aims to establish justice in business transactions9. The 
commodities mentioned in the ÎadÐth (wheat, barley, dates, salt) formed the 
staple foods of the common people at that time. When these commodities were 
exchanged on credit, for example ten bushel of wheat now for ten bushel of 
wheat later, they tended to be transformed into loans of commodities similar to 
the monetary loan10. The borrower normally was required to return an extra 
quantity of wheat during repayment. The Prophet prohibited such unequal 
exchange and insisted that exact mathematical equivalency must be fulfilled. 
Instead of barter transactions, the Prophet commanded the use of currency as a 
medium of exchange.  
 
A Prophetic ÎadÐth narrated from AbÙ SaÞÐd al-KhudrÐ states:  
BilÁl brought to the Prophet some barnÐ (good quality) dates 
whereupon the Prophet asked him where these were from. 
BilÁl replied, 'I had some lower quality of dates which I 
exchanged for these – two ÒÁÞs for a ÒÁÞ. The Prophet said, 'Oh 
no, this is precisely ribÁ. Do not do so, but when you wish to 
                                                 
8 Ibn Íajar al-ÝAsqalÁnÐ, FatÎul al-BÁrÐ bi sharÎ SaÎÐh al-BukhÁrÐ, Beirut: DÁr IÎyÁ' al-TurÁth 
al-ÝArabÐ, vol. 4, 1981, pp.302.  
9 Umer Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System, pp.59. 
10 Ziaul Haque, RibÁ The Moral Economy of Usury, Interest and Profit, Kuala Lumpur: S. 
Abdul Majeed & Co, 1995, pp.53. 
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buy, sell the lower quality of dates against something (cash) 
and then buy the better dates with the price you receive.’11 
 
The use of currency is preferred over barter transactions because it could help 
reduce the possibility of an unfair exchange12. This is because a fair equivalent 
measurement is difficult to determine in a barter transaction compared to the 
use of currency which serve as medium to provide neutral measure of value. 
Most of the classical jurists were of the opinion that the ribawÐ items were not 
confined to the six commodities stipulated in the 'gold for gold' ÎadÐth. They 
agreed that other items which share a similar Ýillah (legal cause) are also 
included in the prohibition. There was disagreement however concerning the 
determination of the Ýillah. The ShÁfiÝÐs and MÁlikÐs defined the Ýillah of gold 
and silver in the ÎadÐth as monetary currency. In this regard, they did not 
differentiate between the raw metals, minted coins or jewellery. Thus, if gold 
jewellery was traded for gold coins, it must be carried out in equal weight and 
in spot transaction. The Ýillah (monetary currency) ruled out other metals such 
as copper, bronze and nickel. These metals were not commonly used as a 
medium of exchange and therefore could be traded unconditionally.  
 
It is noteworthy that since paper money has functioned in a way similar to gold 
and silver coins in the contemporary period, the modern jurists had recognised 
it as one of the ribawÐ items. During the third conference of the International 
Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA), a fatwÁ regarding the utilisation of paper money 
in daily commercial dealings and transactions had been issued. The fatwa 
stated:  
"Paper money is a currency that stands with its own value. Its 
rule is similar with the rule of gold and silver. Thus, it is 
treated as one of zakatable as well as ribawi items"13. 
 
On the other hand, the ShÁfiÝÐs and MÁlikÐs were of the opinion that the Ýillah of 
the other four commodities (wheat, barley, dates and salt) is "foodstuff". 
                                                 
11 Muslim ibn ÍujÁj, ÑaÎÐh Muslim; KitÁb al-MusÁqÁt, ÎadÐth no. 96, Beirut: DÁr IÎyÁ' al-
TurÁth al-ÝArabÐ, vol. 3, 1985, pp.1215.  
12 Umer Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System, pp. 60. 
13 Resolution 21(3/9), al-AhkÁm an-NuqÙd al-Waraqiah wa Taghyir QÐmah al-ÝUmlah, Amman, 
16 October 1986. www.fiqhacademy.org.sa/qrarat/3-9htm. Accessed on 22nd November 2009.  
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Despite agreeing on the Ýillah, they differed in defining the meaning of 
foodstuffs. Are all kinds of foodstuffs are included in the prohibition of ribÁ al-
faÃl? What kind of foodstuff is implied by the ÎadÐth? According to ShÁfiÝÐ 
jurists, the foodstuffs mentioned in the ÎadÐth signify three categories of foods. 
Firstly, the wheat and barley indicate foods used for everyday nutrition. 
Secondly, the dates imply foods used as a dessert and thirdly the salt indicate 
foods used for seasoning (to make the cook more edible)14. In contrast, the 
MÁlikÐs devided the foodstuffs into two categories; nutrition (similar to the 
ShÁfiÝÐs) and the storability. The latter category refers to foods which are not 
easily perishable and may be stored for a period of time. Hence, both schools 
ruled that all foodstuffs which satisfy the characteristics of either one of the 
categories will be considered as ribawÐ items and thus have to follow strict 
equality requirement in their barter or sale transaction.  
 
Meanwhile, the ÍanafÐs and the ÍanbalÐs (in one of their narrations) regarded 
the Ýillah as measurement which is determined either by weight or volume. 
They viewed gold and silver were stipulated in the ÎadÐth to signify all goods 
(irrespective whether foodstuffs or not) that can be measured by weight 
whereas the four commodities (wheat, barley, dates and salt) indicate goods 
which can be measured by volume. The ÚÁhirÐs rejected all the Ýillahs discussed 
by the four Sunni schools of law. For them, ribÁ al-faÃl only occurs in the six 
commodities which Allah has delineated, and any other goods remain in their 
state of permissibility. Their position is due to their denial of analogical 
reasoning (qiyÁs) as a principle of jurisprudence15.   
 
It is not my intention here to prolong the juridical debate concerning the legal 
cause of ribÁ al-faÃl. However, it is obvious from the classical discussions that 
the main reason behind the prohibition is to establish an ethical framework for 
Muslim economic endeavour. RibÁ is banned by the Islamic legal tradition to 
                                                 
14 Wahbah al-ZuÎaylÐ, al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ wa Adillatuh, Financial Transactions in Islamic 
Jurisprudence MaÎmoud A. El-Gamal (trans), Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, 2003, vol.1, pp. 324. 
15 Wahbah al-ZuÎaylÐ, The Juridical Meaning of RibÁ, Interest in Islamic Economic, 
Understanding of RibÁ, (edited) AbdulKader Thomas, London: Rutledge Taylor & Francis, 
2006, pp.39.    
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ensure a fair and just economic system. The classical jurists viewed ribÁ as the 
root cause of exploitation and manipulation which in turn causes depression 
among the impoverished people in the community. Hence, the banning of ribÁ 
is seen as the impetus for the social and economic reform.  
 
The wisdom behind the prohibition of ribÁ is generally acknowledged within 
Muslim society until modern days. Since the early 20th century, interest in the 
conventional banks has been much criticised by Muslim religious scholars. 
They equated the practice of charging interest with ribÁ al-nasÐÞah applied 
during the pre-Islamic period. The conventional banks make profit through 
becoming a financial intermediary, receiving money from depositors by 
guaranteeing a fixed rate of return, and lending the money to borrowers with a 
higher interest rate. As such, ribÁ al-nasÐÞah occurs in the relationships between 
the three parties, and this makes dealing with conventional bank forbidden. 
However, despite the obvious existence of ribÁ in the banking institutions, 
Muslims can not deny the essential role of banks in the context of modern life.  
Hence, they face the challenges of working out an alternative to the 
conventional banking system.  
 
The effort to provide the alternative started at theoretical level in its early 
phase. During that time, the discussions regarding ribÁ were more juridical in 
nature. Interestingly, a few prominent scholars of that period including 
Muhammad ÝAbduh (d.1316/1905) and his disciple RashÐd RiÃÁ (d.1337/1935) 
were of the opinion that interest generated by saving bank accounts and 
insurance companies were admissible16. They viewed interest distributed by the 
banks to depositors as a share of the profit from investment as permitted. The 
argument has influenced TantawÐ, the current Shaykh al-Azhar and Sheikh 
WÁÒil, the previous mufti of Egypt who held similar opinions.17 However, the 
majority of current scholars including MawdÙdÐ (d.1381/1979) and al-
                                                 
16 Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986, pp.28. 
17 Mahmoud A. El Gamal, An Economic Explication of The Prohibition of RibÁ in Classical 
Islamic Jurisprudence, 2001, www.ruf.rice.edu/~elgamal/files/riba. Accessed on 27 November 
2008. 
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Qardhawi rejected such re-interpretations of ribÁ to accommodate the banking 
interest. It appears nowadays that the mainstream opinion of the majority of 
Muslims upholds the 'equation' ruling18. Consequently, the theoretical debate 
on ribÁ has been devolved to a practical level. At this juncture, the development 
of the debate received significant contributions from scholars of an economic 
educational background. The works of Muslim economists such as Khurshid 
Ahmad and Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi provided a clear framework for the 
establishment of interest-free banking institutions.  
 
In this regard, the profit and loss sharing (PLS) principle has been viewed as 
the ideal model for interest-free banking institutions. The model is based on the 
two Islamic classical commercial contracts namely muÃÁrabah and 
mushÁrakah. The distinctive difference between the PLS model and the 
conventional banking system lies in the fact that the former is based on the risk 
sharing principle while the latter is based on the guaranteed return. Briefly 
speaking, the theory of PLS signifies that the Islamic bank will act a middle-
party between depositors (rabb mÁl) and entrepreneurs (muÃÁrib). The main 
task of the Islamic banks is to invest the depositors' money into viable business 
projects run by trustworthy entrepreneurs. Any profit generated from the 
business venture will be shared between the three parties based on a pre-
determined profit ratio. However, the monetary loss will be borne solely by the 
depositors. The bank and the entrepreneurs will only lose their time and effort.  
Research Problem: Theory versus Practice  
 
The first Islamic commercial bank was established in 1963, in Mit Ghamr, 
Egypt. Since its inception, the industry experienced remarkable growth. Islamic 
banks currently are operating in almost all Muslim countries. They are reported 
to have grown at 15 to 20 percent every year. However, the way the Islamic 
banks have progressed so far in many ways has deviated from the PLS theory. 
In any Islamic banks worldwide, the contracts of muÃÁrabah and mushÁrakah 
                                                 
18 Saeed, Abdullah, Riba, Encyclopedia of Islam Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman , Th. 
Bianquis , C.E. Bosworth , E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill Online, 
EXETER UNIVERSITY. Accessed on 27 November 2008. 
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have become the least popular contracts. In Malaysia for example, both 
contracts constitute less than 5 percent of the total Islamic banks' transactions. 
Instead of PLS based contracts, the predominant contracts are the debt-like sale 
contracts such bay Ýal-ÝÐnah, bayÝ al-murÁbahah and bayÝ bithamanin Ájil. The 
over reliance on these contracts has raised the issue of the authenticity of the 
Islamic banking operation. This is because by applying the debt-like contracts, 
Islamic banking products appear to be identical to their conventional 
counterparts.  
 
Islamic bankers argue that the PLS banking system has major practical 
problems. Most problems highlighted involve the lack of a bank's expertise in 
supervising business projects, the risk-averse attitude among the depositors and 
the agency problem. Due to these impediments, the PLS theory has been 
neglected. As an alternative, Islamic bankers adopt the 'duplication' orientation. 
This orientation indicates that conventional banking instruments will be 
adopted after necessary 'Islamic alteration' has been carried out. As a result of 
this orientation, the products offered by the two banking systems appear to be 
insignificantly different. For instance, in the liability side of the banking 
business, conventional saving and current account are redesigned as wadÐÝah 
accounts whereas general investment accounts become muÃÁrabah accounts. 
Similarly, in the asset side, short term loans have been transformed as bayÝ al-
ÝÐnah and bayÝ al-murÁbahah financing, while medium and long term loans as 
bayÝ bithamanin Ájil.  
 
The duplication orientation has been successfully implemented because it 
receives support from sharÐÝah scholars who uphold a pragmatic approach. The 
pragmatic approach implies that they pay great attention to the practical aspects 
of the banking business when evaluating the sharÐÝah compliance of a proposed 
product. As we shall see in the proceeding discussion, such an approach has 
made a general presumption that these sharÐÝah scholars are lenient and relaxed 
as some of their decisions appear to contradict the prevalent rulings of the 
classical Islamic commercial rules.   
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The problem with both the duplication and the pragmatic orientations lies on 
the ‘form over substance’ issue. The duplication process, which transforms a 
conventional banking product into an Islamic one, very much focuses on the 
change in terminology rather than the essence of the product. As the substance 
of the products remains, many wonder whether ribÁ is actually removed from 
the Islamic banking system. While discussing this matter, Umer Chapra, one of 
the eminent scholars in the Islamic banking admitted that:   
“Despite the fact that Islamic banking has developed rapidly 
for the past 30 years, with an impressive number of products 
that have applied various Islamic classical commercial 
contract, I do believe that the element of interest (ribÁ) is still 
exists”19. 
 
Hence, it is not surprising that nowadays there is a growing tendency among 
researchers to discuss the authenticity of Islamic banking products20. This 
group of researchers believe that the current practice of Islamic banking has 
deviated from its objective; to abolish ribÁ from the current conventional 
financial system.  There is stronger call from the fundamentalists to re-instill 
the philosophy of Islamic moral economy (IME) in all products and services 
offered by the Islamic banks21. They demand the the Islamic bankers, sharÐÝah 
scholars and the relevant government authorities adopt a ‘substance over form’ 
approach in order to sustain the development of the Islamic banking system. 
This undeniably requires a major paradigm shift for everyone involved.  
Objectives of the Study 
 
In respect of the authenticity issue in the current practice of Islamic banking 
system, the present study primarily aims to (1) analyse the classical theory of 
muÃÁrabah and (2) examine its application in the Malaysian Islamic banks.  
 
                                                 
19 M. Umer Chapra, Innovation and Authenticity in Islamic Finance, paper presented at the 
Eight Harvard Conference in Islamic Finance, Massachusetts, April 2008,.       
20 See for example, Shamin Ahmad Siidiqui, 'Understanding and Eliminating RibÁ: Can Islamic 
Financial Instruments be Meaningful Implemented'. Journal of Management and Social 
Sciences, vol.1, no.2, 2005, 187-203.   
21Mehmet Asutay, 'Islamic Banking and Finance: Social Failure', New Horizon (169), October 
2008.    
 17 
With regard to the first objective, this study will analyse the muÃÁrabah 
doctrine of the four Sunni schools of Islamic law. As such, the classical legal 
texts of the ÍanafÐs, MÁlikÐs, ShÁfiÝÐs and ÍanbalÐs will be examined to 
formulate their doctrine of the contract. The disagreement between them 
pertaining to the detailed practices of the contract will also be scrutinised. The 
main objective in discussing the rules is to comprehend the ethical framework 
of muÃÁrabah contract as propounded by the classical jurists. I hypothetically 
think that there is strong connection between the establishment of muÃÁrabah 
contract and the prohibition of ribÁ. Both subjects are asserted by the Islamic 
legal tradition to promote justice and fairness in Muslim economic affairs. By 
having a sound understanding regarding the philosophy of muÃÁrabah contract, 
it is hoped that Islamic bankers and their shÁrÐÝah advisors could develop a 
better equity-based banking instrument.  
 
In addition to this, the study will also examine the current practice of 
muÃÁrabah in the Malaysian Islamic banking institution. It attempts to 
investigate the extent to which local Islamic bank applied the muÃÁrabah theory 
as developed by the classical jurists. Realising that muÃÁrabah had not been 
practised for more than 150 years, modification of its original theory seems 
unavaoidable. The present study aims to examine the modification and analyse 
the justifications of the Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars. By analysing the 
justifications, it is hoped that this study will be able to determine whether the 
muÃÁrabah products in the Malaysian Islamic banks comply with the doctrine 
of muÃÁrabah, as laid out in the Islamic legal tradition. The emphasis is not on 
the compliance of every detail of the classical muÃÁrabah rules but rather to the 
spirit and the ethical framework of the contract. I personally believe that the 
current practice of muÃÁrabah in Malaysian Islamic banks is far from perfect. 
Thus, the present study attempts to highlight the loopholes and suggest ways to 
improve the system.      
 
In a broader perspective, this study also aims to be a valuable addition to the 
existing literature on the practical issue of Islamic law in the contemporary 
Muslim society. Taking muÃÁrabah as an example, it demonstrates the conflict 
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faced by the current Muslim community in applying the classical jurists' rules 
in their modern life. It discusses the dilemma between sticking to the 
established principles and meeting the complex demands of the contemporary 
period. In the context of Islamic banking industry, it shows the continuous 
struggles between the fundamentalists who firmly uphold the classical jurists’ 
doctrine and the modernist who appear very flexible in response to the 
changing demand of the financial market.  
Review on the Studies of MuÃÁrabah in Islamic Banking and Finance 
 
The muÃÁrabah contract was developed in the context of pre-Islamic Arabian 
caravan trade22. The contract was practised largely by those who were not 
capable of engaging directly in trading activities – these included women, 
orphans and the elderly. They would entrust money to skilful and reliable 
traders to transport merchandise from Mecca and trade with them in Syria, 
Yemen and other places in the Arab peninsular23. One of the salient features of 
the contract is that profit generated from the business will be shared according 
to a pre-determined ratio (such as 50:50). The monetary loss however will be 
borne entirely by the capital provider and the traders would only lose his 
expanded time and effort.  
 
In the classical fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) texts, the rules of muÃÁrabah have 
been elaborated in great detail. The contract has been discussed since the early 
development of Islamic law. All the earliest texts of the four Sunni schools of 
law devoted separate chapters or sections to this subject although varying in 
their scope of discussion. The earliest ÍanafÐ rules on muÃÁrabah are found in 
the works of al-ShaybÁnī (d.189/205) namely his al-JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr and al-JÁmiÝ 
al-kabÐr. In the other schools, the rules of muÃÁrabah were recorded in the texts 
which, it is said, were written by the madhhÁb’s eponyms; al-MuwaÔÔaÞ of 
MÁlik (d. 179/795), KitÁb al-Umm of al-ShÁfiÝÐ (d.204/820) and MasÁÝil ImÁm 
AÎmad of AÎmad ibn Íanbal (d.241/855).   
                                                 
22 Abraham L Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam, Princeton N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1970, p.172. 
23 AÎmad ibn SaÝÐd Ibn Hazm, al-MuÎallÁ bi al-ÀthÁr, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, vol. 7, n.d. pp.92. 
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In the context of modern application, the muÃÁrabah contract has been used as 
the underlying principle that governs the relationship between the depositors 
and Islamic banks. Hence muÃÁrabah has attracted quite considerable attention 
from contemporary researcher. The previous studies on this subject could be 
divided into two broad categories; theoretical and empirical. The theoretical 
studies, in turn cover two main themes. Firstly, they focus on explaining the 
rules of muÃÁrabah from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. In my 
opinion, while such studies are abundant in the Arabic language, there are not 
many in-depth analyses of muÃÁrabah rules in other languages including 
English. Presumably, this is because most of the contemporary jurists are 
originally from Arabic speaking countries. With a few exceptions such as the 
work of Taqi Usmani (An Introduction to Islamic Finance), the published 
studies on this subject are mainly produced by scholars with economics 
backgrounds. Hence, their discussions tend to be simple and general avoiding 
the classical jurists’ differences of opinion (ikhtilÁf).  
 
El-Sharif24 and Borhan25 in their Phd theses had elaborated the doctrine of 
muÃÁrabah in Islamic law. In terms of the content (subject coverage), their 
studies are undeniably comprehensive. They explain the positive law (what we 
should do) of all main topics in the muÃÁrabah contract. However, their 
analyses are found to be lacking in argumentation. In other words, El-Sharif 
and Borhan’ studies are excellent if one wishes to know the rules of muÃÁrabah 
are but dissatisfying if one wishes to understand the rationale behind them. The 
fundamental questions relating to the problem of agency such as to what extend 
the capital provider will be informed regarding their investment and the limit of 
the agent manager in making business decisions are not clearly explained in 
either thesis. Besides, in elaborating the rules of muÃÁrabah, both scholars had 
taken a generic approach where most of the rules are expressed without dispute. 
                                                 
24 El-Sharif B.B.K. Law and Practice of Profit Sharing in Islamic Banking with Particular 
Reference to MuÃÁrabah and MurÁbaÎah, Phd Theses University of Exeter, 1990. 
25 Borhan J.T. Bin, The Doctrine and Application of Partnership in Islamic Commercial Law 
With Special Reference To Malaysia Experiments in Islamic Banking and Finance, Phd Theses 
University of Edinburgh, 1997.   
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Presumably, their purpose is to articulate a standard framework of muÃÁrabah 
for current banking practices. Both researchers also examined the practice of 
muÃÁrabah in the Islamic banks. El-Sharif investigated the muÃÁrabah 
application in several Islamic banks in the Middle East while Borhan focused 
on two Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia. Surprisingly, though 
admitting the need to enhance the current application, neither of them critically 
argues the sharÐÝah compliance of the muÃÁrabah products. The present study is 
distinct from those of El-Sharif and Borhan as it will highlight the contradiction 
between the theory and the practice of the muÃÁrabah products in the Islamic 
banking system.  
 
As far as the Western scholars are concerned, they have not yet embarked on 
specific examinations of the application of Islamic law in this area, except for a 
few works by Frank Vogel26. Nonetheless in 1970, Abraham Udovitch 
produced an excellent analysis of partnership contracts which includes a 
discussion of muÃÁrabah.27 His work, however gives more emphasis to ÍanafÐ 
law comparing it to the other Sunni schools of law.   
 
The second theme of the theoretical studies concentrates on the economic 
justifications in advocating muÃÁrabah as the ideal solution to be used to 
abolish injustice of the interest-based financial system. As argued by Umer 
Chapra, the conventional banking system plays an important role in promoting 
economic inequalities. This is because the conventional banks usually give 
finance based on the creditworthiness of borrowers.  They then have the ability 
to offer collateral which is valued higher than the amount of financing required. 
Based on this method, the financing of the conventional banks increasingly 
becomes a business of transferring wealth to wealthy businessmen. The 
phenomenon widens the gap between rich and poor, as entrepreneurs with no 
collateral but economically promising projects may fail to get financing from 
ordinary conventional banks. In contrast, the application of muÃÁrabah in 
                                                 
26 Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes III, Islamic Law and Finance, Religion, Risk and 
Return, London: Kluwer Law International, 1998. 
27 Abraham L Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam, Princeton N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1970 
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Islamic banks is believed to lead to a more efficient allocation of capital since it 
depends on the profitability and productivity of a proposed project rather than 
the creditworthiness of the borrower. In addition to that, it will also promote 
economic growth since in theory; Islamic banks would tend to be involved in 
long-term projects with higher return rates28.  
 
The empirical studies concentrate on examining the performance of muÃÁrabah 
products in Islamic financial institutions. The muÃÁrabah contract is 
particularly used to create investment and saving accounts. In these accounts, 
the depositors who put their money in Islamic banks are regarded as investors 
while the banks which responsible to generate profit are perceived as traders. 
However in practice, Islamic banks are not involved directly in the business as 
the classical rules indicate. Similar to conventional banks, they act as financial 
intermediaries mobilising the funds for entrepreneurs. In the classical fiqh, such 
a practice was termed as ‘muÃÁrib yuÃÁrib’.  Thus, one can see that muÃÁrabah 
is similar to venture capital as practised by the Western capitalists.29 Although 
both contracts seem similar there is still a distinctive difference between them.   
MuÃÁrabah and venture capital are similar in the sense that they emphasise the 
profit of the business rather than interests on loan as conventional banks do. 
However, they differ in terms of the involvement of the capital provider in 
running the business. The venture capitalists often participate in the business by 
supplying managerial know-how to entrepreneurs. In contrast, the participation 
of capital provider is not permitted in muÃÁrabah according to majority of 
classical jurists. Therefore, in my opinion, muÃÁrabah practice is more similar 
to equity investment by a shareholder in a public listed company.    
 
A review of empirical literature on this subject reveals that the muÃÁrabah 
products have been successful in generating funds for Islamic banks. However, 
the same concept of product fails to provide capital for entrepreneurs. In other 
words, there is an imbalance concerning the utilisation of muÃÁrabah products 
                                                 
28 Umer Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System, pp. 107-120. 
29 Timur Kuran, Islam and Mammon, The Economic Predicaments of Islamism, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004, pp.9  
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by Islamic banks.  MuÃÁrabah investment and saving accounts contribute 
significantly in attracting deposit but muÃÁrabah financing mobilises a very 
small portion of funds for entrepreneurs. For example in 2005, the investment 
and saving accounts contributed 64.4 percent of the total Islamic banking 
deposit whereas the muÃÁrabah  financing accounted only 0.5 percent the total 
Islamic banks’ financing.30 Instead of profit and loss sharing financing 
products, Islamic banks prefer to provide funds through debt-like products 
which are adopted through the contracts of bayÝ bithaman ajil, murÁbaÎah, 
ijÁrah and wakÁlah. 
 
The failure of muÃÁrabah financing has made some scholars reconsider the 
relevance of the contract in today's banking environment. The ability of the 
muÃÁrabah contract to meet with the sophisticated needs of contemporary 
society has been doubted. One of the scholars argues that muÃÁrabah in the 
classical fiqh texts, was a simple muÃÁrabah in which would only suit Muslim 
social structures in the past. As trustworthiness is the key success of a 
muÃÁrabah venture, it was a relatively easy to identify the quality of trust of a 
business partner in a small society like it was in Madinah,31 where people knew 
each other very well. However, trust is difficult to identify nowadays since the 
banks deal with giant companies as well as large scale businesses32.  
 
In my opinion, the argument is valid if we only imagine that Muslim 
civilisation never expanded outside Madinah after the lifetime of the Prophet. 
However, history tells us that the Muslim empire had expanded beyond the 
Arab peninsular and Muslim traders conducted international trade with 
European countries and North Western India from the early 10th century CE. 
Furthermore, as suggested by Udovitch, the muÃÁrabah contract was applied 
and introduced to Southern Europe by Muslim traders through the Italian 
                                                 
30 Central Bank of Malaysia, Annual Report 2005, Kuala Lumpur. 
31 A.L.M. Abdul Gafoor, MuÃÁraba-based Investment and Finance, Journal of Islamic Banking 
and Finance, vol 19. no 5, 2002. 
32 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Equity and Fairness in Islam., Cambridge: The Islamic Text 
Society, 2005, pp.104. 
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seaports during that period33. In view of the extent of the economy of Muslim 
empire, the argument that muÃÁrabah contract only applicable for small society 
thus unconvincing.       
 
Researchers have identified the agency problem as the main cause for the 
failure of muÃÁrabah financing in Islamic banks. The agency problem is said to 
be rooted in two principal rules of the contract. The first rule is pertaining to the 
obligation of capital provider to absorb all monetary losses. According to 
Obiyathullah, as profit is defined as revenue minus cost, such a rule will give 
the entrepreneur every incentive to increase the cost of the business that accrues 
to him as benefit.34 For example, the entrepreneur will probably include his 
personal electricity bill as part of the business expenses. Furthermore, the 
second rule which restricts the capital provider from interfering in the business 
may even encourage him to do so. As stressed by Homouyon Dar and John 
Presley, the rules create imbalance in the governance structure of muÃÁrabah 
financing and therefore it has failed to mobilise financial resources in Islamic 
banks35.  
 
In conclusion, a review of the literature in this subject reveals two main issues 
regarding the application of muÃÁrabah in Islamic financial institutions. Firstly, 
there is lack of studies which analyse critically the classical theory of 
muÃÁrabah. In my opinion, the need for such a study in this subject is 
significant, particularly in English because the language increasingly become 
medium of communication amongst Islamic bankers. In this study, I intend to 
present a comprehensive study of the classical muÃÁrabah theory, which 
perhaps will be a valuable resource for Islamic bankers as well as researchers in 
enhancing their understanding on the virtues of Islamic banking.  
                                                 
33 Abraham L. Udovitch, At the Origins of Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium? 
Speculum, vol. 37 no.2, April 1962, pp.198-207. 
34 Obiyathullah Ismath Bacha, Adapting Mudarabah Financing To Contemporary Realities: A 
Proposed Financing Structure, Journal of Accounting, Commerce and Finance, vol. 1, no.1, 
1997. 
35 Homouyon A. Dar and John R. Presly, Lack of Profit and Loss Sharing in Islamic Banking: 
Management and Control Imbalances, Economic Research Paper No. 00/24, University of 
Loughborough.  
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Secondly, the prior studies have indicated several practical problems faced by 
Islamic banking institutions in applying the muÃÁrabah contract. It seems that 
the contract has not functioned effectively in the contemporary period. Thus, it 
will be interesting to investigate how the Islamic banking institutions apply the 
classical muÃÁrabah contract in their daily banking operation. Do Islamic banks 
really comprehend the spirit of muÃÁrabah or do they just apply certain 
elements of the contract which benefit them? Do they make adjustments or 
modifications to the classical theory of muÃÁrabah? What are their 
justifications in making such ijtihÁd? In investigating these sorts of questions, 
the present study will focus on the Malaysian Islamic banking experience.  
Methodology of the Study 
 
The present study is divided into two main sections. The first section analyses 
(theoretical) the classical theory of muÃÁrabah whereas the second section 
examines its (empirical) application in the current banking system. As indicated 
earlier, the subject of muÃÁrabah had been discussed by jurists since early stage 
of the juristic development. Hence, it was found that the contract was written in 
almost all classical legal texts. For the purpose of this study however, I will 
concentrate on the following texts as my primary sources: 
1. Al-MabÒÙÔ of SarakshÐ (d.490/1097) of the ÍanafÐ school. 
2. MukhtaÒar al-KhÁlil of KhalÐl bin IshÁq (d.776/1374) and Al-DhakhÐrah 
of al-QarÁfÐ (d.684/1285) of the MÁlikÐ school. 
3. MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn and al-MajmÙÝ sharÎ al-Muhadhdhab 0f al-NawawÐ 
(d.676/1278) of the ShÁfiÝÐ school. 
4. Al-MughnÐ of Ibn QudÁmah (d. 620/1223) of the ÍanbalÐ school. 
 
The above texts are chosen based on three main criteria. Firstly, they present 
the most comprehensive discussions of muÃÁrabah contract within their 
respective schools. In identifying a comprehensive text, I study (in chapter one) 
numerous classical legal texts; beginning from the early period where 
muÃÁrabah rules were preliminary discussed until its discussion became mature 
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or comprehensive. A particular text is viewed as comprehensive when it covers 
all important issues of muÃÁrabah practices. My investigation in this topic 
covers the period from the second until the eighth century Hijri.  
 
Secondly, the above texts are chosen because they held authority within the 
schools. Al-MabÒÙÔ is considered as the most authoritative texts in elaborating 
the ÛÁhir al-riwÁya of the ÍanafÐs. MukhtaÒar al-KhÁlil and al-DhazkhÐrah are 
considered by the MÁlikis as the most important texts in understanding the 
school’s doctrine. Similarly, the texts al-MajmuÝ sharÎ al-Muhadhdhab and al-
MughnÐ, besides becoming the main references in fiqh comparison (fiqh al-
muqÁran), are also the most reliable sources in studying the rules of the ShÁfiÝÐs 
and ÍanbalÐs.   
 
Thirdly, all the texts exhibit inter and intra madhhab disagreement (ikhtilÁf). 
What I mean by intra madhhab disagreement is the dispute between jurists of a 
particular school, such as between the ÍanafÐs masters (AbÙ Íanīfa, Zufar 
(d.158/775), AbÙ YÙsuf (d.182/798) and al-ShaybÁnī (d.189/805). On the other 
hand, inter madhhab disagreement refers to dispute between jurists of different 
schools, for example between the Íanafis and ShÁfiÝÐs schools. The main 
reasons for studying the disagreement are to examine the justifications behind 
every rule and to identify a specific ethical framework which each school 
depends upon when developing their muÃÁrabah doctrine.  
 
The following section is the detailed description regarding the legal texts 
chosen:  
       
Al-MabÒÙÔ of SarakhsÐ 
 
The text al-MabsÙÔ was written by MuÎammad b. AÎmad b. AbÐ Sahl al-
SarakhsÐ, a renowned ÍanafÐ jurist of the fifth century Hijri, who lived and 
worked in Transoxania region. He was categorised by Ibn HanÁÝÐ (d.979/1571) 
as one of the third rank jurists within the ÍanafÐ school. The first is the rank of 
independent mujtahid, specified only for AbÙ ÍanÐfa who had been perceived 
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as the founder of the school. The second rank is the students of AbÙ ÍanÐfa, 
especially AbÙ YÙsuf and al-ShaybÁnÐ. They are regarded as mujtahid fÐ al-
madhhab who only practised ijtihad within the boundaries of the school. The 
third rank is the rank of mujtaÎid who practiced ijtihad in those particular cases 
that AbÙ ÍanÐfa and his students did not address.  Based on this typology, 
SarakshÐ was viewed as a jurist who though incapable of differing from the 
methodology (uÒÙl) and positive legal rulings (furÙÞ) founded by the ÍanafÐ 
masters, nonetheless solved unprecedented cases in accordance with their 
principles36.     
 
SarakshÐ wrote al-MabsÙÔ based on al-KÁfÐ of MuÎammad al-MarwÁzÐ 
(d.334/945). Al-KafÐ is a text that compiled the ÛÁhir al-riwÁya rulings of al-
ShaybanÐ, the foundational texts of the Íanafis school. Therefore, al-MabÒÙÔ is 
in turn an epitome of the ÛÁhir al-riwÁya rulings.  As a thirty-volume text, the 
discussion of legal rulings in al-MabÒÙÔ is comprehensive (as its name implies), 
covering nearly all topics and sub-topics in Islamic law. With regard to the 
muÃÁrabah contract, probably al-MabsÙÔ is the most comprehensive legal text 
that explains the detailed rules of the contract. This is an interesting fact since 
contemporary scholars believe that SarakshÐ wrote the text while in 
imprisonment37. The discussion of muÃÁrabah is divided into 26 separate 
sections (bÁb). The sections explain various practical issues of the contract and 
were written in masÁ’il (problem) style. In the modern presentation, perhaps the 
sections could be classified into the following sub-topics.  
Table 1: MuÃarabah section in kitÁb al-MabsÙÔ 
No Sub-topic Section 
 
 
1 
 
Definition and Legality 
 
- Introduction to kitÁb al-muÃÁrabah 
- The conditions in muÃÁrabah 
 
 
2 
 
Capital Issues in MuÃÁrabah 
- MuÃÁrabah with merchandises (al-ÝurÙÃ) 
- Agent-manager who asks investor to convert the 
muÃÁrabah contract into loan contract 
 
                                                 
36 ÝAli JalabÐ b. Amr Allah b. ÝAbd al-QÁdir al-ÍamÐdÐ ar-RÙmÐ, ÓabaqÁt al-Íanafiyyah, Jordan: 
DÁr Ibn al-JuzÐ, 2003, pp.94.  
37 Norman Calder. "SarakshÐ, MuÎammad b. AÎmad b. AbÐ SaÎl AbÙ Bakr, Sham al-AÞimma". 
Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bionquis, C.E. Bosworth, 
E. Von Donvel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2009. Brill Online. Exeter University. Accessed on 11 
February 2009.    
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3. 
 
 
Profit Distribution Issues 
- Forcing the contracting parties to give part of the 
profit to others 
- The loss of muÃÁrabah asset before and after 
purchasing 
- Guarantee against losses made by an agent-
manager 
- The claims made by an agent-manager and an 
investor 
- The witness in muÃÁrabah   
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
 
 
 
 
Empowerment of Agent-
manager (muÃÁrib) 
- The permitted activities of the agent-manager 
- The permitted and prohibited activities of an 
agent-manager 
- The purchase and sale of an agent-manager 
- The maintenance (nafqah) of an agent-manager 
- MurÁbaÎah (sale with mark up price) in 
muÃÁrabah 
- Agent-manager who sells (a muÃÁrabah asset) 
and buy it back for himself at lower price 
- An agent-manager who entrusts an other party in 
another muÃÁrabah arrangement 
- Agent-manager freed slaves (using muÃÁrabah 
asset) and claimed (the action was based on) part 
of his shares of profit 
- ShafÁÝah in muÃÁrabah 
- Partnership in muÃÁrabah 
- MurÁbaÎah between the agent-manager and the 
investor 
 
5. The Roles of Investor - The investor (rabb ul-mÁl) who works with 
agent-manager 
 
6. Dispute Between The 
Contracting Parties 
- Dispute between agent-manager and investor 
 
 
7. 
 
Miscellaneous  
- The crime of a slave in muÃÁrabah  
- MuÃÁrabah with people of different religion 
- The plea (iqrÁr) of agent-manager while dying 
 
As indicated in table 1 above, a large part of the discussion is devoted to 
explain the scope of empowerment given to agent-manager (muÃÁrib). This 
includes the issues of agent manager’s permitted and prohibited activities, the 
guidelines of maintenance (nafaqah) claims, the involvement of an agent-
manager in other partnership contracts and so on. In explaining these issues, 
SarakshÐ normally states first, the agreed opinions of the ÍanafÐ masters and 
justified their evidences (dalÐl). If the matter was disputed among them, he 
would explain the reason of their disagreement. In exhibiting the internal 
ikhtilÁf, SarakshÐ however, did not make any determining preference (tarjÐÎ). In 
other words, he did not make ijtihad in cases where rules had been decided by 
the ÍanafÐ masters. This approach, besides demonstrating his loyalty to the 
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ÍanafÐ masters, also explains the reason why he was regarded as the third rank 
jurist within the school.  
 
MukhtaÒar al-KhÁlil of KhalÐl bin IsÎÁq and Al-DhakhÐrah of al-QarÁfÐ. 
 
MukhtaÒar al-KhÁlil was written by KhalÐl b. IsÎÁq b. MÙsÁ b. ShuÝaib al-
Djundi, an Egyptian jurist of the eight century Hijri. KhalÐl learned MÁlikÐ 
doctrine from ÝAbd AllÁh al-ManÙfÐ (d.749/1348) despite the fact that his 
farther was a Íanafi. Besides his master, KhalÐl was influenced by another 
leading MÁliki of the sixth century Hijri namely Ibn al-Íajib (d.646/1246). 
MukhtaÒar al-KhÁlil is regarded as the most recognised legal manual of MÁlikÐ 
school, where, to some extent replaced the role of the MuwaÔÔa’ of MÁlik and 
the Mudawwanah of SaÎnÙn (d.240/854) in disseminating the school’s 
doctrine38. Since the middle eight century Hijri, the MukhtaÒar was increasingly 
used as the subject of teaching in MÁlikÐ madrasa in North Western Africa and 
Spain.  The wide acceptance to this text is attributed to its comprehensiveness 
and concision. The MukhtaÒar consists of 61 chapters all the important topics of 
MÁlikÐ law including the ritual, personal law and muÝÁmalÁt (commercial 
transactions).  
 
The concision is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the text can only be well 
understood by means of a commentary. Due to its significance, the MukhtaÒar 
had attracted many commentators. Among the famous commentaries are al-TÁj 
wa al-IklÐl of al-MuwÁq (d.897/1491), MawÁhib al-JalÐl of al-ÍaÔÁb 
(d.954/1548), SharÎ al-KhurashÐ of KhurashÐ (d.1101/1690), and ÍÁshiyah al-
DusÙqÐ of DusÙqÐ (d.1230/1815). In this study, I particularly rely on the 
ÍÁshiyah al-DusÙqÐ in understanding the rules of the muÃÁrabah contract. 
ÍÁshiyah al-DusÙqÐ is in fact the enhancement of al-DardÐr’s (d.1201/1786) 
work namely SharÎ al-KabÐr. According to DusÙqÐ, his main purpose in writing 
                                                 
38 Bencheneb, M. “KhÁlil b. IsÎÁq b. MÙsÁ b. ShuÝaib al-Djundi.” Encyclopedia of Islam 
Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. 
Heirinchs. Brill 2009. EXETER UNIVERSITY. Accessed on 28 November 2009.  
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the commentary (ÍÁshiyah) is to clarify certain issues in which from his point 
of view require further explanation39.  
 
It should be noted however; as far as this study is concerned the conciseness of 
the MukhtaÒar has a few shortcomings. The MukhtaÒar does not explain the 
legal evidence (dalÐl) used by the MÁlikÐ jurists in supporting their rulings. 
There is no doubt that the MukhtaÒar is excellent text for one wish to know the 
rules of MÁlikÐs. However, the text is insufficient for one wish to analyse their 
justifications. Besides, the school’s rulings are presented in undisputed style. 
Inter and intra madhhab disagreement (ikhtilÁf) was minimally recorded. This 
style is understandable since the text was intended to be a legal manual of the 
school. 
 
Hence, in order to obtain more information regarding the dalÐl and the ikhtilÁf, 
it is pertinent for me to look at other MÁlikÐ texts. In this regard, I choose to 
study the text al-DhakhÐrah which was written by AbÙ al-ÝAbbas AÎmad b. AbÐ 
ÝAlÁ Idris al-QarÁfÐ, also an Egyptian MÁlikÐ scholar from the North African 
Berber tribe of the ÑanhÁÃja40. Al-QarÁfÐ was better known as a legal 
theoretician than a jurist. During his life time, many scholars, MÁliki and non-
MÁliki alike travelled from Syria and North Africa to study uÒÙl al-fiqh with 
him. Al-FurÙq is one of his masterpieces in the subject. The text al-DhakhÐrah 
is probably the only major work of al-QarÁfÐ in fiqh. Nonetheless, it is still 
recognised as an important legal text within the school. The strength of the text 
lies on the approach taken by al-QarÁfÐ in which he tried to adapt the 
knowledge of uÒÙl al-fiqh in elaborating the positive branches of law (al-furÙÝ). 
By adapting such an approach, readers of al-DhakhÐrah will be enlightened with 
the legal evidences relied upon by the MÁlikÐ jurists.  
 
                                                 
39 DusÙqÐ, MuÎammad ibn AÎmad ibn ÝArafah, ÍÁshÐyat al-DusÙqÐ ÝalÁ al-SharÎ al-kabÐr (ÝalÁ 
MukhtaÒar KhalÐl) li AÎmad al-DardÐr maÝa taqrÐrÁt li MuÎammad ÝUllaysh. Cairo: ÝIsÁ al-BÁbÐ 
al-ÍalabÐ, vol. 1, n.d. 
40 Jackson, S.A. “ShihÁb al-DÐn al-QarÁfÐ.” Encyclopedia of Islam Second Edition. Edited by: 
P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heirinchs. Brill 2009. 
EXETER UNIVERSITY. Accessed on 28 November 2009.  
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The case of disagreement between MÁlikÐ jurists’ concerning the consequence 
of a void muÃÁrabah provides a good example to explain this point. The MÁlikÐ 
jurists had differed in determining the basis of remuneration for the agent 
manager (muÃÁrib) in a void muÃÁrabah contract. Some MÁlikÐs ruled that the 
agent manager should be paid based on qirÁÃ mithil and the other ruled on ‘ujr 
mithil.  The distinctive difference between the two payment methods is that the 
remuneration is not guaranteed in the former whereas guaranteed in the latter. 
In his al-DhakhÐrah, al-QarafÐ did not only mention the opinions of the previous 
MÁlikis jurists but tried to explain their justifications. And more importantly he 
determined preference (tarjÐh) based on his own argument. The argument is 
significant as it demonstrates al-QarÁfÐ’s mastery of uÒÙl fiqh knowledge. 
According to him, since muÃÁrabah was legitimised on the basis of exception 
of ijÁrah contract (a methodological issue discussed in detail in chapter two), 
the remuneration of agent manager should be paid based on reasonable market 
wages (‘ujr mithl)41. In addition to that, the organisation of muÃÁrabah topic is 
better presented in al-DhakhÐrah as al-QarÁfÐ summarised the MÁlikÐ rulings 
and emerges with the essential elements (arkÁn) and the conditions (shurÙÔ) of 
the contract.  
 
MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn and al-MajmÙÝ sharÎ al-Muhadhdhab 0f al-NawawÐ 
 
Similar to the case of the MÁlikÐ school, my selection of ShÁfiÝÐ legal sources 
also required two different texts; MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn and al-MajmÙÝ sharÎ al-
Muhadhdhab. Both texts are usually attributed to the most celebrated ShÁfiÝÐ 
jurist of the seventh century Hijri; YaÎyÁ b. Sharaf b. MurÐ al-NawawÐ. Al-
NawawÐ only lived for approximately 45 years. Despite his relatively short 
lifetime, al-NawawÐ left a considerable amount of outstanding work which 
retained his high reputation until present day. The text of MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibin is 
one of the reflections of his gifted intelligence. It is regarded almost as the law 
book par excellence within the ShÁfiÝÐ school. Al-NawawÐ wrote the MinhÁj al-
ÓÁlibÐn based on KitÁb al-MuÎarrar of al-RÁfiÝÐ (623/1224). He summarised all 
                                                 
41 AÎmad b. Idris al-QarÁfÐ, DhakhÐrah, Bayrut: DÁr al-Gharb al-IslÁmi, 1994, vol.6, pp. 43-45.  
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the important rulings of the school and presented them in a legal manual style. 
The text MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn is significant due to its simple and concise approach 
to explaining the complicated fiqh doctrine. Even the organisation (taqsÐm and 
tabwÐb) of the discussed topics is modern in its presentation. The ShÁfiÝÐ books 
after the seventh centuries were mostly based on the commentaries of the text. 
Among the famous commentaries were TuÎfah al-MuÎtÁj of Ibn Íajar al-
HaytamÐ (d.974/1566) and NihÁyah al-MuÎtÁj of al-RamlÐ (d.1004/1596) and 
MughnÐ al-MuhtÁj of al-SharbÐnÐ (d.977/1570). In examining the muÃÁrabah 
rules described in the MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn, I refer to the commentary of al-
SharbÐnÐ. The commentary is useful as it explains the legal reasons which often 
missed out by al-NawawÐ.      
  
The main reason for studying the other text of ShÁfiÝÐ school is to obtain 
information regarding inter and intra madhhab disagreement. In this respect, I 
found the text al-MajmÙÝ sharÎ al-Muhadhdhab to be the most appropriate. 
Although al-MajmÙÝ is usually attributed to al-NawawÐ, the text was actually a 
combined work of al-SubkÐ (d.771/1369) and al-MuÔiÝÐ (d.1400/1979). Neither 
of al-NawawÐ nor al-SubkÐ managed to complete the text during their relatively 
short period of lifetime. Al-NawawÐ commented 140 pages of the original text 
of al-Muhadhdhab whereas al-SubkÐ continued until the chapter of murÁbaÎah 
(mark-up sale) contract. The commentary was left incomplete for nearly six 
centuries until al- al-MuÔiÝÐ came forward to accomplish it42.    
 
Al-NawawÐ wrote al-MajmÙÝ based on al-Muhadhdhab of al-ShirÁzÐ, which I 
believe to be the earliest comprehensive legal text of the ShÁfiÝÐ school.  
Contrary to MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn, al-MajmÙÝ was written by adopting a 
commentary approach. As explained by al-NawawÐ in the introduction chapter, 
his remarks on al-ShirÁzÐ's work include clarifying the status of ÎadÐth, the 
meaning of terminologies (alfÁz al-lughÁt) and the names of jurists (asmÁ' al-
aÒhÁb). Al-NawawÐ also clarified disagreement between al-ShirÁzÐ with other 
                                                 
42 Íasan al-MaÝnaqash, al-ÝIlÁqÁÔ al-Tarbawiyah min KhilÁl Muqaddimah al-MajmÙÝ al-
NawawÐ, http:/attarbawya.maktoobblog.com/ Accessed on 1 December 2009.   
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ShÁfiÝis jurists and jurists from other schools43. Al-NawawÐ asserted that al-
MajmÙÝ not only meant to articulate the opinion of al-ShirÁzÐ but also aimed to 
represent the doctrine of the ShÁfiÝÐs. He wrote: 
"Please be informed that although I named this book as sharh 
al-Muhadhdhab [in fact] it is commentary for the madhhab as 
a whole…44."  
 
All types of commercial contracts were discussed at the end of al-Muhadhdhab. 
Therefore, the text related to muÃÁrabah was commented by al-MuÔiÝÐ. Al-
MuÔiÝÐ explained and elaborated the contract based on the principles laid down 
by al-NawawÐ. He imitated al-NawawÐ approach; explaining the original text 
(matn) using various sources. In order to exemplify this, let us examine how al-
MuÔiÝÐ described the definition of al-qirÁÃ (terminology used by the ShÁfiÝÐs) at 
the beginning of the muÃÁrabah chapter.   
 
Al-ShirÁzÐ wrote in al-Muhadhdhab: 
[The contract] is executed with the term al-qirÁÃ because it 
was the terminology of HijÁzi people and with the term al-
muÃÁrabah since it was the terminology of Iraqi people….  
 
Al-MuÔiÝÐ explained the above text by integrating the opinions of several jurists 
including Ibn BaÔÁl, Ibn QudÁmah, al-SanÝÁnÐ and al-NawawÐ. He started with 
describing the origin words of al-qirÁÃ and al-muÃÁrabah. Referring to Ibn 
BaÔÁl, al-MuÔiÝÐ explained that the word al-qirÁÃ was derived either from al-qarÃ 
(cutting) or muqÁraÃah (equality). Al-qirÁÃ is said to be derived from al-qard 
since the investor and agent-manager will be cutting their deposition of money. 
At first, the investor will cut some portion of his money to give to agent-
manager. After that, when the business is to be liquidated, the agent-manager 
will cut some portion of profit to share with the investor. Al-qirÁÃ is also said to 
be derived from muqÁraÃah based on the saying 'al-shÁÝirÁnÐ taqÁraÃa'; two 
poets are praising each other since their works are equally compatible. 
Meanwhile, based on al-SanÝÁnÐ's view, the term muÃÁrabah is said derived 
                                                 
43 NawÁwÐ, YaÎya ibn Sharaf, al-MajmÙÝ sharÎ al-Muhadhdhab lil ShÐrÁzÐ. al-QÁhirah: ZakarÐyÁ 
ÝAlÐ YÙsÙf, 1966-69, vol 1, pp.7-9. 
44 Ibid 
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from 'al-Ãarb fÐ al-ÞarÃ'' (making a journey). It is called mudarabah because the 
contract normally requires the agent-manager to travel for the sake of business.  
 
In order to confirm the statement that muÃÁrabah was the terminology of Iraqi 
residents, al-MuÔiÝÐ proved it by referring to Ibn QudÁmah of the ÍanbalÐ 
jurists. After clarifying the origin of both terminologies, the legal meaning of 
the contract is defined. In this regard, al-MuÔiÝÐ relied on the definition of al-
NawawÐ as stipulated in MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn. The point that I wish to draw 
attention here is that the above example shows al-MuÔiÝÐ's enormous efforts in 
upholding al-NawawÐ’s writing method to complete the al-MajmÙÝ. As 
observed, al-MuÔiÝÐ explained the definition of the contract by referring to the 
works of previous jurists either from the ShÁfiÝÐs or from other schools. By 
referring to the various sources, al-MuÔiÝÐ also maintained the approach of inter 
and intra disagreement employed by al-NawawÐ in the earlier chapters of al-
MajmÙÝ. In addition to that, the completed text sustains its authority within the 
ShÁfiÝÐs school because al-MuÔiÝÐ always relied on the MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibin as the 
main reference in his writing.    
 
Al-MughnÐ of Ibn QudÁmah 
 
The text al-MughnÐ was written by ÝAbdallÁh b. AÎmad b. MuÎammad Ibn 
QudÁmah al-MaqdisÐ, probably the greatest jurist of the ÍanbalÐ school during 
the seventh century Hijri. Ibn QudÁmah received his early education in 
Damascus where he studied the Qur’an and ÎadÐth. When he was in early 20’s, 
Ibn QudÁmah started his academic journey to Baghdad with his cousin ÝAbd al-
GhanÐ al-MaqdisÐ (d.600/1203). They spent four years in the city studying 
various branches of Islamic knowledge especially the ÍanbalÐ law. After 
several other visits to Baghdad, Ibn QudÁmah then settled in Damascus and 
established his circle. 
 
The text of al-MughnÐ is one of Ibn QudÁmah’s treatises in fiqh. It was written 
based on mukhtaÒar al-KhiraqÐ (d.334/945), the first legal manual of the 
ÍanbalÐ school. The text is recognised as the most complete legal treatise not 
 34 
only in studying the school’s doctrine but also in examining the subject of fiqh 
comparison (fiqh al-muqÁran).  In commenting on the mukhtaÒar, Ibn QudÁmah 
did not only clarify the rules, justifications and terminologies used by al-
KhiraqÐ but include discussion of jurists from other schools as well. I will use 
one example from the text to demonstrate this particular point. In explaining the 
rules of credit transaction in a muÃÁrabah contract, al-KhiraqÐ stated: 
"If an agent-manager sells on credit without being ordered to 
do so, he will be accountable according to one of the 
narrations; the other [narration] said he is not accountable"    
 
Ibn QudÁmah described in great detail the above rule: 
The general rule for the agent-manager and other partners is 
that if the methods of transaction are stipulated, [the investor 
says] transact by cash or credit, by local or other currencies, 
[the instructions are all] permissible and [the agent-manager] 
can not contradict them. The transactions are permissible 
because they are conducted with permission. Thus, do not get 
involved in transactions in matters which are not clearly 
permitted to, [the agent-manager's condition is similar to 
wakÐl]. If the methods have not been presented in detailed 
(muÔlaq), there is no dispute over the permissibility of 
conducting cash transactions, however there are two 
narrations regarding credit transactions. One of them 
stipulates that the transaction is not allowed. It was the 
opinions of MÁlik, Ibn AbÐ LaylÁ and al-ShÁfiÝÐ, because 
muÃÁrib is an agent in the contract thus he is not permitted to 
transact in credit without having explicit permission, similar 
to a wakÐl, an agent (muÃÁrib) is not permitted to make 
transaction except in a vigilant manner. Credit transaction 
exposes capital into losses….. The second narration stipulates 
that the credit transaction is permissible. This is the opinion 
of AbÙ Íanifa and preferred by Ibn ÝAqÐl. The reason for this 
is the [initial] permission was granted to conduct business, 
and muÃÁrabah will be practiced for common activities in 
business. This [credit transaction] is the common practice 
among traders. And the agent-manager aims to make profit, 
and credit transaction could possibly bring a lot of profit45.      
 
The above example clearly demonstrates the approach of Ibn QudÁmah in 
writing his al-MughnÐ. He explained the disagreement of ÍanbalÐ rules over 
                                                 
45 Ibn QudÁmah, ÝAbd AllÁh ibn AÎmad, Muwaffaq al-Din. Al-MughnÐ/ tahqiq ÝAbd AllÁh ibn 
al-MuÎsinal-TurkÐ, ÝAbd al-FattÁÎ MuÎammad al-Íulw. Al-RiyÁd: DÁr ÝÀlam al-Kutub, 1999, 
vol. 7, pp. 147.  
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the permissibility of conducting credit transaction by comparing them to the 
opinions of other great sunni jurists such as MÁlik, Ibn AbÐ LaylÁ (d.148/745), 
AbÙ ÍanÐfa and al-ShÁfiÝÐ. Every different rule was explained with the 
respective justifications. By adopting this approach, readers of al-MughnÐ do 
not only attain information about the Íanbali rules but also gain preliminary 
fact about other’s schools position. Hence, as far as this study is concerned, the 
text al-MughnÐ satisfies all the three criteria determined earlier.          
 
Field Work 
 
A study on the classical muÃÁrabah doctrine raises many issues with regard to 
its suitability in the modern world. By reading the legal texts, I find out that 
many of the classical rules appeared to be impractical within the context of the 
complicated banking business. For example, I wonder how the Islamic banks 
deal with prevalent rules of majority Sunni jurists who confined the activity of 
muÃÁrabah business to purely trade transaction (tijÁrah). Adhering to the rule 
means muÃÁrabah is not suitable as the basis of banking and financing 
operations. How the present practice is justified with respect to its deviation 
from the classical muÃÁrabah rule? As such, field work was necessary to 
complete this study. With a list of other inquiries, I need to discuss the matters 
with scholars who directly involved in deciding the shariÝah compliance of 
Islamic banking products.  
 
After contacting a number of sharÐÝah scholars, I managed to interview five of 
them. They are: 
1. Professor Dr. Joni Tamkin Borhan, who is currently member of sharÐÝah 
council of RHB Islamic bank and former member of National SharÐÝah  
Advisory Council (NSAC) founded by Central Bank of Malaysia. He 
also teaches at the Department of SharÐÝah and Economic, Academy of 
Islamic Studies, University of Malaya. 
2. Associate Professor Dr. Engku Rabiah Adawiyah Engku Ali, who is 
currently member of the NSAC and serves at Ahmad Ibrahim Kuliyyah 
of Law, International Islamic University of Malaysia. 
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3. Associate Professor Dr. Shamsiah Mohammed, who is currently 
member of sharÐÝah council of Standard Chartered Bank and Malaysian 
Securities Commission. She is also a member of Department of SharÐÝah 
and Law, Academy of Islamic Studies, University of Malaya. 
4. Nazri Chick, former head of sharÐÝah department of Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). Recently, he has moved to the Islamic bank 
in Dubai as shÁrÐÝah auditor.  
5. Ahmad Sharafi Idris, Secretariat of SharÐÝah Department of RHB 
Islamic bank.  
 
Through the interviews, I obtain the viewpoint of Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars 
pertaining to the current practice of muÃÁrabah contract in the local Islamic 
banks. Discussions with Nazri Chick and Ahmad Sharafi are particularly 
significant, as I gain in depth information about the framework and the 
practices of sharÐÝah governance in the local Islamic banks. However, perhaps 
one will argue about the reliability of these sources since my case study (in 
chapter four) mainly focusing on muÃÁrabah products of BIMB. How I could 
use information from scholars who sit in different shÁrÐÝah boards of Islamic 
banks (RHB Islamic and Standard Chartered) to analyse the compliance of 
BIMB’s products? In order to answer to this argument, it is essential to describe 
the rules concerning muÃÁrabah products offered by various Islamic banks in 
Malaysia.  
 
MuÃÁrabah products in the Malaysian Islamic banking institutions are identical 
despite being labelled with various names i.e. Sakinah account of BIMB and 
Amanah account of HSBC Amanah. These different names are given merely 
for strategic marketing purposes. The underlying muÃÁrabah contract is applied 
in the same manner to draw funds from depositors and investors. The practice 
of muÃÁrabah is governed and regulated by the Central Bank of Malaysia. All 
Islamic banks in the country are obliged to follow the standards and guidelines 
stipulated by the Central Bank in creating their muÃÁrabah products. Therefore, 
given the parameters in which muÃÁrabah products are operating, the 
information obtained from the scholars mentioned is relevant and justifiable.     
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It is also important to note that for the Qur’Ánic translation, I have used 
ÝAbdullÁh Yùsuf ÝAlÐ’s translation of the Holy Qur’Án. Meanwhile for the 
ÎadÐth and the classical fiqh texts, mostly I use my own translation.    
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
Although various classical Islamic commercial contracts are being practised by 
the Islamic banks, the present study focuses only on the application of 
muÃÁrabah contract. Undoubtedly, the focus is beneficial in many ways. It 
gives opportunity for me to understand thoroughly the classical muÃÁrabah 
rules and examine its current application problems. MuÃÁrabah contract 
becomes the focus of this study as the contract is widely claimed as the 
fundamental principle of the Islamic banking operations.  
 
However, given the fact that the current practice of Islamic banks has deviated 
from its original theory, perhaps the study of muÃÁrabah contract alone will be 
inadequate to demonstrate the complete picture of the authenticity issue. This is 
because the contract is applied minimally in generating income for the Islamic 
banks. In terms of utilisation of the banks’ deposit, the muÃÁrabah contract only 
constituted 5 percent of banking transactions. This means, a large part of 
Islamic banks’ profit is derived from the application of other contracts such as 
bayÝ al-murÁbahah, bayÝ al-ÝÐnah and ijÁrah. In view of this issue, the findings of 
this study are considered limited in the sense that it does not offer a holistic 
fnding with regard to the shariÝah compliance issue in the Islamic banks. The 
present work is just a case study to depict some of the weaknesses of the 
existing products offered by the banking institutions. Obviously, more studies 
are required to achieve a solid conclusion in this matter.      
 
Compared to the Western banks, the present situation of transparency within 
Islamic banks leaves much room for improvement. Islamic banks do not openly 
share their products’ information and operations with the public. In many cases 
the most essential information such as the exact way of calculating the share of 
profit of different types of deposit holders is private. Some of the Islamic 
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banks’ personnel who I contacted declined to share their thought and 
experiences. They claimed that they are bound by strict confidentiality rules. In 
view of these limitations, my analysis on the current practices of muÃÁrabah 
contract is restricted to the best available sources which include the Islamic 
bank’s annual reports, Islamic bank’s websites, customer copy of products 
agreement, obtainable personnel for interview, academic papers and books.       
 
Outlines of the Study 
 
After the Introduction, the study is divided into five chapters and a conclusion. 
Chapter 1 elucidates the historical background of the four Sunni schools of law 
and then examines their development of muÃÁrabah rules. The examination in 
this subject covers the period between the second until the eighth centuries 
Hijri. It aims to provide information regarding the different orientations in 
which each school depended upon in formulating their muÃÁrabah doctrines. 
Chapter 2 explains the detailed rules of the contract as described by the 
classical jurists. This chapter analyses their rulings pertaining to various 
practical issues of muÃÁrabah including an explanation on its definition, 
relationship with other sharÐkah (partnership) contracts, legal evidences and 
essential elements (arkÁn). The discussions highlight the disagreement between 
the schools and analyse their respective justifications. The chapter concludes 
with two distinctive ethical frameworks of the ShÁfiÝÐs and the ÍanafÐs which 
formed the basis in assessing the Malaysian shariÝah scholars’ orientation.    
 
Chapter 3 provides preliminary background of the discussion regarding the 
muÃÁrabah application in Malaysian banking experience. It mainly discusses 
(1) the theory of interest-free bank and presents (2) an overview of Malaysian 
Islamic banking system. For the first topic, the chapter reviews the models’ of 
MuÎammad Baqer al-Sadr and MuÎammad Nejatullah Siddiqi in outlining a 
practical framework for an Islamic bank. Discussion of an overview of 
Malaysian Islamic banking system sheds light the history, growth, sharÐÝah 
governance system and the methodology adopted by local sharÐÝah committees. 
The chapter also discusses the Malaysian application of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah which has 
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been subject of criticism by most of the Middle East sharÐÝah scholars. After 
that, chapter 4 analyses the modus operandi of general and specific investment 
muÃÁrabah products offered by Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). The 
discussions highlight some critical issues arising from ijtihÁd made by the local 
sharÐÝah scholars in modifying muÃÁrabah contract into modern banking 
practices. The ijtihÁd is broadly discussed under two main subjects; (1) the 
utilisation of muÃÁrabah capital and (2) the profit distribution method. In the 
first subject, the chapter analyses the extent to which the financing, Islamic 
bonds and Islamic money market products uphold the profit and loss sharing 
principles. Meanwhile, discussion of the second topic highlights the ijtihÁd on 
profit equalisation reserve (PER), indicative profit rate, interim profit payment 
and capital guarantee.  
 
Analyses of the ijtihÁd exhibit two main approaches adopted by the Malaysian 
sharÐÝah scholars in assessing the compliance of muÃÁrabah products in Islamic 
banks. Firstly, they tend to argue on the basis of principle of maÒlaÎah when 
justifying their deviation from the prevalent classical rules. Secondly, 
sometimes the shÁrÐÝah scholars also can be too rigid with the legal technicality 
of the classical rules by trying to apply the controversial contracts in modern 
banking practices. In both situations I argue the approaches are taken in order 
to please the demands of Islamic bankers. As a result, the current muÃÁrabah 
products offered by the local Islamic banks do not fully realise the philosophy 
of the contract. Therefore in chapter 5, I introduce a new discussion concerning 
the maÒlaÎah theory in Islamic law. I argue there is a need to formulate a well-
defined maÒlaÎah doctrine in order to assist the shariÝah scholars in attaining 
more appropriate ijtihad in Islamic banking and finance matters. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUÂÀRABAH 
RULES IN THE FOUR SUNNI SCHOOLS OF LAW 
 
Introduction 
 
The focus of this chapter is the development of muÃÁrabah rules in early 
schools of Islamic law. It discusses the juristic growth of the contract from 
second until eighth century Hijri. The classical legal texts examined included 
JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr, KhizÁnat al-Fiqh and al-MabÒÙÔ of the ÍanafÐ and al-MuwaÔÔa’, 
al-Mudawwanah, al- KÁfÐ fÐ Fiqh ahl al-MadÐnah, BidÁyat al-Mujtahid and al-
DhakhÐrah of the MÁlikÐs. For the ShÁfiÝÐs, the legal texts studied are al-Umm, 
al-Muhadhdhahb, al-WajÐz and MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn. The ÍanbalÐ legal texts 
studied are the MasÁ’il of Ibn Íanbal, al-MukhtaÒar of al-KhiraqÐ, al-MughnÐ 
and al-FurÙÝ. It is found that the contract was developed at different phases 
between the schools. The rules were presented in a highly developed manner 
earlier among the MÁlikÐs and ÍanafÐs compared to the ShafiÝÐs and ÍanbalÐs.  
 
Before the discussion, the present chapter introduces the historical background 
of the Sunni schools of Islamic law. The discussion explains the distinctive 
methods employed by the early jurists in interpreting the law which 
consequently led to the emergence of different madhhabs (plural form 
madhÁhib).  It also identifies each school’s prominent jurists and their 
authoritative legal texts. The discussion is essential as the basis to understand 
the context in which muÃÁrabah rules were formulated and developed.  
 
The Definition of Madhhab in Islamic Law 
 
The term madhhab is conventionally translated as ‘school of law’. Literally, it 
means “the way one goes”. In the past, the term is referred to a toilet as well. It 
is narrated in a ÎadÐth that if the Prophet Muhammad wanted to go to toilet, he 
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would go away to madhhab46. In additin to this, madhhab is also used to signify 
the doctrine, tenet or opinion upheld by a person. In the field of Islamic law, the 
term madhhab had been used by the classical jurists to indicate both the 
individual opinion and the opinions of a whole school concerning a particular 
case47. In Islamic legal history, the number of madhhabs was actually quite 
large. In addition to the four well-known sunni madhhab, there are other 
madhhabs that contributed significantly to the development of Islamic law such 
as the madhhabs of al-AwzÁÝÐ (d.157/773-774), SufyÁn al-ThawrÐ (d.161/777-
778), al-IbÁÃiyyah, al-ÚÁhiriyyah, Ibn JarÐr al-ÓabarÐ (d.310/923) and various 
ShÐÝÐ madhhabs.  However, not all of them have survived into the modern 
period.  The most significant madhhabs that remain in practice in most part of 
the Muslim world are the ÍanafÐs, ShÁfiÝÐs, MÁlikÐs, ÍanbalÐs of the sunnis and 
al-Zaydiyyah and JaÝfariyyah of Shi’ite. On the other hand, the madhhab of 
IbÁÃiyyah remain in practice in Oman whereas the madhhab of al-AwzÁÝÐ, 
SufyÁn al-ThawrÐ, the ÚÁhirÐs and Ibn JarÐr al-ÓabarÐ have died out.   
 
The Development of Islamic Law during the Second Century Hijri  
 
The institution of the madhhab emerged as a result of a hundred years of effort 
made by the early Muslim jurists in interpreting the sharÐÝah48. This interpretive 
effort was carried out to deduce legal rulings for new legal problems which 
increasingly arose in the early second century Hijri. During this period, the 
Muslim Empire experienced a vast expansion in which Islam spread from the 
Arabian peninsular. During the Umayyad era (43/661-132/750) the centre of 
government was moved to Damascus, then to Baghdad when the Umayyads 
were overthrown by the Abbasids (132/750-656/1258). As a result of the 
Empire’s expansion, the Muslim community who lived a simple dessert life 
faced challenges in governing the more civilised nations which had previously 
been under the administration of the Byzantine and Sassanid kingdoms.  
                                                 
46 ‘Umar SulaimÁn al-’Ashqar, al-Madkhal ilÁ dirÁsat- il- al-madhÁhib wal al-madÁris al-
fiqhiyyah, Aman: DÁr al-NafÁ’Ðs, 2007, pp.48.  
47 Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries, 
Leiden: Brill, 1997, pp.xvi.  
48 Peri Bearman, Rudoph Peters, Frank E. Vogel, The Islamic School of Law, Evolution, 
Devolution and Progress, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 2005, pp.viii. 
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As a response to this unprecedented situation, the early Muslim jurists were 
divided into two main schools. The first school was known as the aÒÎÁb al-raÞy 
or rationalists. They were the jurists who exercised human reasoning in solving 
legal problems especially when there were not so many sound ÎadÐth to be 
consulted. They were reported to be inspired by ÝAbd AllÁh b. MasÝÙd (d. 
32/652-3), a Companion who was send by the Prophet to teach Islam to the 
residents of Iraq. ÝAbd AllÁh b. MasÝÙd was known to adopt legal reasoning 
when making judgements in cases that were not clearly mentioned in the 
QurÞÁn or Sunnah. His method was widely accepted by jurists in Iraq where its 
residents came from different belief systems and cultural backgrounds. Debate 
and discussion on theology were common in Iraq, as Muslims comprised many 
new converts from Persian, Greeks and Indians. Influenced by this theological 
discussion (Ýilm al-kalÁm), the jurists (fuqahÁÞ) tended to use human reasoning 
to justify their legal rulings. In addition, the jurists in Iraq went further by 
involving in their discussion hypothetical legal problems. They not only applied 
their jurisprudential knowledge to solve the actual problems but also tried to 
give judgements on problems which have not yet occurred, nor were likely to 
occur.  Perhaps, based on this phenomenon Schacht asserted that Iraq was the 
intellectual centre for the development of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as a new 
discipline of knowledge - not Medina as is usually assumed49. ÍammÁd ibn AbÐ 
SulaimÁn (d.120/737-738) and his student AbÙ ÍanÐfah (d.150/767) were 
among the prominent rationalists of Iraq at this time.      
 
The second school of early jurists is known as aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth. This group of 
jurists relied heavily on ÎadÐth of the Prophet and reports (ÁthÁr) from 
Companions as well as Successors in justifying their legal rulings. Schacht 
suggested that the aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth emerged as a result of their dissatisfaction 
with the rationalists concerning their over-reliance on human reasoning in the 
religious matters50. His theory implied that the aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth came after the 
rationalists with the former disagreeing with some methods applied by the latter 
                                                 
49 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. pp.29. 
50 Ibid, pp.34. 
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such as the practice of legal devices (ÎÐlah) and analogy (qiyÁs). According to 
them, both methods would defeat the spirit of the law and evade the strict 
requirement as indicated by ÎadÐth51.  
 
Schacht’s theory contradicted most Muslim scholarly views. Although Muslim 
scholars acknowledged that the rivalry between the two schools was intense, 
they believed that it was not the main factor which led to the establishment of 
the aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth’ school. They were of the opinion that the two schools 
emerged due to disagreements in exercising personal opinion (raÞy) to deduce 
legal rulings for unprecedented cases52. Since, the time of Companions, 
Muslims disagreed over the extent to which personal opinion should be used in 
religious matters.  There were Companions such as ÝAbd AllÁh b. MasÝÙd who 
used his personal opinion extensively. On the other hand, there were also 
Companions such as ÝAbd AllÁh b. ÝAbbÁs (d.68/687) who preferred to not to 
use opinion but to rely exclusively to ÎadÐth. Influenced by these two methods, 
subsequent generations of jurists were divided into two schools respectively. 
Therefore, Muslim scholars viewed rationalists and aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth as emerging 
simultaneously.  
 
The aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth preferred not to make judgement where there was no 
relevant ÎadÐth or ÁthÁr from later authorities. They would prefer to use ÎadÐths 
with isnÁds (chains of transmission) rather than analogical reasoning. The aÒÎÁb 
al-ÎadÐth, according to some, were originally specialists in ÎadÐth. They did not 
study fiqh separately from hearing and transmitting ÎadÐth53. Contrary to the 
rationalists who devoted their time to study fiqh, the aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth’ main 
concern was to collect and preserve ÎadÐth. As ÎadÐth is their main source, the 
aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth were known as the pioneer in developing the science of ÎadÐth 
(ÝulÙm al-ÎadÐth). Since the early second Hijri, they were present in various 
parts of the Muslim Empire particularly in Medina. Ibn ShihÁb al-ZuhrÐ 
(d.124/742), RabÐÝah b. AbÐ ÝAbd al-RaÎmÁn (d.136/753-4) and YaÎyÁ b. SaÝÐd 
                                                 
51 Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries, pp.7-8. 
52 Muhammad Abu Zahra, The Four Imams, Aisha Bewley (trasn). London; Dar al-Taqwa, 
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53 Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries, pp.7-8. 
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al-AnÒÁrÐ (d.143/760-1), all teachers of MÁlik (d. 179/795-6) were the key 
figures of aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth in Medina.  
 
Beginning in the second half of the second century, ShÁfiÝÐ (d.204/820) 
emerged with his doctrine intended to mediate between the aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth and 
rationalist schools. ShÁfiÝÐ was a student of both schools, being first a disciple 
of MÁlik, and then becoming a disciple of MuÎammad al-ShaybÁnÐ (d.189/205), 
one of the two great followers of AbÙ ÍanÐfa. For the majority of Muslim 
scholars, ShÁfiÝÐ was reputed to be the founder of Islamic legal theory (usul al-
fiqh). His remarkable book, al-RisÁlah established a systematic legal procedure 
for deducing new legal rulings by synthesising the methods of the aÒÎÁb al-
ÎadÐth and the rationalists. ShÁfiÝÐ propounded different solutions to those of the 
aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth concerning the problem of conflicting ÎadÐth. The aÒÎÁb al-
ÎadÐth, when faced with conflicting ÎadÐth would narrate all of them without 
giving any preference for practice. According to ShÁfiÝÐ the conflicting ÎadÐth 
should be treated as followed; (1) it should be assumed that one of the 
conflicting ÎadÐth might represent an exception to a general rule (2) a particular 
ÎadÐth with a stronger chain of authority (isnÁd) should be preferred over 
another with a weak chain (3) if these do not solve the problem, the theory of 
abrogation (naskh) should be employed, where the earlier ÎadÐth abrogates the 
later one54.  
 
ShÁfiÝÐ also recognised analogical reasoning (qiyÁs) as the rationalists do. QiyÁs 
is applied when a jurist extends a given ruling established by the QurÞÁn and 
Sunnah to a new case, on the ground that the legal basis (Ýillah) of the two cases 
are similar. However, ShÁfiÝÐ did not assert the freedom of opinion fully. He 
criticised the method of istiÎsÁn (juristic preference) which was widely used by 
AbÙ ÍanÐfah and other rationalists. He was reported to say, 'anyone who uses 
istiÎsÁn has legislated for himself' and he devoted a chapter in his book al-Umm 
to invalidating istiÎsÁn55. But what was the istiÎsÁn of which al-ShÁfiÝÐ 
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disagreed? According to al-KharkhÐ (d.340/952), istiÎsÁn means a jurist departs 
from an established precedent in favour of another ruling for a stronger reason. 
This means that the rationalists would apply the concept of istiÎsÁn when the 
strict application of analogy would have led to a different legal ruling.  The 
ruling based on istiÎsÁn was seen as contrary to the interest of the public. For 
al-ShÁfiÝÐ, the use of istiÎsÁn to abandon the legal ruling deduced from analogy 
was considered as exploitation of personal opinion over its limit.  
 
To conclude, by the end of second century Hijri, the term madhhab as we are 
familiar with it today did not yet exist. Based on a methodological difference, 
Muslim jurists during this period were divided into two groups namely the 
rationalists and traditionalists. Then ShÁfiÝÐ came and tried to compromise 
between the strict rejection of all human reasoning propounded by the 
traditionalists and the unrestricted use of personal opinion adapted by the 
rationalists. 
 
How the Madhhab began? 
 
Scholars have differed in their explanation of how the four Sunni madhhab 
(ÍanafÐs, MÁlikÐs, ShÁfiÝÐs and ÍanbalÐs) emerged in the history of Islamic law. 
I begin with the theory of Ibn KhaldÙn (d.732/1332) which is subscribed to by 
the majority of modern Muslim scholars. According to Ibn KhaldÙn, the 
madhhab emerged as a result of the early jurists' division into rationalists 
(aÒÎÁb al-raÞy) and aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth. These two schools not only differed in term 
of their methodology in interpreting the law, but also they can be distinguished 
by their geographical location. Kufah and Basrah in Iraq were the centre of the 
rationalists while Medina and Mecca in Hijaz were the hub of traditionalists. 
This is based on the notion that a few well-known scholars who are thought to 
be the leaders of rationalists (such as AbÙ ÍanÐfah) were based in KÙfah, while 
MÁlik the leader of aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth, as evidenced in his al-MuwaÔÔÁ', was based 
in Medina. AbÙ ÍanÐfah appeared as the representative of the Iraqi school 
while MÁlik representative of the Íijazi school.  Then, ShÁfiÝÐ blended the two 
doctrines and established his own school. ShÁfiÝÐ succeeded MÁlik and became 
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the leading jurist in Medina. His school however expanded in Egypt when he 
migrated and spread his doctrine there. Later, the school of AÎmad ibn Íanbal 
(d.241/855) emerged. According to Ibn KhaldÙn, the adherents of ÍanbalÐ 
school were few in number, and the majority of them were based in Baghdad 
and Syria. The ÍanbalÐs were described as jurists who possessed the best 
knowledge of the Sunnah and greatly depend upon them as source of law56.    
 
Ibn KhaldÙn's description of how the madhhab begun has received considerable 
attention from the Western scholars. Western scholars generally recognised the 
division of early jurists into rationalists and traditionalists. They also located 
many rationalists in KÙfah and Basrah. Among them were AbÙ ÍanÐfah and his 
notable students AbÙ YÙsuf (d.182/798) and MuÎammad al-ShaybÁnī 
(d.189/805). Influenced by Ibn KhaldÙn, Schacht proposed the regional theory. 
According to Schacht, the madhhabs begun from regional schools (Iraqi and 
Íijazi) before they transformed into personal schools. This means the Iraqis 
school turned into the ÍanafÐs and the Íijazi school shifted to the MÁlikÐs. 
However, the general theory has become a topic of debate amongst the Western 
scholars. Some of them, such as Melchert, agreed with this perspective, whilst 
others such as Hallaq put forward difference hypothesis. The critics of the 
regional theory raised the question over the basis for distinguishing the Iraqi or 
Íijazi jurists. Was it based on the collective legal doctrine?57 As we know, 
there was no such collective legal doctrine upheld by jurists in each region. 
During that time, there were hundreds of groups centred on renowned jurists 
and each group had distinct legal doctrines.  
 
Based on the above argument, Hallaq proposed that the madhhab begun from 
personal schools before developing into doctrinal schools58. The personal 
schools included the 'circles' of a number of prominent jurists such as AbÙ 
Hanīfah, Ibn Abī LaylÁ (d.148/765), MÁlik, ShÁfiÝÐ, AÎmad ibn Íanbal, AwzÁÝÐ 
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and Sufyan al-Thawrī. These prominent jurists' circles had attracted many 
followers who learned fīqh from their masters and applied their doctrine in 
courts or taught it to other students in new circles. However, out of the many 
circles, only four of them developed into the doctrinal schools. According to 
Hallaq, the doctrinal schools possessed four characteristics lacking in the 
personal schools. There are (1) a cumulative legal doctrine that consists of legal 
opinions of the so-called founder and his great followers (2) a distinctive legal 
methodology (3) substantive boundaries and (4) loyalty59.    
 
In my view, the regional theory probably needs further clarification. The theory 
could explain the emergence of the ÍanafÐs, MÁlikÐs and ShÁfiÝÐs but is 
insufficient when describing the beginning of the ÍanbalÐs. As described 
above, the ÍanafÐs and MÁlikÐs originated from the Iraqi and Íijazi schools 
whereas the ShÁfiÝÐs was the compromise between the two. But, what was the 
position of the ÍanbalÐs? With regard to the basis of the regional theory, Ibn 
KhaldÙn was of the opinion that the Iraqi and Íijazi jurists were distinguished 
by their methodology for interpreting the law. The Iraqi jurists were rationalists 
who used personal opinion extensively whereas the Íijazi jurists were aÒÎÁb al-
ÎadÐth who strictly struck to the Îadīth. Nevertheless, the depiction of MÁlik as 
the leader of traditionalists was denied by most of the Western scholars 
including Schacht60. According to them, MÁlik was not recognised as a pure 
traditionalist since many of his rulings were based on his own legal reasoning. 
Melchert supports this notion by providing evidences that the later generation 
of Medinan jurists after MÁlik issued rulings which were based on opinion 
rather than Îadīth61. Instead of MÁlik, Melchert asserts that the true leader of 
aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth was AÎmad ibn Íanbal. He further suggested that the 
traditionalist school developed in Iraq not Medina as usually assumed62. Hence, 
Melchert's theory refuted the claim that the Iraqi jurists could be generalised as 
rationalists.   
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The majority of Muslim scholars viewed the institution of madhhab as 
emerging during, or soon after, the eponyms' lifetime. They considered the 
eponyms as the founders of the madhhabs. For example, Ali JumÝah divided the 
development of ShÁfiÝÐ school into four phases ; (1) early establishment (2) the 
old doctrine (3) the new doctrine and (4) dissemination of ShÁfiÝÐ doctrine. 
According to him, the first three phases occurred during the lifetime of al-
ShÁfiÝÐ while the phase four took place after ShÁfiÝÐ’s death63. Meanwhile the 
MÁlikī school was taught and established during MÁlik’s life due to his al-
MuwaÔÔÁ’. AbÙ Íanīfah was reputedly the founder of the Íanafīs school 
because of his outstanding position amongst the rationalists during his time. He 
stood as the most authoritative jurist in Iraq who promulgated the use of 
personal opinion (raÞy). Contrary to the three eponyms, AÎmad ibn Íanbal was 
better known to some Muslim scholars as specialist in Îadīth rather than fīqh. 
For example, Ibn Jarīr al-Óabarī denied that he was a jurist and other jurists 
such as al-ÓaÎawÐ (d.321/933), al-DabÙsī, al-Nasafī, ÝAlÁ’ al-SamarqandÐ, al-
Farahī and al-GhazÁlī ignored his opinion in their writings on jurisprudential 
disagreement (fīqh al-ikhtilÁf)64.Nevertheless, AÎmad ibn Íanbal is still 
reputed to be the founder of the ÍanbalÐs school. The Inquisition (miÎna) was 
viewed as the impetus for the rise of the school. This is due to the fact that the 
reputation of AÎmad ibn Íanbal’s as the religious leader (ImÁm) grew 
tremendously after the incident. 
 
However, most Western scholars disagreed with the claim that the eponyms 
were the founders of the madhhab. They also opposed the view that the 
madhhab emerged since the eponyms’ lifetime. Melchert, the most cited author 
in this subject, suggested that the madhhabs of the ShÁfiÝÐs, ÍanafÐs and 
ÍanbalÐs emerged between the late 200's/800's and early to mid 300's/900's. 
Contrary to a view prevalent among Muslim scholars, Melchert named Ibn 
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Surayj (d.306/918), al-Karkhī (d.340/952) and al-KhallÁl (d.311/923) as the 
founders of the ShÁfiÝÐs, ÍanafÐs and ÍanbalÐs respectively. The three jurists 
were considered as the founders of the madhhabs for two main reasons; (1) 
being chiefs of schools in their time and (2) founding a systematic teaching 
method for their respective schools. Ibn Surayj was reported as the first who 
initiated a normal course of advanced study which required his students to 
produce a ta‛liqah, a sort of doctoral dissertation describing the ShÁfiÝÐ doctrine. 
As a result of this teaching method, graduates from Ibn Surayj's circle were 
identified as having inherited the title of being ShÁfiÝÐs.  
 
Al-Karkhī founded the school of ÍanafÐs in the same style of Ibn Surayj. His 
circle attracted many more known students than any ÍanafÐ teacher during his 
time. Most importantly, al-Karkhī’s MukhataÒar was the first MukhtaÒar on 
which the later generation of ÍanafÐ jurists wrote commentaries. Al-KhallÁl 
was known as the first of the ÍanbalÐ jurists to compile the most 
comprehensive legal doctrine of AÎmad ibn Íanbal. He pioneered a study 
circle teaching AÎmad ibn Íanbal’s legal doctrine as jurisprudence, a form of 
study which the traditionalists were unaccustomed. As for the MÁlikÐs, no 
particular jurist was identified as the founder of the school. This is because 
after MÁlik’s death, the school of MÁlikÐs experienced expansion in three 
different regions (Andalusia, North Africa and Iraq). In each region had own 
leading jurists65.   
 
For the purpose of this study, I am inclined to support the view that the 
madhhab was actually a product of later jurists. With great respect to the 
eponyms, during their lifetime, the schools had not yet achieved the doctrinal 
status but were maintained as personal schools. It was their loyal followers who 
perpetuated their doctrine and brought the schools to the next level. This is 
evident when we examine the development of muÃÁrabah rules in each school. 
As will be explained later, the rules of muÃÁrabah were preliminary in nature 
during the time of eponyms, but developed gradually after their death.  
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The Dissemination of the Íanafi School  
 
The Íanafis school was named after AbÙ ÍanÐfah al-Nu‘mÁn b. ThÁbit 
(d.150/767).  AbÙ ÍanÐfa was born in Kufa and grew up in a family originally 
from Persia. According to most bibliographical sources, AbÙ ÍanÐfah’s family 
was mawlÁ of the tribe of TaymallÁh b. Tha‘laba.  ZÙÔa, the grandfather of AbÙ 
ÍanÐfah was captured in Kabul and later brought to Kufah as a slave. When he 
was freed, he and his descendants became mawlÁs of the tribe66. However, the 
report was denied by AbÙ ÍanÐfah’s grandson IsmÁ‘Ðl (d.212/827-8) asserting 
that his family had never been enslaved67. Despite the disagreement over AbÙ 
ÍanÐfah’s family status, it was commonly agreed that his father was a 
successful trader. AbÙ ÍanÐfah himself also began his carrier as trader, selling 
khazz (silk fabric) before embarking his life in searching of knowledge.  
 
At first AbÙ ÍanÐfah was interested in the discussion of theology (kalÁm). 
However, he then inclined towards the study of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)68. 
AbÙ ÍanÐfah’s studied fiqh for eighteen years with ÍammÁd ibn AbÐ 
SulaymÁn. ÍammÁd was a student of IbrahÐm al-NakhaÝÐ (d. 95/713-4), a 
Successor who learned from the Companion (of the Prophet MuÎammad), ‘Abd 
AllÁh ibn MasÝÙd. Reviewing the bibliographical sources, one will find variant 
descriptions of the achievements of AbÙ ÍanÐfah in fiqh. His views had 
opponents and supporters. For example al-DhahabÐ (d.748/1348) described him 
as one of the greatest jurists in Iraq69. On the other hand, there are a number of 
reports claimed that the traditionists often accused him of being too 
innovative70. The reason why there was such disagreement about him is 
because AbÙ ÍanÐfah employed several methods of legal thinking such as the 
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principles of qiyÁs (analogy), istiÎsÁn (juristic preference) and ÎiyÁl (legal 
device) in deducing new legal rulings. His approach was criticised by the 
traditionists who rejected the use of personal opinion (raÞy) in religious matters.  
 
AbÙ ÍanÐfah succeeded ÍammÁd ibn AbÐ SulaymÁn’s circle after his teacher’s 
death. During that period, there were other renowned jurists who also held fiqh 
circles such as the qÁÃÐ of Kufa, Ibn AbÐ LaylÁ and the traditionist, SufyÁn al-
ThawrÐ. AbÙ ÍanÐfah had disagreement with both of them in many issues. For 
example, al-ShÁfi‘Ð mentions in his book KitÁb mÁ ikhtalafa fÐ-hi AbÙ ÍanÐfah 
wa Ibn AbÐ LaylÁ ‘an AbÐ YÙsuf that AbÙ ÍanÐfah and Ibn AbÐ LaylÁ had 
disagreement in 250 cases, sub cases and issues71. A question which emerges 
from this analysis is, then how did AbÙ ÍanÐfah teachings reach the point of 
predominance in Iraq at the expense of the teachings of his contemporaries?  
 
Many scholars regarded the two notable students of AbÙ ÍanÐfah, AbÙ YÙsuf 
and al-ShaybÁnÐ as the key figures in disseminating their master’s teachings 
which eventually formed a distinctive school of law. ShaybÁnÐ was known for 
his role in compiling the most authoritative texts of the ÍanafÐs legal doctrines 
called ÛÁhir al-riwÁyah (the prevailing opinion). The texts attributed to him are 
al- AÒl, al-JÁmiÝ al-Kabir, al-JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr, al-Siyar al- kabÐr, al-Siyar al-
ÒaghÐr and al-ZiyÁdÁt. The texts consist of the fatwÁ of AbÙ ÍanÐfa as well as 
the juridical opinions of AbÙ YÙsuf and al-ShaybÁnÐ. It should be noted 
however, al-ShaybÁnÐ was eighteen years old when AbÙ ÍanÐfah died. Hence, 
considering his age, it is impossible that he narrated all of AbÙ ÍanÐfah fatwas 
by himself. It is believed that many of the narrations came from AbÙ YÙsuf 
with whom al-ShaybÁnÐ studied72.  In addition to the ÛÁhir al-riwÁyah, the 
ÍanafÐs legal sources include texts known as nawÁdhir al-riwÁyah. It refers to 
the collections of legal rulings which were not mentioned in the ÛÁhir al-
riwÁyah. Based on both sets of texts, the ÍanafÐs legal doctrines were 
transmitted to the subsequent generation of jurists.   
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In addition to the contribution of al-ShaybÁnÐ, the appointment of AbÙ YÙsuf as 
the first chief judge (qÁÃÐ al-quÃah) during the period of HÁrÙn al-RashÐd (170-
193/786-809) also played important role in the dissemination of AbÙ ÍanÐfa’s 
doctrine. AbÙ YÙsuf was thought to have manipulated his position in the 
government to influence the appointment of other ÍanafÐ qÁÃÐ in the Muslim 
empire. This notion however has been challenged by Nurit Tsafrir who opined 
that AbÙ YÙsuf did not have significant influence in the appointment or 
dismissal of a qÁÃÐ 73. Based on the evidences in Khurasan, Egypt, Syria and 
Basra, she suggested that it was popular pressure which was the determining 
factor in the appointment of a qÁÃÐ. In other words, a qÁÃÐ was selected among 
local jurists on the basis of local approval, and this qÁÃÐ then became the local 
community representative.     
 
Beginning from the second half of the second century, ÍanafÐ doctrines were 
spread largely from Kufah to other areas such as Basra, Baghdad, Anbar, 
Isfahan, Egypt and Maghrib. As indicated above, the students of AbÙ ÍanÐfah 
contributed significantly to the spread of the ÍanafÐs doctrines. They convened 
study circles to teach AbÙ ÍanÐfah’s doctrine in many parts of Muslim empire. 
For example Zufar b. al-Hudhayl (d.158/775) was the first who initiated 
ÍanafÐs circle in Basra and Isfahan74. The dissemination of the ÍanafÐs doctrine 
also received strong support from the ‘Abassid caliphs. This was evident when 
the ‘Abassid government changed the qÁÃÐ appointment policy. A qÁÃÐ used to 
be appointed based on his influence within the local community which reflect 
the dominant legal tradition of a place. However, gradually the ‘Abassid 
government replaced the policy and appointed qÁÃÐs from Baghdad who were 
expected to implement the will of state. Apparently, many of the qÁÃÐs who 
were willing to corporate with the government were affiliated to the ÍanafÐs 
school.     
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Baghdad was the earliest centre of the development of the ÍanafÐs school. The 
spread of the ÍanafÐs doctrine in Baghdad was led by al-KarkhÐ (d.340/952)75. 
With the exception of AbÙ ÍanÐfah and his two students, al-KarkhÐ had many 
more known students than any other ÍanafÐ teacher before him. Beginning 
from the fifth/eleventh centuries, the school appeared noticeably in Khurasan 
and Transoxania. According to Eyyup, the cities of Balkh in Khurasan and 
Bukhara in Transoxania gradually became the centre of the ÍanafÐs school. The 
ÍanafÐs jurists in these cities developed distinct academic networks in which 
they had at least one leading figure in each generation, and each figure had their 
own numerous famous students76.  
 
As for the growth of the ÍanafÐ legal texts, the works of ShaybÁnÐ has become 
the main sources in which the school’s legal doctrine was developed. Being the 
earliest texts, KitÁb al-Asl, JÁmiÝ al-kabÐr and al-JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr are little more 
than compilation of legal rulings of the three ÍanafÐ masters. A century after al-
ShaybÁnÐ’s death, al-ÓaÎÁwÐ (d.321/933) an Egyptian ÍanafÐ wrote the first 
commentary on al-JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr. As observed by Ya’akov Meron, the 
Mukhtasar of al- ÓaÎÁwÐ did not show any improvement from al-ShaybÁnÐ’s 
texts. The text is not systematically organised in which rulings were scattered. 
There is no specific chapter devoted to cover a particular topic. Similar to KitÁb 
al-Asl, MukhtaÒar of al-ÓaÎÁwÐ also did not explain the legal reasoning to 
support the rulings77. In addition to that, the other important ÍanafÐs legal texts 
written during the third/ninth centuries were MukhtaÒar of al-KarkhÐ, al-KÁfÐ of 
al-ÍÁkim al-ShahÐd al-MarwazÐ (d.334/945) and KhizÁnat al-Fiqh of AbÙ Layth 
al-SamarqandÐ (d.373/983). MukhtaÒar of al-KarkhÐ is a commentary of 
MukhtaÒar of al-ÓaÎÁwÐ. On the other hand, al-KÁfÐ and KhizÁnat al-Fiqh are 
compilations of ÛÁhir al-riwÁyah rulings.  
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In the fourth/tenth centuries al-QudÙrÐ (d.428/1037) wrote a commentary of 
MukhtaÒar of al-KarkhÐ. QudÙrÐ made improvements in the ÍanafÐ legal text 
with regard to the introduction of new terminology and the organisation of the 
topics’ arrangement78. In the second half of the fourth/tenth centuries, SarakshÐ 
(d.490/1097) wrote his remarkable book al-MabsÙÔ. The book was written 
based on al-KÁfÐ by al-ÍÁkim al-ShahÐd al-MarwazÐ. Al-MabsÙÔ is considered 
as the most authoritative texts in elaborating the ÛÁhir al-riwÁyah rulings. As a 
thirty-volume book, the discussion of legal rulings in al-MabsÙÔ is 
comprehensive (as its name implies), covering nearly all topics and sub-topics 
in Islamic law.  SarakshÐ’s work is vital because he explains the basis or 
reasoning in which AbÙ ÍanÐfah, AbÙ YÙsuf and al-ShaybÁnÐ used to justify 
their rulings.  
 
In the fifth/eleventh centuries, two other outstanding legal texts were produced 
by the great ÍanafÐs jurists. The texts are BadÁ’i‘ al-SanÁ’i‘ of al-KÁsÁnÐ (d. 
587/1191) and al-HidÁyah of al-MarghÐnanÐ (d. 593/1197). KÁsÁnÐ’s work was 
inspired by his master and father in law, ‘AlÁ’ ul-DÐn al-SamarqandÐ 
(d.539/1144) the author of TuÎfat al-FuqahÁ’. It should be noted however, 
despite the qualities of BadÁ’i‘ al-SanÁ’i‘ , the book has left a little impact on 
the later development of the ÍanafÐ doctrines. It seems that the jurists of al-
KÁsÁnÐ’s time were not impressed with his work and his name is hardly 
mentioned in the ÍanafÐ literature in the subsequent centuries79. As for al-
HidÁyah, the book is a commentary of al-MarghÐnanÐ’ earlier book namely 
BidÁyah al-MubtadiÞ. Al-MarghÐnanÐ wrote the BidÁyah al-MubtadiÞ based on 
the texts of JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr of al-ShaybÁnÐ and MukhtaÒar of al-QudÙrÐ. Al-
HidÁyah received much attention from the later ÍanafÐ jurists. The book has 
been commented by many jurists including al-BÁbarti (d.786/1364) in his al-
‘InÁyah ‘ala al-hidÁyah and Ibn HumÁm (d.861/1457) in Fathu al-qadÐr. 
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The Early Development of ÍanafÐs Rules on MuÃÁrabah 
 
The earliest ÍanafÐ legal texts that discussed the rules of muÃÁrabah are JÁmiÝ 
al-ÒaghÐr and JÁmiÝ al-kabÐr of al-ShaybÁnÐ. Both texts demonstrate that AbÙ 
ÍanÐfah and his disciples had established the fundamental principles of the 
topic for later development. This is based on the notion that the muÃÁrabah 
rules in the texts are relatively comprehensive. In JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr, al-ShaybÁnÐ 
records AbÙ ÍanÐfah’s views on various issues including (1) the maintenance 
(nafaqah) of agent-manager (2) the invalid muÃÁrabah (3) the practice of 
recursive muÃÁrabah (4) unacceptable capital (i.e. capital other than dirhÁm and 
dÐnÁr) and (5) dispute between the contracting parties.  
 
According to AbÙ ÍanÐfah (as recorded by ShaybÁnÐ), an agent-manager has no 
right to claim on his personal expenses if he conducts the business locally80. 
However, he has the right to do so if he travels for business purposes. The 
personal expenses are defined as the food, drinks and clothes of the agent-
manager. It is also ruled that the contract would be rendered invalid if the 
agreement stipulates that one of the contracting parties receives a fixed amount 
of money (e.g. ten dirham) in addition to his/her shares of profit. In such an 
invalid contract, the investor would be obliged to pay current hire wages (ujr 
mithil) to the agent-manager.  
 
AbÙ ÍanÐfah also permitted the practice of recursive muÃÁrabah. This occurs 
when an agent-manager becomes the middle-man, receiving capital from 
original investor and act as capital provider in another muÃÁrabah arrangement. 
AbÙ ÍanÐfah also illustrated how the profit should be distributed between the 
three parties. He gave an example where the original investor and the first 
agent-manager agreed on a 50:50 of profit ratio. Then a similar ratio is agreed 
between the first and the second agent-manager. When profit is obtained, the 
second agent-manager will receive half of the profit and the remaining profit 
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will be shared between the first agent-manager and the original investor. This 
means each of the two parties will receive only a quarter of the initial profit81.  
 
AbÙ ÍanÐfah also ruled that the muÃÁrabah capital must be in monetary 
currency (dinÁr or dirhÁm). He rejected any form of capital other than both 
units of currency82. Apart from that, AbÙ ÍanÐfah also described to what extend 
the investor have control for his investment. He permitted the investor to 
specify the place in which the agent-manager is allowed to conduct the 
muÃÁrabah business. If the agent-manager transgresses the investor’s 
injunction, he would be responsible for any loss incurred83. Besides, he also 
explained the scope of empowerment given to the agent manager. AbÙ ÍanÐfah 
established several principles in solving the dispute between the contracting 
parties. According to him, if the investor and the agent-manager disagree over 
the amount of capital (for example, case where agent-manager claims that he 
had been given capital worth 2000, whereas the investor denies it and claims 
that the 2000 comprised 1000 of capital and another 1000 of profit), AbÙ 
ÍanÐfah ruled that the agent-manager’s claim will be accepted. However, if the 
dispute related to the type of the contract (for example, in a case where the 
agent manager claims that the contract is muÃÁrabah (thus, profit should be 
distributed) whereas the investor claims it was biÃÁ‘ah (agent-manager was 
trading for free), AbÙ ÍanÐfah ruled that the investor’s claim is accepted84.  
 
As indicated earlier, the text of JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr is merely a compilation of 
rulings without highlighting the legal reasoning behind them. For example, al-
ShaybÁnÐ did not explain on what basis AbÙ ÍanÐfah allowed the agent-
manager to claim his personal expenses while travelling and why he allowed 
the practice of recursive muÃÁrabah. In this respect, SarakshÐ, through his book 
al-MabsÙÔ in the fourth/tenth centuries, has made excellent contribution. 
SarakshÐ elaborated the basis used by the ÍanafÐs masters in justifying their 
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rulings. However, before we discuss further detail on al-MabsÙÔ, an analysis of 
KitÁb KhizÁnat al-Fiqh of AbÙ Layth al-SamarqandÐ, one of the essential 
ÍanafÐs works during the third/ninth centuries, is appropriate.   
 
In the introduction to his book, AbÙ Layth al-SamarqandÐ states that the 
KhizÁnat al-Fiqh was a compilation of legal rulings of the ÍanafÐ jurists of his 
time. The book was written in a simple way to help students of fiqh understand 
and memorise ÍanafÐ legal doctrine85. Hence, the organisation of the book 
resembles student notes in which the rulings are arranged in a list.  For 
examples, he listed ten activities which are permitted for the agent-manager in 
managing the capital entrusted to him. In addition to the two activities 
mentioned in the JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr (wadÐ‘ah and biÃÁ‘ah), AbÙ Layth al-
SamarqandÐ ruled that an agent-manager is permitted to borrow (Ð‘Árah), to rent 
warehouses, to hire employees or vehicles, to purchase by cash or credit, to 
appoint an agent, to approve slave to conduct muÃÁrabah business, to give or 
take collateral (rahn) and to travel with the capital. Among other activities 
which are prohibited for the agent-manager are to give loans, to donate, to give 
to charity and to free slaves using the muÃÁrabah revenues and to receive credit 
letters (sing; saftajah, plu; safÁtaj). As for the investor, AbÙ Layth al-
SamarqandÐ added three more permissible conditions that could be specified by 
the investor as a means of monitoring his investment. Apart from the location 
of business (mentioned in JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr), the investor has the right to specify 
the period of time, the type of business, the kind of produce and the price which 
the agent-manager must comply when making a business deal.  
 
Indeed, the rulings compiled in the KhizÁnat al-Fiqh demonstrated that the 
ÍanafÐ rules of muÃÁrabah had been developed dramatically during the end of 
the third/eight centuries. The development of the rules is significant particularly 
in determining the scope of relationship between the investor and the agent-
manager. AbÙ Layth al-SamarqandÐ’s work shows that the ÍanafÐ jurists had 
clearly defined the boundaries between the two parties. In addition to that, AbÙ 
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Layth al-SamarqandÐ probably was the first ÍanafÐ jurist who provides a 
definition of the muÃÁrabah. He defines it as a contract of partnership in which 
the capital is from one party and the work is from the other86.   
 
However, KhizÁnat al-Fiqh is similar to JÁmiÝ al-ÒaghÐr in the sense that both 
texts do not provide the legal reasoning to support their rulings. As mentioned 
before, the work of SarakshÐ during the end of the fourth/tenth centuries had 
appeared to fill this gap. In my opinion, SarakshÐ’s al-Mabsut perhaps could be 
regarded as the most comprehensive text of the muÃÁrabah topic not only 
within the ÍanafÐs school but also the other three Sunni schools of law. 
SarakshÐ discusses the muÃÁrabah rules in 26 chapters (bÁb). He elaborates in 
great detail regarding many important topics such as the permitted activities for 
the agent-manager, the recursive muÃÁrabah, the guaranty of agent-manager, 
the dispute between the two parties, the profit distribution, muÃÁrabah with 
people of different religion and the lost of the capital. However, in this section, 
I will focus on the issue of the maintenance (nafaqah) of agent-manager. I will 
highlight SarakshÐ’s explanation of the legal reasoning used by the ÍanafÐs 
masters in justifying their legal rulings as well as the comprehensiveness of his 
discussion.  
 
It should be recalled that AbÙ ÍanÐfah permitted the agent-manager to claim on 
his personal expenses if he travels for business proposes but not if he does the 
business locally. According to SarakshÐ, the rule is based on the analogy (qiyÁs) 
to wakÁlah, biÃÁÝah and hiring contracts. Since an agent in wakÁlah contract or 
al-mustabda‘ in biÃÁÝah contract or an employee in hiring contract do not have 
the right to claim on their personal expenses when they exercise their roles 
locally so does the agent-manager.  Furthermore SarakshÐ added that ‘Did you 
see that an agent-manager before the muÃÁrabah used to stay at the place and 
support his maintenance using his money and therefore this should be 
maintained after the muÃÁrabah’87. However, if the agent-manager travels, his 
action implies that he has experienced hardship for the sake of the muÃÁrabah 
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business. It is commonly viewed that a person will not be encouraged to travel 
for business using his own money in which he knows that the profit is 
uncertain. Therefore, considering the difficulties faced by the agent-manager 
during travelling, AbÙ ÍanÐfah granted the agent-manager the right to claim on 
his/her personal expenses88.  
 
In clarifying the details of the topic, SarakshÐ states that the ÍanafÐ masters 
(AbÙ ÍanÐfah, AbÙ YÙsuf and ShaybÁnÐ) are in agreement in defining the 
personal expenses as foods, drinks, clothes and transportation. These things are 
considered as the basic needs of a traveller. However, there is disagreement 
between the ÍanafÐ masters over the inclusion of medical costs as part of the 
maintenance of the agent-manager. AbÙ ÍanÐfah was reported as including 
these, but a report in the zawÁhir al-riwÁyah mentioned that there are other 
ÍanafÐs masters ruled against AbÙ ÍanÐfah. According to SarakshÐ, those who 
disagreed with AbÙ ÍanÐfah justified their rulings on the basis of two main 
reasons. Firstly, they argued that the rule is consistent with the rule in the issue 
of the maintenance (nafaqah) of a wife in which a husband is not legally 
responsible to support his wife’s medical cost. Secondly, it is presumed that the 
medical claim would be rarely happened, thus such uncommon case is not 
recognised89.    
 
SarakshÐ, however, did not explain clearly the limit of an agent-manager’s 
possible claim. He only recommended that the claim should be made 
responsibly and reasonably (maÝrÙf). Perhaps this general guideline is tied with 
the common practice of traders. Thus, the limit of the claim will vary depend 
on the size of the business and the period in which muÃÁrabah is practised. 
Nonetheless, it is strongly emphasised that the personal expenses must had 
direct benefit to the business.   
 
Al-MabsÙÔ of SarakshÐ clearly shows that the ÍanafÐ rules on muÃÁrabah has 
been finalised during the fourth century Hijri. SarakshÐ had covered all 
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important issues of the topic. However, al-MabsÙÔ was written in the masÁÞil 
(legal problem) style, make the discussion too lengthy. In the fifth/eleventh 
centuries, al-MarghÐnanÐ produced a more concise but comprehensive legal text 
namely al-HidÁyah.  
 
The Dissemination of the MÁlikÐ School 
 
The MÁlikÐ school was established based on the adoption of MÁlik bin Anas’s 
doctrine. His full name was AbÙ ÝAbd AllÁh MÁlik bin Anas bin MÁlik bin AbÙ 
ÝÀmir bin ÝAmr bin al-Íarith bin GhaymÁn bin Khuthayn bin ÝAmr bin Íarith 
al-AÒbaÎÐ. His family was originally from Yemen. The great grandfather of 
MÁlik namely AbÙ ÝÀmir migrated to Medina because of his disagreement with 
one of the governors in Yemen90. MÁlik was born and spend his entire life in 
Medina. The city during that time was the main reference of scholars especially 
in the science of ÎadÐth. Medina was the home of many Companions (ÒahÁbah) 
and Successors (tÁbÐ‘Ùn).  MÁlik narrated ÎadÐth from the Successors such as 
NÁfiÝ (d.117/735), the client of ÝAbd AllÁh ibn ÝUmar, Ibn ShihÁb al-ZuhrÐ 
(d.124/742) and RabÐÝah ibn AbÐ ÝAbd al-RaÎmÁn (d.136/753-4).   
 
RabÐÝah ibn AbÐ ÝAbd al-RaÎmÁn was also MÁlik's teacher in fiqh. He was 
known as RabÐÝah al-raÞy. Influenced by his teacher, MÁlik was said to have 
incorporated al-raÞy in developing his fiqh doctrine91. Apart from relying on 
ÎadÐth and the Medinan jurists practices, MÁlik also applied the principles of 
maÒÁliÎ al-mursalah (public interest) and sadd al-dharÁÞiÝ (blocking pretences). 
The reputation of MÁlik as the leading jurists in Medina had attracted many 
scholars from various parts of Muslim world to study under him.  
 
Similar to other schools, MÁlik's doctrine was spread by his students. 
According to Ibn KhaldÙn, the school was very actively cultivated in Spain and 
North-western Africa until the dynasties of Cordova and QayrawÁn were 
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destroyed92. This includes the city of Andalusia, Qairawan and a large part of 
Tunisia.  This situation is explained by the fact that most of the scholars from 
these areas travelled to Íijaz (Medina) to learn the Islamic sciences, since it 
was the centre of religious scholarship.  
 
However, the MÁlikÐ school did not last for long time in its origin land Medina. 
Approximately after 60 years of MÁlik’s death, the number of MÁlikÐ jurists in 
Medina had fallen93. One of the reasons for this phenomenon was the political 
events within the city. In year 266 Hijri, the Umayyad and Abbassid had fought 
each other in their attempt to control Medina. As a result of this, learning and 
knowledge had become secondary in the eye of Medina rulers. Nevertheless, I 
shall mention MÁlik’s important students who had maintained the survival of 
MÁlik’s doctrine in Medina: ÝUthmÁn bin KinÁnah (d.185/801), Ibn NÁfiÝ 
(d.186/802), ÝAbdul MÁlik bin al-MÁjishÙn (d.214/829) and MaÔraf bin 
ÝAbdullah (d.220/835). ÝUthmÁn and Ibn NÁfiÝ succeeded as leaders of MÁlik’s 
circle after his death. Ibn NÁfiÝ was the teacher of SaÎnÙn (d.240/855), the 
compiler of al-Mudawwanah.   An Andalusian jurist, ÝAbd al-MÁlik Ibn ÍabÐb 
(d. 238/853) learned the doctrine from al- MÁjishÙn and MaÔraf and spread the 
MÁlikÐs doctrine in Andalusia.  This at least is the official MÁlikÐ account of its 
spread. 
 
Outide of Medina, the doctrine of MÁlik was transmitted in Egypt. The 
transmission was carried out by several prominent MÁlik’s students such as 
ÝAbdul RahmÁn Ibn al-QÁsim (d.191/807), AÒÎab (d.203/819) and Ibn ÝAbd al-
ÍakÁm (d.214/829). Within the MÁlikÐ madhhab, Ibn al-QÁsim was regarded as 
having achieved a similar position like al-ShaybÁni of the ÍanafÐ school. Both 
jurists were the key figures in transmitting their eponyms’ doctrines.  Ibn al-
QÁsim’s transmission of al-MuwaÔÔaÞ was considered the soundest and his 
replies to SaÎnÙn’s inquiries in al-Mudawwanah were considered the most 
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comprehensive collection of MÁlik’s rulings94. Ibn ÝAbd al-ÍakÁm also wrote 
one of the earliest MÁlikÐ texts, namely al-MukhtaÒar al-kabÐr fÐ al-fiqh. In 
general, the works of Egyptian jurists significantly influenced the dissemination 
of MÁlikÐ school since they were studied in Baghdad, QayrawÁn and 
Andalusia95. In addition to that, the narration of the Egyptian jurists pertaining 
to MÁlik’s legal opinions was considered the most reliable source within the 
school96. The later MÁlikÐs jurists used to come to Egypt to hear MÁlik’s rulings 
from Ibn al-QÁsim and his contemporaries. The Egyptian school was perceived 
as the closest to the Medinan MÁlikÐs in following MÁlik's principles.  
 
In Iraq, the doctrine of MÁlik was introduced by his students ÝAbd al-Rahman 
bin MahdÐ (d.197/813) and ÝAbd Allah bin Maslamah al-QaÝnabÐ (d.220/835). 
After them, the school was led by Ibn MuÝadhdhal. The dissemination of the 
MÁlikÐs doctrine enhanced further during the time of IsmÁ‘Ðl bin IsÎÁq 
(d.282/895), one of ibn MuÝadhdhal’s students. IsmÁÝÐl became a qÁdÐ in 
Baghdad for 36 years and was actively taught the MÁlikÐs doctrine in the city97. 
It should be noted that the MÁlikÐ jurists in Iraq seem to be less extreme in 
holding their madhhab opinions. This is a result of their interaction with the 
other madhhahib such as the ÍanafÐs and ShÁfiÝÐs.   For example, al-QÁdÐ 
IsmÁÝÐl was reported to have chosen a middle position with regard to the issue 
of conflicting between ÎadÐth and raÞy98. This stand contradicted to his 
contemporaries in Medina and Egypt in which they would prefer ÎadÐth over 
raÞy.  However, the history of the MÁlikÐs in Iraq came to end after their last key 
figure, ÝAbd WahhÁb bin Nasr died in 422 Hijri. After him, the line of 
succession of the MÁlikÐs jurists is difficult to make out.   
 
                                                 
94 MuÎammad AbÙ Zahra, The Four Imams, pp.84. 
95 Jonathan E. Brockopp, Early MÁliki Law, Ibn Abd al-ÍakÁm and his Major Compendium of 
Jurisprudence, Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp.49. 
96 ‘Umar SulaimÁn al-’Ashqar, al-Madkhal ilÁ DirÁsat- il- al-MadhÁhib wal al-MadÁris al-
Fiqhiyyah, pp.155. 
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As indicated earlier, the MÁlikÐ school was disseminated widely and maintained 
for a considerable amount of time in Spain and North-western Africa. Among 
the earliest juristsin North-western Africa who studied under MÁlik was ÝAli b. 
ZiyÁd (d.183/799). He was the teacher of the two MÁlikÐ jurists namely Asad 
bin al-FurÁt (d.213/828) and SaÎnÙn who had played pivotal role in developing 
the school's earliest texts. As is generally known, al-MuwaÔÔaÞÝ was the main 
reference of scholars in understanding MÁlik's legal opinions. After learning al-
MuwaÔÔaÞÝ from MÁlik, Asad bin al-FurÁt had travelled to Iraq to study with al-
ShaybanÐ of the ÍanafÐs.  Then he appeared trying to produce a new doctrine 
for the MÁlikÐs which followed the same style of the ÍanafÐs. He compiled 
problems discussed by the ÍanafÐs and brought them to Ibn al-QÁsim. Ibn al-
QÁsim responded to the problems and his answers were compiled in a text 
named as al-AsÁdiyyah. The AsÁdiyyah had received a mixed feedback 
amongst the MÁlikÐs in QairawÁn. They found that some of the answers 
contradicted to the well-known fatwÁ within the school. SaÎnÙn brought the 
Asadiyyah to Ibn al-QÁsim and asked him to revise the text. Ibn al-QÁsim made 
a lot of revisions and SaÎnÙn compiled the amendments in al-Mudawannah99. It 
was reported that Asad had refused to delete from his text the problems that had 
been reconsidered by Ibn al-QÁsim and SaÎnÙn100. Since then al-Mudawannah 
was widely accepted by the MÁlikÐs in North-western Africa and many jurists 
regarded it as second only to al-MuwaÔÔaÞ.  
 
Among the earliest jurists who spread the MÁlikÐ doctrine in Andalusia was 
YaÎyÁ bin YaÎyÁ (d.234/849). He narrated al-MuwaÔÔaÞ from MÁlik and after 
that went to Egypt to study under Ibn al-QÁsim. The dissemination of the 
MÁlikÐs in Andalusia was supported by YaÎyÁ bin YaÎyÁ's influence in the 
government. When he died, the leadership of the school was led by ÝAbd al-
MÁlik Ibn ÍabÐb. He was the author of an important MÁlikÐ jurisprudence text 
namely al-WaÃÐhah in which he tried to imitate the method of MÁlik in al-
                                                 
99 ‘Umar SulaimÁn al-’Ashqar, al-Madkhal ilÁ DirÁsat- il- al-MadhÁhib wal al-MadÁris al-
Fiqhiyyah, pp.148. 
100  Ibn KhaldÙn, The Muqadimah An Introduction to History. vol. 3, pp.15. 
 64 
MuwaÔÔaÞ101. After that, al-ÝUtbÐ (d.254/868) one of Ibn ÍabÐb's students 
produced a revise version of his teacher's text called as al-ÝUtbiyyah. According 
to Ibn KhaldÙn, the people of Andalusia had concentrated on studying the al-
ÝUtbiyyah and abandoned other texts102. After that, the line of succession went 
to Ibn LabÁbah (d.314/926) and Ibn ÝUmar al-MakwÐ (d.401/1011). Other 
leading figures amongst the Andalusian jurists were Ibn ÝAbd al-Barr 
(d.463/1071) and al-BÁjÐ (d.474/1081). Ibn Abd al-Barr wrote al-KÁfÐ fil fiqh 
ahlul MadÐnah while al-BÁjÐ produced al-MuntaqÁ, a commentary of al-
MuwaÔÔaÞ.  In the fifth century, the MÁlikÐs in Andalusia were led by Ibn Rushd 
al-HafÐd (d.595/1198). His work on Islamic law namely BidÁyah al-MujtaÎid 
had been recognised as one of the most important manuals in the fiqh of 
disagreement. This is because in his work Ibn Rushd did not only record the 
opinions of jurists but also explained the reasons behind their disagreement.    
  
During the fifth century Hijri, the MÁlikÐ school in Egypt re-emerged. It was 
developed by AbÙ Bakr al-ÓurÔushi (d.520/1126), one of al-BÁjÐ's students. The 
school produced a number of great MÁlikÐ jurists such as Ibn al-Íajib 
(d.646/1248), al-QarÁfÐ and KhalÐl bin IshÁq. The jurists of this school were 
very loyal to the legal opinions founded by the previous MÁlikÐs103.  
 
Based on the preceding discussion, perhaps we could conclude that the main 
texts of the MÁlikÐs in the second century Hijri were al-MuwaÔÔaÞ, al-
Mudawwanah, al-WaÃÐhah and al-ÝUtbiyyah. Later, in the third century Ibn AbÐ 
ZÁÞid (d.310/922) from QairawÁn produced an important book namely 
NawÁdhir wal al-ZiyÁdÁt. The book is significant as it gathers the principles (al-
usÙl) and the substantives (al-furuÝ) rulings of the previous MÁlikÐ masters. The 
book became the main reference of the MÁlikÐs until Ibn al-Íajib produced its 
commentary (JamÐÝ al-UmmahÁt) and al-QarÁfÐ wrote al-DhakhÐrah in the 
middle of the seventh century Hijri. Ibn al-Íajib also wrote al-Mukhtasar of the 
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book al-Tahdhib by al-BarÁdaÝÐ (a student of Ibn AbÐ ZÁÞid).  Al-Tahdhib was 
an abridgment of Ibn AbÐ ZÁÞid's MukhtaÒar lil al-Mudawwanah. The work of 
Ibn Íajib was widely accepted by the majority of the MÁlikÐs. In the following 
century (eighth), KhalÐl bin IshÁq wrote a MukhtaÒar of Ibn Íajib’s work. Since 
then, the MukhataÒar of al-Khalil became, par excellence, the principal teaching 
book within the school.  
 
The Early Development of MÁlikÐs Rules on MuÃarÁbah 
 
In this section, I will investigate the development of muÃÁrabah  rules in five 
early MÁlikÐ texts, namely, al-MuwaÔÔa’ of MÁlik, al-Mudawwanah al-KubrÁ of 
SaÎnÙn, al-KÁfÐ fÐ Fiqh Ahlul MadÐnah of Ibn ÝAbd al-Barr, BidÁyah al-
MujtaÎid of Ibn Rushd and al-DhakhÐrah of al-QarÁfÐ. 
 
As mentioned earlier, al-MuwaÔÔaÞ and al-Mudawwanah al-KubrÁ became the 
main reference of the MÁlikÐ law since its early establishment. The former was 
written in ÎadÐth narration style whereas the latter was written in problem or 
masÁÞil style. Al-MuwaÔÔaÞ consists of 20 rules on various issues of muÃÁrabah. 
This includes the issues of permitted and prohibited activities in the contract, 
types of accepted capital, conditions (shurÙÔ), the maintenance of agent-
manager and his negligence as well as the method in solving disputes between 
the contracting parties104. For examples, MÁlik stated that ‘the agent-manager 
has right to use part of capital to cover his nafaqah (maintenance) when he 
travels which includes foods, clothes and other needs subject to the availability 
of the capital and in a reasonable manner. If the agent-manager resides with his 
family there is no maintenance or clothes from the capital’105. In my opinion, 
although the rulings in al-MuwaÔÔaÞ cover various issues, it does not represent 
the complete muÃÁrabah doctrine of the MÁlikÐ school. 
 
                                                 
104 BÁjÐ, SulaymÁn ibn KhalÁf, al-MuntaqÁ sharÎ MuwaÔÔaÞ MÁlik, Beirut: DÁr al-Kutub al-
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On the other hand, the text of al-Mudawwanah consists of 69 muÃÁrabah cases 
study. These cases were extended from the rulings of MÁlik in al-MuwaÔÔaÞ. I 
divide the cases into the following sub-topics: 
Table 2: Sub-topics of muÃÁrabah cases in al-Mudawwanah 
No. Sub-topic Cases 
1 MuÃÁrabah capital   
 a Types of capital DinÁr, DirhÁm, FulÙs, Molten gold and 
silver, wheat, barley, trust (wadicah), debt 
 b Damages of capital -Some of the capital damaged and the 
remaining was invested and bring profit to 
business 
- Capital lost before the business commences 
 c Commingling of capital - capital commingle with agent-manager's 
asset 
- capital commingle with asset from previous 
muÃÁrabah 
2.  The nature of muÃÁrabah business Supplying leather ( as capital) for shoe 
manufacturing business   
3. Profit ratio - Agreeing that only one party will receive all 
profit 
- Profit ratio for two and more agent-
managers 
- Agreeing that part of the profit will be 
donated to poor 
4. Maintenance (nafqah) of agent-
manager 
Food, accommodation and limitations 
5. The zakah (almsgiving) in muÃÁrabah - paying zakah of muÃÁrabah revenues 
without the presence of investor  
6. The scope of empowerment for agent-
manager 
- Appoint agent (wakÐl) 
- Hire assistant  
- Entrust capital as wadicah to the other party 
-Entrust capital to other party in another 
muÃÁrabah contract 
-travelling matters 
- credit transaction issues 
- agent-manager breaches investor's rule 
concerning credit transaction 
- Defect of the muÃÁrabah assets 
- agent-manager buys/sells muÃÁrabah assets 
to investor 
7. The role of investor -Participation of investor in muÃÁrabah 
business 
-Participation of investor's slave in 
muÃÁrabah  
- Restrict agent-manager from selling/buying 
certain things 
- Prohibit agent-manager from travelling 
- Specify agent-manager to deal with certain 
people only 
8. Dispute between investor and agent-
manager 
- dispute on the ratio of profit 
9. MuÃÁrabah with slaves - Involve different types of slaves (i.e. 
makÁtib) in muÃÁrabah 
- Involve muÃÁrabah with person who 
ignorance of the Îukm   
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- agent-manager buys investor's slave (as 
assistant in the business) 
-agent-manager frees slave using muÃÁrabah 
capital 
10. Guarantee in MuÃÁrabah -Investor asked agent-manager to guarantee 
his capital 
 
SaÎnÙn enhanced further the discussion of muÃÁrabah in his al-Mudawwanah 
al-KubrÁ. He detailed out the rules of the contract found in al-MuwaÔÔaÞ. For 
example, in describing the types of accepted capital, a general rule was 
recorded stipulating that ‘al-muqÁraÃah (muÃÁrabah) with merchandise is not 
permitted’106 . In al-Mudawwanah, SaÎnÙn elaborated the rules of currencies 
(dinÁr, dirham, fulÙs), molten gold and silver ingot, wheat, barley, debt and 
trust (al-wadÐÞah) as capital in muÃÁrabah. In addition, the rules of profit 
distribution are not clearly discussed in al-MuwaÔÔaÞ, but it is explained in al-
Mudawwanah.  
 
The text of al-Mudawwanah also provides evident that the students of MÁlik 
made ijtihÁd based on his rules. For example, MÁlik ruled that an agent-
manager is entitled for personal expenses when he travels to a place where he 
does not have any family members. MÁlik was asked about a man who 
conducts muÃÁrabah business in city A in which he does not have any family 
member, then he travels (for business purpose) to city B which is his home 
town. According to MÁlik, his journey from city A to city B will not be 
covered, but on his return to city A, he could claim on his personal expenses. 
SaÎnÙn asked Ibn al-QÁsim, if the person has family in both cities A and B. Ibn 
al-QÁsim ruled that, based on MÁlik's principles; the agent-manager is not 
entitled for travel expenses107. The example illustrates two main points. First, 
MÁlik’s rules had been regarded as the underlying principles for future 
development, and second, it shows that Ibn al-QÁsim did not merely memorize 
the rules of MÁlik but also make his own ijtihÁd. Such an ijtihÁd expands the 
school’s doctrine. 
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Beginning from the third century Hijri, the MÁlikÐs jurists started to produce 
mukhtaÒar of both texts in which they adopted a text book approach. These 
mukhtaÒar recorded the rules of MÁlik and his prominent students and were 
studied by the later MÁlikÐs. The production of these mukhtaÒar, however, has 
been argued as leading to the wide practice of taqlÐd. This is because the 
majority of MÁlikÐs tend to memorise the rules in mukhtaÒar and rarely make 
new rulings and practise ijtihÁd.   
 
In this context, I will highlight the text of Ibn ÝAbd al-Barr, written in the fourth 
century Hijri, which in my opinion demonstrates this taqlÐd phenomenon. One 
finds that the text is merely the record of rulings from the problems discussed 
in al-Mudawwanah. Nevertheless, although the majority of the MÁlikÐs seem to 
be in the taqlÐd group, there are some others who make much effort to practise 
ijtihÁd. I examine two texts of jurists which are said belong to this group. The 
first is BidÁyah al-MujtaÎid of Ibn Rushd in the sixth century and the second is 
al-DhakhÐrah of al-QarÁfÐ in the seventh century Hijri. 
 
Kitab al- KÁfÐ fÐ fiqh ahl al-MadÐnah of Ibn ÝAbd al-Barr is a good example of 
mukhtaÒar produced by the MÁlikÐ jurists. It seems that the content of the text 
was heavily influenced by the al-Mudawwanah al-KubrÁ. Ibn ÝAbd al-Barr 
recorded the rulings of MÁlik and his prominent students without adding any 
new rulings. The significant change is in the style of presentation of the text. In 
contrast to the ÎadÐth narration style in al-MuwaÔÔa’ and problem style in al-
Mudawwanah, the text of al- KÁfÐ was written in a text book style. Perhaps, the 
text book style was more suitable to facilitating the teaching of MÁlikÐ doctrine 
to the public. In the text of al-KÁfÐ, the discussion of muÃÁrabah  is divided 
clearly into five sub-topics which are entitled as the permitted and prohibited 
activities in muÃÁrabah , combined muÃÁrabah  (with other contact), rules of 
void muÃÁrabah , zakÁh of muÃÁrabah  and negligence in muÃÁrabah . In each 
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sub-topic, the rules of muÃÁrabah are elaborated with a little explanation of 
their reasoning108.     
 
MÁlik’s rules obviously possessed the highest authority within the school. His 
rules were narrated by many of his students. It is noticed that in some cases, 
there is contradictory narration of MÁlik’s rulings. For example, in the case of a 
void muÃÁrabah contract, Ibn ÝAbd al-ÍakÁm ruled that all void muÃÁrabah will 
be treated as qirÁÃ mithil. However, according to Ibn al-QÁsim, not all void 
muÃÁrabah will be treaated as qirÁÃ mithil because in some cases the void 
contract would be converted into ujr mithil. The two jurists claimed that their 
rules were based on MÁlik's own opinions. The difference between the rules is 
the remuneration of agent-manager (for work has been done) is not guaranteed 
in qirÁÃ mithil, as it depends on the profit earned. However, the agent-manager 
surely will be paid whether the business makes profit or not if a void 
muÃÁrabah converts into ujr mithil. In relation to the conflicting narrations, Ibn 
ÝAbd al-Barr did not make any preference (tarjÐÎ) but simply reports the two of 
them109.  
 
KitÁb BidÁyah al-MujtaÎid is a text that highlights the disagreement among 
earliest jurists in Islamic law. In general, according to Ibn Rushd, the jurists 
agreed on the basic element of the muÃÁrabah contract but differ on its details. 
For example, the jurists unanimously agreed that the empowerment given to the 
agent-manager is not absolute but restricted. However, they differed in deciding 
the limitations for the agent-manager in performing his task. MÁlik, AbÙ 
ÍanÐfah and al-ShÁfiÝÐ had different opinions regarding a credit transaction 
executed by an agent-manager without obtaining an explicit permission from 
the investor. MÁlik and al-ShÁfiÝÐ disapproved the transaction whereas AbÙ 
ÍanÐfah permitted it. Ibn Rushd did not only record the rules made by the 
jurists but he also provided their justifications and reasonings. The explanation 
of jurists’ justification is vital because with that understanding, people could 
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understand better why the disagreements occurred. In the case of a credit 
transaction, Ibn Rushd explained that the disagreement occurred because the 
jurists differed in determining whether the action is a common or rare practice 
among the public. AbÙ ÍanÐfah allowed the credit transaction because he 
believed it was practised widely by the traders. On the other hand, MÁlik and 
al-ShÁfiÝÐ were of the opinion that the credit transaction was practised 
occasionally 110. It should be noted however, Ibn Rushd did not express his own 
preference with regard to the jurists’ disagreement. He just presented the 
different views and explained the reason behind the disagreement and left it to 
readers to evaluate or decide which rules are more appropriate. In this respect, 
probably he wanted to encourage ijtihÁd among the later jurists. 
 
In the seventh century Hijri, al-QarÁfi produced al-DhakhÐrah. The text is 
distinctive due to al-QarÁfi's approach that not only presented the rulings of the 
MÁlikÐs but attached them with the legal methodology (usÙl al-fiqh) of the 
school. In addition to that, al- QarÁfÐ enhanced further the organization (taqsÐm 
and tabwÐb) of muÃÁrabah topic. The presentation of the topic is sophisticated, 
even modern in its presentation. It begins with the literal and legal definition of 
the term qirad and continues with discussion on the evidence (dalÐl) of its 
permissibility. Al-QarÁfÐ summarised the rulings of the previous MÁlikÐs and 
emerges with the essential elements (arkÁn) and conditions (shurÙÔ) of the 
contract111.   
 
The Dissemination of the ShÁfiÝÐ School 
 
In Islamic law history, al-ShÁfiÝÐ was known as the first jurist who attempted to 
produce a compromise doctrine between the traditionalists (aÒhÁb al-ÎadÐth) 
and rationalists (aÒhÁb al-raÞy) schools. He tried to mediate between the strict 
rejections of all human reasoning propounded by the traditionalists and the 
unrestricted use of personal opinion adapted by the rationalists. Al-ShÁfiÝÐ 
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began his fiqh study with jurists in Medina. One of his teachers in Medina was 
MÁlik, with whom he studied for nearly 16 years beginning from 163 until179 
Íijri. After MÁlik's death, al-ShÁfiÝÐ travelled to Iraq to learn the fiqh of the 
rationalists. He attended circles of many rationalist jurists and debated with 
them concerning the fiqh problems. This included the circle of al-ShaybÁnÐ, one 
of the two great followers of AbÙ ÍanÐfah. After staying for considerable of 
time in Iraq, al-ShÁfiÝÐ returned to Mecca to start his circle in masjid al-harÁm. 
In year 199 Hijri, al-ShÁfiÝÐ migrated to Fustat, Egypt and settled down there 
until his death. It should be noted however, between the year 195 to 199 Íijri, 
al-ShÁfiÝÐ made two visits to Iraq112.  
 
Based on his life journey, al-ShÁfiÝÐ's legal rulings were divided into two 
groups. The first group was known as the old doctrine (al-madhhab al-qadÐm) 
which indicates al-ShÁfiÝÐ's rulings in Iraq while the second, called the new 
doctrine (al-madhhab al-jadÐd) was his legal rulings in Egypt. The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists 
ruled that the old doctrine was valid when it does not contradict the new 
doctrine. However, when both doctrines seem contradict to each other, the new 
doctrine will overrule the old one.      
 
Al-ShÁfiÝÐ had many students coming from various regions such as Egypt, Iraq 
and Khurasan. His most famous Egyptian students were al-BuwayÔÐ 
(d.231/846), al-MuzanÐ (d.264/878) and RabÐÝ ibn SulaimÁn al-MurÁdÐ 
(270/884). Based on the ÓabaqÁt al-fuqahÁÞ al-ShÁfiÝiyyah of Ibn QÁÃÐ Shubah, 
Kevin Jaques has produced an excellent analysis regarding the position of the 
three jurists within the ShÁfiÝÐs school. According to Ibn QÁÃÐ Shubah, al-
BuwayÔÐ was posited as the first rank amongst the three113. He was described as 
the closest, most loyal and the most pious student of al-ShÁfiÝÐ.  Al-BuwayÔÐ 
succeeded al-ShÁfiÝÐ as leader of his circle after his death.  
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After al-BuwayÔÐ, the leadership of ShÁfiÝÐs was led by al-MuzanÐ. Distinct from 
al-BuwayÔÐ, al-MuzanÐ was described as a controversial student of al-ShÁfiÝÐ. 
This is because many of his rulings appeared to contradict his teacher's legal 
rulings. Therefore, it was not surprising that some scholars regarded him as an 
independent jurist (mujtahid muÔlaq).  However, despite the doubt over al-
MuzanÐ’s affiliation to the ShÁfiÝÐs school, his contribution to the development 
of the school was the most significant.  He wrote al-MukhtaÒar which was a 
compilation of ShÁfiÝÐ's legal rulings and his own ijtihÁd114. The MukhataÒar 
was considered as the most important early text of divergent opinion (ikhtilÁf) 
in the school in which the later ShÁfiÝÐs jurists developed their legal doctrine. 
The third important student of al-ShÁfiÝÐ was RabÐÝ ibn SulaimÁn al-MurÁdÐ. He 
was known as the primary transmitter of KitÁb al-umm, the most important al-
ShÁfiÝÐ fiqh book.  The Muslim scholars unanimously believed that al-ShÁfiÝÐ 
was the original author of the book. RabÐÝ ibn SulaimÁn al-MarÁdÐ was 
acknowledged as the compiler of al-ShÁfiÝÐ's writings and named the book 
according to al-ShÁfiÝÐ’s idea.  
 
One of the earliest of al-ShÁfiÝÐ's students in Iraq was al-KarÁbÐsÐ (d.248/862). 
He was known for his role in transmitting the old doctrine of al-ShÁfiÝÐ. The 
new doctrine however was transmitted by al-AnmÁÔÐ (288/902), who was said 
to have learnt the jurisprudence of ShÁfiÝÐs from al-RabÐÝ and al-MuzanÐ in 
Egypt. The transmission of the new doctrine in Iraq enhanced further during the 
time of AbÙ al-ÝAbbÁs ibn Surayj (306/918), al-AnmÁÔÐ's student. Ibn Surayj 
was the first jurist who was described as having the chieftaincy within the 
ShÁfiÝÐs school in Iraq. He initiated a normal course of advanced study which 
required his students to produce a taÝliÐqah, a sort of doctoral dissertation 
describing ShÁfiÝÐ doctrine115. As graduates from Ibn Surayj's circle begun to 
carry the title “ShÁfiÝÐ”, the dissemination of the madhhab became more 
obvious. One of Ibn Surayj's great students was AbÙ IsÎÁq al-MarwazÐ 
(d.340/951). He succeeded his teacher as the chief of the ShÁfiÝÐs in Iraq. Then, 
                                                 
114 ‘Umar SulaimÁn al-’Ashqar, al-Madkhal ilÁ dirÁsat- il- al-madhÁhib wal al-madÁris al-
fiqhiyyah, p.171 
115 Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E, 
pp.   
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the order of the chieftaincy went to al-DÁrakÐ (375/986) and AbÙ ÍÁmid al-
IsfarÁyinÐ (406/. 1017)116. 
 
Apart from Iraq, the doctrine of ShÁfiÝÐ was transmitted largely in Khurasan. 
According to al-NawawÐ, the school of ShÁfiÝÐs used to categorise into the 
“jurists of Iraq” and the “jurists of Khurasan”. Based on the principles laid 
down by ShÁfiÝÐ, both groups developed their specific method (ÔarÐqah) in 
expanding ShÁfiÝÐ legal doctrine. Al-NawawÐ described the ÔarÐqah of both 
groups as follows: 
The narration of our Iraqi jurists pertaining to the text (nuÒÙÒ) 
of al-ShÁfiÝÐ , his madhhab principles and the opinions 
(wujÙh) of his early followers is more accurate (atqan) and 
valid (athbaÔ) comparing to the narration of Khurasan jurists 
in general, the Khurasani is better in terms of taÒarrufan, 
research (baÎthan), expansion (tafrÐÝan) and systematise 
(tartÐban)117.     
 
MuÎammad ibn Nasr al-MarwazÐ (d. 294/907) and Ibn Khuzaymah (d.311/924) 
were among the earliest ShÁfiÝÐs in Khurasan. They were reported to have 
travelled to Egypt to learn from al-ShÁfiÝÐ’s students. After that, the ShÁfiÝÐs in 
Khurasan were led by their student namely AbÙ ÝAlÐ al-ThaqafÐ (328/941). 
Then the sequence of chieftaincy went to AbÙ IsÎÁq al-MarwazÐ, the student of 
Ibn Surayj of Iraqi group. This suggests that the teachings of Ibn Surayj had 
influenced the ShÁfiÝÐs in both regions. After that, the chieftaincy of ShÁfiÝÐs in 
Khurasan continued with AbÙ Bakr al-QaffÁl al-MarwazÐ (d.418/1031).  
 
However, according al-SubkÐ (d.756/1357), beginning with the period of AbÙ 
ÝAli al-SanjÐ, the ÔarÐqah of Iraqi and Khurasani ShÁfiÝÐs had been faltering. 
Being the student of AbÙ Bakr al-QaffÁl al-MarwazÐ and AbÙ ÍÁmid al-
IsfarÁyinÐ, the leader of Khurasanis and Iraqis respectively, AbÙ ÝAlÐ al-SanjÐ 
begun to merge the two ÔarÐqah. His efforts were continued by ImÁm al-
Íaramayn (d.478/1091) who wrote NihÁyat al-maÔlab fÐ Ýilm al-madhhab. In 
                                                 
116 Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E, 
pp. 103-106 & ‘Ali Jum’ah MuÎammad, al-Madkhal ilÁ DirÁsat -il al-MadhÁhib al-Fiqhiyyah, 
pp.38-39. 
117 ‘Ali Jum’ah MuÎammad, al-Madkhal ilÁ DirÁsat -il al-MadhÁhib al-Fiqhiyyah, pp.40. 
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this book, ImÁm al-Íaramayn compiled the legal rulings of both ÔarÐqahs and 
made tarjÐÎ between the conflicting opinions. Al-GhazÁlÐ (d.505/ 1118), the 
student of ImÁm al-Íaramayn, developed further his teacher’s work and since 
then ShÁfiÝÐ jurisprudence was no longer divided.  
 
In this study, the development of ShÁfiÝÐ rulings on muÃÁrabah is examined 
based on the four main al-ShÁfiÝÐ texts. The texts are al-Umm of al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-
Muhadhdhab of AbÙ Ishaq al-ShÐrÁzÐ (d.472/1085), al-WajÐz of al-GhazÁlÐ and 
MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn of al-NawawÐ. These texts represent the ShÁfiÝÐ madhhab 
written in the second (al-Umm), fourth (al-Muhadhdhab), sixth (al-WajÐz) and 
seventh (MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn) century Íijri. Undoubtedly, for the majority of 
Muslim scholars, KitÁb al-Umm is regarded as ShÁfiÝÐ’s most important text in 
fiqh. They believed that al-ShÁfiÝÐ was the original author of the text. The 
transmitter of the text, RabÐÝ ibn SulaymÁn al-MurÁdÐ had been described as 
faithful and truthful who transmitted al-ShÁfiÝÐ legal rulings without 
interpretation or manipulation118. However, Calder has raised doubts over the 
actual authorship of KitÁb al-Umm. He argued that the book might be written 
after the period of RabÐÝ ibn SulaymÁn al-MurÁdÐ119. For the purpose of this 
study however, we will assume that KitÁb al-Umm represents the legal rulings 
of al-ShÁfiÝÐ.  
 
Based on al-ShÁfiÝÐs text, AbÙ Ishaq al-ShÐrÁzÐ wrote al-Muhadhdhab. AbÙ 
Ishaq al-ShÐrÁzÐ was known for his loyalty to the principles laid down by 
ShÁfiÝÐ. He had added new legal rulings in his book but they did not diverge 
from what would have been al-ShÁfiÝÐ’s opinion because they are based on his 
method. Besides al-Muhadhdhab, AbÙ Ishaq al-ShÐrÁzÐ also wrote another 
important book in fiqh namely al-ÓanbÐh. On the other hand, KitÁb al-WajÐz 
represented al-GhazÁlÐ’s continuing effort in narrowing the range of divergent 
opinions within the ShÁfiÝÐ school. The main reference of the book was KitÁb 
al-nihÁyat al-maÔlab fÐ Ýilm al-madhhab of ImÁm al-Íaramayn, who was al-
                                                 
118 R. Kevin Jaques, Authority, Conflict and the Transmission of Diversity in Medieval Islamic 
Law, pp.110. 
119 Norman Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 
pp.82. 
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GhazÁlÐ‘s teacher. Before writing al-WajÐz, al-GhazÁlÐ wrote al-BasÐÔ fÐ al-
madhhab and al-WasÐÔ.  In fact, al-WajÐz is a condensation of al-WasÐÔ, which 
in turn, is an abridgment of al-BasÐÔ fÐ al-madhhab120.     
 
KitÁb MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn of al-NawawÐ has been regarded almost as the law 
book par excellence within the ShÁfiÝÐ school. The book is a commentary on the 
MuÎarrar by al-RÁfiÝÐ (623/1224). Al-NawawÐ made improvements from the 
earlier book by mentioning the divergent opinions not pointed out by al-RÁfiÝÐ. 
Furthermore al-NawawÐ presented the evidence used by each of the diverging 
parties and made tarjÐÎ to indicate which opinion is the most correct121. The 
ShÁfiÝÐ books after the seventh/thirteen centuries were mostly based on the 
commentaries of MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn. Among the famous commentaries were 
TuÎfah al-muÎtÁj of Ibn Íajar al-HaytamÐ and NihÁyah-muÎtÁj of al-RamlÐ 
(d.1004).  
 
The Early Development of ShÁfiÝÐs Rules on MuÃÁrabah  
 
In KitÁb al-Umm, the discussion of muÃÁrabah is entitled as bÁb al-qirÁd. It is 
further divided into four sub-topics; (1) the impermissibility of merchandise 
(al-ÝurÙÃ) as capital (2) the stipulated conditions (al-shurÙÔ) of muÃÁrabah (3) 
loan (al-salaf) in muÃÁrabah and (4) the accounting of muÃÁrabah business.  
 
Al-ShÁfiÝÐ ruled that the merchandise can not be accepted as muÃÁrabah capital. 
This rule contradicts that of MÁlik who was reported to have permitted certain 
types of merchandise as capital. However, al-ShÁfiÝÐ did not explain the reason 
behind such prohibition. He only indicated that the muÃÁrabah contract would 
be render invalid (fÁsid) if merchandise was capital. According to him, in an 
invalid muÃÁrabah the investor would receive the capital and profit if any.  
However, the investor was obliged to pay current hire wages (ujr al-mithil) to 
the agent-manager for the work had been done. 
                                                 
120 R. Kevin Jaques, Authority, Conflict and the Transmission of Diversity in Medieval Islamic 
Law, pp.110. 
121 Ibid, pp.232. 
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With regard to the stipulated conditions (al-shurÙÔ) of muÃÁrabah, al-ShÁfiÝÐ 
ruled that the contract would be rendered invalid if the amount of capital was 
unknown and the duration of the contract was fixed i.e. one year. He explained 
that the rule against the fixed duration of muÃÁrabah is made to prevent an 
unknown amount of capital. In his justification al-ShÁfiÝÐ gave an example:  
‘if I pay to you one thousand dirham to work on it for a year, 
then you buy and sell (trading) during the first month and 
make a profit of one thousand dirham, later for the next 
trading you will use the one thousand of profit which belongs 
to me and you; in which I might not agree to participate in the 
trading. Thus you will use capital which is unknown to 
me…122’  
 
From the example, perhaps we could conclude that the muÃÁrabah from al-
ShÁfiÝÐ point of view is carried out on a job basis. It means the contract 
commences and ends when a single trade (buying and selling) is completed. 
When both parties wish to continue with other trading activity, another 
muÃÁrabah arrangement should be agreed.  
 
Al-ShÁfiÝÐ also ruled that it was discouraged (makrÙh) for the agent-manager 
who initially took money as muÃÁrabah capital, to ask the investor to amend the 
contract into a loan contract. Al-ShÁfiÝÐ claimed that he agreed with all MÁlik’s 
rulings concerning the accounting of muÃÁrabah. This however excludes his 
ruling to permit the absence of the capital during the profit distribution if the 
agent-manager was deemed as a truthful person.    
   
In my opinion, the discussion of a muÃÁrabah contract in KitÁb al-Umm was 
preliminary in nature. Al-ShÁfiÝÐ can not be regarded as establishing distinct 
principles of muÃÁrabah since many of his rulings were found to be similar to 
the earlier jurists. For example, the ruling on the impermissibility of 
merchandises as capital contradicts MÁlik but was similar to the opinion of AbÙ 
Íanifah and Ibn AbÐ LaylÁ. Two centuries after the time of ShÁfiÝÐ, the 
muÃÁrabah rulings within the school experienced a significant growth. This 
                                                 
122 Al-ShÁfiÝÐ, MuÎammad IdrÐs, KitÁb al-Umm, Beirut: DÁr al-Ma‘rifah, 1973, vol. 4, pp.9. 
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development was evident in the KitÁb al-Muhadhdhahb of AbÙ IsÎÁq al-ShÐrÁzÐ 
who organised the discussion of muÃÁrabah into 32 sections. Table 3 below 
shows the additional topics/issues as compared to the earlier text of al-ShÁfiÝÐ. 
Table 3: Additional topics/issues in KitÁb al-Muhadhdhahb123  
No. Topics/Issues 
1 The terms of the contract; qirÁÃ, muÃÁrabah and any other terms that indicate 
similar meaning 
2 The conditions of muÃÁrabah  
a. The share of the profit must be agreed in proportion  
b. All contracting parties must share the profit. 
c. The share can not be agreed on a fixed amount of money 
 
d. The contract can not accept any unknown forthcoming conditions 
(sharÔ al-mustaqbal) 
3 The scope of activity for muÃÁrabah is limited to trading activities  
4 The agent-manager is expected to perform the ordinary business tasks himself  
5 Restriction to agent-manager from entrusting the capital to others in another 
muÃÁrabah contract without investor's permission 
6 The agent-manager should trade with goods that had been specified by the 
investor 
7 Restriction to agent-manager from purchasing goods worth more than the capital 
8 Restriction to agent-manager from selling good below the market price and 
selling in credit without investor's permission 
9 Restriction to agent-manager from purchasing slave using the muÃÁrabah capital 
without investor's permission 
10 Restriction to agent-manager from travelling with muÃÁrabah capital without 
investor's permission  
11 The disagreement on the issue 'when' the contracting parties have the right to 
utilise the profit   
12 The distribution of the profit can not be executed before the liquidation of the 
business in case where only one party agreed to do so.    
13 The agent-manager was considered liable to the damage of the capital if it was 
due to his negligence. 
14 Both parties have the rights to terminate the contract 
15 The contract will be terminated automatically when one of the contracting parties 
dies or becomes mad  
16 Commercial transactions carried out by the agent-manager in an invalid 
muÃÁrabah were legally binding. However, the agent-manager had no right of 
the profit generated from the transactions.  
17 Disputes between the investor and agent-manager 
 a. Dispute on the damage of the capital 
 b. Dispute on the negligence of the agent-manager  
 c. Dispute on the returning of the capital 
 d. Dispute on the agreed proportion of profit share  
 e. Dispute on the amount of the capital 
 f. Dispute on the aim of purchasing slave 
 g. Dispute on the prohibition to purchase slave 
 h. Dispute on the mistake in announcing the muÃÁrabah profit  
No. Topics/Issues 
1 The terms of the contract; qirÁÃ, muÃÁrabah and any other terms that indicate similar 
meaning 
2 The conditions of muÃÁrabah  
                                                 
123 AbÙ IsÎÁq al-ShÐrazÐ, KitÁb al-Muhadhdhab fÐ al-Fiqh madhhab al-ImÁm al-ShÁfiÝÐ, Egypt : 
Isa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1929, vol.1, p.385-390.   
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a. The share of the profit must be agreed in proportion  
b. All contracting parties must share the profit. 
c. The share can not be agreed on a fixed amount of money 
 
d. The contract can not accept any unknown forthcoming conditions (sharÔ al-
mustaqbal) 
3 The scope of activity for muÃÁrabah is limited to trading activities  
4 The agent-manager is expected to perform the ordinary business tasks himself  
5 Restriction to agent-manager from entrusting the capital to others in another muÃÁrabah 
contract without investor's permission 
6 The agent-manager should trade with goods that had been specified by the investor 
7 Restriction to agent-manager from purchasing goods worth more than the capital 
8 Restriction to agent-manager from selling good below the market price and selling in 
credit without investor's permission 
9 Restriction to agent-manager from purchasing slave using the muÃÁrabah capital 
without investor's permission 
10 Restriction to agent-manager from travelling with muÃÁrabah capital without investor's 
permission  
11 The disagreement on the issue 'when' the contracting parties have the right to utilise the 
profit   
12 The distribution of the profit can not be executed before the liquidation of the business 
in case where only one party agreed to do so.    
13 The agent-manager was considered liable to the damage of the capital if it was due to 
his negligence. 
14 Both parties have the rights to terminate the contract 
15 The contract will be terminated automatically when one of the contracting parties dies 
or becomes mad  
16 Commercial transactions carried out by the agent-manager in an invalid muÃÁrabah 
were legally binding. However, the agent-manager had no right of the profit generated 
from the transactions.  
17 Disputes between the investor and agent-manager 
 a. Dispute on the damage of the capital 
 b. Dispute on the negligence of the agent-manager  
 c. Dispute on the returning of the capital 
 d. Dispute on the agreed proportion of profit share  
 e. Dispute on the amount of the capital 
 f. Dispute on the aim of purchasing slave 
 g. Dispute on the prohibition to purchase slave 
 h. Dispute on the mistake in announcing the muÃÁrabah profit  
 
As indicated in table 3, the muÃÁrabah rules were improved mainly in three 
topics: (1) the stipulated conditions of muÃÁrabah (2) the empowerment of 
agent-manager and (3) the dispute between the investor and agent-manager. 
The rules regarding the conditions of muÃÁrabah were mostly related to the 
profit share. It was stipulated that the profit share should be agreed in 
proportion i.e. one-third. If the contracting parties agreed on a fixed amount of 
profit i.e. 100 dirham, the contract would be invalid. This condition was 
forbidden because the total profit probably would be only 100 dirham, leaving 
only the investor receiving the profit. Furthermore, it was ruled that the profit in 
muÃÁrabah contract must be shared by all the contracting parties. Similar to the 
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sale (bayÝ) and hire (ijÁrah) contracts, the muÃÁrabah can not accept any 
unknown forthcoming conditions (sharÔ al-mustaqbal). 
 
The text of al-ShÐrÁzÐ also elaborated the extent to which the agent-manager 
was empowered. The text clearly demonstrated that the empowerment was not 
absolute but restricted. Al-ShÐrÁzÐ ruled four restrictions to be placed upon on 
the agent-manager in managing the capital. The rules asserted that without 
having explicit permission from the investor, the agent manager was not 
allowed to (1) entrust capital to others in another muÃÁrabah arrangement (2) 
purchase goods worth more than the capital (3) sell things below the market 
price and (4) travel with the capital.  
 
Another important development of muÃÁrabah rulings found in al-ShÐrÁzÐ's text 
was the discussion regarding the dispute between the investor and the agent-
manager. Perhaps, the inclusion of this topic indicates that the muÃÁrabah had 
been practised widely and many cases of dispute had been brought to the court. 
The dispute could occur when both parties conflicted over the issues of (1) the 
damage of the capital (2) the negligence of agent-manager (3) the returning of 
capital (4) the agreed proportion of profit share (5) the amount of capital (6) the 
aim in purchasing slaves (7) the prohibition to purchase slaves and (8) the 
mistake in declaring profit. Apart from the development of the rulings, al-
ShÐrÁzÐ was the first who demonstrated the evidence of muÃÁrabah based on the 
athar of ‘Umar al-KhaÔÔÁb. 
 
Undoubtedly, al-ShÐrÁzÐ had made significant improvements on the muÃÁrabah 
rulings. Perhaps, al-ShÐrÁzÐ had covered all main topics in the muÃÁrabah 
practices. This fact became more obvious when we compare al-ShÐrÁzÐ’s text 
with the text of al-WajÐz of al-GhazÁlÐ. It was found that al-GhazÁlÐ just added a 
few rulings from what were found in the text of al-ShÐrÁzÐ. However, al-WajÐz 
was different from al-Muhadhdhahb in terms of the structural discussion of the 
muÃÁrabah topic. In other words, al-GhazÁlÐ summarised all rulings made by 
the previous generations of jurists and organised the topic in a systematic way.  
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The presentation of muÃÁrabah contract in KitÁb al-WajÐz is shown in table 4. 
Table 4: MuÃÁrabah contract in kitÁb al-WajÐz124 
No. Section One: The Essential Element (rukn) 
1. The Capital 
a. Should be in monetary (naqdÁn) 
b. Should be specific (muaiyÁn) 
c. Should be known (ma lumÁn) 
 
d. Should be delivered to the agent-manager (musallamÁn) 
2. The Work 
a. Should be trading activities (tijÁrah). Trading was defined as 
obtaining profit from the act of buying and selling. It excluded the 
craft and manufacturing activities.  
b. Free from any restrictions that cause difficulty to the agent-manager 
in conducting the business, i.e. restrict the agent-manager to trade 
with only a particular person.  
 
c. Unfixed duration 
3. The Profit 
a. Should be exclusively for the two parties (makhÒuÒan)  
b. Should be shared (musytarak) 
c. Should be known to all contracting parties (maÝlumÁn)  
d. Should be agreed in proportion (i.e. one-third) and not a fixed money 
such as 100 dirham  
The Form of Expression (ÒÐghah) 4. 
The acceptable forms included qÁraÃtuka or ÃÁrabtuka or ÝÁmaltuka ÝalÁ Ýanna al-rabha 
bainanÁ 
The contracting parties (the investor and the agent-manager) 5& 6 
The relationship between the two parties is based on the agency (wakÁlah) contract 
No. Section One: The Essential Element (rukn) 
1. The Capital 
a. Should be in monetary (naqdÁn) 
b. Should be specific (muÝaiyÁn) 
c. Should be known (maÝlumÁn) 
 
d. Should be delivered to the agent-manager (musallamÁn) 
2. The Work 
a. Should be trading activities (tijÁrah). Trading was defined as obtaining profit 
from the act of buying and selling. It excluded the craft and manufacturing 
activities.  
b. Free from any restrictions that cause difficulty to the agent-manager in 
conducting the business, i.e. restrict the agent-manager to trade with only a 
particular person.  
 
c. Unfixed duration 
3. The Profit 
a. Should be exclusively for the two parties (makhÒuÒan)  
b. Should be shared (musytarak) 
c. Should be known to all contracting parties (maÝlumÁn)  
d. Should be agreed in proportion (i.e. one-third) and not a fixed money such as 
100 dirham  
The Form of Expression (ÒÐghah) 4. 
The acceptable forms included qÁraÃtuka or ÃÁrabtuka or ÝÁmaltuka ÝalÁ Ýanna al-rabha 
bainanÁ 
The contracting parties (the investor and the agent-manager) 5& 6 
The relationship between the two parties is based on the agency (wakÁlah) contract 
                                                 
124 GhazÁlÐ, MuÎammad AbÙ ÍamÐd, al-WajÐz fÐ fiqh madhhab al-ImÁm al-ShÁfiÝÐ, Beirut : DÁr 
al-MaÝrifah, 1997, vol.1, pp.221-223. 
 81 
As indicated in table 4, al-GhazÁlÐ concludes that there are six essential 
elements (rukn) of a muÃÁrabah contract. They are capital, work, profit, form of 
expression (ÒÐghah) and contracting parties (investor and agent-manager). In 
each of these essential elements, there are stipulated conditions (shurÙÔ) to be 
met. Clearly, al-GhazÁlÐ’s muÃÁrabah model was derived from the rulings of 
the previous jurists. It is noticed that al-GhazÁlÐ’s only added two new rulings; 
first the condition stipulating that the capital must be in the possession of the 
agent-manager and second, the work in muÃÁrabah is defined as purely trading 
activity; the act of selling and buying for profit.   
 
In the seventh century Hijri, al-NawawÐ improved further the discussion on 
muÃÁrabah. From his time onwards, the ShÁfiÝÐs have a clear definition of al-
qirÁÃ or muÃÁrabah. In his MinhÁj al-ÓÁlibÐn, al-NawawÐ defined muÃÁrabah as 
a contract whereby money is paid to agent-manager to be traded with and profit 
is to be shared. Another text of al-NawawÐ (al-MajmÙÝ sharÎ al-Muhaddhab) is 
also significant in the sense that it highlights the divergence of opinions 
(ikhtilÁf) amongst the ShÁfiÝÐs jurists. A case in point is when investor said to 
agent manager ‘I give you money as muÃÁrabah but all profit will belong to 
me’ or he said ‘I give you money as muÃÁrabah and all profit is for you’125. 
According to al-ShÐrÁzÐ when such conditions are stipulated, the contract is 
void. In the first, the contract will automatically change to biÃÁ‘ah contract 
whereas the second turn to loan (qarÃ) contract. More importantly, al-ShÐrÁzÐ 
argued as if the rule is unanimously agreed by the ShÁfiÝÐs jurists126. Al-GhazÁlÐ 
followed the same approach of al-ShÐrÁzÐ by emphasising that the profit must 
be shared (mushtarak)127. However, according to al-NawawÐ, the ShÁfiÝÐs jurists 
disagreed in that matter. Some of the ShÁfiÝÐs jurists permit both kinds of 
conditions.  
 
To conclude, I find that the rules of muÃÁrabah in KitÁb al-Umm of al-ShÁfiÝÐ 
are preliminary in nature. Although al-ShÁfiÝÐ had ruled various aspect of the 
                                                 
125 SharbÐnÐ al-KhaÔÐb, MuÎammad ibn MuÎammad, MughnÐ al-muhtÁj ilÁ maÝrifah maÝÁni al-
alfÁÛ al-minhÁj, Cairo : MaÔba‘at MusÔafÁ al-BÁbÐ al-HalabÐ, 1958, vol.2, pp.312.  
126 ShÐrÁzÐ, KitÁb al-Muhadhdhab fÐ al-Fiqh madhhab al-ImÁm al-ShÁfiÝÐ,pp.385. 
127 GhazÁlÐ, al-WajÐz fÐ fiqh madhhab al-ImÁm al-ShÁfiÝÐ,pp.222. 
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muÃÁrabah but yet it would be exaggerate to claim that he had founded the 
fundamental principles of the contract. Hence, I argue that the muÃÁrabah 
rulings of the ShÁfiÝÐs school were developed after the lifetime of al-ShÁfiÝÐ. 
Based on the analysis of al-ShÐrÁzÐ’s al-Muhadhdhahb, I suggest that this 
development happened extensively in particular during the fourth/tenth 
centuries. The text of al-ShÐrÁzÐ covered all important rulings which became the 
basis of muÃÁrabah doctrine of the school. The jurists in the following centuries 
did not produce significant new rulings but they did improve and refine the 
muÃÁrabah discussion. Al-GhazÁlÐ presented the discussion in a systematic 
way. He analysed all the rulings of the previous jurists and come out with the 
structure i.e. the essential elements (arkÁn) and stipulated conditions (shurÙÔ) of 
the muÃÁrabah contract. However, the approach in the writings of al-ShÐrÁzÐ 
and al-GhazÁlÐ are identical in the sense that both jurists tried to demonstrate an 
agreed ShÁfiÝÐs rulings on the muÃÁrabah contract. In contrast, al-NawawÐ’s 
texts comprise of divergent opinions (ikhtilÁf) within the school. He also 
initiated the ShÁfiÝÐ definition of the term muÃÁrabah.  
 
The Dissemination of the ÍanbalÐ School 
 
As discussed earlier, during the early second century Hijri, Muslim jurists were 
divided into two main schools; aÒÎÁb al-raÞy (rationalists) and aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth. 
One of prominent personalities of the aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth was AÎmad Ibn Íanbal, 
the eponym of the ÍanbalÐ school. Ibn Íanbal was born in Arab family who 
had actively participated in the Muslim conquest of Iraq and Khurasan. His 
farther died while serving as army in the city of Marw, when he was three years 
old. Since then, Ibn Íanbal was brought up by his mother in Baghdad. 
 
Ibn Íanbal was undeniably a traditionist. He devoted himself to study ÎadÐth 
since he was sixteenth years old. However, it should be noted that before Ibn 
Íanbal started his quest for ÎadÐth, he was one of the students of AbÙ YÙsuf. 
For some reasons, the legal reasoning taught by the ÍanafÐs master did not 
attract Ibn Íanbal rather he found himself more interested in studying the 
ÎadÐth criticism (ÝulÙm al-ÎadÐth). Hence, he left the circle of AbÙ YÙsuf and 
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travelled to the cities of Kufah, Basrah, Mecca, Medina, Yemen and Syria to 
collect and preserve ÎadÐth. Among the famous traditionists whom he visited 
and learned from were ÝAbd al-RazzÁq (d.211/812) in Yemen and SufyÁn ibn 
ÝUyaynah in Mecca.  
 
The framework of ÎadÐth criticism was heavily adapted by Ibn Íanbal when 
developing his legal doctrine. He profoundly upheld the authority of the Qur’Án 
and ÎadÐth by inferring rules as directly as possible to the textual evidence from 
both sources. He only ruled the non-controversial matter and refused to give 
rules on problems in which conflicting of traditions were reported128. Based on 
the principles laid down by Ibn Íanbal, the ÍanbalÐ school was known for their 
dependence on ÎadÐth through isnÁd comparison methodology. In addition to 
the strident advocacy of ÎadÐth, the ÍanbalÐs jurists declined to use personal 
opinion widely in deducing new legal rulings. Their tendency is to let the 
Quranic verses or ÎadÐth speak the rules themselves without involving in 
argumentative discussions.  
 
However, such a strict methodology had slowly changed beginning from the 
fourth century Hijri. As observed by Melchert, this transformation happens as 
response to the change of methodological approach adopted by jurists of the 
other schools of law. Before, the ÍanbalÐs jurists did not study ÎadÐth 
separately from fiqh. However, when the jurists of other schools begin to 
incorporate extensively ÎadÐth in their legal texts, the ÍanbalÐs jurists begin to 
accept the need for separate expertise in fiqh and hadÐth criticism. They realised 
that it was no longer sufficed for them to know volumes of ÎadÐth but they need 
to obtain the knowledge of usul fiqh (legal methodology) as well 129.  
 
                                                 
128 Susan A. Spectorsky, Ahmad ibn Íanbal’s Fiqh, Journal of The American Oriental Society, 
vol. 102, no. 3, Jul-Oct 1982, pp. 461-465.   
129 Christopher Melchert, Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law, Islamic 
Law and Society, Leiden: Brill. 2001, vol.8, no.3, pp. 383-406.  
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According to Ibn KhaldÙn, the followers of the ÍanbalÐs madhhab were smaller 
as compared to the ÍanafÐs, MÁlikÐs and ShÁfiÝÐs130. The madhhab did not 
expand beyond Iraq and Syiria regions. The main centre of the ÍanbalÐs from 
the middle of the second to the end of the fifth century Hijri was Baghdad. 
From among the numerous jurists whose names have been preserved in ÔabaqÁt 
work, I shall cite here some of official HanbalÐs account of its early spread in 
the city. They were the two sons Ibn Íanbal namely SÁlih (d.266/879) and 
ÝAbd AllÁh (d.290/903), AbÙ Bakr al-AthrÁm (d.260/873-4), Íanbal bin IshÁq 
(d.273/886), AbÙ DÁud al-SidjastÁni (d.275/887) and AbÙ Bakr al-MarwÁzÐ 
(d.275/887). These jurists were the narrators of al-MasaÞil which is the 
collection of Ibn Íanbal's responses to problems put forward during his circle. 
It should be noted that Ibn Íanbal actually did warn his followers from writing 
down his rulings. He refused to risk his rulings to become authoritative and 
superior to the QurÞÁn and ÎadÐth131. Despite the command, the masÁÞil was 
regarded as one of the earliest texts attributed to Ibn Íanbal particularly in 
formulating his legal doctrine. However, the problem with the text is that it has 
many versions in which they are very different from one another.   
 
The systematic collection of Ibn Íanbal’s legal doctrine was produced during 
the time of AbÙ Bakr al-KhallÁl (d.311/923). AbÙ Bakr al-KhallÁl travelled to 
many places to meet up the students of Ibn Íanbal and gathered his rulings in 
the text named al-JÁmÐÝ. The rulings were recorded with a chain of narrators 
(isnÁd)132. Al-KhallÁl’s work has been well appreciated by the later ÍanbalÐs 
and was recognised as the fullest possible sources of Ibn Íanbal’s fiqh. After 
that, AbÙ al-QÁsim al-KhiraqÐ (d.334/945) wrote the first legal manual 
(mukhtaÒar) of the ÍanbalÐs. It was claimed that the mukhtÒar of al-KhiraqÐ had 
been commented by more than three hundred jurists. However, the most 
significant commentaries are the commentary of qÁdÐ AbÙ Ya‘lÁ (d.458/1066) 
                                                 
130 Ibn KhaldÙn, ‘Abd al-RaÎmÁn ibn MuÎammad, the Muqaddimah, an Introduction to History, 
pp.3-9.  
131 Laoust, H. "AÎmad ibn Íanbal." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. 
Bearman, Th. Bianquis , C.E. Bosworth , E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2008. Brill 
Online. EXETER UNIVERSITY. Accessed on 18 December 2008. 
132 ÝAbd al-QadÐr b. BadrÁn, al-Madkhal ilÁ Madhhab Ibn Íanbal, ‘Abd AllÁh b. MuÎsin 
(editor), Beirut: Mu‘asasah al-RisÁlah, 1981, pp. 124. 
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and al-MughnÐ of Ibn QudÁmah. The commentary of AbÙ YaÝlÁ was smaller 
than al-MughnÐ of Ibn QudÁmah. This is because AbÙ YaÝlÁ only commented 
the exact text of al-KhiraqÐ’s mukhtaÒar whereas Ibn QudÁmah added 
discussion of new positive legal rulings (furÙ‘). In addition to that, Ibn 
QudÁmah included the rules of other sunni jurists who contradicted to the 
Íanbalis and discussed their disagreement133.  
 
Ibn QudÁmah appeared to be a prolific ÍanbalÐs jurist of his time. Besides al-
MughniÐ he composed three other ÍanbalÐs texts namely al- ÝUmdah, al-MuqnÐÝ 
and al-KafÐ. Based on the contents and the writing style of the texts, it was 
viewed that they were written for the different level of ÍanbalÐs followers. Al- 
ÝUmdah was written for early stage of student in Islamic law, presumably with 
little knowledge of the ÍanbalÐs legal doctrine. The text listed the core rules of 
the ÍanbalÐs madhhab without any discussion of their legal evidences (dalÐl). 
The second text, al-MuqniÝ comprises of more positive legal rules with a 
modest explanation of the legal evidences and legal justification (taÝlÐl). It is 
claimed that the text was suitable for the ÍanbalÐs who are neither the early nor 
the middle levels. The third text, al-KafÐ was written for the middle level 
ÍanbalÐs whom are labelled as mujtaÎid within the madhhab. The text 
emphasises more on discussion of the legal evidence used by the ÍanbalÐs 
jurists134. The highest level text was al-MughnÐ in which it presented the 
disagreement between different schools of Islamic law.  
 
Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) emerged in the early eight century Hijri. His 
affiliation to the ÍanbalÐ school however, has become a subject of interest 
among contemporary researchers. Some view that he was a ÍanbalÐ who at 
later stage became absolutely independent jurist and capable of forming his 
own school. The others consider him a loyal ÍanbalÐ right until the end of his 
                                                 
133 Ibid, pp. 426. 
134 ‘Umar SulaymÁn al-Ashqar, al-Madkhal ‘ilÁ DirÁsat -il al-Madhhab wa al-MadÁris al-
Fiqhiyyah, pp. 191. 
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life. Since the subject is beyond the scope of this study, my viewpoint in this 
matter is based on a study conducted by al-Matroudi135.   
 
Based on comparison of the general principles and sources of law employed by 
Ibn Íanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Matroudi concludes that the latter was 
affiliated to the school of the ÍanbalÐs. However, Ibn Taymiyyah’s loyalty to 
the school doctrine was lower as compared to other ÍanbalÐ jurists. Ibn 
Taymiyyah contradicted Ibn Íanbal in many issues such as in his fatwÁ 
concerning the ‘triple divorce’. He also criticised some rulings of later ÍanbalÐs 
which he believed had been influenced by innovation resulting from the misuse 
of maÒlaÎah principles, invalid analogy and creative method of fiqh writing136.  
 
Ibn Taymiyyah left considerable amount of notable treatises in fiqh such as al-
MuÎarrar and the fatÁwÁ of Ibn Taymiyyah. The latter have been collected in 
various compilations such as MajmÙÝ al-FatÁwÁ, al-FatÁwÁ al-KubrÁ, al-FatÁwÁ 
al-ÝIraqiyyah and MajmÙÝ al-RasÁ’il. Nevertheless, because of his controversy, 
none of his great treatises are examined in this study.     
 
The Early Development of ÍanbalÐs Rules on MuÃÁrabah 
 
The development of ÍanbalÐs rules on muÃÁrabah is examined in the four legal 
texts. They are MasÁÞil Ibn Íanbal, MukhtaÒar al-KhiraqÐ, al-MughnÐ of Ibn 
QudÁmah and al-FurÙÝ of Ibn MuflaÎ (d.763/1362). The MasÁ’il only recorded 
two responses of Ibn Íanbal relating to the muÃÁrabah issue. The first response 
is regarding the transgression of agent manager. Ibn Íanbal ruled that if agent 
manager appeared to have breach the contract agreement, all profit generated 
from the business will be given to the investor. The agent manager will be paid 
a reasonable hire wage (ujr mithil) for the work had been done. However, if the 
business suffer losses, the agent manager will be liable to replace the capital. 
The second response is pertaining to the question whether merchandises (al-
                                                 
135 Abdul Íakim I. al-Matroudi, The Íanbali School of Law and Ibn Taymiyyah Conflict or 
Conciliation, London: Routledge, 2006.  
136 Ibid, pp.186-191. 
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ÝurÙÃ) can be accepted as capital in the contract. Interestingly, the MasÁ’il 
which I refer to (the narration of IshÁq b. MansÙr al-MarÙzÐ d.251), did not 
provide answer to the question. Ibn Íanbal’s view in the matter was taken from 
another version of the text137.   
 
Having reviewed the note of muÃÁrabah in the MasÁÞil, I personally think that it 
represents a far less than preliminary discourse of ÍanbalÐ’s doctrine on the 
contract. In terms of the subject contents, the discussed issues did not give clear 
indication of the muÃÁrabah salient features. The two rules recorded in the 
MasÁÞil represent only negligible section of vast practical issues of the contract. 
Besides, the MasÁÞil also lack of juristic clarification as the responses of Ibn 
Íanbal were stipulated in very brief statements. Hence, as far as muÃÁrabah 
contract is concerned, I think the MasÁÞil can not be regarded as the main 
source that established the fundamental principles of ÍanbalÐ doctrine for later 
development. 
 
Approximately a century later, al-KhiraqÐ emerged with his legal manual 
(mukhtaÒar) of the school. Although the mukhtaÒar did not represent a complete 
doctrine, it comprised fundamental elements of the muÃÁrabah’s discussion. A-
KhiraqÐ elucidated the rules under the chapter of shÐrkah (partnership) contract. 
He probably the first ÍanbalÐ jurist who expounded the theory that muÃÁrabah 
was legitimised in conformity with the analogy (epistemology discussion 
elaborated in detail in chapter 2). Al-KhiraqÐ described 9 problems (mas’alah) 
of the contract in which Ibn QudÁmah in his al-MughnÐ expanded them into 41 
sections (fuÒÙl). The summary of the masÞalah and fuÒÙl are shown in table 5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
137 AÎmad ibn Íanbal, MasÁ’il al-ImÁm AÎmad Ibn Íanbal wa IsÎÁq b. Ruwaiyah narrated by 
IsÎÁq b. MansÙr al-MarÙzÐ, Medina: Saudi Arabia, 2004.  
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Table 5 : The development of muÃÁrabah rules in al-MughnÐ  
No. Al-KhiraqÐ’s text 
(mas’alah) 
Ibn QudÁmah’s clarification (fusÙl) 
1. Issue in the determination of agent manager’s share 
2. Issue where profit ratio was not spelled out in 
proportionate division 
3. Issue in which profit will be only received by one 
party 
4. MudÁrabah contract of multiple agent managers 
5. MuÃÁrabah contract of multiple investors 
6. Allocating profit to third party 
1. Profit is distributed 
according to pre-agreed 
ratio  
7.  MuÃÁrabah becomes invalid if agent manager is 
guaranteed with profit  
8. Travelling issue of agent manager 
9. Agent manager is perceived as wakÐl (agent) in 
managing investor’s money 
10.  Can agent manager buy things using foreign 
currency? 
11. Can agent manager buy defect items? 
12. The purchase of slave with the intention to free 
him/her without permission from the investor 
13. Various other issues pertaining to purchasing of slave 
using muÃÁrabah capital 
14. Agent manager purchases something valued more 
than the capital 
15. Issues concerning sexual intercourse of agent 
manager and slaves bought using muÃÁrabah capital 
16. Agent manager entrusts the capital to others without 
having investor’s permission 
17.  Agent manager commingles the capital with other 
funds 
2. Agent manager will 
become liable (ÃÁman) if 
he makes credit 
transaction in one of the 
narrations. The other 
narration says that he is 
not liable. 
18. Agent manager purchases alcohol and pork 
19.  Various issues dealing with agent manager who 
involved in multiple muÃÁrabah business  
20. Agent manager has right to conduct muÃÁrabah 
business himself based on custom (Ýurf) principles.  
21 Issue in which capital was stolen  
3. If an agent manager had 
agreed to work on 
muÃÁrabah contract with 
someone, he can not 
engages another 
muÃÁrabah with others, 
especially if the second 
contract cause harm to the 
first venture.     
22. Issue in which slave bought for muÃÁrabah was 
murdered by another slave 
23. Case where capital is 100 and loss is 10. Then the 
investor takes the 10. 
4. There is no profit for 
muÃÁrabah until the 
capital has been restored. 24. Case in which investor uses capital to purchase thing 
for his own purpose  
25. Investor who engages into muÃÁrabah contract while 
in dying condition 
26. Investor dies during the muÃÁrabah contract 
5. Agent manager purchases 
two sale items in which he 
earns profit for one and 
makes loss for the other.  27. Agent manager dies and nobody knows the owner of 
muÃÁrabah capital which is in his possession 
28. Case where one of the contracting parties wants to 
divide the expected profit whereas the other refuses  
29. MuÃÁrabah is one of the contract of al-jÁ'Ðzah; could 
be terminated at any time by either of the contracting 
parties.   
6. When agent manager 
expects profit from 
muÃÁrabah business, he is 
not allowed to take the 
profit without permission 
from the investor 30. MuÃÁrabah contract was terminated in which the 
business bear debt. 
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31. MuÃÁrabah would be terminated if one of the 
contracting parties dies or become mentally unstable. 
32. Conditions (shurÙÔ) in muÃÁrabah 
33. MuÃÁrabah with fixed duration limit 
34. Agent manager imposed condition to support his 
maintenance (nafqah).  
35. Invalid conditions are classified into three types 
7. Case where investor and 
agent manager agreed to 
collectively share the 
profit and the monetary 
loss.  
36. Explanation on the rules of invalid muÃÁrabah 
37. MuÃÁrabah capital should be known and precisely 
determined 
8. Case hiwÁlah (transfer of 
debt) in muÃÁrabah. 
38. Case where a person brought two bags of money and 
said that I invest one of them 
39. The investment of money obtained from extortion.  
40. Agent manager is perceived as trustworthy person 
9. The acceptability of 
property in safekeeping as 
muÃÁrabah capital 41. Disputes in muÃÁrabah 
 
Obviously, the rules of muÃÁrabah were developed significantly during the time 
of Ibn QudÁmah. He expanded the previous discussion on muÃÁrabah to certain 
extends achieved its maturity level. The 41 fusÙl resemble all important rulings 
of the contract within the context of medieval commercial dealings. Therefore, 
I conclude that the ÍanbalÐ rules on this subject became complete during the 
late sixth century Íijri. In order to verify this premise, we will investigate 
further the discussion of the contract in later ÍanbalÐ jurists’ writing. In this 
regard, we will examine the text al-FurÙÝ of Ibn MuflaÎ.  
 
As compared to the al-MughnÐ, the discussion of muÃÁrabah contract in al-
FurÙÝ is more concise. In elaborating the ÍanbalÐ rules of muÃÁrabah, Ibn 
MuflaÎ emphasised two topics (profit and empowerment of agent manager). 
Among the issues of profit addressed were the cases of unspeficed profit ratio 
and distribution of profit while the business remains. The discussed problems 
relating to the empowerment of agent manager involved the questions to what 
extend an agent manager was allowed to make bussines travel, purchase, hire 
and held responsibility in managing the investor's money138.  It is found that all 
the rules asserted by Ibn MuflaÎ were repetitive to the rules expounded by Ibn 
QudÁmah. Besides, the rules are stipulated without explaining their 
justifications. Nevertheless, the text al-FurÙÝ is still worth reviewing as it 
contains a lot of inter-disagreement within the school. Ibn MuflaÎ exemplified 
                                                 
138‘Abdullah MuÎammad b. MuflaÎ al-MaqdisÐ, al-FurÙ‘, Beirut: ‘└lam al-KutÙb, 1985, vol. 4, 
pp.383.   
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all different narrations and opinions of later ÍanbalÐs and made tarjiÎ between 
them.  
 
MuÃÁrabah in the Contemporary Juristic Writtings 
 
The previous discussions show the growth of muÃÁrabah doctrine from the 
period of the second until the eight century Hijri. From the discussions, we 
know that despite varying in their phases of development, all of the four Sunni 
schools had a comprehensive doctrine by the end of the sixth century Hijri. 
These classical rules were believed to be the references in governing the 
muÃÁrabah practices of the medieval period.  
 
With the re-introduction of the muÃÁrabah in the Islamic banks since 1970’s, 
one will likely to wonder whether the modern jurists had enhanced the classical 
doctrines when adapting them to the modern banking business environment. 
Have the modern jurists incorporated the recent application of the muÃÁrabah 
contract in their writings? The investigation on this issue brings me to the 
review of three works of the modern jurists. They are Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ wa-
Adillatuh of Wahbah al-ZuÎaylÐ, Fiqh al-Sunnah of Sayyid SÁbiq, and Fiqh al-
ManhÁjÐ ÝalÁ Madhhab al-ShÁfiÝÐ of MuÒtafÁ al-Khin, MuÒtafÁ al-BughÁ and ÝAlÐ 
al-SharbajÐ. These books were written based on different writing methods and 
approaches. Wahbah al-ZuÎaylÐ wrote his book using the fiqh comparison 
method in which muÃÁrabah rules were explained by highlighting the classical 
jurists’ disagreement. Meanwhile Sayyid SÁbiq who was influenced by the 
salafÐ movement139, attempted to produce a fiqh doctrine that tied its rules as 
directly as possible to sunnah. The third book was produced by a group of 
contemporary ShÁfiÝÐ scholars who aim to provide a simple but comprehensive 
ShÁfiÝÐs' legal doctrine for current ShÁfiÝÐs.           
  
                                                 
139 Established to institute religious behaviour and practices that capture the purity of Islam, as 
understood by the salÁf  (early Companion of the Prophet). This group asserts that all Muslims 
actions must be based upon the Qur’Án and sunnah. For detail discussion, see Quitan 
Wiktorowicz, The Salafi Movement in Jordan, International Journal of Middle East Study, 32 
(2000), 219-240.   
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As far as the subject coverage is concerned, Wahbah al-ZuÎaylÐ’s work 
represents the most comprehensive discussion on the mudÁrabah contract. He 
adopts al-KÁsÁnÐ's approach and describes the rules within the classication of 
unrestricted and restricted contract (muÃÁrabah muÔlaqah and muÃÁrabah 
muqayyadah). The classification has influenced many contemporary scholars 
when writing the fiqh aspect of Islamic banking and finance140. The 
classification also has been adopted widely by the Islamic bankers in designing 
their investment products. However, in terms of the development of new 
rulings, Wahbah's work is less significant. The rules discussed in his book are 
merely compilation of the classical jurists' rulings. There is no serious attempt 
being made to make ijtihÁd in relation to the modern application of the 
muÃÁrabah in the Islamic banks. Perhaps, the only new contribution of Wahbah 
in this subject is his remark on whether various forms of contemporary 
corporations could be regarded as applying the muÃÁrabah. Interestingly, he 
views that none of the modern corporations are established exactly under the 
principles of the contract. For instance, he asserts that the joint-stock company 
is created through the application of hybrid contracts (not solely on muÃÁrabah 
as generally assumed). This is because the shareholders might be considered as 
rabb al-mÁl (investors) but the managers and employees are regarded as 
workers who work for fixed wages (under hire-wages employee contract)141.   
 
Sayyid SÁbiq discusses the rules of the muÃarabah in much more concise 
manner. His method of writing consists of the following discussion outlines: 
definition, legal evidences, rationale of permissibility, essential elements 
(arkÁn) and conditions (shurÙÔ). He analyses the rules by adopting non-
affiliation of madhhab approach. As such, most of the rules are presented in 
undisputed style. It should be noted however, the undisputed style is fairly 
maintained throught out the book because the writer avoids the detailed 
discussions pertaining to the practical issues of the contract. For example, in 
elucidating the scope of empowerment of an agent manager, Sayyid SÁbiq 
                                                 
140 See for example, An Introduction to Islamic Finance of MuÎammad TaqÐ Usmani, Karachi, 
1998.   
141 Wahbah al-ZuÎailÐ,al-Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ wa Adillatuh, Damascus: DÁr al-Fikr, 1997, vol. 5, 
pp.3930.  
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briefly stated that ‘when the contract of muÃÁrabah was agreed and the agent 
manager possessed the capital; he was perceived to be a trustworthy person. He 
would not be liable unless for his negligence’142. He did not elaborate in detail 
what is meant by the word negligence. What are the activities allowed and 
prohibited for an agent manager? These were the issues with which the 
classical jurists had differed. Furthermore, in relation to our purpose of 
investigation, Fiqh al-Sunnah does not bring any enhancement of the classical 
muÃÁrabah doctrine. The muÃÁrabah rules in the book are basically the 
collection of agreed or standard rulings of the medieval jurists.  
 
A similar finding is found when reviewing the third book, Fiqh al-MinhÁjÐ ÝalÁ 
Madhhab al-ShÁfiÝÐ. The application of the muÃÁrabah in the contemporary 
banking sector does not attract the writers' attention. Rather they maintain the 
approach of not involving in the ijtihadi discussion and simply narrate the 
classical ShÁfiÝÐs doctrine. Moreover, some of the classical rules described seem 
unfeasible in the context of current business situations. For instance, the writers 
uphold the classical rule of the ShÁfi‘Ðs who against any determination of the 
duration in a muÃÁrabah. According to the rule, muÃÁrabah investment can not 
be specified for a limited period but should be left open until one of the 
contracting parties decides to withdraw from the contract. Considering the 
present business environment, such an investment deal is difficult to work out. 
Without having a specificied period of investment, muÃÁrabah venture will be 
very risky for most of the current investors. Nonetheless, this issue has not been 
discussed by the authors of Fiqh al-MinhÁjÐ ÝalÁ Madhhab al-ShÁfiÝÐ.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142 Sayyid SÁbiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, Beirut: DÁr al-KitÁb al-ÝArabÐ, 1985, vol. 3, pp.208. 
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Conclusion 
 
The emergence of various schools in Islamic law is a result of different 
orientations adopted by the early jurists when interpreting the divine sources of 
sharÐÝah (the QurÞÁn and Sunnah). During the second century Hijri, the two 
distinct schools were aÒÎÁb al-raÞy (rationalist) and aÒÎÁb al-ÎadÐth. In 
developing their fiqh doctrines, the former school would use human reasoning 
whereas the latter school would strictly infer rules to the divine sources. The 
early prominent jurists such as MÁlik, AbÙ Íanifah, Ibn AbÐ LaylÁ, al-AwzÁÝÐ, 
SufyÁn al-ThawrÐ, al-ShÁfiÝÐ, AÎmad ibn Íanbal were attached to one of the 
orientations though varying in their degree of adaptation. These jurists 
established their personal schools through teching circles held in cities such as 
Kufah, Basrah, Baghdad, Madinah and Damascus. The personal schools were 
then slowly transformed into doctrinal schools by their loyal students. Out of a 
number of personal schools, only four survived in the current Sunni world. 
They are the ÍanafÐs, MÁlikÐs, ShafiÝÐs and ÍanbalÐs. 
 
Our investigation concerning the development of the muÃÁrabah rules reveals 
similar trend of juristic growth. With the exception of AÎmad ibn Íanbal, all 
other eponmys could be considered as the founders of the muÃÁrabah 
discussions within their respective schools. As is evident in al-MuwaÔÔaÞ, JÁmÐÝ 
al-ÒaghÐr and al-Umm, the salient features of the contract were explained 
preliminary by MÁlik, AbÙ ÍanÐfah and al-ShÁfiÝÐ. The subsequent generations 
of jurists expanded the fundamental rules in line with the changes of economics 
and business settings. For instance, from 4 major topics of the muÃÁrabah 
discussed by al-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-ShÐrazÐ elaborated them into 32 sections. The 
expansion process happened at different phases between the schools.  
 
It is appeared that the MÁlikÐs and the ÍanafÐs have advanced in their legal 
writing of the muÃÁrabah contract earlier than the ShÁfiÝÐs and the ÍanbalÐs. 
The MÁlikÐs had a complete text in the subject probably at the end of the second 
century and the ÍanafÐs had it in the late third century Hijri. The ShÁfiÝÐs had a 
comprehensive discussion of the muÃÁrabah contract by the end of the fourth 
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century. Meanwhile, the ÍanbalÐs only had a well written doctrine of the 
contract by the end of sixth century. My finding refines Schacht's theory who 
believed that all the essential questions in Islamic law had been thoroughly 
discussed and finally settled by the fourth century Hijri. Schacht is right in 
reference to the three schools named earlier.  
 
The majority of jurists during the fifth century Hijri and onwards did not 
produce significant new rules in muÃÁrabah. However, they did organise the 
discussion of the topic in a more systematic way. Most of the discussions of 
this period consist of muÃÁrabah's definition, legal evidences (dalÐl), essential 
elements (arkÁn) and conditions (shurÙÔ). In addition, the writing style of the 
text had been changed; from problem-based (masÁÞÐl) to legal manual 
(mukhtaÒar) style. Hence, the discussions of the muÃÁrabah of this period 
normally were concise and brief.     
 
The study on the development of muÃÁrabah rules has helped me understand 
better the classical discussions regarding the contract. By understanding each 
school historical background, I could identify the different methodologies 
adopted by the classical jurists when formulating their muÃÁrabah doctrines. 
The root of disagreement among the schools becomes clearer after knowing 
each school orientation in interpreting the sharÐÝah. The ÍanafÐs were known as 
inclining to adopt human reasoning extensively. Thus, most of their rules 
regarding the practice of muÃÁrabah seemed to be accommodating the needs of 
muÃÁrib (agent manager). In contrast, the ÍanbalÐs and MÁlikÐs were viewed as 
the supporters of traditionalists' group. They would rely heavily on sunnah in 
deducing new problems of the muÃÁrabah business. However, since the sunnah 
pertaining to the muÃÁrabah contract was limited, Ahmad ibn Íanbal and 
MÁlik's responses (fatÁwÁ) had become their main source of reference.  
 
On the other hand, al-ShÁfiÝÐ was known as the jurist who attempted to produce 
a compromise doctrine between the traditionalists and the rationalists group. He 
tried to mediate between the strict rejections of all human reasoning 
propounded by the former and the unrestricted use of personal opinion adapted 
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by the later. This is done by developing a science of Islamic legal methodology 
which known as uÒÙl fiqh. In the following chapter we will see more clearly 
these differences of legal methodology when discussing the detail rules of a 
muÃÁrabah contract.      
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CHAPTER TWO: MUÂÀRABAH DOCTRINES OF THE FOUR 
SUNNI SCHOOLS OF LAW 
 
Introduction 
 
The present chapter studies the doctrine of muÃÁrabah of the four major Sunni 
schools of law (ÍanafÐs, MÁlikÐs, ShÁfiÝÐs and ÍanbalÐs). It analyses their 
rulings pertaining to various practical issues of the contract, starting from the 
outset until it is to be liquidated. The discussions are organised into several 
sections. They begin with an explanation on the literal and legal meaning of the 
word muÃÁrabah and its relationship with other sharÐkah (partnership) 
contracts. Then it looks into the question of whether muÃÁrabah was 
legitimised against or in conformity to the rules of analogy (al-qiyÁs). Next, the 
chapter analyses the legal evidence used by the classical jurists in justifying the 
legitimacy of the contract. It assesses the opinion of Ibn Íazm (d.456/1064) 
who challenged the legality of muÃÁrabah evidences from the Qur’an and the 
ÎadÐth of the Prophet.   
 
After that, the discussion continues by elaborating the rules of muÃÁrabah’s 
essential elements (arkÁn). They are identified as capital, work, investor, agent 
manager and profit. For capital, the chapter explains the classical jurists’ 
opinion in determining the eligibility of gold, silver, goods, debts and property 
in safekeeping (wadÐÝah) as a form of muÃÁrabah investment. Discussion on 
work describes the legal and practical reasons why the majority of jurists 
restricted muÃÁrabah to trading activities. With regard to the investor and agent 
manager, the key discussion is to examine the relationship between the two 
parties. It focuses on the scope of empowerment given to the agent manager in 
investing the entrusted capital. Discussion on profit explains the rules and 
guidelines stipulated by the classical jurists concerning the proportional 
division of profit and its distribution method. 
 
In analysing the classical jurists’ rules, I adopt the comparative inter-madhhab 
approach. Hence, throughout the following sections, I highlight the 
disagreement between the schools over many issues and analyse their 
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justifications and legal reasoning. It is hoped that this chapter will be a valuable 
addition to our understanding of the classical muÃÁrabah theory. A 
comprehensive understanding of the theory is important to evaluate the sharÐÝah 
compliance of muÃÁrabah products in the Islamic banking institutions which 
will be dealt in the next chapter.        
 
The Definition of MuÃÁrabah and its Relationship with Other Partnership 
Contracts  
 
Literal meaning  
In the classical fiqh texts, muÃÁrabah is also known as al-qirÁÃ. Both 
terminologies indicate a similar meaning with the former was used by people in 
Iraq while the latter was used by people in Hijaz. In relation to this 
geographical basis, the ÍanafÐs and ÍanbalÐs usually referred the contract as 
muÃÁrabah whereas the MÁlikis and ShÁfiÝÐs referred it as al-qirÁÃ. The term 
muÃÁrabah literally is derived from the expression of Ãarb fi al-‘ard which 
means "making a journey". It is called muÃÁrabah because the contract 
normally requires the agent manager to travel, transporting merchandises from 
one place to another.  
 
Meanwhile, the origin of al-qirÁÃ was derived from two possible words; qaraÃ 
and muqÁraÃah.  The former means cutting and the latter means equality. Al-
qirÁÃ was said derived from qaraÃ because the investor and the agent-manager 
will be cutting their deposition of money for each other. At the beginning of the 
contract, the investor will cut some portion of his money and entrust them to 
the agent-manager.  When the business is to be liquidated, the agent-manager 
will cut some portion of profit generated from his works to share with the 
investor. On the other hand, al-qirÁÃ was possibly derived from muqÁraÃah due 
to the element of equality embedded in the contract. Al-qirÁÃ is viewed as an 
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equal contract since it requires both contracting parties to share certain degree 
of risks before they can enjoy any business profit143.    
 
According to SarakshÐ, the term muÃÁrabah is preferred over al-qirÁÃ because it 
is mentioned in the Qur’an. He stated in KitÁb al-MabsuÔ, ' indeed we (the 
Íanafis) chose the first terminology (muÃÁrabah) because it is in congruence 
with the book of Allah'144. He based his opinion on the verse 73:20, '' Others 
travelling through the land seeking of Allah's bounty'. SarakshÐ viewed that the 
phrase 'travelling through the land'' as specifically denoting the contract of 
muÃÁrabah. However, SarakshÐ's opinion was disputed by majority of jurists. 
They believed that the phrase indicates a broad meaning in which could be 
interpreted as muÃÁrabah or other types of business journeys made for the sake 
of God. Hence according to the majority of jurists, the verse is not valid 
evidence in justifying the preference of the term muÃÁrabah over al-qirÁÃ. 
Based on this view, the difference between both terminologies is seen merely as 
due to the divergence of geographical background and therefore could be used 
interchangeably. For the purpose of this study, however, I will use the term 
muÃÁrabah. My reason for choosing the terminology is only based on its 
popularity. In the modern literature either in fiqh or in the Islamic banking 
subject, the term muÃÁrabah is used more widely as compared to al-qirÁÃ.  
 
Legal Meaning 
In spite of the different terminologies, the classical jurists were unanimous in 
their legal definition of the contract. They referred muÃÁrabah or al-qirÁÃ as a 
contract between two parties, one (called the investor) entrusts money to the 
other party (called the agent-manager) to commence a business venture. Any 
realised profit will be shared between the two parties based on the profit ratio 
decided at the beginning of the contract.  
 
                                                 
143 ShirbÐnÐ, MuÎammad ibn MuÎammad. MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj MaÝÁni al-fÁz al-MinhÁj/ sharÎ 
MuÎammad al-ShirbÐnÐ al-KhaÔÐb ÝalÁ matn al-MinhÁj li-AbÐ ZakarÐyÁ YaÎya ibn Sharaf al-
NawawÐ. Misr: SharÐkat wa MaÔbaÝat MustafÁ al-BÁbÐ al-ÍalabÐ, 1958, vol. 2, pp. 309. 
144 SarakshÐ, MuÎammad ibn AÎmad. KitÁb al-MabsÙÔ. Misr: MaÔbaÝat al-SaÝÁdah, 1324-
1331/1906-13, vol. 22, pp. 18. 
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The following are the legal definitions of muÃÁrabah described by the jurists of 
the main references in this study: 
1. SarakshÐ of the ÍanafÐs explained, 'muÃÁrabah is derived from Ãarb fi 
al-‘arÃ, it is called with such term because the agent-manager is entitled 
for the profit derived from his efforts and works, he is the investor's 
partner in profit, capital and business decision making'.  
2. Al-KhalÐl of the MÁlikÐs defined, 'qirÁÃ is an act of appointing an agent 
(tawkÐl) to conduct business by giving (the agent-manager) cash for 
some return of business' profit'145.  
3. Al-NawawÐ of the ShÁfiÝÐs illustrated, 'qirÁÃ or muÃÁrabah takes place 
when a man had been handed money to trade with and (any realised) 
profit will be shared between the two parties'146.  
4. Ibn QudÁmah of the ÍanbalÐs explained the contract as,' a person gives 
someone his money to trade with and any realised profit will be shared 
between the two parties based on the pre-agreed ratio'147       
 
The above definitions demonstrate dissimilar approaches taken by the jurists 
when describing the muÃÁrabah contract. SarakhsÐ explained the contract from 
the perspective of agent-manager; al-KhalÐl and Ibn Qudamah from the 
viewpoint of investor and al-NawawÐ from the outlook of an outsider. 
Nonetheless, all of them addressed similar salient features which form the 
fundamental elements of the contract. In order to execute a valid muÃÁrabah 
contract there are five elements need be clearly identified; the investor (rabb al-
mÁl), agent manager (muÃÁrib), capital, work and profit.  
 
It is noteworthy that the contract of muÃÁrabah was often discussed together 
with the mushÁrakah contract. In the following section, we will examine further 
the relationship between the two contracts. 
                                                 
145 DusÙqÐ, MuÎammad ibn AÎmad ibn ÝArafah, ÍÁshÐyat al-DusÙqÐ ÝalÁ al-SharÎ al-kabÐr (ÝalÁ 
MukhtaÒar KhalÐl) li AÎmad al-DardÐr maÝa taqrÐrÁt li MuÎammad ÝUllaysh. Cairo: ÝIsÁ al-BÁbÐ 
al-ÍalabÐ, n.d. vol. 3, pp. 518. 
146 ShirbinÐ, MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj maÝÁni alfÁz al-MinhÁj, vol. 2, pp. 309. 
147 Ibn QudÁmah, ÝAbd AllÁh ibn AÎmad, Muwaffaq al-Din. Al-MughnÐ/ tahqiq ÝAbd AllÁh ibn 
al-MuÎsin al-TurkÐ, ÝAbd al-FattÁÎ MuÎammad al-Íulw. Al-RiyÁd: DÁr ÝÀlam al-Kutub, 1999, 
4th edition, vol. 7, pp.132. 
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The Relationship between MuÃÁrabah and MushÁrakah Contracts 
 
MushÁrakah literally means sharing. Legally, it refers to partnership contracts 
in which two parties agreed to set up a joint business venture. The mushÁrakah 
partnership could take place in many forms. The most common forms 
elaborated by the classical jurists were; shirkah al-ÝinÁn (limited partnership), 
shirkah al-mufÁwaÃah (unlimited partnership), shirkah al-ÝamÁl/abdÁn (works 
partnership) and shirkah al-wujÙh (credit partnership). There was disagreement 
between the classical jurists in classifying muÃÁrabah within this mushÁrakah 
framework. The ÍanbalÐ jurists considered the former as part of the latter. 
Therefore, they elaborated the rules of muÃÁrabah under the broad chapter of 
kitÁb al-shirkah. In contrast, the majority of jurists including the ÍanafÐs, 
MÁlikÐs and ShÁfiÝÐs treated muÃÁrabah and mushÁrakah as two distinctive 
contracts. They normally explained the rules of the former under a separate 
chapter which excluded from the rules of shirkah al-ÝinÁn, al-mufÁwaÃah, al-
ÝamÁl/abdÁn and al-wujÙh.  
 
In his magnum opus al-MughnÐ, Ibn QudÁmah provided a clear distinction 
between these mushÁrakah contracts. His definitions could be summarised in 
table 6 below: 
Table 6: The contribution of partners in mushÁrakah contracts 
Types Partner A Partner B 
MuÃÁrabah capital work 
ÝInÁn capital and work capital and work 
MufÁwaÃah capital and work capital and work 
ÝÀmÁl/ AbdÁn work work 
WujÙh Work and debt Work and debt 
 
The contracts are defined based on the contribution of each individual partner. 
MuÃÁrabah is a contract whereby capital and work are provided by two 
distinctive parties. As ruled by the majority of jurists, the partner who provides 
capital is not permitted to participate in the business. The business' activities are 
entirely the responsibility of the other partner, called as muÃÁrib.  
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On the contrary, shirkah al-ÝinÁn and shirkah al- mufÁwaÃah are partnership 
contracts based on the contribution of money and work by every partner. 
However, the liability held by the partners in the former is limited whereas the 
liability in the latter is unlimited. In shirkah al-ÝinÁn, the loss will be shared 
between the partners according to their contribution of shares in capital, 
whereas in shirkah al-mufÁwaÃah all partners will bear equally the losses even 
though they exceed their contributed shares. This different rule is the result of 
dissimilar conditions required by the jurists when executing the contracts. In 
shirkah al-ÝinÁn, the contribution of capital by the partners does not necessarily 
have to be equal. The legal rights of each partner in utilising the capital also 
could vary since they are insignificantly related. However, in shirkah al-
mufÁwaÃah all aspects of the contract such as the contribution of capital, legal 
right in making business decisions, distribution of profit/loss and religion of 
partner (for some jurists) are required to be equal.    
 
Shirkah al-ÝamÁl/abdÁn is a contract solely based on the labour contribution of 
the partners. It takes place when two or more individual agree to embark on a 
joint labour project and share the wages from their work. There is no capital 
contribution made by either of the partner.  According to the ÍanafÐs and 
ÍanbalÐs, the partners of work partnership may be of similar or different 
specialisation148. In a housing project for example, according to both schools, 
contractors of different expertise such as in building, roof installation and 
plumbing could possibly form a partnership. However, the MÁlikÐs ruled that 
the partners should be of similar specialisation149. They only allowed a group of 
carpenters for example to work together and make furnishes for profit. The 
MÁlikÐs restrict the partners to be similar specialisation mainly to minimise 
gharÁr (uncertainty) arising due to the difference in nature of the work. Since 
work can not be measured accurately, sharing of profit from difference works 
of partners will lead to gharar. The ShÁfiÝÐs held similar argument with the 
                                                 
148 Ibn QudÁma, Al-MughnÐ, vol. 7, pp. 113.   
149 DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshÐyat al-DusÙqÐ ÝalÁ al-SharÎ al-kabÐr ÝalÁ MukhtaÒar KhalÐl. vol. 3, pp. 364-368.  
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MÁlikÐs but they reach a conclusion prohibiting entirely all sort of work 
partnership150. 
 
In the context of modern business milieu, shirkah al-wujÙh or credit partnership 
could be best described as a contract of two or more individuals who agree to 
set up a business by using borrowed capital. This means none of the partners 
contribute capital using their own money but they will work for the business.  
The proportion of credit held by each partner in forming the business will 
determine their ownership in the business and consequently their capacity in 
making business decisions and their ratios in sharing profit or loss. 
 
The approach adopted by Ibn QudÁmah in elaborating the above contracts is 
understandable. He clearly viewed muÃÁrabah as an extended form of the 
mushÁrakah contract. From Ibn QudÁmah’s perspective, all the contracts share 
similar mushÁrakah fundamental concepts. The contracts require the partners to 
bear a certain degree of business risk before they can share any potential profit. 
As explained earlier, the differences between the contracts mainly depend on 
the contribution of the partners151. A question remains in our mind; why did the 
majority of jurists not consider muÃÁrabah as part of the mushÁrakah contracts?   
 
Instead of classifying muÃÁrabah as part of the mushÁrakah contracts, the 
majority of jurists regarded the former as one of the contracts of exchange 
(ÝuqÙd al-muÝÁwaÃah). Specifically, they considered muÃÁrabah as similar to 
hire-wages contract. As it name implies the contract of exchange involves a 
trade between two monetary values. In the case of muÃÁrabah, the works of 
agent manager is monetarily recognised and therefore should be exchanged 
with fair wages. The basic rule of the contract of exchange necessitates that the 
wage of any employees is to be precisely determined before work is carried out. 
Any ambiguity relating to the wages will turn the contract into an invalid 
transaction. However, muÃÁrabah contract certainly does not comply with this 
                                                 
150 ShirbinÐ, MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj MaÝÁni AlfÁz al-MinhÁj. vol. 2, pp. 212. 
151 Though one must also bear in mind that in muÃÁrabah, only the investor will bear the 
monetary loss. 
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basic rule. The income of agent manager is uncertain or even unsecured as it 
depends on the amount of muÃÁrabah business profit. Having realised this 
issue, the majority of jurists inferred that muÃÁrabah contract was legitimised 
on the basis of dispensation (rukhÒah) and exception. This concept was often 
referred in the classical texts as a contract permitted against the rule of analogy 
(ÝalÁ khilÁf fÐl qiyÁs).  It indicates that the analogy of hire-wage contract can not 
be applied in the muÃÁrabah since the latter was legitimised on the basis of 
special consideration152. The rukhÒah concept has profound impact particularly 
in determining the nature of work allowed in the contract. We will discuss the 
issue in detail later in this chapter.  
 
Our concern at the moment is to examine why the classical jurists legitimised 
the muÃÁrabah even though it opposes the condition which requires certainty 
regarding the wages for the working party. The legal reason, as stated by 
SarakshÐ was mainly to fulfil the pressing economic necessity of the society153. 
The muÃÁrabah contract was needed in order to allow the two groups of people 
in the community to perform a business partnership. The first group are those 
who possess surplus cash but have limited trading skill while the second group 
are the traders who desperately need capital. Through the practice of 
muÃÁrabah contracts both groups could form a business venture and possibly 
gain better financial situation.  In fact, the muÃÁrabah was not the only contract 
legitimised on these exceptional grounds. The same legal reason was applied by 
the majority of jurists in justifying the legitimacy of al-muzÁraÝah 
(sharecropping) and bayÝ salÁm (forward sale) contracts. Applying the analogy 
of hire-wages and the rule of certainty in the object of sale to the contracts 
would turn them into unlawful transactions. In al-muzÁraÝah, the sharecroppers 
agree to cultivate the land based on unknown wages whereas in bayÝ salÁm the 
goods were sold even though they were not in possession of the seller. 
However, considering the needs of the society, both types of contract were 
legalised by the classical jurists.        
                                                 
152 Íasan al-AmÐn, al-MuÃÁrabah al-SharÝiyyah wa-TaÔbÐqahÁ al-ÍadÐthah, Jeddah: al-MaÝhad 
al-IslÁmÐ lil-Tanmiyyah, 2000, pp.23. 
153 SarakshÐ, KitÁb al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp. 19. 
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The ÍanbalÐs viewed the legality of muÃÁrabah to be in conformity with the 
rule of analogy. They emphasised that muÃÁrabah is not a contract of exchange 
but is one of the mushÁrakah contracts. Hence, for the ÍanbalÐs the issue of 
uncertainty of the agent manager’s income does not arise. MuÃÁrabah is totally 
different from the contract of hire-wages between employee and employer. 
Knowing the nature of muÃÁrabah as part of partnership contract, the agent 
manager is aware that his income is not fixed and guaranteed. He shares the 
risk of conducting a business together with the investor as provider of capital. 
 
The Legitimacy of MuÃÁrabah Contract 
 
Contrary to the majority of classical jurists, Ibn Hazm (d.456/1064) thought 
that the legitimacy of muÃÁrabah was established solely based on the 
consensus (ijmÁÝ). He did not accept the validity of the verses of the Qur’an 
and ÎadÐth of the Prophet on which relied most of the classical jurists in 
justifying the legal position of the contract. In his MarÁtib al-IjmÁÝ, Ibn Hazm 
stated that: 
‘All topics in Islamic jurisprudence have evidence in the 
Qur’an and the sunnah except al-qirÁÃ. We did not find any 
evidence from the sunnah but there is evidence from the 
ijmÁÝ’154. 
 
This section attempts to appraise Ibn Hazm's opinion by analysing the legality 
and the authority of muÃÁrabah’s legal evidences. 
 
Some jurists considered the verse 73:20, 'Others travelling through the land 
seeking of Allah's bounty' as one of the pieces of evidence which indicates the 
legitimacy of the muÃÁrabah contract. The verse uses the verb yaÃrib which is 
the similar root word of muÃÁrabah. Thus according to the jurists, the phrase 
'travelling through the land'' specifically denotes the muÃÁrabah contract155. 
                                                 
154 NawÁwÐ, YaÎya ibn Sharaf, al-MajmÙÝ sharÎ al-Muhadhdhab lil ShÐrÁzÐ. al-QÁhirah: 
ZakarÐyÁ ÝAlÐ YÙsÙf, 1966-69, vol. 14, pp. 191. 
155 El Sharif B.B.K. Law and practice of profit sharing in Islamic banking with particular 
reference to muÃÁrabah and murÁbaÎah. Phd Thesis, University of Exeter, 1990, pp.   
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Besides, al-MÁwardÐ believed that the contract is also mentioned in the Qur'an 
in another verse. He referred to the verse 2:198, 'It is no sin for you to seek (by 
trading) the bounty of your Lord '156. This verse encourages Muslims to 
perform various business activities as a means of achieving Allah's bounty. The 
verse uses the word ibtaghÙ (searching) which has no relation to the muÃÁrabah 
contract. However, al-MÁwardÐ interpreted the general encouragement as 
referring to the muÃÁrabah contract alone.  
 
Based on the justifications, perhaps we can understand why Ibn Íazm refused 
to accept the relevance of the verses. He disagreed with the jurists who 
broadened the meaning of the verses into muÃÁrabah contract. From his point 
of view, there is no sufficient evident to link the verses to the said contract. 
Therefore, Ibn Íazm contended that the verses should be maintained in their 
general meaning which includes all types of business contracts made for the 
sake of Allah.       
 
The aÎadÐth (plural form of ÎadÐth) of the Prophet that demonstrate the legality 
of muÃÁrabah could be classified into sunnah qauliyyah and sunnah taqrÐriyyah. 
The former signifies a verbal statement from the Prophet while the latter refers 
to his affirmation of an action done by someone other than him. One of the 
sunnah qauliyyah was narrated in the collection of ÎadÐth of Ibn MÁjah. The 
Prophet (pbuh) was reported as saying ‘Three transactions have God’s blessing; 
sale with deferred payment, muqÁradah (i.e. muÃÁrabah) and mixing wheat 
with barley for home usage and not for sale’157. However, the authenticity of 
the ÎadÐth was doubted by majority of the traditionists. The ÎadÐth is classified 
as ÃaÝÐf (weak) because one of the narrators namely NaÒr ibn al-Qasim is 
majhÙl (his credentials are not known)158.    
 
                                                 
156 ShirbinÐ, MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj MaÝÁni AlfÁz al-MinhÁj, vol. 2, pp. 309. 
157 Ibn MÁjah, Sunan Ibn MÁjah, KitÁb al-TijÁrÁt, BÁb al-Sharikah wa al-MuÃÁrabah, ÎadÐth 
no.2377, Stuttgart: Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation, 2000, pp. 331 
158 Mohd Faiz Hakimi et. al, MuÃÁrabah Perkongsian Modal dan Untung. Kuala Lumpur: 
Academy of Islamic Studies, University of Malaya, 2008, pp. 40.  
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The other Îadith in this regard is sunnah taqrÐriyyah. In the ÎadÐth, the Prophet 
did not give a verbal verdict on the permissibility of muÃÁrabah contract but he 
did acknowledge silently the contract performed by Companions.  ÍakÐm ibn 
ÍizÁm and ÝAbbÁs ibn ÝAbd al-MuÔallib were reported as stipulating several 
conditions to their agent-managers in muÃÁrabah contracts. They prohibited the 
agent-manager from buying living things and from travelling through sea and 
flooded valleis. The Prophet was informed of the conditions and he did not 
oppose to them. According to majority of jurists, the Prophet's approval clearly 
indicates the legitimacy of muÃÁrabah contract. Furthermore, the ÎadÐth was 
classified as ÒaÎÐÎ and narrated by many traditionists such as al-DÁruquÔnÐ159 
and Ibn Íajar al-ÝAsqÁlÁnÐ160.  
 
As far as I have been able to ascertain, the two aÎadÐth mentioned here are the 
most relevant evidence from the Prophet MuÎammad in proving the legitimacy 
of the muÃÁrabah contract. There are other aÎÁdÐth reported by the traditionists 
but they are indirectly related to the contract. For example, a traditionist AbÙ 
DÁwÙd included ÎadÐth between the Prophet and ÍakÐm ibn ÍizÁm as one of 
the evidences. It was reported that the Prophet had given one dÐnÁr to ÍakÐm to 
buy an animal for holy slaughtering (al-'aÃÎiyyah). ÍakÐm bought a sheep with 
the money. He then sold the sheep for two dinÁr. Having two dinÁr in his hand, 
ÍakÐm bought another sheep for one dinÁr and returned to the Prophet with the 
remaining one dinÁr. The Prophet donated the money to charity and praised 
ÍakÐm's trading skill.                
 
AbÙ DÁwÙd narrated this ÎadÐth and categorised it under the sub-topic of 
muÃÁrib yukhÁlif (agent-manager who breaches a muÃÁrabah contract)161. He 
opined that when the Prophet gave one dinar to ÍakÐm, it was based on the 
                                                 
159 DÁraquÔnÐ, ÝÀli ibn ÝUmar, Sunan al-DÁraquÔnÐ/ Ýuniya bi-taÒÎÐhi wa-tarqÐmihi wa-taÎqÐqihi 
al-Sayyid ÝAbd AllÁh HashÐm YamÁnÐ al-MadanÐ. Al-Qahirah: DÁr al-MaÎÁsÐn, 1980, vol. 3-4, 
BÁb al-buyÙÝ, ÎadÐth no.246, pp. 63. 
160 Ibn Íajar al-ÝAsqalÁnÐ, AÎmad Ibn ÝAlÐ. al-MaÔÁlib al-ÝÁliyah bÐ-zawÁÝid al-thamÁniyah/ 
taÎqÐq AbÐ BilÁl Ghunaym ibn ÝAbbas ibn Ghunaym, AbÐ Tamim ibn IbrahÐm MuÎammad. Al-
RiyaÃ: DÁr al-WaÔar, 1997, vol. 2, BÁb al-QirÁÃ, ÎadÐth no. 1472, pp. 118.   
161 AbÙ DÁwÙd, SulaymÁn ibn al-AshÝath, Sunan AbÙ DÁwÙd, ÎadÐth no. 3384, Cairo: DÁr IÎyÁ' 
al-Sunnah al-NabawÐyah, 1950, vol. 3, pp. 256. 
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contract of muÃÁrabah. However, this opinion contradicts the majority of jurists 
who often referred the ÎadÐth as a case of wakÁlah (agency) contract. According 
to the majority of jurists, the Prophet had appointed ÍakÐm as his agent to buy 
certain thing in the market. As an agent, ÍakÐm not only did what he supposed 
to but came back to the Prophet with a surplus of one dÐnÁr. Although ÍakÐm 
seemed to disobey the original order, his action was approved by the Prophet. 
Hence, based on this ÎadÐth, the jurists gave permission to an agent to do extra 
effort for the benefit of his master (the man who gives him the authority). More 
importantly, the ÎadÐth is regarded by the jurists as a case of wakÁlah not 
muÃÁrabah contract.        
 
As far as Ibn Íazm is concerned, he clearly rejected the validity of the ÎadÐth 
of Ibn MÁjah because it is classified as ÃaÝÐf. However, one would wonder 
about his basis in rejecting the ÎadÐth of al-DÁruquÔnÐ and al-'AsqÁlÁnÐ since its 
authority has been recognised by many traditionists. Commenting on this 
matter, al-NawawÐ offered a very simple explanation. He presumed that Ibn 
Íazm never heard of the ÎadÐth162. In my opinion, perhaps this matter 
demonstrates a bigger issue relating to Ibn Íazm's legal methodology. Ibn 
Íazm's rejection of the ÎadÐth confirms his strict standard in accepting a 
particular ÎadÐth as the sources of law. The present case is another example 
whereby Ibn Íazm in his KitÁb al-IÎkÁm had rejected many aÎÁdÐth which his 
adversaries rely on163. Therefore, I hypothetically think that he did not 
recognised sunnah taqrÐriyyah as having similar authority to sunnah qauliyyah. 
      
In addition to ÎadÐth, the jurists also rely on ÁthÁr (the reports of the practice of 
Companions) in justifying the legitimacy of muÃÁrabah. The most often quoted 
athÁr was the muÃÁrabah practised by ÝAbdallÁh and ÝUbaidullÁh, the sons of 
‘Umar al KhaÔÔÁb. The ÁthÁr was discussed by al-SarakshÐ, al-NawawÐ, al-
QarÁfi and Ibn QudÁmah in their introductions to the muÃÁrabah chapter. It was 
reported that the sons of the second Caliph were in the army in Persia and 
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participated the battle of Nahawand. On the way back to Medina, they met Abu 
MusÁ al-‘AshÝÁri who was the governor of Basra. Abu MusÁ al-ÝAshÝÁrÐ wanted 
to send Basra’s provincial tax to ÝUmar al-KhaÔÔÁb. He then asked ÝAbdallÁh 
and ÝUbaidullÁh to send the money with the suggestion that they bought Iraqi 
merchandise and sell them with profit in Medina.  Both of them agreed with the 
idea and successfully implemented it. They earned some profit from the trade. 
Upon arrival in Medina, ÝAbdallÁh and ÝUbaidullÁh had an argument with their 
father. ÝUmar-al KhaÔÔÁb demanded his sons to return both capital and profit to 
the baitul mÁl (treasury). However, ÝUbaidullÁh refused to do so and argued that 
they were entitled some of the profit since they held some degree of risk in the 
business venture. At first Umar al-KhaÔÔÁb refused to accept the argument. 
However, he then changed his decision after one of the meeting’s members 
suggested that they turned the whole contract into muÃÁrabah. Finally, ÝUmar 
al-KhaÔÔÁb decided that his two sons received half of the profit and the rest of 
the money went to the baitul mÁl164. 
 
The legality of the ÁthÁr however was questioned by some of the classical 
jurists. This is because it appeared that from the beginning, ÝAbdallÁh and 
ÝUbaidullÁh were not clearly aware that they performed the business based on a 
muÃÁrabah contract. The contract was decided at the last stage when they 
wanted to hand over the tax money to ÝUmar al-KhaÔÔÁb. Hence, according to 
al-NawawÐ, the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists had divided into three groups. The first group was 
of the opinion that it was not a muÃÁrabah contract. The second group thought 
it was an invalid muÃÁrabah, thus, whatever amount of money received by the 
two sons of ÝUmar al-KhaÔÔÁb was considered as compensation. The third 
group, however, opined that it was a valid mudarabah. This group maintained 
that this was an exceptional case where muÃÁrabah contract was not agreed in 
advance165. The MÁlikÐs' opinions were similar to the second group. As 
explained by al-BÁjÐ (d.494), ÝUmar al-KhaÔÔÁb decided to refer the contract as 
qirÁÃ al-mithil. This means the decision to share equally the profit was made 
                                                 
164 SarakshÐ, KitÁb al-MabsuÔ, vol.22, pp. 18, al-NawawÐ, al-MajmÙÝ, vol. 15, pp. 189, Ibn 
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after comparing his sons' case to a similar muÃÁrabah arrangement166. 
Considering the jurists' argument, it is clear to us that despite beinga famous 
piece of legal evidence, the ÁthÁr do not illustrate a definite verification on the 
legitimacy of muÃÁrabah contract.         
 
In addition to that, SarakshÐ reported another ÁthÁr to justify the legitimacy of 
muÃÁrabah. He claimed that the contract was practised by ÝUmar al-KhaÔÔÁb 
when he invested an orphan's money entrusted to him. ÝUmar's action raised 
important issue. Was a guardian of orphans allowed to invest their money in 
muÃÁrabah business without asking prior permission from them? SarakshÐ 
explained that ‘Umar al KhaÔÔÁb performed the transaction within his capacity 
as the guardian as well as the leader of the state. As such, he was allowed to 
invest the orphans’ money in business which he considered would be 
profitable. From SarakshÐ's perspective, the decision to invest in a muÃÁrabah 
contract was a wise judgment because it could possibly generate more money 
for the orphans. Undeniably, it would be the most desirable thing, if ÝUmar 
manage to find someone who could trade for the orphans voluntarily. However, 
it was also understood that not many people were willing to do that for free. 
Therefore, the muÃÁrabah contract was seen as one of the ways to achieve his 
objective for the sake of the orphans167.   
 
Having examined the muÃÁrabah legal evidence, we now understand that their 
validity is arguable. The verses of the Qur'an (73:20 and 2:198) do not address 
the contract specifically. The same verses could be used to prove the legitimacy 
of other commercial activities. Meanwhile, the sunnah qauliyyah which showed 
the oral approval of the Prophet had been criticised as a weak evidence. Its 
isnÁd consists of a less qualified narrator. The problem in accepting the athÁr of 
the Companions is that they did not demonstrate a perfectly valid muÃÁrabah 
contract. Despite these issues, the jurists claimed that they had reached a 
consensus in legitimising the contract. All of them agreed in recognising the 
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muÃÁrabah as a legitimate commercial activity for Muslim society. Ibn 
QudÁmah for instance confirmed the ruling in the following statement: 
All of the people of knowledge (‘ahl al-Ýilm) agreed on the 
permissibility of muÃÁrabah in general168.  
 
It would be noteworthy to highlight here that the discussion concerning the 
legal evidence for muÃÁrabah also signifies the origin of the contract. The 
sunnah taqririyyah proved that muÃÁrabah was developed before the advent of 
Islam. It appears very likely that ÍakÐm ibn ÍizÁm and ÝAbbas ibn ÝAbd al-
MuÔallib had been practising the contract during the pre-Islamic period. When 
MuÎammad became Prophet, ÍakÐm and ÝAbbas sought his opinion regarding 
the terms and conditions they used to put forward to their agent manager. 
Prophet MuÎammad had no objection to approving the contract. This clearly set 
forth another example of the Arab custom’s (Ýurf) influences on Islamic law. As 
explained earlier, the ‘Islamic’ doctrine of muÃÁrabah was rudimentary in 
nature during the early Islam. It developed extensively at beginning of the 
second century Hijri as a response to the socio-economic changes within the 
Muslim community.  
 
Capital in MuÃÁrabah  
 
In principle, the jurists of the four major schools were in agreement in 
accepting gold and silver coins as capital in muÃÁrabah contracts. The rule was 
stated for example by al-NawawÐ and Ibn QudÁmah in the following way:  
It is required for al-qirÁÃ to be valid, the mÁl (capital) must 
be in the form of darÁhim (silver coins) or danÁnir (gold 
coins)169.  
 
There is agreement (between the jurists) in accepting 
darÁhim and danÁnir as capital in the contract170 
 
Gold and silver coins were unanimously accepted because they served as the 
mediums of exchange during the medieval period. Both metals became the 
currencies of that time because they possessed intrinsic value which was 
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consistent throughout all times and in all places. The consistent value of the 
coins is crucial in determining the muÃÁrabah profit. This is because at the end 
of the contract, an agent manager is required to return the capital to the 
investor. Profit from the business is identified as any surplus from the capital. 
For this reason, the value of the capital must be consistent. Fluctuation in its 
value would certainly affect the share of the investor and the agent manager.  
 
Based on this justification, goods or merchandises (al-ÝurÙÃ) were not accepted 
as a form of muÃÁrabah investment171. If an investor supplies finished 
consumer products to the agent manager as capital in muÃÁrabah, the contract 
will be rendered invalid. As indicated earlier, the rule is to avoid uncertainty 
during the determination of muÃÁrabah profit. Unlike gold and silver, the price 
of goods normally fluctuated172. The fluctuation in their prices will make the 
amount of muÃÁrabah profit indefinite. Suppose for example, when the agent 
manager wanted to return the goods to the investor, their price became 
substantially higher. The agent-manager would then need to use some portion 
of the profits in returning the goods to the investor. In this case, he technically 
obtained less share of the profit than he deserved. In contrast, if the price of the 
goods became significantly lower, the agent manager would pay much less 
money. In this situation, the agent-manager would gain more profit at the 
expense of the investor’s share173.   
 
The preceding justifications signify two main criteria considered by the 
classical jurists in accepting or rejecting a particular commodity as a 
muÃÁrabah capital. The criteria are (1) the consistent value of a commodity and 
(2) its function as legal tender in the society. The second criterion was 
particularly applied in rejecting other commodities such as copper coins, fulÙs 
and unminted gold (tibr). These commodities were fiduciary currency with little 
or no intrinsic value. Although they were used as medium of exchange by some 
people, their circulation within the community was not universal. The 
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justifications also imply that the capital of muÃÁrabah can be varied according 
to times and societies. This is due to the fact that a legal tender accepted by 
society could possibly change and does not necessarily to be in the form of gold 
and silver coins. This was evident when the classical jurists used to accept 
foodstuff and wheat as muÃÁrabah capital in Mecca and Bukhara. Their main 
justification was that people in the cities had utilised them as mediums of 
exchange174. Besides, the ÍanafÐs jurists who at first rejected the ‘commercial 
dirham’ (darÁhim tijÁriyyah)175 as muÃÁrabah investment, had later permitted it 
because of its prevalence use in local business transactions176.  
 
It is worth mentioning that SarakshÐ had mistakenly mentioned MÁlik as one 
the prominent jurists who permitted goods as capital in muÃÁrabah. He stated 
MÁlik’ opinion in this matter as follows:  
MÁlik, may God have mercy upon him said that muÃÁrabah 
with goods is permissible because goods are valuable 
properties which are usually relied upon in trade177. 
 
A closer examination on MÁlikÐ major works however shows a contradictory 
position taken by MÁlik. In al-MuwaÔÔaÞ for instance, MÁlik clearly disallowed 
goods as a form of muÃÁrabah investment. He ruled that: 
Al-qirÁÃ is valid only if the investment is in the form of 
cash of either gold or silver. It may not consist of any 
goods and merchandise178. 
 
SarakshÐ did not give any reference to support his statement. However, as 
suggested by Udovitch, the statement attributed to MÁlik by SarakshÐ might 
have been a generalisation based on the muÃÁrabah in goods through the use of 
ÎÐlah (legal stratagem) 179. The legal stratagem in this context takes place when 
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an investor entrusts goods to an agent manager and instructs him to sell them, 
and use the cash realised from the sale as investment in the muÃÁrabah. MÁlik 
was reported to have approved such legal trick. Apart from him, the transaction 
was approved by several prominent jurists including Ibn AbÐ LailÁ, al-AuzÁÝÐ, 
ÍamÁd ibn SulaymÁn, ÓÁwus and AÎmad ibn Íanbal [in one of his 
narrations]180. As we may expect, a similar position was taken by the ÍanafÐs. 
They considered the transaction as hybrids of the wakÁlah (agency) and 
muÃÁrabah contracts181. The former took place when the agent manager 
converted the goods into cash. In this transaction, the agent manager was 
regarded as the representative (wakÐl) of the investor. The latter contract 
commenced immediately after the cash was in the hands of the agent manager. 
He would invest the cash according to the terms and conditions of a muÃÁrabah 
contract. 
 
The legal stratagem was seen as an example of the classical jurists’ response to 
the economic needs of the society. It was argued that the traders of long-
distance business were in need of a more flexible rule that can accept goods as 
capital in the muÃÁrabah contract. Basically, the traders made profit by buying 
goods in a market that was low and selling them in one that is high. However, 
such a business model did not always generated profit as intended. Sometimes, 
a trader would be in the position where he had a lot of unsold goods. For 
various reasons he could not pursue the business on his own. Thus, a 
muÃÁrabah arrangement with an itinerant trader would provide a convenient 
and profitable solution182. The trader would entrust the unsold goods to other 
trader and embark into muÃÁrabah contract. As explained earlier, the legal 
stratagem would make the arrangement possible. The jurists who accepted the 
legal stratagem further allowed the agent-manager to return the value of the 
goods instead of their actual material. Hence, in the case where the invested 
goods were not to be sold, their value would be recorded at the beginning of the 
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contract and when the business was to be liquidated, the recorded value would 
be based upon to determine muÃÁrabah profit183.  
 
However, the legal stratagem was rejected by the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists. As explained in 
al-MajmÙÝ, their rejection was based on two underlying justifications:  
If the agent manager was given goods and was told to sell 
them, muÃÁrabah with the proceeds of the sale is not 
permissible due two reasons (1) the unknown value, and al-
qirÁÃ with unknown capital is void (2) the contract was agreed 
based on Òifat (attribute/feature), al-qirÁd with such capital is 
void.  
 
ShÁfiÝÐ jurists clearly put emphasis on the technicality of the muÃÁrabah 
contract developed through the legal stratagem. For them, the muÃÁrabah 
contract begins once the agent manager accepts the goods as capital. The 
problem is that upon receiving the goods, neither the agent manager nor the 
investor knows their exact value. The value will be known only after the goods 
are sold in the market. Thus, the muÃÁrabah agreed earlier was based on 
unknown capital. This definitely contradicts the fundamental condition of the 
contract which necessitate the capital to be clearly known and identified. Those 
who agreed with the legal stratagem might argue that the muÃÁrabah is 
executed not based on unknown capital but based on capital with clear 
attributes and features (sifÁt). The ShÁfiÝÐ jurists however did not accept the 
argument and maintained their emphasis on the definite value of the capital 
from the beginning of the muÃÁrabah contract. 
  
In addition to goods, the classical jurists also discussed the eligibility of debt as 
a form of muÃÁrabah investment. In discussing the topic, they illustrated two 
different cases in which debt was used as capital. They unanimously 
disapproved the first and approved the second case. The first case happens 
when a creditor asked his debtor to be his agent manager (in a muÃÁrabah 
contract) using the borrowed money. In this case, Ibn al-Qasim of the MÁliki 
feared that the agent manager might not be able to settle his debt during the 
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commencement of the muÃÁrabah contract. If this happened, the muÃÁrabah 
business would be set up based on capital which did not exist (mÁl ghÁ’ib). It 
would possibly lead to a usurious loan especially when the business plan went 
wrong. Ibn al-QÁsim’s concern for this situation was recorded by SaÎnÙn in al-
Mudawwanah:  
[SaÎnÙn] what do you think if I ask someone who owed me 
money to invest it in al-qirÁÃ. Is it permissible or not? [Ibn 
al-QÁsim] The transaction is not permissible according to 
MÁlik. [SaÎnÙn] Why?  [Ibn al-QÁsim] I am afraid of the 
late payment and increase in the debt184.  
 
However, the classical jurists agreed in approving ÎawÁlah (the act of 
transferring of debt) in the muÃÁrabah contract. The ÎawÁlah could take place 
for example:  
When an investor says to an agent-manager; ‘take the debt 
which the person owed me and work with it as muÃÁrabah. 
Then [the agent manager] took it and worked with it. The act 
is permissible according to all of the jurists185.  
 
The jurists asserted that there was a distinctive difference between the two 
cases. In the first case, the debt is considered an unsecured asset. This is 
because it remained in the hands of the debtor who was supposed to transform 
himself into an agent manager. As explained by ibn al-QÁsim, the possibility of 
delayed or even unsettled debt payment remains. However in the second case, 
the debt becomes almost a secured asset. The ÎawÁlah is a matter of 
transferring money from a debtor to an agent manager. In other words, the 
investor was viewed as having empowered the agent manager to collect the 
debt and to use the money collected as a muÃÁrabah investment. Once the 
money is in the possession of the agent manager, the contract will take in 
effect. As pointed out by Udovitch, the flexibility shown by the classical jurists 
in accepting the practice of ÎawÁlah had been beneficial for the traders of the 
long-distance business. The mechanism enabled the investments run more 
smoothly between them. Consider the following case as an example: 
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If merchant A is leaving with goods or capital for some 
distant point at which merchant B has unpaid debt from C, A 
can be empowered to collect from C and invest in goods on 
a muÃÁrabah basis for the return trip186. 
      
It would be appropriate at this point to highlight another important requirement 
concerning the muÃÁrabah capital. The Îawalah case mentioned before 
indicates that the capital of muÃÁrabah must be physically handed over to the 
agent manager. In fact, the muÃÁrabah contract only takes effect when the agent 
manager receives the capital. The classical jurists insisted on this rule in order 
to ensure that the agent manager had total control in making business decision. 
SarakhsÐ explained: 
One of the rules in muÃÁrabah is that the capital should be a 
trust (amÁnah) in the hands of agent manager. This cannot be 
fulfilled unless the investor alienated himself from the 
money187.  
 
Other type of asset which was discussed in detail by the classical jurists was the 
property in safe keeping or termed as wadÐÝah. The investment of wadÐÝah in the 
muÃÁrabah contract is similar to the case of using orphan's money as capital. 
This is because both types of assets are regarded as trusts (amÁnah) conferred 
by the owner to a person or guardian for a specific period. The rule of wadÐÝah 
contract dictates that the entrusted money should be kept in the trustee’s 
custody within the agreed period. Similarly, the custodian of orphans is obliged 
to ensure the safety of the children’s money until they become mature. Having 
said that; can the trustee of wadÐÝah or the guardian of orphans invest the money 
entrusted to them in a muÃÁrabah contract? As we have discussed earlier, the 
classical jurists had no objection in permitting the latter. It was permitted 
following the action of ÝUmar al-KhaÔÔÁb narrated in the famous athÁr. 
 
However, the classical jurists differed in determining the eligibility of wadÐÝah 
money. The ÍanafÐs and ÍanbalÐs appeared to be the most flexible jurists in 
this matter. They allowed the investment of wadÐÝah money even without 
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asking the prior permission from the original owner188. Interestingly according 
to Ibn QudÁmah, the reason the ÍanbalÐ jurists allowed such an investment is 
because they treated the trustee as have a position similar to the original owner 
in utilising the money. The right however comes with condition. The trustee is 
obliged to guarantee the wadÐÝah money. This means he will be liable to return 
it to the original owner irrespective whether the investment succeeds or not. In 
general, the rule was agreed by the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists. However, they imposed 
additional conditions such as requiring the trustee to seek permission of the 
owner of the wadÐÝah before investing it in muÃÁrabah189. In addition to that, 
they also required the money used in the investment to be precisely determined 
and known by all of the contracting parties. The conditions are stipulated to 
minimise any possible dispute in the course of the business. On the other hand, 
the MÁliki jurists refused to accept wadÐÝah money as a form of investment. 
They worried that the practice would place burden on the trustee especially 
when the muÃÁrabah venture suffered losses. Ibn al-QÁsim commented on this 
issue by saying‘….I afraid the trustee who had invested the wadÐÝah would turn 
it to debt on him’190.     
 
In conclusion, our preceding discussions indicate several basic characteristics 
of muÃÁrabah capital. Firstly, it must be in the form of monetary 
currency/money. Money was unanimously accepted as a form of muÃÁrabah 
investment because it possessed fairly consistent value which is crucial in 
determining the worth of profit/loss at the end of the contract. Secondly, fixed 
assets or finished consumer products are not accepted as capital in muÃÁrabah. 
Thus, a business partnership formed by two parties whereby the first party 
provides a fixed asset (e.g. a car) and the second contributes work (driving) is 
not considered as a muÃÁrabah contract. The business agreement will be treated 
as a hire-wages contract. As described by the classical jurists, the muÃÁrabah 
contract was purely based on the contribution of money from the investor and 
work of the agent manager. Thirdly, the capital must be in the form of secured 
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assets and legally authorised. As far as the security of assets is concerned, they 
collectively rejected debt as a form of investment. However, with the exception 
of the ShÁfiÝÐs they were quite flexible in permitting the ÎawÁlah. The jurists 
ruled that the investor must posses complete authority when investing his 
money. For this reason, a mudÁrabah of stolen money was certainly rendered 
invalid. However, they differed in determining the rule for wadÐÝah in which the 
authority of its trustee in utilising the entrusted money was quite ambiguous.  
 
Work in MuÃÁrabah 
 
In this section, we will identify the scope of muÃÁrabah investment as 
determined by the classical jurists. We would like to examine their opinion over 
whether an agent manager was allowed to invest the capital in various 
economic sectors (i.e. manufacturing, agriculture or services) or was restricted 
to execute a particular type of economic activity?   
 
A review of the medieval Islamic legal texts reveals that muÃÁrabah was 
primarily viewed by the classical jurists as a commercial contract executed in 
trade (tijÁrah). The muÃÁrabah capital was normally used in a series of 
purchases and sales with the hope of realising profit. The utilisation of 
muÃÁrabah capital in non-trade activities was considered unusual. In relation to 
this, the view of the ShÁfiÝÐs and MÁlikÐs seem to be more rigid when compared 
to the ÍanafÐs. They strictly confined the job of agent manager as involving the 
retail activities (buying and selling to attain profit). Any other commercial 
activities carried out by the agent manager during the operation of muÃÁrabah 
will render the contract invalid. Al-NawawÐ explained the rule as follow: 
And the job of agent manager is trading (tijÁrah) and its related 
activities such as marketing and packaging, if al-qirÁÃ was 
agreed whereby an agent manager was asked to buy wheat, 
grind and bake it into bread, or cotton for weaving, the contract 
will be rendered invalid191. 
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A similar position was taken by the MÁlikÐs and their rule was based on MÁlik’s 
opinion recorded in al-Mudawwanah: 
[SahnÙn]: what is your opinion if I give to a man money as 
qirÁÃ. The man buys leather and makes slippers, shoes and 
boots from it with his hands and then sells them. Whatever 
proceeds endowed by Allah will be divided between us 
equally. [Ibn al-QÁsim] There is no good in that according 
to MÁlik192.  
 
As evident in al-DhakhÐrah of al-QarÁfÐ, the later MÁlikÐs consistently 
maintained the above ruling193. They rejected a muÃÁrabah which requires the 
agent manager to get involved in any manufacturing activity. Questions 
promptly arise. What are the reasons for disallowing muÃÁrabah in non-trade 
operation? Why did the ShÁfiÝÐs and MÁlikÐs rigidly limit muÃÁrabah 
investment into trade activity?  
 
The answer lies on two main reasons; legal (uÒÙl) and practical. As we may 
recall from the preceding discussion, muÃÁrabah was viewed by the majority 
of jurists as a contract legitimised on the basis of the principle of rukhÒah 
(dispensation). MuÃÁrabah originally does not comply with the basic rule of 
hire-wages contract. It contradicts the rule that requires the income of the 
working party to be precisely determined in advance. Nevertheless, on the 
ground of a pressing economic necessity of the society, the contract was 
allowed. The consent however comes with limitations. This followed a 
principle established by the classical jurists who stipulated that a thing founded 
on the contrary of analogy can not be used as analogy to others194. Since, the 
initial permission of muÃÁrabah was to facilitate partnership in trade, any other 
commercial activities undertaken by the agent manager would be considered as 
beyond its allowed limit. If, for instance, the agent manager invested the 
capital to the manufacturing industry, the transaction would be governed by a 
contract of hire-wages in which the investor will keep the entire proceeds and 
the agent manager is entitled equitable wages.   
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This practical justification demonstrates the inability of muÃÁrabah to facilitate 
a business partnership in a complex commercial dealing. Let us consider 
manufacturing industry as an example. The muÃÁrabah was viewed as an 
inappropriate contract to support partnership in manufacturing projects because 
it would lead to an inequality of the risk shared by the partners. The contract 
necessitates that all the monetary cost is to be funded by the investor.  In the 
context of a manufacturing project, this means the investor will bear the cost of 
everything, from the promotion of the industry down to the purchase of land, 
machinery, construction, installation, maintenance, wages, raw material and 
etc. On the other hand, the agent manager is only expected to put in his skill 
and management ability to ensure the products are manufactured for sale. 
Despite the huge difference in risk borne by both parties, the investor still 
becomes the sole party who absorb the monetary loss. In view of this 
imbalance, the business model is strongly believed to be difficult to work out. 
Considering the amount of money involved in a manufacturing project, it 
would be hard to find investors willing to bear the entire cost of the project and 
share a portion of the profit with the managing agent. Furthermore in 
muÃÁrabah, the subsistence (nafqah) of the agent manager during travel is to 
be chargeable to the muÃÁrabah account. The rule would lessen the agent 
manager’s motivation in maximising the profit of the business. He could 
probably increase his expenses to reduce the business profit. This condition is 
surely unfair to the investor and makes the contract unlawful according to the 
Islamic law195.                 
 
On the other hand, the ÍanafÐ jurists appeared to be more relaxed in this issue. 
Contrary to the ShÁfi‘Ðs and MÁlikÐs, they did not confine the task of the agent 
manager to a retailing job (buying and selling to attain profit). The ÍanafÐs 
expanded the job scope of the agent manager to include pre-sale processing 
and after sale service. However, they did not preclude a muÃÁrabah in which 
the pre-sale processing involved craft or manufacturing activities. According to 
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them, an investor is allowed to entrust his capital to an agent manager on the 
condition that the latter buys raw materials and turns them into finished 
consumer products. The products would be sold and any realised profit would 
be shared between the two parties on the basis of a pre-determined ratio. 
SarakshÐ explained: 
For the work which is stipulated for the agent manager is the 
kind that traders practice in the pursuit of the attainment of 
profit. It is comparable to buying and selling. Similarly, if 
the investor instructs the agent manager to use the capital to 
purchase leather and then cut it into boots, buckets and 
leather bags, this is all part of the practice of the traders in 
the pursuit of the attainment of profit, and its stipulation is 
permissible in a muÃÁrabah.       
 
Note that the ÍanafÐ jurists were also of the opinion that muÃÁrabah was 
legitimised on the basis of the principle of rukhÒah. However as evident in the 
above case, they did not view the rukhÒah principle had affecting the way 
muÃÁrabah capital should be invested. In the case where the agent manager was 
capable of producing finished consumer products, he would be supposed to do 
it himself. In the context of small scale business, the action seems to be a wise 
business decision as compared with hiring workers for the production process. 
From the ÍanafÐ jurists’ perspective, these pre-sale processes undertaken by the 
agent manager were still within the definition of trading activities. It is 
important to note that the Islamic classical legal texts did not show how 
extensively such arrangement were utilised in financing the industrial 
production in the Islamic cities during the medieval period. However, the 
Geniza documents (an accumulation of 200,000 Jewish manuscript fragments) 
contain several examples of exactly this type of commercial-industrial 
arrangement involving minting, weaving and textile-dyeing196.  
 
As far as I could ascertain, the text of al-MughnÐ did not addresses the said 
issue directly. All muÃÁrabah cases discussed by Ibn QudÁmah related to pure 
trading activities. Hence, it is not clear whether the ÍanbalÐs support the 
restricted scope of muÃÁrabah business or otherwise. Nevertheless, since they 
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viewed that muÃÁrabah was legitimised in conformity of the analogy (not on 
the basis of rukhÒah), presumably they would have no objection to conduct the 
contract in non-trade operations.  
 
MuÃÁrabah implemented in the Malaysian Islamic banking institutions is totally 
different from the classical jurists' framework. As we shall explain in the next 
chapter, muÃÁrabah funds in the local Islamic banks are not been utilised to 
support trading activities but to provide financing for various economic sectors 
i.e. housing construction, transportation and money/capital market. The 
Malaysian shÁrÐÝah scholars do not agree with the strict view of the ShÁfi‘Ð 
jurists but uphold the opinion that muÃÁrabah work should be open and 
unrestricted. Their justification in opposing the ShÁfi‘Ðs is worth reviewing. 
Based on interview with two local shÁrÐÝah scholars, I could sense that they are 
not fully acquainted with the classical jurists' arguments in confining the 
muÃÁrabah work to trading activities. According to the scholars, the strict view 
of the classical jurists was the result of different economic conditions. In the 
past, Muslims lived in a simple life in which trading was the dominant 
economic activity. Therefore, trading became the most extensive dealing in 
muÃÁrabah contract. However, since the economic life of Muslims has changed 
significantly nowadays, there is a need to expand the scope of muÃÁrabah work 
to cater for a variety of complex financial dealings. Based on this argument, the 
scholars strongly believed that the rule to restrict the muÃÁrabah work to 
trading activities is no longer relevant197.                  
 
The Relationship between Investor and Agent manager  
 
Our preceding discussions point out that the role of the investor and the agent 
manager in setting up a muÃÁrabah contract had been clearly delineated by the 
classical jurists. According to them, a muÃÁrabah contract will be established 
when one party (the investor) contributes capital and the other party (the agent 
manager) runs the daily business operations. The following discussion 
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elucidates how the venture is going to work. It examines the jurists’ rules in 
governing the relationship between the two parties. For example it deals with 
questions; to what extend is an agent manager empowered? Did he have 
absolute power in making business decisions? If not, did the investor have the 
right to know what the agent manager was using the money for? Did the 
investor have mechanism to assure the trustworthiness of the agent manager?  
     
The majority of jurists were of the opinion that the business operation was 
exclusively the responsibility of agent manager. The ÍanafÐ, MÁlikÐ198 and 
ShÁfiÝÐ199 jurists did not allow the investor to participate in muÃÁrabah business. 
They ruled that if an investor participates in the business the contract will be 
rendered invalid. The participation is prohibited from the beginning of the 
contract specifically when the capital had been handed over to the agent 
manager. The exclusion of the investor from the business was argued to be 
necessary in order to express the authority given to agent manager in 
controlling the business operation. SarakshÐ explained the rule as follows:  
If muÃÁrabah agreed with the condition that the investor will 
work with the agent manager, the contract rendered invalid 
because one of the conditions in determining its validity is 
the separation (takhliyah) between the agent manager and 
the investor200.  
 
It seems that when the investor is prohibited from participating in the business, 
the agent manager will obtain total control over the muÃÁrabah business. 
However, a closer look at the classical jurists’ discussion reveals that the 
empowerment given is not absolute but restricted. The jurists imposed certain 
limitations to the agent manager in performing his task. In this respect, the 
ÍanafÐs appeared to be the most flexible and relaxed as compared to the other 
Sunni schools of law.  
 
According to the ÍanafÐs, the scope of empowerment of agent-manager is 
identified based on the expression (ÒÐghah) used at the beginning of muÃÁrabah 
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contract. They divided the expression into three; (1) the general expression 
(ÒÐghah muÔlaqah) (2) the expression when the investor said to the agent-
manager ‘act according to your opinion’ and (3) restricted expression.  An 
example of the general expression is when the investor says to the agent-
manager, ‘start a business with my initial capital of 1000 dirhÁm and we will 
share the profit equally’. The expression will empower the agent manager to 
execute various types of business transactions which are thought to generate 
profit and are customarily practiced by traders. The business transactions 
allowed include all types of sales, appoint a representative (wakÁlah), put 
muÃÁrabah capital in safe keeping (wadÐÝah), collecting debt, transfer of debt 
(ÎawÁlah) and hire an employee or transportation201.  
 
In addition, based on the general expression, the ÍanafÐ jurists permitted the 
agent manager to perform credit transactions. According to the ÍanafÐs, an 
agent manager is allowed to sell muÃÁrabah commodities in credit to customers 
even without having prior permission from the investor. As explained by 
SarakhsÐ, credit transaction is allowed mainly because of two reasons; (1) the 
transaction was customarily practised by traders and (2) it could bring more 
profit to the business. SarakshÐ explained the justification in the following 
statement: 
We said that the credit sale is part of traders’ practices and it 
is closer in attaining the investors’ objective which is profit. 
Profit is usually obtained from credit sale not cash sale202.  
 
On the other hand, the MÁlikÐ203, ShÁfiÝÐ204 and ÍanbalÐ jurists ruled against 
credit sale. They did not permit the agent manager to purchase or sell on credit 
without obtaining a clear and explicit permission from the investor205. The 
ÍanbalÐs in particular laid down several guidelines before allowing the agent 
manager to execute credit transactions. For example, if the agent manager 
wants to buy on credit, the amount of credit allowed must not exceed the 
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amount of muÃÁrabah capital206. If he wants to sell on credit, he must ensure 
the creditworthiness of customer. If the agent-manager happens to sell on credit 
to a customer whose creditworthiness is doubtful, he would become liable for 
any loss incurred207. The main reason for majority of jurists ruled against credit 
transaction because they viewed it as a risky deal. From their perspective, credit 
transaction involves high risk of incurring losses or reducing the muÃÁrabah 
capital. Since the investor is the sole party who bears the monetary loss in the 
muÃÁrabah, his approval in dealing with such transaction is mandatory.  
 
In addition to that, the jurists justified their rule based on an analogy with that 
of the wakÁlah contract. Based on the general expression (ÒÐghah muÔlaqah), an 
agent of a wakÁlah contract is prohibited from executing credit transaction. 
Similarly, the agent-manager in muÃÁrabah is prohibited from doing so208. The 
ÍanafÐs disagreed with the analogy. They viewed wakÁlah and muÃÁrabah to be 
two distinct contracts. The main objective of wakÁlah is to buy or sell at a 
reasonable price according to the order of the original owner. The agent of 
wakÁlah is not expected to bring any profit. Since a reasonable price is 
normally realised by dealing in cash, there is no need for the agent of wakÁlah 
to execute credit transaction. In contrast the main objective of muÃÁrabah is to 
maximise profit. As claimed by traders, a higher profit is usually attained by 
dealing in credit. Therefore the agent manager in muÃÁrabah is allowed to 
execute such transaction209.  
 
The disagreement over the credit transaction issue demonstrates two different 
considerations by the classical jurists in determining the scope of empowerment 
of agent manager. The ÍanafÐ jurists appeared to give priority in the attainment 
of profit whereas the majority of jurists emphasise more the safety of the 
investment. For the ÍanafÐs, the determinant factor in deciding the scope of 
empowerment of agent manager is the custom of traders (Ýurf al-tujjÁr). This 
                                                 
206 Ibn TaymÐyah ÝAbd SalÁm ibn ÝAbd AllÁh, al-MuÎarrar fÐ al-Fiqh ÝalÁ Madhhab al-ImÁm 
AÎmad ibn Íanbal, Beirut: DÁr al-KutÙb al-ÝIlmiyah, 1999, vol 2, pp.531.  
207 Ibn QudÁmah, al-MughnÐ, vol.7, pp.147 
208 Ibid 
209 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.38 
 126 
means, if an act is widely practised by traders, it can be executed by an agent 
manager without obtaining prior permission from the investor. However, for 
the majority of jurists the determinant factor is the risk element. They did not 
allow the agent manager to execute any transaction which exposes the business 
into danger. Based on this premise, it is also true that the ÍanafÐs seem to be on 
the agent manager’s side whereas the other schools are on the investor’s side. 
We will see more examples of these deliberations when we discuss more cases 
of muÃÁrabah empowerment.   
 
Our next case is travelling for the purpose of conducting muÃÁrabah business. 
According to the ÍanafÐs, the ÒÐghah muÔlaqah expressed at the beginning of 
the contract would allow the agent-manager to make business trips whenever he 
thinks it necessary. The rule is based on three main justifications. Firstly, they 
base their rule on the literal meaning of muÃÁrabah. As mentioned earlier, 
muÃÁrabah is derived from the expression of Ãarb fÐl-arÃ in the Qur’an, which 
means making a journey. In view of this terminology background, the ÍanafÐs 
asserted that the word muÃÁrabah explicitly entails the permission to travel. 
Secondly, the ÍanafÐ jurists made analogy with the wadÐÝah contract. Since a 
trustee of wadÐÝah contract is permitted to travel with asset in safekeeping, the 
same rule should be applied to agent manager in a muÃÁrabah contract. In fact, 
the permission to travel for the latter has greater priority. The jurists had 
permitted the trustee of a wadÐÝah contract to travel even though he is prohibited 
from utilising the asset in his safekeeping. Rationally, an agent-manager should 
be permitted to travel because he has control over the capital. The third 
justification perhaps is the most significant. Similar to the case of credit 
transaction, the ÍanafÐs argued on the basis of the traders' custom in the 
attainment of profit. They admitted that travelling is one of the basic activities 
of any business. In order to maximise profit, traders have to conduct their 
business locally and abroad. Therefore, based on the general expression, an 
agent manager should be allowed to make business travel without having prior 
permission from the investor210.  
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The MÁlikÐs’ rule seems to be similar to that of the ÍanafÐs. They allowed the 
agent manager to embark on business travel if the investor did not prevent him 
to do so at the beginning of the contract211. However, the ShÁfiÝÐs emerged to be 
the strictest jurists in this matter. Al-ShirazÐ explained their rule as follows: 
And do not travel with the capital without having permission 
from the investor. This is because the agent manager was 
asked to perform his job with careful and vigilant 
consideration. And travelling is not regarded as a vigilant 
decision because it could cause loss to the capital212.   
 
Consistent with their rule on credit transaction, the ShÁfiÝÐs maintained the 
approach of emphasising the safety of the capital over the attainment of profit. 
They viewed travelling to be a risky activity which could cause loss to the 
business. Hence, explicit permission from the investor is compulsory before the 
agent manager could make any business trip. Meanwhile, the ÍanbalÐs had two 
different rulings with regard to travelling based on the ÒÐghah muÔlaqah. The 
first ruling is similar to the ShÁfiÝÐs who prohibited the agent-manager from 
travelling without having clear and explicit permission from the investor. The 
second ruling is similar to the ÍanafÐs and MÁlikÐs who permitted travelling 
with the condition that the journey is safe213. 
 
It is noteworthy that there is a significant difference between the circumstances 
of travelling discussed by the classical jurists compared with the business 
travelling in the present day. As is evident in the ShÁfiÝÐs’ argument, travelling 
in the past refers to caravan trade where properties of muÃÁrabah were carried 
from one place to another by the agent manager in his effort to sell them. Given 
the condition of routes between Mecca, Medina, Basrah, Kufah, Baghdad, 
Damascus and Yemen at that time, we could understand why the ShafiÝÐ jurists 
were concerned with the safety of the properties. In the remote areas between 
the cities, the properties were exposed to robbers. However, business trips in 
modern days happen in a complete different environment. Nowadays a 
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businessman rarely travels to various places with all his products and goods. 
But, he will go to meet his potential clients with prototype and arranges the 
delivery of the sale items later on. Therefore, the safety factor which concerned 
by the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists is now become secure. Based on this premise, I could 
argue that it would be misleading to apply the ShÁfiÝÐ’s rule in our 
contemporary period. The classical rule was made in a different context. 
Nevertheless, the case of travelling demonstrates the distinctive methods 
adopted by the two groups of jurists. The first group gives priority to the 
traders’ custom in the attainment of profit whereas the second group is 
concerned more about the safety of muÃÁrabah investment.         
 
The case of travelling is also significant in demonstrating the classical jurists’ 
opinions with regard to muÃÁrabah expenses. In principle, all of them agreed 
that the expenses of the muÃÁrabah business are to be borne by the investor. 
The expenses include the cost of facilities which contribute directly to the 
operation of the business such as hiring transportation, employees, stores and 
etc. However, the subsistence of the agent manager (i.e. foods and clothes) is 
excluded from the expenses. This is because the agent manager will not be paid 
any wages during the business period. His income depends on the business 
profit determined after the business is liquidated. Nevertheless, when the agent 
manager travels (for the purpose of business), he is allowed to claim his 
subsistence on the muÃÁrabah account. According to ÍanafÐs and MÁlikÐs, the 
ÒÐghah muÔlaqah would not only give permission to the agent manager to travel 
but also to claim his subsistence during the business journey. MÁlik stated the 
rule as follows: 
And the subsistence of the agent manager including foods 
and clothes during travelling is taken from the capital, and 
whatever is appropriate for him provided that the capital is 
adequate. If the agent manager resides with his family, he is 
not entitled the subsistence from the capital and the 
clothes214.        
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SarakshÐ argued that the claim should be permitted because the business trip is 
conducted for the sake of muÃÁrabah business. During the journey, the agent 
manager had put a lot of effort to bring profit to the venture and therefore the 
capital should cover his personal expenses. It is also argued that without such a 
travelling allowance, an agent manager would not be motivated to make a 
business trip which consequently affects any possible profit to the business. 
SarakshÐ explained: 
This is because his travel and journey is for the muÃÁrabah. 
And a person will not undertake hardship to travel and pay 
its cost using his own money for an uncertain profit which 
he may or may not achieve. The agent manager is willing to 
undertake such hardship with a view to the benefit that 
might accrue to him. This will not happen unless he spends 
from the capital in his possession sufficiently215 
 
On the other hand, the ShÁfiÝÐs216 and ÍanbalÐs217 ruled that the agent-manager 
has no right to claim on travel expenses unless it was agreed at the beginning of 
muÃÁrabah. Both schools strongly recommended that the parties clarify the cost 
of travelling before the trip take place. They did not consider the ÒÐghah 
muÔlaqah as the approval for the agent manager to travel and subsequently 
claim on his subsistence. As we may expect, the reason for this rule is to 
prevent business loss due to over spending on travelling expenses. The ShÁfiÝÐ 
and ÍanbalÐ jurists worried that the agent manager would have every incentive 
to increase the travelling expenses for his own benefit.  
 
The concern over the agency problem is understandable since no clear 
guideline was stipulated by the classical jurists in determining the maximum 
limit of the claim. A fixed maximum expense was not laid down by the jurists 
since the cost of travelling varies all the time. However as stipulated by the 
ÍanafÐs, the general rule in this matter is that the extent of the agent manager's 
expenses is determined by commercial custom and their quality is determined 
by his social status218. The claim on ointment provides a good example with 
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regard to the first point (custom). Apart from foods, clothes and transportation 
the ÍanafÐ jurists differed in allowing the agent manager to claim on the 
ointment used during travelling. As explained by SarakshÐ, the claim on the 
ointment is only allowed when the agent manager travel to the regions where 
the use of the ointment is customary (i.e. Hijaz and Iraq), but not to areas in 
which this is not the case. Meanwhile in explaining the point of social status, 
SarakshÐ compared it with the maintenance (nafaqah) of a wife in marriage 
contract. As a husband is required to provide equivalent accommodation, foods 
and clothes to his wife that she used to live before marriage, an agent manager 
is also entitled for the same quality of subsistence before he embarks into 
muÃÁrabah business trip219. Hence, the point which we could address from the 
preceding discussions is that the agent manager’s expenses is not rigidly 
regulated by the classical jurists but it left open to the discretion between the 
contracting parties.   
 
The second type of expression is when the investor said to the agent-manager 
‘act according to your opinion’. According to the ÍanafÐs, this expression 
granted more flexibility to the agent-manager in conducting the muÃÁrabah 
business. In addition to all transactions mentioned before, the expression 
permitted the agent-manager to commingle the entrusted capital and execute 
recursive muÃÁrabah. Commingling of capital means the agent-manager has the 
right to pool together the muÃÁrabah capital given by the original investor with 
his own money or other investors. Recursive muÃÁrabah happens when the 
agent-manager use the capital to act as capitalist in another muÃÁrabah 
arrangement220. Both transactions were viewed by the classical jurists as 
transactions beyond the general scope of agent manager’s empowerment.  This 
is because by executing either the commingling of capital or recursive 
muÃÁrabah the investor will be obliged to enter into partnership with other 
parties. The basic rule of muÃÁrabah specifies that the agent manager has no 
right to draw the investor into such situation.  Therefore, the classical jurists 
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stressed that explicit permission is required before the agent manager is allowed 
to execute them. In identifying this permission, the ÍanafÐs appeared to be the 
most flexible school. They ruled that the expression ‘act according to your 
opinion’ is adequate to demonstrate the investor’s permission221.  
 
However, according to the MÁlikÐs and ÍanbalÐs, a more specific permission is 
required. The expression of ‘act according to your opinion’ is insufficient to 
indicate the investor’s approval. They emphasised the explicit permission to 
avoid any dispute in the future. Ibn QudÁmah and al-QÁrafÐ stated the rules as 
follow: 
If a person accepts muÃÁrabah contract with someone and then 
want to accept another muÃÁrabah with other; it will be allowed 
only if the first investor permits it222.   
 
And it is stipulated in al-KitÁb (al-Mudawwanah) that an agent 
manager is not allowed to entrust others in muÃÁrabah unless 
with permission. This is because the agent manager does not 
have right to entrust other223.   
 
On the other hand, the ShÁfÐÝÐs agreed with the MÁlikÐs and ÍanbalÐs in the case 
of commingling of capital but maintained their strict view in the recursive 
muÃÁrabah. The majority of ShÁfiÝÐs did not permit the agent-manager to 
entrust muÃÁrabah capital to the other party, even if the investor was to approve 
it. They argued that since muÃÁrabah contract was legitimised on the 
exceptional ground (Ýala khilÁf al-qiyÁs), it should always be conducted in its 
basic form. According to them the basic form of muÃÁrabah is essential because 
it justifies the right of the investor and the agent manager in sharing the 
muÃÁrabah profit. In muÃÁrabah, the right to any portion of the profit is earned 
either by virtue of the money invested, or by virtue of the work carried out. If 
the agent manager acts as capitalist in another muÃÁrabah arrangement his right 
to share the profit will be questionable. The intermediary role played by the 
agent manager in the recursive muÃÁrabah is not recognised by the majority of 
                                                 
221 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.39. 
222 Ibn QudÁmah, al-MughnÐ, vol.7, pp.159. 
223 Al-QarÁfÐ, al-DhakhÐrah, vol. 6, pp.69. 
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ShÁfiÝis as he is neither the owner of the capital nor the worker for the 
business224. 
 
In view of the current practice of muÃÁrabah in Islamic banking institutions, the 
cases of commingling of capital and recursive of muÃÁrabah are very 
significant. This is because both transactions are the fundamental elements of 
every muÃÁrabah product in the local Islamic banks. Malaysians Islamic banks 
practice commingling of capital by receiving capital from many customers and 
invested them in similar investment portfolios. The banks also implement the 
recursive muÃÁrabah by playing an intermediary role between the depositors 
and the entrepreneurs. Islamic banks do not personally run the muÃÁrabah 
business but will entrust the money given by the depositors to trusted and 
reliable entrepreneurs. In this matter, the Islamic banks clearly adopt the 
ÍanafÐs' rule. The general consent given by the depositors at the beginning of 
the contract is regarded as sufficient evidence to allow the banks to carry out 
commingling of capital and recursive muÃÁrabah.       
 
Our previous discussions so far reveal the two distinctive methods adopted by 
the classical jurists in formulating their muÃÁrabah doctrine. We find out that in 
governing the unrestricted muÃÁrabah, the ÍanafÐs seem to be the most lenient 
jurists whereas the ShÁfiÝÐs appear to be the strictest. Based on the general 
expression (ÒÐghah muÔlaqah) or the expression of act according to your 
opinion, the ÍanafÐs allowed the agent manager to perform credit transaction, 
travel for the purpose of business, claim on his subsistence, commingle 
muÃÁrabah capital as well as entrust the capital to other party. It is argued that 
these transactions were customarily practised by traders and could bring more 
profit to the muÃÁrabah venture. In contrast, the ShÁfiÝÐs did not permit all the 
transactions unless the agent manager obtains explicit permission from the 
investor. Their rulings in these matters demonstrate their cautious approach 
when regulating muÃÁrabah of unrestricted conditions. The ShÁfiÝÐs are more 
                                                 
224 SharbinÐ, al-MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, vol.2, pp.314. 
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likely to give priority to the protection of investor’s capital than the possible 
profit made by the agent manager. 
 
However, as we shall see in the following discussions a contradictory approach 
was adopted by the two schools in formulating the rules of restricted 
muÃÁrabah. Restricted muÃÁrabah takes place when the investor specifies 
certain guidelines to the agent manager in conducting the business. In this 
respect, the ÍanafÐs appeared to be supporting more the investor as they allow 
him to stipulate many guidelines to the agent manager which the ShÁfiÝÐs 
viewed as unnecessary. The rules include limiting the scope of business, the 
object of trade and the person that the agent manager could deal with and the 
duration of the muÃÁrabah contract. According to the ShÁfiÝÐs, these conditions 
are not permitted as they will significantly limit the flexibility of the agent-
manager in performing his task. However, the ÍanafÐs allowed the stipulation 
of the rules in view of the fact that they might benefit the business.   
 
Generally, the jurists agreed that the investor has the right to impose conditions 
to the agent-manager. This ruling is a derivative of ÎadÐth of Ibn ÝAbbÁs and 
ÍakÐm ibn ÍizÁm who were reported as stipulating conditions such as 
prohibiting their agent-manager from travelling with merchandises through sea, 
valley and from buying a living thing. The Prophet (pbuh) was informed of the 
conditions and he did not oppose to them. Basically the conditions laid down 
by the investors must be useful, practical and not seriously limit the flexibility 
of the agent-manager.  
 
It is agreed unanimously by the jurists that the investor could specify the 
location in which the business will take place225. Hence, for example it is 
permitted for the investor to say to the agent-manager; ‘trade at Kufah market’. 
The condition requires the agent-manager to conduct his business at the Kufah 
market only. If the agent-manager purchase and sale at other than the stipulated 
                                                 
225 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.40, Ibn ÝAbd  al-Barr, KitÁb al-KÁfÐ fÐ Fiqh Ahlul MadÐnah 
al-MÁlikÐ. Riyadh; Maktabah al-RiyÁdh al-ÍadÐthah, 1980, vol.2, pp. 773. SharbinÐ, al-MughnÐ 
al-MuÎtÁj, vol.2, pp.311,  Ibn TaimÐyah, al-Muharrar fÐ al-Fiqh ÝalÁ Madhhab ImÁm AÎmad ibn 
Íanbal, vol.2, pp.532.  
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place, the muÃÁrabah contract will be rendered invalid and he will become 
liable to any loss incurred. Such a condition is permissible because it is a 
preventative measure for the investor to secure his capital226. For instance, the 
investor chose the Kufah market because he probably knows most of the 
customers there. Perhaps, by restricting the business place, he could avoid any 
business fraudulent that will cause loss to his investment. The condition of 
location restriction is also vital for investor who wants to invest in short term 
period. The condition permits the investor to access his capital quickly and at 
any time could instruct the agent manager to convert the investment into cash. 
Unlike the unrestricted muÃÁrabah, the investor would not have to wait the 
agent manager to return from a journey of undetermined duration227.  
 
In addition to the restriction of location, the ÍanafÐs and ÍanbalÐs also 
permitted the investor to specify the scope of business and the types of goods 
that the agent manager was allowed to invest/trade with228. For, example, the 
investor could say to the agent-manager; ‘invest in food’ or ‘purchase and sale 
apple’. According to SarakshÐ, the restrictions are permitted to minimise risk in 
the muÃÁrabah contract. This is because the agent-manager might specialise in 
certain types of business to the exclusion of others and thus the investor wish to 
confine the agent manager’s activity to his speciality229. The MÁlikÐs230 and 
ShÁfiÝÐs231 however did not allow the restriction of object of trade particularly 
those which rarely found in the market. An example of such condition is when 
the investor instructs the agent manager to sell red sapphire. As the precious 
stone is rarely found, the restriction would seriously limit the flexibility of the 
agent-manager in conducting the business. Adhering to such condition will also 
prevent the agent-manager from earning profit, which is the ultimate aim in 
muÃÁrabah.  
 
                                                 
226 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.40, 
227 Udovitch, A.L, Partnership and profit in Medieval Islam, pp.211. 
228 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.40, Ibn QudÁmah, al-MughnÐ, vol.7, pp.177. 
229 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.41 
230 DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshÐyat al-DusÙqÐ ÝalÁ al-SharÎ al-kabÐr ÝalÁ MukhtaÒar KhalÐl. vol. 3, pp.521. 
231 SharbinÐ, al-MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, vol.2, pp.311. 
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The HanafÐs and ÍanbalÐs also allowed the investor to specify persons whom 
the agent-manager should deal with232.  Thus, when the investor says ‘deal with 
AÎmad only’, the agent-manager cannot buy and sell with any other person. 
From the investor point of view, the condition is important as it ensures the 
agent-manager deals with a right person, as individuals are different in terms of 
creditworthiness, trustworthiness and reliability in fulfilling obligation233. 
Contrarily, the MÁlikÐs234 and ShÁfiÝÐs235 disallowed condition that requires the 
agent-manager to deal with a specific person. The important consideration in 
prohibiting such a condition is that it will seriously confine the flexibility of the 
agent-manager. For both schools, the agent-manager should have freedom to 
choose the person with whom he would deal because probably, dealing with the 
specific person named by the investor will not bring profit to the muÃÁrabah236.   
 
The ÍanafÐs and ÍanbalÐs also permitted conditions, which stipulate the 
duration of muÃÁrabah contract237. For example, the investor could say to the 
agent-manager ‘invest my money for a year’. This condition will empower the 
agent-manager to manage the capital within the stipulated period. According to 
Ibn QudÁmah, if the agent-manager continued to invest the capital after the 
stipulated period, the muÃÁrabah contract will automatically turn into debt 
contract. In other words, the investment at that time will make the agent-
manager responsible and liable for any loss incurred238.  
 
On the other hand, the MÁlikÐs and ShÁfi’Ðs disallowed the investor to restrict 
the muÃÁrabah contract to a specified period239. They justified their ruling 
based on three main arguments. Firstly, they argued that the muÃÁrabah 
contract is initially a general contract without time limits similar to marriage 
                                                 
232 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.42, Ibn TaimÐyyah, al-Muharrar fÐ al-Fiqh ÝalÁ Madhhab 
ImÁm AÎmad ibn Íanbal, vol.2, pp.532 
233 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.42 
234 DusÙqÐ, ÍÁshÐyat al-DusÙqÐ ÝalÁ al-SharÎ al-kabÐr ÝalÁ MukhtaÒar KhalÐl. vol. 3, pp.521. 
235 SharbinÐ, al-MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, vol.2, pp.312. 
236 SharbinÐ, al-MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, vol.2, pp.313. 
237 Ibn QudÁmah, al-MughnÐ, vol.7, pp.177 & JazÐrÐ, ÝAbd RaÎmÁn, al-Fiqh ‘alÁ al-MadhahÐb 
al-ÝArba’ah, BayrÙt: DÁr al-KutÙb al-ÝIlmÐyah, 1990, vol2, pp.49  
238 Ibn QudÁmah, al-MughnÐ, vol.7, pp.177 
239 SharbinÐ, al-MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, vol.2, pp.312 & JazÐrÐ, al-Fiqh ‘alÁ al-MadhahÐb al-ÝArba’ah, 
vol. 2, pp. 52. 
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contract. As such, it should remain in general as it is. Secondly, they viewed the 
condition as worthless for both the investor and the agent-manager.  Thirdly, 
they were of the opinion that the time limit will put the agent-manager under 
serious pressure to achieve profit for the business. The jurists viewed that the 
agent-manager should be given no-time limit to earn profit because no one can 
guarantee when he can achieve it240.   
 
The preceding discussions again demonstrate two distinctive schools of Islamic 
law in formulating the framework of restricted muÃÁrabah. The ÍanafÐs and 
ÍanbalÐs are more flexible in allowing the investor to stipulate guidelines and 
conditions to the agent manager as compared to the schools of MÁlikÐs and 
ShÁfiÝÐs. They permitted the investor to specify the object of trade, the person 
whom the agent manager could deal with and the duration of the business. 
These restrictions are considered as preventive measures taken by the investor 
to safeguard his investment. However, the MÁlikÐs and ShÁfiÝÐs were reluctant 
to impose the restrictions and to maintain the freedom of the agent manager. 
They viewed that the restrictions will seriously limit the authority of agent 
manager in performing his task. As far as Islamic banking is concerned, the 
restricted muÃÁrabah contract is also adopted by the Malaysian Islamic banks in 
creating their investment products. Islamic banks claim that they apply the 
concept of restricted muÃÁrabah since the product has limitation in its portfolio 
and duration of the investment241. A detail analysis on this subject is presented 
in the following chapter. However, as a brief finding, the current practice 
appears to be different from the framework described by the classical jurists. 
Nowadays, the Islamic bank as agent manager has more power when compared 
to the depositors (the investor). The conditions laid down in the investment 
product are entirely decided by the bank instead of the depositors. The situation 
totally contradicts the medieval muÃÁrabah in which the investors are seen as 
the controlling party. 
   
 
                                                 
240 Ibn QudÁmah, al-MughnÐ, vol.7, pp.17 
241 Application of SharÐÝah Contracts in Banks Islam's Products and Services, Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad: Kuala Lumpur, Access at www.bankislam.com.my on 15 April 2010. 
 137 
Profit in MuÃÁrabah 
 
The classical jurists’ discussion regarding provisions of muÃÁrabah profit can 
be broadly divided into two aspects. The first aspect relates to the proportional 
division whereas the second concerns with the distribution method.  
 
It was agreed unanimously by the jurists that profit in muÃÁrabah should be 
distributed in ratio or proportion. The proportion must be decided at the 
beginning of the contract by both contracting parties. The division of 
muÃÁrabah profit in the form of fixed amount is not accepted and will 
invalidate the contract. The fixed amount of profit is prohibited because it leads 
to the inequitable situation of sharing the proceeds of the business. This could 
happen in various cases. For example, suppose an investor agreed to embark on 
a muÃÁrabah contract and promised to pay his agent manager a fixed 100 
dirhÁm. After sometime, the agent manager came back and declared that the 
business did not make any profit except the amount of his guaranteed income. 
In this case, all the profit will go to the agent manager and the investor will get 
nothing. And it is even worse if the profit is claimed to be less than 100 dirhÁm. 
In order to keep his promise, the investor has to use his own money to pay to 
the agent manager242. Hence, the fixed amount of profit could be manipulated 
for the benefit of agent manager. Knowing the limit of his income, the agent 
manager will have no incentive to maximise muÃÁrabah profit for the sake of 
an investor. In contrast, the proportional division of profit will avoid such 
problems. This is because the shares of the concerned parties will depend on 
the actual amount of profit realised from muÃÁrabah business. For the agent 
manager, the more profit declared from the business the larger amount of 
money he would receive.  
 
The classical jurists did not determine the accepted standard division of the 
profit. It is entirely down to the discretion of the investor and the agent manager 
at the time the muÃÁrabah is being negotiated. The cases discussed by the 
jurists in the classical legal texts were theoretical in nature. They are not 
                                                 
242 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.23. 
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indications of the prevalent practice of muÃÁrabah of the medieval period. The 
most frequent ratio mentioned was 50:50. Perhaps, the equal division was 
highlighted in most of the cases to provide simple examples for the general 
readers. It is notable however that the formulaic phrase used by the classical 
jurist in this subject often begins with investor's offer. For instance an investor 
would say to an agent manager: “I will entrust you 1000 dirhÁm in the form of 
muÃÁrabah on the basis of half the profit”. Besides the negotiation element, the 
phrase demonstrates the investor’s position as the dominant party in the 
muÃÁrabah contract. As provider of the capital, the investor is the one who 
makes offer and stipulates conditions to safeguard his investment. As the 
working party, the agent manager would have no other choice either to accept 
or reject the offer. In contrast, the present practice of muÃÁrabah in the Islamic 
banks illustrates the opposite scenario. Most of the matters including the 
provisions of profit ratio are determined by the banks. Depositors do not have 
the opportunity to discuss the issue with the banks since muÃÁrabah investment 
product has become the ‘take it or leave it’ affair offered by Islamic banks.           
  
The issue of proportional division of muÃÁrabah profit did not raise many 
disputes among the classical jurists. All of them agreed that the ratio or 
proportion must be clearly determined and known (maÝlÙm) as well as spelled 
out between the two contracting parties. Perhaps the only disagreement in this 
subject is the case when the contract mentioned only one party would receive 
the share of the profit. According to the majority of jurists as the risk of 
muÃÁrabah must be borne by both the investor and the agent manager, so too 
should the profit of the business be shared. Hence, the ÍanafÐs, ShÁfiÝÐs and 
ÍanbalÐs ruled that if all the profit is assigned to the agent manager, the capital 
will be governed on the basis of loan (qarÃ) contract. In this case, the agent 
manager is responsible to return the full amount of capital and bear the 
monetary losses. On the other hand, if it was agreed that only the investor 
would receive the profit, the agreement would be treated as an ibÃÁÝ contract243. 
This means the agent manager would not be liable to any risk at all in the deal. 
                                                 
243 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.24, SharbinÐ, al-MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, vol.2, pp.312 & Ibn 
QudÁmah, al-MughnÐ, vol.7, pp.142.  
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However, MÁlik was of the opinion that a muÃÁrabah contract remains intact 
even when it was agreed that all the profit will be given exclusively to the 
agent-manager. It was reported that MÁlik was asked about a similar case and 
he replied: “that is very good and surely no problem”244. 
 
After discussing the proportional division of muÃÁrabah profit, we will now 
move on to the issue of profit distribution process. It begins with the 
requirement for the agent manager to return the capital to the investor. The 
jurists asserted that as muÃÁrabah could not begin without the investor 
relinquishing control over his capital, so too, the contract could not be 
liquidated unless the agent manager restore the capital to the physical 
possession of the investor245. The return of capital is crucial to determine the 
muÃÁrabah profit. This is because the profit of the contract is defined as any 
surplus from the capital. Hence, after all the profit is been restored, any 
remaining money will be divided by both parties according to the pre-agreed 
proportion. Ibn QudÁmah explained the rule as follows: 
And there is no profit for the agent manager until he restores 
the capital. This means the agent manager is not entitled to 
anything from the business until he returns the capital to the 
investor, and when there is loss and profit, the former will 
absorb the latter irrespective of whether they occur at the same 
or different times. This is because profit means any surplus 
from the capital and anything which has no excess has no 
profit246.    
 
If, for some reason the investor and the agent manager divided the profit 
without returning the capital, the original muÃÁrabah was considered as 
continuing in force. SarakshÐ illustrated a similar case to explain the position of 
the Íanafis in this matter. Suppose an investor entrusted 1000 dirhÁm to an 
agent-manager. From the capital given, the agent-manager managed to earn an 
additional 1000 dirhÁm. Then, both of them distributed the profit equally and 
took 500 dirhÁm each. The capital remained in the possession of the agent-
manager and he continued the business with it. After that, the business was 
                                                 
244 SahnÙn, al-Mudawwanah al-KubrÁ, vol.5, pp.89-90.  
245 Udovitch, A.L, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam, pp.246. 
246 Ibn QudÁmah, al-MughnÐ, vol.7, pp.165.  
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unsuccessful and made losses. According to SarakshÐ, the previous distribution 
of profit is invalid. Therefore, the 500 dirhÁm which the agent manager took as 
profit is to be considered as capital. The agent manager should return the 
money to the investor and then only the muÃÁrabah would be dissolved. The 
insistence of returning of the capital is based on a ÎadÐth of the Prophet. It is 
reported that the Prophet says ‘A Muslim is like a trader, just as the trader’s 
profit is not complete until his capital is restored, so too a recommended 
worship of a Muslim is incomplete until he performs the obligatory worship’247.  
 
The case above also indicates that the ÍanafÐs recognised the right of the 
concerned parties to share the expected return of the muÃÁrabah business. In 
other words, although the contract is not yet dissolved, the investor and the 
agent manager are allowed to take their projected shares. However, as the 
original muÃÁrabah business is still continuing, the profit taken is conditional. 
The profit taken is subject to the performance of muÃÁrabah business after the 
distribution. If there is loss incurred in the subsequence business, the agent 
manager has to return the profit as part of the capital. The most prevalent view 
of the ShÁfiÝÐs (al-aÛhar) agreed to this ruling248. The majority of ShÁfiÝÐs did 
not consider any sales or commercial contracts executed using money from 
muÃÁrabah expected profit as legally binding. In a theoretical case study, they 
refused to recognise the act of the agent manager who bought and freed a slave 
with such profit. They argued that the expected profit is not absolutely owned 
by the agent manager, thus he has no right to free the slave249.   
 
However, the ÍanbalÐs recognised the absolute ownership of expected profit 
taken from a continuing muÃÁrabah business. In justifying the rule, the 
ÍanbalÐs made an analogy with musÁqÁh contract250. As the worker in this 
contract owns his shares starting with when the fruit is beginning to grow, the 
agent manager also has the right of ownership from the expected return of 
                                                 
247 SarakshÐ, al-MabsÙÔ, vol.22, pp.105. 
248 SharbinÐ, al-MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, vol.2, pp.318. 
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muÃÁrabah business251. On the other hand, the MÁlikÐs seemed to be the 
strictest schools in this matter. Unlike the ÍanafÐs and ShÁfiÝÐs, they prohibited 
the distribution of expected muÃÁrabah profit completely. MÁlik in particular 
did not permit the agent manager to take his expected shares without the 
presence of the investor. He stressed that the distribution of profit should be 
carried out in the presence of the investor who receives his capital in full 
amount. Even, if the investor was present during the distribution of profit but he 
did not physically possess the capital, the distribution process is not considered 
valid252.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that the above classical jurists’ discussion was 
made on the basis of a simple muÃÁrabah contract which usually took place 
between two parties and carried out to finance a specific trade project. Hence, 
the determination of profit for each concerned party is relatively easy. 
However, muÃÁrabah in Islamic banks was practised in a complex business 
setting. Islamic banks receive muÃÁrabah capital from many depositors at 
different times. The money is then pooled together and invested in various 
projects which vary in their completion periods. So how can the banks 
determine the actual profit for the depositors? The task seems more problematic 
given the right of every depositor to withdraw part or all of his money at any 
times. In additions to that, because of the national banking legislation, not all 
the depositors’ money is invested. Some of the money is kept as reserve in the 
Central Bank. Hence, a similar question arises of how the Islamic banks 
determine the actual profit for the depositors in this situation253.   
 
The above issues are the challenges faced by the Islamic banks in implementing 
the muÃÁrabah theory. Surely, the present sharÐÝah scholars in the Islamic banks 
are required to make new ijtihÁd to adapt the classical theory to modern 
banking practices. This issue will be analysed in detail in chapter four.  
 
                                                 
251 Ibn QudÁmah, al-MughnÐ, vol.7, pp.164. 
252 Al-BÁji, MuntaqÁ sharÎ al-MuwaÔÔa’, vol.7, pp.119. 
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Disputes between Investor and Agent Manager 
 
Besides elaborating the rules of essential elements (arkÁn), the classical jurists 
also gave special attention to the discussion regarding disputes in the 
muÃÁrabah contract. Most of the discussed cases were related to disagreement 
over capital, profit and agent manager’s negligence. In my personal opinion, 
besides assisting the judges dealing with the disagreement, the discussions also 
indicate the actual practice of muÃÁrabah contract. In other words, the dispute 
cases show that muÃÁrabah was not merely a theory but had been implemented 
by Muslims during the medieval period. As muÃÁrabah contract took place in 
the society, disagreement between investor and agent manager would be likely 
occurred. The disagreements were brought to the legal court for official 
settlement. These common cases were analysed by the classical jurists and 
recorded in their legal treatises.  
 
Unlike the discussions of muÃÁrabah’s essential elements, the classical jurists 
appeared to be in agreement over the verdict for most disputes. The uniformity 
of opinions was attained as a result of the agreed principle used in solving the 
cases. The classical jurists unanimously uphold the opinion that muÃÁrabah was 
established on the premise that an agent manager is viewed as a trustworthy 
person. Based on the premise, the classical jurists ruled that agent manager’s 
claim will be accepted in the dispute cases concerning (1) the amount of 
entrusted capital (2) the amount of declared profit (3) the claim of capital 
damage and (4) the denial of negligence. If, for instance, the investor and the 
agent manager argued about the amount of capital in which the former claims it 
was 1000 dirhÁm whereas the latter says it was less, the agent manager’s claim 
will be accepted before the court254. Similarly, an agent manager’s claim on 
profit will be accepted without inferring any doubt. If an investor questioned 
the declared profit, he has to support his doubt with evidence. In the words of 
al-NawawÐ, the rule was explained as follows;  
                                                 
254, Al-QarÁfÐ, al-DhakhÐrah, vol. 6, pp.50, SharbinÐ, al-MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj, vol.2, pp.321, Ibn 
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And the agent manager is deemed right with his oath when he 
said: there is no profit or I do not make profit except this 
amount255.    
 
The classical jurists were also in favour of the agent manager in the dispute 
regarding any damage occurred to the capital. For example, agent manager is 
trusted when he proclaims that the capital lost while in his possession. He will 
not be responsible to replace the capital if the lost is not because of his 
negligence. On the other hand, the investor who doubts the incident or accuses 
the loss was due to the negligence of the agent manager will be required to 
bring evidence256. Without having evidence, prosecution for agent manager’s 
negligence will be considered as a weak case. This is based on the premise that 
an agent manager is deemed as trustworthy and reliable. Ibn QudÁmah 
illustrated a similar case to explain the rule: 
If an agent manager bought a slave, and the investor said’ ‘I had 
prohibited you from the purchase’. And the agent manager denied 
it, then the accepted saying (qaul) is the saying of agent manager 
because initially there is no prohibition. And we do not know any 
disagreement (khilÁf) in this matter257.   
 
As far as I could ascertain, the only case where investor’s claim is deemed 
rightful is when it involves dispute over the determination of profit ratio. 
SarakshÐ explained:  
If agent manager says after the realisation of profit that investor had 
agreed of the provision of half of the profit, and investor says, ‘I 
only agreed to give you (agent manager) one-third of the profit’. 
The claim of the investor will be accepted together with his oath. 
This is because profit belongs to the investor, and the agent 
manager is entitled to it with condition. The agent manager also 
claims in excess of the condition stipulated to him and the investor 
had denied it258.      
 
It is important to note that the cases highlighted above are discussed with the 
presumption that the prosecutor (investor) was unable to provide evidence to 
support his claim. Without the investor’s evidence, the judgments in favour of 
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the agent manager are in congruence with a legal maxim; al-baiyinah ÝalÁ man 
iddaÝa wal yamÐn ÝalÁ man ankara the evidence is on the prosecutor and the oath 
is on the accused.  
 
The previous cases also demonstrate the standard of documentation and the 
level of transparency of classical muÃÁrabah. Without a proper record, investor 
and agent manager had argued on the exact amount of entrusted capital and the 
agreed proportion of profit. And due to the non-existence of the disclosure 
information guideline, the investor has doubt over transactions made by the 
agent manager. As a result, both parties had argued for the issues of negligence 
and breach of the contract. However, in the context of modern banking 
practices, some of the classical disputes are no longer significant. The strict 
requirement of banking documentation will clearly record the amount of deposit 
and the profit ratio. Thus, it will be hard to imagine depositors and Islamic 
banks having a dispute on such matters. Contrarily, the issue of negligence 
remains important. At this point, it is worth mentioning the opinion of 
Malaysian shÁrÐÝah scholars regarding the definition of gross negligence of an 
agent manager. According Nazri Chik, former head of BIMB shÁrÐÝah 
department, the guidelines issued by Bank Negara are the determinant factor in 
determining whether an Islamic bank has been neglectful or otherwise. Hence, 
as long as an Islamic bank acts within its authority granted by the Bank Negara, 
it can not be accused as negligence even though huge losses were made from 
the bank's erroneous business strategy259.  
 
Conclusion 
 
MuÃÁrabah is one of the classical contracts that advocate the principle of risk 
sharing in mobilising financial resources in an Islamic economy. The contract 
encourages equity partnership between investors and entreprenuers in venturing 
business projects. During the Prophet time, muÃÁrabah was practised largely by 
those who were not capable of engaging directly in trading activities – these 
                                                 
259 Interviewed with Nazri Chik, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, 10 August 2008. 
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included women, orphans and the elderly. They would entrust money to skilful 
and reliable traders to transport merchandise from Mecca and trade with them 
in Syria, Yemen and other places in the Arab peninsular. When Islam spread 
from the Arab peninsular, the contract continued to be practised by Muslims 
traders during the Umayyad (43/661-132/750) and the Abbasids (132/750-
656/1258) periods. This is evident from the growth of muÃÁrabah rules 
developed by the classical jurists. The extensive application of muÃÁrabah in 
international trade had required the jurists to develop comprehensive doctrines 
of the contract.  
 
The classical Sunni jurists differed in elaborating the practical rules of 
muÃÁrabah with the most distinctive doctrines being found in the ShÁfiÝÐ and 
the ÍanafÐ schools. The former school appeared to be more rigid as it upheld a 
'law determines market' approach. For the ShafiÝÐs, muÃÁrabah is more than just 
an ordinary commercial contract. It served a central role in establishing justice 
and fairness within the society. They imposed many restrictions on the 
operation of the contract, especially on the agent manager's license in managing 
the investors' capital. For instance, agent manager was not allowed to conduct 
any credit transaction, recursive muÃÁrabah, commingling of capital and made 
business traveling without having explicit permission from the investor. The 
ShÁfiÝÐ jurists believed that the contract of muÃÁrabah should be implemented 
according to strict observance of the original rules in order to achieve its 
desired objectives.  
 
In contrast, the ÍanafÐs were more flexible and lenient in formulating their 
muÃÁrabah doctrine. They paid considerable attention to market forces in 
deciding the scope of empowerment to the agent manager. In many cases, the 
customary practices of traders (Ýurf al-tujjÁr) were used as the determining 
factor in deciding rules for the contracting parties. The ÍanafÐ jurists adopted 
such a flexible approach because they give priority on the realisation of profit 
from a muÃÁrabah venture. Hence, for the ÍanafÐs the general expression 
(ÒÐghah muÔlaqah) was sufficient to empower an agent manager to carry out 
many transactions which were prohibited by the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists. Nonetheless, it 
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should be noted that despite the relaxed and lenient approach, the ÍanafÐ jurists 
maintained the philosophy of muÃÁrabah which is to preserve the notion of 
profit and loss sharing.                                 
 
Inspired by the notion of profit and loss sharing, the early modern Muslim 
economists proposed the muÃÁrabah as the ideal basis in establishing Islamic 
banks. MuÃÁrabah is suppossed to be the fundamental principle in running the 
operations of Islamic banks as alternatives to interest-based financial 
institutions. In theory, Islamic banks act as middle-parties between depositors 
as capital providers (rabb mÁl) and entrepreneurs as agent managers (muÃÁrib). 
Islamic banks are responsible for channeling the depositors' money into viable 
business projects runned by trustworthy entrepreneurs. Any profit generated 
from the business venture will be shared between the three parties based on pre-
determined profit ratio. The subsequent chapters will observe in detail how the 
Malaysian Islamic bankers implement the muÃÁrabah in the real banking 
business.   
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CHAPTER THREE: PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND OF 
MALAYSIAN ISLAMIC BANKING SYSTEM 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we have discussed the rules of muÃÁrabah as 
formulated by jurists of the four Sunni schools of Islamic law. These classical 
rules have been viewed as the ideal basis for current Islamic banking practices. 
In subsequent chapters, we aim to evaluate the extent in which muÃÁrabah rules 
are applied by Malaysian Islamic banking institutions. The present chapter 
provides preliminary background for the discussions. It explains (1) the theory 
of interest-free bank and presents (2) an overview of Malaysian Islamic 
banking system. As far as the theory is concerned, the chapter reviews the 
models expounded by two prominent scholars in Islamic finance, namely 
MuÎammad Baqer al-Ñadr and MuÎammad Nejatullah Siddiqi. The section 
shows how both scholars incorporated the muÃÁrabah contract in their outlines 
of practical models of an interest-free bank.  
 
Discussion of the overview of Malaysian Islamic banking system sheds light 
the history, growth, sharÐÝah governance system and the methodology adopted 
by local sharÐÝah advisory committees. It shows the numerous efforts made by 
the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM) in facilitating the industry's rapid growth 
since its inception in 1980's until present days. The chapter also elucidates the 
three level of supervision formed to ensure the compliance of Islamic banking 
products to the principles of sharÐÝah. In an attempt to understand the 
methodology of the local sharÐÝah advisory committees, this chapter analyses 
their justification in legalising the contract of bayÞ al-ÝÐnah for the creation of 
the so-called "Islamic" credit card. It is hoped that by understanding these 
preliminary discussions, readers can appreciate my argument in the following 
chapter.  
 
 
 148 
 
The Models of Interest-free Bank 
The theory of interest-free banking has been discussed by Muslim scholars 
since the late 1940's. The earliest reference in this subject is attributed to the 
work of Qureshi entitled Islam and the Theory of Interest260. Qureshi proposed 
the application of the muÃÁrabah contract as the primary basis for replacing 
interest in the conventional banking system. The contract of muÃÁrabah is 
believed to be a better alternative than other possible contracts because it 
supports a profit and loss sharing (PLS) principle. Contrary to the interest-
based banking system, the PLS principle, it is argued, could lead to socio-
economic justice and equitable distribution of wealth. Beginning in the early 
1950's, jurists and Muslim economists started to explore this subject and 
developed a workable model of interest-free bank. In 1955, MuÎammad Uzair 
published two notable articles, entitled as 'Interestless Banking: Will it be a 
Success' and 'An Outline of Interestless Banking'. Uzair enhanced further the 
conceptual of interest-free bank by suggesting a triangular relationship between 
depositors, bank and entrepreneurs under a muÃÁrabah contract261.   
In the 1960's, more comprehensive studies of interest-free banking theory were 
written. One of them was al-Bank al-lÁ RibawÐ fÐl Islam produced by 
MuÎammad Baqer al-Ñadr. Ñadr developed his model of interest-free bank in 
isolation from the mainstream jurists and Muslim economists. This was partly 
because he was a ShÐÝÐ scholar living in Najaf which at that particular time was 
closed to other parts of the Muslim world262.  Ñadr's work is significant as it 
was the first workable model of interest-free bank produced by a traditionally 
trained jurist. He begins the discussion of the model by pointing out a 
distinction between an interest-free bank functioning in an economic system 
which totally based on the Islamic principles and an interest-free bank 
                                                 
260 Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Muslim Economic Thinking: A Survey of Contemporary 
Literature in Studies in Islamic Economics, Khurshid Ahmad (ed.), The Islamic Foundation: 
Leicester, 1980. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Rodney Wilson, The Contribution of MuÎammad BÁqir al-Ñadr to Contemporary Islamic 
Economic Thought, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 9 no.1, 1998, pp.47. 
 149 
operating as partial component of the interest-based financial system. Ñadr 
argues that the wisdom (Îikmah) behind the prohibition of ribÁ could be 
realised under the former condition but would not necessarily materialise under 
the latter circumstances. His main argument is based on the notion that Islamic 
economic components are closely integrated; every component influences one 
another to achieve the desired goals.  
However, despite admitting the possible inability of obtaining the Îikmah under 
the latter circumstances, Ñadr maintains the obligation to set up an interest-free 
bank within a conventional financial system. Ñadr's model of interest-free 
banking was developed on the basis of two important points. First, an interest 
free bank should be run as a commercial entity aiming to make a profit263. 
Second, the revenue of the bank should be generated from the proceeds of 
human labour not from the exploitation of capital264. Ñadr viewed an interest-
free bank as functionning principally as a financial intermediary. This means 
the bank acts as an agent (wakÐl) who collects funds from depositors and 
channels them to potential entrepreneurs. Figure 1 below illustrates the 
relationship between the three parties.  
Figure 1: The relationship between depositors, bank and entrepreneurs 
 
Based on Ñadr's model, the contract of muÃÁrabah is executed between 
depositors as capital providers (rabb al-mÁl) and entrepreneurs as agent-
manager (muÃÁrib). The bank just plays an intermediary role which trys to 
establish a business relationship between the two parties. The bank is neither an 
agent-manager nor a capital provider in this agreement. Ñadr wrote: 
                                                 
263 Sadr, MuÎammad BÁqir, al-Bank al-LÁ RibawÐ fÐ al-IslÁm, Beirut: DÁr al-TaÝÁruf lil 
MaÔbuÝÁt, 1977, pp.9 
264 Ibid. 
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The bank is actually not a contracting party in this muÃÁrabah 
contract. This is because it is neither capital provider nor agent-
manager; it only plays intermediary role between the two 
parties; instead of the entrepreneurs meet the capital providers 
one after another asking for funds, the bank gathers the 
depositors' money and deal with the entrepreneurs directly265  
As an agent (wakÐl), it is part of the bank's duties to identify honest, capable, 
reliable and knowledgeable entrepreneurs for depositors. Once entrepreneurs 
with such qualities have been identified, the bank will make investment in their 
businesses on behalf of the depositors. This particular point differentiates a 
muÃÁrabah account from the investment account of a conventional bank. In a 
muÃÁrabah account, the period of investment only starts when the bank 
manages to initiate a muÃÁrabah deal with entrepreneurs. However, in 
investment accounts the period of investment starts immediately when the 
customer deposits their money into the account.   
According to Ñadr, all the deposits under muÃÁrabah contracts will be pooled 
together and invested in various sorts of businesses. As a general rule, profit 
generated from the business will be shared between the depositors and 
entrepreneurs according to a pre-determined ratio. The profit ratio, as suggested 
by Ñadr, should be higher than interest rates offered by the conventional bank. 
This strategy is vital for the survival of the interest-free bank especially in the 
context of a dual banking system where customers have options to maximise 
their saving266. Meanwhile, the bank will receive juÝÁlah (fee or commission) 
for its intermediary work. However, Ñadr’s idea regarding the bank’s juÝÁlah 
appears problematic. Ñadr proposes that the juÝÁlah of the bank should consist 
of a fixed fee and share of the bank in the muÃÁrabah profit. While the 
reasoning for the fixed fee is understandable, Ñadr's justification in allowing the 
bank to share the muÃÁrabah profit needs further clarification. In Ñadr’s 
justification, he just stated that the bank as an agent in the muÃÁrabah venture 
                                                 
265 Ibid.pp.41 
266 Ibid. pp.34. 
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has the right to impose additional conditions on depositors and entrepreneurs 
such as the requirement to share their profit267.   
As for the issue of profit distribution, Ñadr realised the complexity of present 
muÃÁrabah accounting. This is because the bank will receive deposits from 
customers at different times and the money will be invested in business projects 
which vary in their completion period. How an interest-free bank determines 
the exact portion of profit for each individual customer in such situation? Based 
on Ñadr's suggestion, the profit will be distributed to depositors based on two 
main factors; (1) the amount of deposit and (2) the duration of investment. In an 
example, Ñadr illustrated a scenario where a bank has to distribute 20,000 
dinars of profit to all depositors who had deposited 1,000,000 dinars. The 
arithmetical example is not easy to understand, but it is interesting as an 
example of Ñadr's concern for practicality.  
Firstly, the total profit is divided into two sections (10,000 dinar each section). 
The first section indicates the profit in relation to the amount of deposit 
whereas the second section shows the profit in relation to the duration of 
investment. For the first section, 10,000 dinar of profit is generated from one 
million dinar investment. Therefore the arithmetical formula for depositors in 
this section is: 10,000 ÷ 1,000,000 x the amount of capital. For example if a 
customer put in 50,000 dinar deposit, his share will be 500 dinar. As for the 
second section, that is profit in relation to the duration of investment, Ñadr 
suggested the 10,000 dinar of profit is divided into time basis, quarterly, 
monthly or weekly, to be decided by the bank. The method implies that the 
depositors will be paid based on their investment period; the longer the higher 
share of profit.  
In my opinion, this method is debatable since it is similar to the interest rate 
formula of conventional banking.  In addition to that, Ñadr ignored the fact that 
various muÃÁrabah businesses make different rates of profit. It is possible that 
one deposit might be more profitable than others. Ñadr' suggestion to distribute 
                                                 
267 Ibid, pp.207. 
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equally the profit seems unfair to some of the depositors. His suggestion is that 
the bank be required to obtain consent from all depositors to share their profit 
equally based on the bank's accounting formula. This is a very simplistic 
suggestion to solve the problem.             
Another controversial point in Ñadr' model of interest-free bank is related to the 
capital guarantee. As discussed in chapter two, one of the salient features of 
muÃÁrabah contract is that disallows the agent-manager from guaranteeing the 
capital from any losses. The reason for this rule is to maintain the concept of 
profit and loss sharing embedded in the contract. However, Ñadr insisted that 
all money deposited in the interest-free bank should be guaranteed. Perhaps, 
Ñadr was influenced by the practice of conventional banks that imposed a 
protection scheme to guarantee their depositors' money. For interest-free 
banking, Ñadr proposed that the guarantee is undertaken by the bank itself. 
According to him, the guarantee is acceptable under the rule of sharÐÝah since 
the bank is a third party in the contract268. He argued that there is no evidence 
in the sharÐÝah which prohibits capital guarantee from an outside party of 
muÃÁrabah.  
Ñadr acknowledged the possibility of business failure in the muÃÁrabah 
contract. He agreed to the classical jurists' rule; if muÃÁrabah business suffers 
losses, the depositors will not get anything from their investment. Nevertheless, 
Ñadr was of the opinion that the zero-return muÃÁrabah investment is very 
unlikely to happen in the context of interest-free banking operation. This is 
because all the money will be pooled together and utilised to support various 
kind of investments. It is unimaginable that all the investments suffer losses 
simultaneously. The losses could be from some of the investments while others 
presumably make huge profit. The huge profit will absorb the losses and 
therefore bank always has something to share with the depositors. 
In addition to this, Ñadr is aware that the muÃÁrabah venture might face an 
agency or moral hazard problem. However, his suggestions to overcome this 
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issue are general in nature rather than specific economic solutions. He stressed 
the importance of dealing with trustworthy and experienced entrepreneurs. The 
bank is required to develop a vigilant mechanism in monitoring entrepreneur's 
business such as specifying the nature of business, the limit within which it is to 
be conducted and the obligation to give regular financial reports. Ñadr's 
recommendations demand a radical change of interest-free bankers' outlook. 
Contrary to the ordinary bankers whose job is mainly to analyse the 
creditworthiness of a customer before lending him a sum of money, bankers in 
an interest free bank are expected to function as project managers.  
In summary, Ñadr' model of interest-free banking is based on the application of 
muÃÁrabah between the depositors and entrepreneurs. The former provides 
capital and the latter conducts the business. The bank only plays an 
intermediary role between the two parties. The bank's main task is to secure the 
deposits and find reliable entrepreneurs to channel the money. It also has an 
obligation to guarantee the deposit and monitor the business operation. Profit 
generated from the business will be shared between the depositors, 
entrepreneurs and the bank. In addition to the share of profit, the bank also 
entitled to a fixed fee for its intermediation work.  
A part from Ñadr, the theory of Islamic banking was elaborated in detail by 
MuÎammad Nejatullah Siddiqi. In fact, Siddiqi's work on this subject was much 
more widely quoted by Islamic economists compared to Ñadr269. One of the 
contributing factors to this situation is the holistic approach adopted by Siddiqi 
in developing his model. Having neo-classical economic educational 
background, Siddiqi not only elaborated his model purely based on the fiqh 
rules but integrated it with recent state of financial reality. He presented an 
economic discourse on how to establish and run an interest-free bank. He 
started developing the model in the late 1960's inspired by the work of AbÙ 
ÝAlÁ al-MawdudÐ. His work published first in Urdu entitled as Ghair SÙdi 
BankarÐ (Banking without Interest). Nevertheless, the present book which is my 
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 154 
focus in this section is the revised version of Siddiqi's previous work published 
in 1983 in English. Although Ñadr and Siddiqi agreed that muÃÁrabah is the 
fundamental basis of interest-free banking system, they differed in outlining its 
practical model. In Ñadr's view, an interest-free bank would not be part of the 
muÃÁrabah contracting parties. The bank just acts as a middle party who links 
between the depositors and the entrepreneurs. In contrast, from Siddiqi's 
perspective, the bank should participate directly in the muÃÁrabah venture. 
Siddiqi's model was based on two-tier muÃÁrabah known in the classical legal 
texts as muÃÁrib yuÃÁrib.  
Based on the proposed model, an interest-free bank will play two different roles 
during the business endeavour. In relation to the depositors, the bank will be 
regarded as muÃÁrib (agent manager) who hold responsibility in generating 
profit from the financial resources obtained. Meanwhile, when the bank 
entrusts the funds to real entrepreneur, it will be considered as investor. 
Interestingly, Siddiqi himself had raised question over the permissibility of 
such financial intermediation based on the two-tier muÃÁrabah270. He might 
share similar view with some ShÁfiÝÐ jurists who rejected the practice since the 
middle party (bank) did not make significant contribution to the business 
venture. Nevertheless, Siddiqi advanced his model as he relied on the previous 
scholars namely Qureshi, MaududÐ and Uzair who in support of the idea271.        
Siddiqi's idea regarding the setting up of interest-free banks also does not base 
itself on pure muÃÁrabah contract. He suggested that an interest-free bank could 
be established based on the hybrid contracts of shirkat ul-ÝinÁn272 and 
muÃÁrabah. The shareholders own the bank based on the former contract while 
the depositors own it based on the latter. Siddiqi's idea regarding this matter 
was actually adapted from the Western concept of joint-stock corporation. 
Persons/partners who provide capital in establishing the bank are regarded as 
owners and known as shareholders. Even though, they have the right to be 
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involved in daily banking operations, usually the task is entrusted to a 
management team. The managers are appointed by the shareholders through a 
board of directors or a council of representatives, formed to represent and 
safeguard their long term interest. The bank's managers or staff will be paid 
based on fixed salaries. On the other hand, the income of shareholders will 
depend on the amount of bank's net profit. It will be distributed in proportionate 
to the size of shareholders' capital. The same rule will be applied in spreading 
any loss suffered. So what are the main business activities of an interest-free 
bank? 
In answering the question, Siddiqi shared the view of some previous scholars. 
He insisted that the revenue of interest-free bank should be generated mainly 
from the application muÃÁrabah contracts. He suggested interest-free banks 
play an intermediate role in the two-tier muÃÁrabah arrangement. This is done 
by mixing up the shareholders' funds and the depositors' money. The 
commingled funds will then be invested with another party (the entrepreneur) 
on the basis of another profit sharing contract. The most important rule for this 
contract is the requirement to produce quarterly accounting reports either by the 
bank or the entrepreneurs. This means the bank and entrepreneurs are required 
to report the state of their whole business and determine the total profit or loss 
in every quarter. As for depositors, the quarterly accounting report is vital in 
providing information regarding the investment of their money. They will know 
what the bank does with the money and have some indication relating to 
potential profit or loss. Similarly, the quarterly accounting report produced by 
the entrepreneurs is crucial for the bank because such a procedure could protect 
the bank from deception and fraud, as the ongoing profit or loss can be studied 
in relatively early period.    
It should be noted however that the requirement to produce quarterly accounts 
does not mean either that the depositors or the bank will demand their capital 
back at the end of each quarter. In fact, the depositors in muÃÁrabah accounts 
will deposit their money for an undetermined period and the bank will probably 
invest for several quarters. The main purpose of requiring the quarterly 
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accounting report is just to give information regarding the use of capital. After 
analysing the financial reports, if either the depositor or the bank wishes to 
withdraw from the contract, on the view of their own interest, they are free to 
do so. If not, the muÃÁrabah deposit account and the muÃÁrabah investment 
will both remain intact273.  
In addition to the muÃÁrabah investment account, Siddiqi suggested the 
creation of a current account which he termed as 'loan account'. Depositors who 
open this type of account will benefit from the safety of the deposited money 
and the convenience in making daily business transactions. The account holders 
will have the right to draw cheques and transfer money to others. Siddiqi 
asserted that the bank will not charge anything for these facilities. However, the 
bank is authorised to invest the money as long as it remains in the account. Any 
profit earned from the investment will go entirely to the bank and the account 
holder will have no share in it. If the investment suffers loss, it must be borne 
by the bank while the account holders deposit is guaranteed274.  
Besides, Siddiqi proposed that the deposited money of loan account to be 
utilised in advancing short-term loan to meet the entrepreneurial demand for 
working capital. This refers to an entrepreneur who is in need of additional 
capital temporarily (i.e for few days) which he expects to return with the 
income he anticipates from the sales of his products. Siddiqi admitted that the 
contract of muÃÁrabah can not be applied to solve the short-term loan problem. 
A muÃÁrabah contract agreed at the final stage of business does not resemble a 
true profit and sharing concept. Rather it will be seen as an act of manipulating 
financial distress of entrepreneur for bank's own benefit. Furthermore, no 
entrepreneur is likely to be willing to enter into partnership in such condition. 
This is because by agreeing a muÃÁrabah contract, the entrepreneur must share 
a part of his profit with the bank at the juncture where he supposes to earn it on 
his own. Hence, by using substantial funds from the loan account deposit, the 
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short-term financing should be advanced on an interest-free basis275. Siddiqi, 
however stressed that these loan have to be repaid in any case even if the 
enterprise makes a loss. In this regard, he allowed the taking of sureties or 
collaterals against the loans. For example, in the case of bankruptcy, the bank 
should have power to recover the unpaid loan by selling borrower business' 
asset.    
Siddiqi's idea regarding the interest-free of short-term loan clearly illustrates his 
vision to portray an Islamic bank as not merely as a profit-oriented business 
entity but at the same time fulfils its socio-economic responsibility. In 
encouraging such activities, the central bank has an important role to play. For 
instance, the central bank could impose a regulation that strictly requires 
Islamic banks to advance free loans or otherwise; they will not be allowed to 
accept deposits in loan accounts. Despite being rather theoretical in this matter, 
Siddiqi's model of interest-free bank has become the main reference in the 
establishment (but not running) of Islamic banks worldwide.             
It is clear that from Siddiqi's and Ñadr's perspectives the muÃÁrabah contract 
should become the major source of income for an interest-free bank. They 
believe that the wide application of muÃÁrabah will distinguish an interest-free 
from an interest-based bank since the former is based on profit and loss sharing 
principle while the latter is based on guaranteed return. In the following 
chapter, we will examine how far the contract of muÃÁrabah is applied in daily 
Islamic banking operations. However, before we embark into the discussions, it 
is appropriate to begin with the overview of Malaysian Islamic banking system. 
I will explain the history, growth, sharÐÝah governance practices and 
methodology adopted by the local sharÐÝah advisory committees. It is hoped that 
by having sufficient information on the topics, readers will be able to 
understand better my argument in the next chapter.      
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An Overview of Islamic Banking in Malaysia  
 
The establishment of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) in 1983 marked the 
beginning of Islamic banking industry in Malaysia. The emergence of Islamic 
banking in the country was driven by both external and internal factors. The 
principal external factor was the commencement of interest-free banking 
institutions in the Middle East, heavily influenced by Islamic resurgence 
movement.276 When Muslim countries obtained independence, there was a call 
from the majority of the population to set up a banking system that is free from 
interest. As a result of the combined efforts of Islamic economists, jurists and 
government, several Islamic banks were established. These were initiated in 
1963, when the first Islamic bank was founded in Mit Ghamr, Egypt. The 
industry grew rapidly in the 1970's through the establishment of the Islamic 
Development Bank in 1974, the Islamic Bank of Dubai in 1975, the Islamic 
Bank of Faisal in Egypt in 1977, the Islamic Banks of Faisal and the Bank of 
Islamic Finance and Investment in Jordan in 1978 and the Islamic Investment 
Company Ltd in UAE in 1979.  
 
The success of these Islamic banks inspired Muslims in Malaysia. In 1980, 
Bumiputera Economic Congress proposed that the government allow the 
establishment of an Islamic bank in the country. As a response to the proposal, 
a National Steering Committee was set up to study the possibility of having an 
Islamic bank, examining in particular its legal and economic impacts. Based on 
the study conducted by the committee, the Malaysian government agreed to 
allow the establishment of BIMB277. However, in contrast to the approach 
adopted by Iran and Sudan in which their financial systems were drastically 
changed in total towards an interest-free system, the government of Malaysia 
decided to implement a dual banking system. This meant the Islamic banking 
institutions would be introduced gradually, firstly by allowing BIMB to operate 
along side established conventional banks.  
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BIMB had been awarded a monopoly status for 10 years to give opportunity to 
the bank to strengthen its business operations. During the first decade of its 
establishment, BIMB had shown a relatively promising performance.  The bank 
maintained a significant growth of profitability, an average profit of 21% from 
1984 to 1997. However, like many other Islamic banks, the profit generated by 
BIMB is largely contributed by debt-based products rather than equity-based 
products. In other words, the principles of bayÝ bithaman ajil and murÁbaÎah are 
applied more widely compared to muÃÁrabah or mushÁrakah. Moral hazard and 
the lack of knowledgeable bankers in selecting, evaluating and managing a 
profitable project had been given as the main reasons for the situation278.  
 
In 1993, the Central Bank of Malaysia introduced its “Islamic Banking 
Scheme” (IBS).  The scheme allows conventional banks to offer Islamic 
banking products through their existing facilities. The main objective of this 
scheme is to speed up the dissemination of Islamic banking products to local 
customers within the possible shortest period. There were 24 conventional 
banks which responded to the call and provided Islamic products through their 
1663 branches279. The IBS banks are required to set up a division is responsible 
for the Islamic banking operations in terms of (amongst other things) product 
development, marketing and credit control. According to the Guidelines of IBS 
issued by the Central Bank, the Islamic banking division should be led by a 
Muslim senior manager who possesses relevant background in Islamic banking 
and has sufficient banking experience280. It is commonly acknowledged that 
during the early stages of IBS, the majority of bankers did not have sufficient 
knowledge of Islamic banking principles. Therefore, the Central Bank has 
required the conventional banks to provide regular training and educational 
programmes to their staff in order to enrich their knowledge in the said area.  
                                                 
278 Abdus Samad & M. Kabir Hassan, The Performance of Malaysian Islamic Bank During 
1984-1997, International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, vol.1, no.3  
279 Norma Md. Saad, Macro Economic Application in South East Asian Countries, Kuala 
Lumpur: International Islamic University of Malaysia Press, 2004, pp.52. 
280 Guidelines on Skim Perbankan Islam, Kuala Lumpur: Central Bank of Malaysia, n.d. pp.8 
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There are several issues raised by the opponents of Islamic banking regarding 
the implementation of IBS. Firstly, it is argued that the conventional banks that 
participated in the scheme actually exploited the rise of religious sentiment 
amongst the Muslims for their own economic benefits. In other words, the 
conventional banks were not really committed to achieving the virtues of 
Islamic banking in order to promote equal distribution of wealth, alleviation of 
poverty (and so on) but rather they were interested in maximising their 
shareholders’ profit. Hence, the over reliance on debt-like products by the 
Islamic banking institution comparing to the equity-based products remains 
unresolved. Secondly, the implementation of IBS raises doubt for some devout 
Muslims, particularly with regard to issue of the commingling of funds. This is 
because customers of conventional and Islamic accounts in IBS banks will 
deposit their money in the same place, which leads to a public assumption that 
the money will be commingled with non-Islamically invested funds, and 
thereby invested in the same business. Although the Central Bank requires the 
conventional banks to disclose separate financial statements so that they might 
know the daily balances of the banks' assets and liabilities relating to IBS, 
doubt still surrounds some conscious Muslims.  
 
However, for some other Muslims, the issue is not significant. Perhaps, they 
rely on the sharÐÝah committee approval which is accountable to the internal and 
external auditing of the banks' operations. In general, as more customers have 
access to the Islamic products, the IBS has successfully increased its 
penetration of Islamic banking market. In fact, the IBS banks have 
outperformed the full-fledge Islamic banks. In December 2002, the IBS banks 
collectively accounted for 70% of Islamic banking deposits whereas BIMB and 
Bank Muamalat (the second full-fledged Islamic bank founded in 1999) 
contributed the remaining 30 percent.  
 
Since 2005, the Central Bank begun to put wind down the IBS scheme. The 
policy is implemented following the Financial Sector Master plan281. The IBS 
                                                 
281 Financial Sector Masterplan, Kuala Lumpur: Central Bank of Malaysia, 2004.   
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banks are encouraged to transform their Islamic 'windows' into separate Islamic 
subsidiaries. The incorporation of Islamic subsidiaries is hoped to further 
strengthen the institutional capacity of Islamic banks towards achieving 20 
percent of total banking market share by 2010. An Islamic bank subsidiary, led 
by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) with greater autonomy in running its own 
business entity, was established. This will capitalise on Islamic banking 
potential to the fullest extent, as the investors both locally and internationally 
can participate in the bank’s activity through direct equity participation. As of 
January 2008, eight IBS banks have transformed their Islamic banking 
divisions into Islamic banks subsidiaries.  
 
Since 2005, the Central Bank also started to liberalise the local Islamic banking 
market. The liberalisation means the government granted licenses to foreign 
Islamic banks and allows them to offer products and services to local 
customers. Its main objective is to create a healthy competition among the 
Islamic banks as a driving force for growth. To date, two Middle East banks 
namely Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad and 
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad have commenced their operation in 
Malaysia. Table 7 below shows the current list of the full-fledge and the 
subsidiaries of Islamic banks in Malaysia.  
Table 7: List of fully-fledged and subsidiary of Islamic Banks in Malaysia 
No. Name 
1 Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 
2 Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 
3 Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad 
4 AmIslamic Bank Berhad 
5 Asian Finance Bank Berhad 
6 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
7 Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 
8 CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 
9 EONCAP Islamic Bank Berhad 
10 Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 
11 Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad 
12 Maybank Islamic Berhad 
13 RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 
 
Besides the banking sector, the Malaysian government is also committed to 
developing the Islamic Capital Market (ICM). The huge amount of global 
Islamic funds estimated to be USD$1.3 trillion has attracted the government to 
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make Malaysia the hub of Islamic finance. In an attempt to draw these funds, 
Malaysia offers sharÐÝah-based unit trusts, sharÐÝah-compliant stocks and sukÙk 
(Islamic bonds) as alternatives to conventional investment instruments. Since 
their inception, these Islamic investment instruments have shown a remarkable 
growth. The number of Islamic unit trust companies has increased sharply from 
just 7 companies in 1995 reaching 71 companies in 2004282. The investors in 
the Malaysian stock market namely Bursa Malaysia, have also a huge selection 
of sharÐÝah-compliant stocks as 816 companies were listed as sharÐÝah-approved 
companies in 2005. These sharÐÝah compliance stocks accounted for 82.5% of 
the total listed companies in Bursa Malaysia. As for the sukuk market, the value 
of sukuk issued was approximately USD11.05 billion in the same year283.  
 
Based on the preceding discussion, it is clear that since its inception Islamic 
banking industry in Malaysia has experienced a rapid growth. This remarkable 
development is achieved mainly due to two main factors (1) unflagging support 
from the government and (2) strong demand from majority Muslims 
population. Undoubtedly, the Malaysian government is very committed to 
establishing the Islamic banking system in the country. Its governing 
institution, the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM) has made numerous efforts to 
facilitate the growth of the industry. The most recent initiative taken is the 
establishment of the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance 
(INCEIF) which aims to be the knowledge leader in the said area. Meanwhile, 
the huge support received from majority of Muslims is driven mainly by the 
religious factor. It goes without saying that other factors such as the 
competitiveness of profit rates, quality of services etc. are not important for 
them. However, it shows that customers who patronise the Islamic banks over 
the conventional banks generally believe that the products and services offered 
fully comply with the principles of sharÐÝah. Realising this matter, the focus of 
BNM nowadays is to enhance the regulatory framework of Islamic banking 
institutions. Specifically, the BNM strives to improve the sharÐÝah governance 
                                                 
282 Mohammed al-Qorshi, Islamic Finance & Development IMF Magazine, December 2005, 
vol. 42, no. 4 
283 The Islamic Capital Market Brochure, Kuala Lumpur: Bursa Malaysia, 2005, pp.9 
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and risk management system within the local Islamic banking environment. In 
the following section, I will discuss the current sharÐÝah governance framework 
adopted by Islamic banks in the country.  
 
SharÐÝah Governance of Malaysian Islamic Banking Institutions 
 
Undoubtedly, the major concern of Islamic banking institutions is to conduct 
their business in accordance to principles laid down by sharÐÝah. In order to 
ensure that all their products and services are sharÐÝah compliant, every Islamic 
bank in Malaysia has set up a sharÐÝah committee. The main duty and 
responsibility of the committee is to assure the business operations in Islamic 
banks comply with sharÐÝah principles at all times. The committee is also 
responsible for approving new products and services proposed by the bank 
management.   
 
The members of each sharÐÝah committee are appointed by the board of 
directors of an Islamic bank upon the recommendation of its nomination 
committee. Normally the appointment is for a renewable term of two years. The 
sharÐÝah committee members are expected to have vast knowledge in Islamic 
law, either in Islamic legal methodology (uÒÙl al-fiqh) or Islamic commercial 
transactions (fiqh al-muÝÁmalÁt)284. Since the sharÐÝah committee members are 
appointed and their allowances are paid by the banks, it is argued that the 
bank’s management may influence them in making proposed products legal. In 
other words, there some people who are not convinced that the sharÐÝah 
committee members has full freedom in expressing their opinions and is fully 
independent. However, based on my interviews with 4 scholars who directly 
involve in the committees, such a complaint is not justified. According to them, 
the sharÐÝah committees have total freedom to make ruling although it may not 
in favour of the bank. Furthermore, their opinions are respected by the bank’s 
management. In her defence of the sharÐÝah committee, Engku Rabiah argues 
that there is no ‘negative influence’ from the bank management except, 
                                                 
284 Guidelines on the Governance of SharÐÝah Committee for the Islamic Financial Institutions, 
Kuala Lumpur: Central Bank of Malaysia, December 2004. 
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administratively speaking; they sometimes have to response to the problems too 
quickly.285 Another scholar, Joni Tamkin contends that the banks respect 
resolutions made by the committees because their endorsement are needed to 
maintain the banks’ reputation.286 The Islamic banks are aware that the 
existence of any non-compliant sharÐÝah element in their operation will affect 
the confidence of the public.     
 
In order to avoid a conflict of interest and for reasons of confidentiality, the 
BNM restricts the multiple appointments of scholars within the same industry. 
However, a scholar is permitted to become a member of sharÐÝah committees in 
different industries. For example if a scholar is appointed as member of sharÐÝah 
committee in BIMB, he is not eligible to become committee member in other 
Islamic bank. However, he can still be appointed as member of committee in 
other industries such as in takÁful (Islamic insurance) or fund management287. 
The policy has a profound impact on the sharÐÝah landscape of Islamic banking 
institutions in the country. It creates more opportunities for the sharÐÝah scholars 
to get involved in this industry. As the number of Islamic financial institutions 
increases every year, more sharÐÝah scholars are needed to fill in the sharÐÝah 
committee quota. This is because previously the same scholars who deem to 
have high reputation in fiqh al-muÝÁmalÁt were likely to sit on many 
committees. Such phenomena are viewed as hindering original sharÐÝah 
discussion as the decisions were drawn from opinions of a few similar scholars.  
 
Currently, there are more than 40 scholars appointed as members of the sharÐÝah 
committee in various Islamic banks in Malaysia. Their educational profiles are 
presented in Appendix 1. As clearly indicated in the appendix, the majority of 
the members are academics in universities. Perhaps academics become the 
popular choice as committee members because the BNM has prohibited the 
function of sharÐÝah supervision in the development of private business. The 
                                                 
285Interview with Dr. Engku Rabiah Engku Ali, 11 August 2008, International Islamic 
University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. 
286 Interview with Prof. Dr. Joni Tamkin, 14 August 2008, University of Malaya, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
287 Guidelines on the Governance of Shariah Committee for the Islamic Financial Institutions. 
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restriction aims to maintain the public confidence in decisions or resolutions 
made by the committee members. Most of them specialise in Islamic law, 
holding doctorate from various universities in United Kingdom, Middle East or 
Malaysia. In addition to that, as a consequence of the liberalisation, the 
committees' members are not limited to Malaysian scholars but also consist of 
foreign experts especially from the Middle East. 
 
In order to depict more clearly the role of sharÐÝah committee within the Islamic 
banks, I reproduce the latest report of BIMB’s sharÐÝah advisory council288. In 
2009, the Council held 9 meetings to review various products, transactions and 
processes in line with the sharÐÝah requirements and had also approved the 
following products: 
 
i. Current account based on wakÁlah contract. 
ii. Issuance of murÁbaÎah Medium Term Notes. 
iii. An-NajÁÎ NID-i structured investment product based on muÃÁrabah 
muqayyadah contract. 
iv. Islamic Convertible Redeemable Non-Cumulative Preference Shares 
(CRNCPS). 
v. Islamic syndicated structure facility based on istiÒna’ contract 
convertible to ijÁrah muntahiah bi-tamlÐk. 
vi. Legal documentations for product based on commodities transaction 
from other Institutions. 
vii. Legal documentations for Islamic profit rate swap (musÁwamah) 
and cross currency profit rate swap (murÁbaÎah) products. 
viii. Structured product and legal documents for Islamic new frontier 
index. 
ix. Legal documentation for equity option product. 
x. Legal documentations for standard Inter-bank commodity murÁbaÎah 
Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia. 
                                                 
288Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) Financial Statement 2009, Kuala Lumpur, 
http://www.bankislam.com.my/bimbpdf/AR09-Financial Staments.pdf, Accessed on 30 
December 2009. 
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xi. Transaction legal documentations bayÝ murÁbaÎah Medium Term 
Notes Issuance Programme. 
xii. Transaction documents for the syndicated business financing-i 
facility. 
xiii. Legal documentations for personal financing-i Tawarruq. 
xiv. Legal documentations for business financing-i Tawarruq. 
xv. Legal documentations for BBA and IstiÒna’ house financing. 
xvi. Legal documentations of ijÁrah muntahiyah bi-tamlÐk facility. 
xvii. Multiple Ýaqad of Negotiable Islamic Debt Certificate (NIDC). 
xviii. Replacement of Novation agreement. 
xix. Variations in Islamic Negotiable Instruments (INI) and Islamic 
Negotiable Instruments of Deposit (INID). 
xx. Variations in al-awfÁr Savings Account-i and Investment Account-i 
(previously known as Savings Multiplier) product features. 
 
In addition, the Council in the said meetings also reviewed, adopted and 
approved several initiatives of the bank in strengthening the sharÐÝah 
governance of the bank which include the following: 
i. WakÁlah contract guideline (version 1.0). 
ii. Tawarruq (financing) concept guideline (version 1.0). 
iii. WadÐÝah contract guidelines (version 3.0). 
iv. Revised terms of reference for SharÐÝah Supervisory Council. 
v. Terms of reference for zakat committee. 
vi. Business zakat payment guideline (version 1.0). 
vii. Dress code guidelines. 
            viii. SharÐÝah compliance training programme. 
 
The above report suggests that BIMB sharÐÝah advisors had been actively 
involved in creating a number of innovative Islamic banking products. They 
have moved towards offering sophisticated financial products such as 
derivatives (swap) and negetiobale instrument deposit (NID). It would be 
interesting to investigate their orientation in supporting such progressive 
development of Islamic banking products.     
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A part from the sharÐÝah committee, Islamic banks in Malaysia have internal 
sharÐÝah departments. This department consists of full-time sharÐÝah officers 
who mainly function as liaison between the bank and the sharÐÝah committee 
members. The sharÐÝah officers serve as a secretariat, drafting the minutes of the 
sharÐÝah committee meeting. Besides this, they are involved in the design of 
new products particularly in giving advice on the appropriate Islamic contract 
to be adopted in the proposed products. Once the proposal of new product is 
prepared, it then will be presented to the sharÐÝah committee for their approval. 
The sharÐÝah committee members will examine the modus operandi of the 
proposed product and decide on its legality. If the sharÐÝah committee members 
are not satisfied with the proposed product, it will be returned back to the bank 
management for further improvement. It is unknown however how frequent a 
particular new product is rejected by the sharÐÝah committees. Nevertheless, the 
report of BIMB’s sharÐÝah advisory council indicates that their discussions are 
brief. The sharÐÝah committees seem rely heavily on the information presented 
by the bank's sharÐÝah officers. Strictly speaking, the sharÐÝah committees 
merely act as 'rubberstamp' who endorses proposal from bank's management.       
  
In addition to this, BNM has also founded the National SharÐÝah Advisory 
Council (NSAC). The NSAC is regarded as the most authoritative body relating 
to the sharÐÝah issues of the Islamic banking in the country. The NSAC is 
responsible to make final decision whenever different interpretations between 
the sharÐÝah committees in Islamic banks occur. The resolutions made by the 
NSAC are binding and should be applied by all sharÐÝah committees of the 
Islamic banks. For example if the NSAC decide to abandon the use of a 
disputed contract, the sharÐÝah committees can not overrule the decision and 
allow them to be use in their respective banks. Hence, it is obvious that the 
main reason for establishing the NSAC is to ensure the standardisation of 
Islamic banking rulings.  
 
It is important to note however, the authority of the NSAC is currently limited 
within the Islamic banking institutions. The NSAC' resolutions do not have any 
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influence in the civil court where disputes between the Islamic banks and their 
customers are decided. Judges of the civil courts are free to adhere to the 
NSAC’s resolutions or not. This situation has created confusion with regard to 
the legality of the bayÝ bithamanin Ájil (BBA) home financing offered by 
BIMB. A judge of High Court has dismissed the NSAC's resolution on the 
sharÐÝah compliance of the product, claiming that the product is merely a 
duplication of conventional housing loan289. As a result, the customer has been 
awarded win in a court in his battle against BIMB over default payment issue. 
After the incident, BNM has proposed a new rule to be passed by members of 
the Malaysian parliament, requiring the judges of civil court to consult the 
NSAC members before giving verdict in the Islamic banking matters290. As 
such, the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 has been passed on recently. The 
Act affirms the authority of the NSAC as the sole authoritative body on sharÐÝah 
matters pertaining to Islamic banking and finance. The Act also makes 
mandatory for the court or arbitrator to refer the NSAC for deliberation on any 
sharÐÝah issues.    
 
Although the framework of the Malaysian sharÐÝah governance looks 
comprehensive291, the current practice is argued concentrating only on the ex-
ante compliance process. What are meant by ex-ante compliance process are 
the reviewing, monitoring and controlling tasks before the product is approved 
(i.e. during the designing of the contracts and agreement). Very few Islamic 
banks undertake ex-post sharÐÝah compliance process which requires the 
sharÐÝah committee members or the sharÐÝah internal officers to check the 
transactions that took place after the execution of the contracts. As the ex-post 
sharÐÝah compliance process is viewed as equally important, the current 
situation is considered as a serious loophole in the Malaysian sharÐÝah 
governance system. Hence, suggestion has been made by researchers to 
introduce a sharÐÝah audit. The sharÐÝah auditors will check random samples of 
                                                 
289 Detail of the case is explained in the following chapter. 
290 Lee Cherng Wee, High Court to Consult SAC in Islamic Finance Cases, The Malaysian 
Reserve, Kuala Lumpur, 22 April 2009.  
291 As it consists of three level of supervision; internal sharÐÝah officer, sharÐÝah committee, the 
NSAC. 
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completed transactions to ensure that they are confirm to the sharÐÝah rules and 
guidelines292.  
 
After this discussion of the framework of the sharÐÝah governance, the practice 
of ijtihÁd particularly among the sharÐÝah committee and the NSAC levels 
becomes the most pertinent focus of our attention. Since the central 
qualification of members of both entities is indicated as their ability to make 
ijtihad, it is interesting to examine the methodology and principles adopted in 
solving current banking and financial problems. The discussion is pertinent 
because Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars are viewed as adopting a more lenient or 
relaxed approach when compared to their Middle East counterparts. One of the 
controversial issues in this matter is the decision to legalise bayÝ al-ÝÐnah 
contract by the NSAC. Understanding the methodology and approach 
employed by the sharÐÝah scholars will help us understand their framework in 
making rulings pertaining to muÃÁrabah products. The discussion in the next 
section is divided into three sub-topics. Firstly, I will explain the classical 
jurists' assessment on the legality of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah. Secondly, I will show how 
the contract has been applied (despite the majority jurists' opposition) to create 
the Islamic credit card of BIMB. Thirdly, based on the justifications in 
accepting the practice of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah, I formulate the Malaysians sharÐÝah 
scholars' methodology and approach in determining the legality of other 
banking products.   
 
The Classical Jurists' Rules on BayÝ al-ÝÐnah  
 
Undeniably, Islamic banking institutions operate in a very competitive and 
demanding industry. In order to survive, they must be able to meet their 
customers' sophisticated financial needs. Product innovation is seen as the key 
success to maintain current business growth. Interestingly, the development of 
new products happens more extensively in the banking institutions of South-
East Asia when compared to innovation within the Middle East. Malaysia is 
                                                 
292 Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman, SharÐÝah Audit for Islamic Financial Services: The Needs and 
Challenges, ISRA Islamic Finance Seminar, Kuala Lumpur, November 2008.  
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one of the countries where new products are regularly developed. The country 
became the first to establish the Islamic Inter-bank Money Market (IIMM), the 
full-fledged Islamic Stockbroking Company, the corporate sukÙk (Islamic 
bond) and the Islamic unit trust293. However, the advancement of Malaysian 
Islamic banking industry has raised controversial issues. This is because the 
advancement is based on the application the of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah contract which has 
been much criticised by most of the Middle East sharÐÝah scholars.  
BayÝ al-ÝÐnah is a sale contract with immediate repurchase. The term bayÝ al-
ÝÐnah was normally used by the ÍanbalÐ and MÁlikÐ jurists. According to some 
MÁlikÐs, al-ÝÐnah was derived from the root word of al-Ýaunu which means 
assistance. It is called bayÝ al-ÝÐnah because the seller assists the buyer in 
obtaining his need. Other MÁlikÐs jurists were of the opinion that al-ÝÐnah was 
derived from the word al-Ýain which refers to cash. According to this view, it 
was called bayÝ al-ÝÐnah since the main purpose of executing the contract is to 
obtain cash294. In KitÁb al-Umm, al-ShÁfiÝÐ did not use the term bayÝ al-ÝÐnah but 
he explained the contract as one of the problems of deferred sale (bayÝ al-
ÞÁjal)295. Similarly, al-MarghinÁnÐ for the ÍanafÐs discussed the contract under 
the sub-topic of void sale (bayÝ al-fÁsid)296. Although the jurists adopted 
different approach in discussing the contract, they had similar understanding on 
its basic concept. According to them, the contract takes place when a person 
sells an asset in credit and immediately buys back the asset in cash at different 
price. 
The classical jurists differed in determining the assessment of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah. The 
ÍanafÐs297, MÁlikÐs298 and ÍanbalÐs299 were of the opinion that the contract was 
unlawful (ÎarÁm). On the other hand, the ShÁfiÝÐs had two rules in this matter. 
                                                 
293 The Islamic Capital Market Brochure, Kuala Lumpur: Bursa Malaysia, pp.3. 
294 AbÙ ÝAbdallah Muhammad al-ÍaÔÁb, MawÁhib al-JalÐl fÐ Sharh MukhtaÒar al-KhalÐl, Beirut: 
Dar al-Fikr, 1992, vol. 4, pp.404 
295 ShÁfiÝÐ, KitÁb al-Umm: bÁb bayÝ al-ÞÁjal, vol. 3 &4, pp.78. 
296 Muhammad al-BÁbartÐ, al-ÝInÁyah ÝAla al-HidÁyah, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, (n.d), vol. 7, pp. 433 
297 Ibid. 
298 AbÙ ÝAbdallah Muhammad al-ÍaÔÁb, MawÁhib al-JalÐl fÐ Sharh MukhtaÒar al-KhalÐl, vol. 4, 
pp.404. 
299 Ibn QudÁmah, al-Mughni, vol. 6, pp.260. 
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According to al-ShÁfiÝÐ, the contract was permissible (mubÁÎ)300. However, 
some later ShÁfiÝÐs such as al-NawÁwÐ contradicted the eponym's rule and 
viewed the contract as discouraged (makrÙh)301. Generally, the jurists who 
ruled against bayÝ al-ÝÐnah justified their assessment on two main explanations. 
Firstly, the prohibition is indicated in athÁr and ÎadÐth and secondly, the 
practice of the contract was seen merely as ÎÐlah (legal artifice) to legalise ribÁ.  
The most commonly quoted legal evidence (dalÐl) in this matter was an athÁr 
narrated from ÝÀÞishah. The athÁr was used by the ÍanafÐs, MÁlikÐs and 
ÍanbalÐs as the main legal evidence to rule the impermissibility of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah.  
It was reported that ÝÀÞishah was asked about a transaction conducted by the 
umm walad  of Zaid bin Arqam. Acting on behalf of her master, the umm walad 
sold one of Zaid’s slave at 800 dirham in credit to ÝAÔÁÞ and bought back the 
slave at 600 dirham in cash. Ruling the transaction, ÝÀÞishah said, "it was very 
bad sale and inform Zaid that his conduct has eliminated all his rewards for 
participating in jihad with the Prophet if he does not repent''. According to the 
majority of jurists, ÝÀÞishah assertion clearly indicated that bayÝ al-ÝÐnah was 
unlawful contract.  
In addition to the athÁr, the ÍanbalÐs justified their ruling based on a ÎadÐth 
which showed the condemnation of the contract by the Prophet. Narrated by 
Ibn Íanbal on the authority of ‘Ibn ÝUmar, the Prophet was reported as saying:   
‘If people are busy with counting every single dinar and dirham, 
trading based on al-ÝÐnah, following behind cows (i.e. farming 
activities), and abandoning the duty of jihad for the sake of Allah, 
Allah will make misfortune befall them, and will not remove it 
from until they return to their religion’302  
 
It should be noted however, the ÎadÐth was only used by the ÍanbalÐs to 
support their ruling regarding bayÝ al-ÝÐnah. On the other hand, the ÍanafÐs and 
MÁlikÐs did not use the ÎadÐth as a dalÐl, probably because its chain of narrators 
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(isnÁd) was weak. One of the narrators, namely al-ÝAmÁsh, was considered to 
be a less than well-qualified narrator. The traditionists doubted that al-ÝAmÁsh 
had heard the ÎadÐth from the previous narrator, named as ÝAÔÁÞ. Despite 
admitting the weakness, the ÍanbalÐs accept the legality of the ÎadÐth by 
supporting it with another isnÁd (chain of narrators) narrated by AbÙ DÁwÙd.  
AbÙ DÁwÙd's isnÁd included Íaiwah bin ShuraiÎ, IsÎÁq bin ÝAbd RaÎmÁn, 
ÝAÔÁ’, Ibn NÁfiÝ and Ibn ÝUmar. According to Ibn al-QayyÐm of the ÍanbalÐs, 
IsÎaq bin ÝAbd RaÎmÁn was viewed as a better qualified narrator whom 
scholars of Egyptian school relied on as compared to al-ÝAmÁsh. In addition, 
the isnÁd of AbÙ DÁwÙd also confirmed that the ÎadÐth was transmitted through 
ÝAÔÁ’. It testified that ÝAÔÁ’ heard the ÎadÐth from Ibn NÁfiÝ, the most reliable 
narrator and the life-long servant of Ibn ÝUmar.  Hence, considering the two 
chains of narrators, the stipulated ÎadÐth is categorised as “fine” (Îasan) and 
valid to be used as dalÐl303. The ÎadÐth clearly indicates that the practice of bayÝ 
al-ÝÐnah was staunchly condemned and thus prohibited.  
 
In justifying his rule, al-ShÁfiÝÐ did not cite the above ÎadÐth but only mentioned 
the athÁr of ÝÀÞishah. However, he did not accept the legality of the athÁr since 
for him it was a case of the Companions in disagreement. In this matter, al-
ShÁfiÝÐ considered ÝÀÞishah and Zaid bin Arqam to have differed in determining 
the legality of the “double sale” contract. From the ShÁfiÝÐ point of view, since 
both of them were Companions, no opinion can overrule the other. In contrast 
to the majority of jurists, al-ShÁfiÝÐ viewed that Zaid bin Arqam's opinion as 
more accurate. Al-ShÁfiÝÐ presumed that ÝÀÞishah prohibited the contract not 
because of the double sale contract rather because the credit transaction was 
agreed with unknown period (when the slave was sold in credit).   
 
The majority of jurists followed the ÝÀÞishah hadith as they viewed the 
application of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah to be a ÎÐlah to legalise ribÁ. Ibn Rushd for the 
MÁlikÐs contended that the contract was manipulated to make ribÁ al-nasÐÝah 
seem legal. For instance, a person said to another person, "I lend you 10 dinÁr 
                                                 
303 AbÐ ÝAbdullÁh MuÎammad bin AbÐ Bakr Ibn Qayyim al-JÙziyyah, ÝIlÁm al-MuwÁqiÝÐn, 
Beirut: DÁr al-Jail, 1973, vol. 3, pp.166. 
 173 
for a month and I want 20 dinÁr (in return)". "That is not permissible", said the 
other person. "But you can sell to me this donkey for 20 dinÁr in credit for a 
month then buy back the donkey for 10 dinÁr in cash"304. Based on the 
transaction, the buyer will get 10 dinÁr in cash and the seller will receive 20 
dinÁr in a month. The sale asset was just a trick since neither of the contracting 
parties actually intended to sell or buy the donkey. Hence, the contract was 
similar to a 10 dinÁr loan with 100 percent interest.  
 
Indeed the application of ÎÐlah in Islamic law has become topic of debate 
among the classical jurists. The ÍanafÐs were known as the jurists most willing 
to employ the ÎÐlahs as one of principles in deducing rules. For example, they 
permitted the marriage of muÎallil based on the principle of the ÎÐlah305. 
Marriage of muÎallil refers to a temporary marriage contract executed to allow 
a husband who had divorced his wife three times (termed as bÁÞin kubrÁ) to re-
marry the wife. In a marriage of a muÎallil, usually it was agreed that the 
temporary husband will not sleep with the wife and will divorce her as soon as 
possible. Interestingly however, in the case of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah the ÍanafÐs 
admitted that the contract was a kind of deception that can not be compromised. 
Al-ShaybÁnÐ said, "In my heart, the contract was such a hill of blameworthy  
which created by those who eat riba"306. 
 
In contrast, al-ShÁfiÝÐ did not consider the practice of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah as ÎÐlah. He 
treated bayÝ al-ÝÐnah as two separate contracts in which each of them comply 
with all the essential elements (arkÁn) of a sale contract. In the case of Zaid bin 
Arqam, both sales were agreed with fixed prices, valid subject of sale and 
qualified contracting parties. Hence, al-ShÁfiÝÐ questioned the basis on which 
one would forbid someone from selling his asset in cash in which the asset was 
obtained from credit purchase. He also made an analogy with the similar case 
which the jurists unanimously agreed on its permissibility. The jurists ruled that 
                                                 
304 Ibn Rushd, BidÁyah al-Mujtahid wa NihÁyah al-Muqtasid, vol.3, pp.1596.  
305 Sarakshi, al-MabsÙÔ: bab al-ÎÐlah, vol. 15, pp. 345.  
306 Ibn ÝÀbidin, MuÎammad AmÐn ibn ‘Umar, Rad al-Mukhtar fir Dar al-Mukhtar, Beirut: DÁr 
al-Kutub al-ÝIlmiyyah, 1992, vol. 5, pp.274. It should be noted that other ÍanafÐs master, AbÙ 
YÙsuf had permitted the bayÝ al-ÝÐnah. He argued that the contract was practiced by some early 
Muslim scholars.   
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it is allowed for a person who purchased a slave with 100 dinar in credit to sell 
the slave with 200 dinÁr in cash. Therefore, for al-ShÁfiÝÐ, bayÝ al-ÝÐnah should 
be permitted on the same basis. Al-ShÁfiÝÐ clearly considered bayÝ al-ÝÐnah as a 
genuine sale contract that was distinct from ribÁ307.  
 
Al-ShÁfiÝÐ's rule in bayÝ al-ÝÐnah was consistent with his rule in bayÝ al-muÝÁÔÁh. 
He established a principle that the validity of any type of sale contract is 
examined based on its compliance with the essential elements which are 
identified as the contracting parties, the subject of sale and the language of 
offer and acceptance (ÒÐghah). Briefly speaking, bayÝ al-muÝÁÔÁh is a sale 
contract without the utterance of offer and acceptance between the seller and 
the buyer. A modern example of this type of contract would be purchasing via 
vendor machine. Contrary to the majority jurists, al-ShÁfiÝÐ ruled that bayÝ al-
muÝÁÔÁh was void. His main argument was because the contract did not comply 
with the condition of the language of offer and acceptance. For him, the offer 
and acceptance must be spelling out verbally and can not be replaced by an 
action308.  
However, his rule to legalise bayÝ al-ÝÐnah contradicted to his rule on marriage 
of al-muÎallil. Applying the principle of analogy, al-ShÁfiÝÐ should reach to 
conclusion that both contracts are prohibited. This is because bayÝ al-ÝÐnah and 
marriage of al-muÎallil are similar: neither of the contracting parties have a 
genuine intention to execute the contracts. In the case of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah the main 
purpose is to obtain cash whereas in the marriage of al-muÎallil, the motive is 
to allow the former husband to re-marry the wife. However, al-ShÁfiÝÐ 
abandoned the analogy and ruled the permissibility of the former and the 
prohibition of the latter. Interestingly, in deducing the rule of marriage of al-
muÎallil, al-ShÁfiÝÐ made an analogy with the marriage of al-mutÝah. Based on 
the Prophet’s prohibition of al-mutÝah marriage, al-ShÁfiÝÐ ruled that any kind of 
marriage contract which was executed on temporary basis was forbidden. The 
rule indicated that al-ShÁfiÝÐ in this matter gave emphasis on the genuine 
                                                 
307 ShÁfiÝÐ, KitÁb al-Umm: bÁb bayÝ al-ÞÁjal, vol. 3 & 4, pp.78. 
308 SharbinÐ al-KhaÔib, MughnÐ al-MuÎtÁj Ila MaÝrifah MaÝÁnÐ al-AlfÁz al-MinhÁj, vol.2, pp. 325 
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intention of the contracting parties. Even though the marriage of al-muÎallil 
complies with all the essential elements (arkÁn) of the marriage contract, it was 
forbidden since the intention of the contracting parties contradicts with the 
concept of a marriage in Islamic law (i.e. establish permanent relationship 
between a husband and wife).   
 
As indicated earlier, the Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars had favoured the opinion 
of al-ShÁfiÝÐ in accepting the bayÝ al-ÝÐnah contract in creating a number of 
Islamic banking products. The following statements are the resolutions by the 
NSAC pertaining to the acceptability of the contract in Islamic money market 
products and Islamic credit card:  
A. Resolution on Money Market Transaction 
 
The Council in its 8th meeting held on 12th December 1998 / 
23rd Syaaban 1419 resolved that bayÝ al-ÝÐnah transaction in the 
Islamic Inter-bank Money Market is permissible based the 
following conditions: i. bayÝ al-ÝÐnah transaction must strictly 
follow the mechanism which is accepted by the ShafÐÝÐ school; 
and ii. the transacted asset is not a ribawÐ item. 
 
B. Resolution on Credit Card 
 
The Council in its 18th meeting held on 12th April 2001 / 22nd 
Muharram 1422 resolved that the mechanism of Islamic credit 
card which applies bayÝ al-ÝÐnah concept to generate funds for 
credit purposes by a customer who requests for the Islamic 
credit card is permissible309. 
 
In the following section, we will examine how the bayÝ al-ÝÐnah contract has 
been applied to create the so-called Islamic credit card. Understanding the 
modus operandi of the Islamic credit card would give us a clear indication 
regarding the methodology and approach adopted by the Malaysian sharÐ‘ah 
committees members in solving current banking and finance problems.      
 
                                                 
309 Resolution of SharÐÝah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, pp.14-
18, 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/01_banking/04_prudential_stds/07_shariah_resolution.pdf. 
Accessed on 20th of January 2010.  
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The Application of BayÝ al-ÝÐnah in BIMB Islamic Card (BIC) 
Credit card is a well-known product in the conventional banking system. It 
refers to ‘plastic money’ that grants credit facility to card credit holder. By 
obtaining a credit card, one can spend the extended credit up to a pre-arranged 
ceiling level. However, the cardholder must pay back the amount that has been 
borrowed within a given period, or else interest will be charged on the 
remaining balance of the unpaid debt310. Due to two main factors (convenience 
and safety), the credit card has become an indispensable banking facility for 
majority of people. The credit card provides a convenient way of making 
payment as one does not have to bring a bundle of cash to make large 
purchases. It is also a safety way of shopping since carrying lot of cash will 
expose us to the risk of robbery. Furthermore, in certain cases the need for a 
credit card is obvious because the card is a pre-requisite for online transactions 
i.e. in hotel booking or car rental payment. As far as the bank is concerned, 
credit card business is able to generate huge profit for the institution. By issuing 
credit card, the bank will earn revenue from (1) annual fees charged to the 
cardholders and from (2) interest for the late settlement. It is reported that the 
credit card market in Malaysia has witnessed a 50 percent of increase in profit 
between 2005 and 2007. This significant growth is attributed to a 32 percent in 
the number of new card issued and a 44 percent growth in the outstanding 
debt311.  
Contemporary jurists had differed in determining the legality of conventional 
credit card. There are some jurists who permit its usage with conditions that 
Muslims customers must (1) pay the full outstanding balance every month, (2) 
never roll over any balance to next statement period and (3) avoid cash 
withdrawals312. It is argued that by adhering to these conditions ribÁ could be 
avoided, thus using a credit card in this way is legitimate. However, the 
majority of jurists are of the view that the conventional credit card is absolutely 
                                                 
310 Paxson, D., & Wood, D, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Finance. Oxford: Blackwell. 1998. 
311 The Paypers-Malaysia credit card market. www.lafferty.com/pdffiles/. Accessed on 4 of July 
2009.   
312 Adil Manzoor Bakshi, Developing a Financial Model for Islamic Credit Card for the UK, 
Masters Dissertation, University of Salford, 2006. 
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forbidden. Its underlying concept is based on ribÁ al-nasÐ’ah. A card credit 
holder is obliged to pay interest if he fails to settle his outstanding debt within a 
given period. Thus by signing a credit card contract, a Muslim is perceived as 
having agreed to commit a major sin (ribÁ). This majority view apparently 
becomes the most accepted ruling in this matter. Nevertheless, although a credit 
card is regarded as unlawful product, its potential profit seems hard for the 
Islamic bankers to ignore. Therefore, they tried to develop a credit card system 
which confirms the rules and guidelines of Islamic commercial law. In their 
quest to invent an ‘Islamic’ credit card, BIMB with the help of their sharÐÝah 
committees have come out with the BIC card model. The modus operandi of 
the transaction is illustrated in figure 2 below.  
Figure 2: The modus operandi of BIC card 
                                                           
Suppose Aminah intends to obtain a BIC card from BIMB. Firstly, she will be 
asked to fill in an application form, notifying her annual income to the bank. 
Based on Aminah’ financial conditions, the bank will offer different types of 
BIC card. Premium card (gold or platinum) usually will be offered if her annual 
income is quite high. Let us assume that Aminah qualifies to have a gold BIC 
card with credit facility up to RM11,000. In granting the said amount to 
Aminah, the bank will execute a bayÝ al-ÝÐnah transaction.  
BIMB will identify a specific asset, for example a piece of land which will then 
be sold to Aminah, say for RM15,000 in deferred sale. Immediately, the bank 
will buy back the land from Aminah for RM11,000 in cash. When the second 
transaction is executed, Aminah who formerly came to the bank with empty 
pocket now will have a substantial amount of cash to spend. The bank will 
disburse the cash (RM11,000) which is the proceeds of the second agreement 
into Aminah's BIC wadÐ‘ah account. Having the money, Aminah now can use 
2. Immediately sell it back to the 
same party with RM11,ooo in 
cash  
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her BIC card for various commercial transactions similar to the conventional 
credit card. She is required to pay back the money she had used from the 
account within a given period. Otherwise, the bank will impose additional 
payment for the late settlement.  
BIMB contends that its additional payment for the late settlement is legitimate 
since it is regarded as profit not interest. The profit is referred to the difference 
between the sell and the buy back prices (RM15,000 – RM11,00) in the bayÝ al-
ÝÐnah transaction executed earlier. In other words, through the act of selling land 
to Aminah, BIMB is actually entitled to RM4000 profit. However, the profit is 
only claimed on her when she struggles to pay her debt on time. The maximum 
additional payment however is fixed (RM4000 in our example). According to 
BIMB, the fixed maximum profit demonstrates BIC card main advantage over 
its conventional counterparts. This is because in the conventional credit card 
system, interest is charged compounded and indefinitely until cardholders’ 
outstanding debts are been settled.     
The Justification and Methodology of Malaysian SharÐÝah Scholars  
The Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars legalise the practice of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah based on 
two main justifications. Firstly, they argue that the contract was not clearly 
prohibited either in the Qur’an or in the sunnah. They do not accept the validity 
(ÎujjÐyah) of the athÁr and the ÎadÐth which indicate the prohibition of the 
contract. For them, the athÁr of ÝÀÞishah is considered as weak evidence due to 
unreliable narrator in its isnÁd. Even if the athÁr is accepted in terms of its 
isnÁd, it still regarded as invalid evident because its textual content (matan) 
appears to contradict the general principle of Islamic law. This is because 
ÝÀÞishah was reported to have invalidated the reward of jihÁd that Zaid bin 
Arqam had involved together with the Prophet. In the athÁr, she was reported 
saying that ‘inform Zaid that his conduct has eliminated all his rewards for 
participating in jihad with the Prophet if he does not repentÝ. Such a statement 
could not be taken into consideration since ÝÀÞishah was not in capacity to do 
so.  
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Secondly, the Malaysian scholars argue on the basis of maÒlahah, in which 
refers to the need or interest of Muslims contemporary society. The scholars 
accept the argument that credit card has become an important banking facility 
for majority of Muslims. In today's world, the card is crucial for daily business 
dealings and commercial transactions. Considering this need, the scholars 
support the bank's initiative to create a credit card that is sharÐÝah compatible. In 
this regard, bayÝ al-ÝÐnah is viewed as a key contract since it provides a makhraj 
(mode of problem solving). The contract can help the society as well as the 
Islamic banks achieve their respective goals. Although admitting bayÝ al-ÝÐnah 
resembles ÎÐlah, the contract is accepted for the sake of majority interest313.  
These two justifications signify the crux of methodology adopted by the local 
sharÐÝah scholars in assessing the legality of other Islamic banking products. 
The first justification indicates that the sharÐÝah scholars practice independent 
ijtihÁd. In solving fiqh problems of the Islamic banking, they will refer directly 
to the primary and the secondary sources of Islamic law. As generally known, 
the primary sources refer to the verses of the Qur’an and the sunnah of the 
Prophet (pubh), while the secondary sources refer to ijmÁÝ (consensus), qiyÁs 
(analogy), istiÎsÁn (legal preferences), Ýurf (custom) and others314. They will 
also examine the prominent classical jurists' opinions but will not blindly be 
restricted by them. This method contradicts their approach when judging the 
matrimonial, inheritance, administration of mosque and waqf (endowment) 
cases where decisions are usually confined to the rulings of the ShÁfiÝÐ’s school.  
In practising the ijtihÁd, the local sharÐÝah scholars uphold a legal maxim 
stipulating that 'the original ruling of muÝÁmalat (business transaction) is 
permissible'. It implies that a new business transaction is regard as lawful 
unless there is legal evidence prove otherwise. In the case of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah, the 
contract is viewed as legal since evidences indicating its prohibition has created 
doubt in the minds of the local sharÐÝah scholars. The legal maxim was 
                                                 
313 Resolution of the Securities Commission SharÐÝah Advisory Council, Kuala Lumpur: 
Malaysian International Islamic Financial Center, 2006, pp.22. 
314 Resolution of the Securities Commission SharÐÝah Advisory Council, pp.8 & Interview with 
Dr. Engku Rabiah 
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commonly practiced by the classical jurists when deciding new rules for 
commercial dealings and business transactions315. It certainly enables the 
Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars to adopt pragmatic orientation when assessing the 
compliance of Islamic banking products. Thus, the local sharÐÝah scholars are 
not fixed rigidly within the classical jurists' rulings but admit changes and 
modifications. They accept creativity and innovation in the field of Islamic 
commercial transaction316. It should be noted however, the scholars embrace a 
different orientation when judging unprecedented ÝibÁdah (worship) matters. 
They are of the opinion that the original ruling of ÝibÁdah is forbidden until they 
find out a divine text which states otherwise.   
The second justification (maÒlaÎah) shows that the Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars 
deliberate at length the practical aspect of the current banking business. 
Through direct involvement in the banking practices, they seem to admit that 
sticking with muÃÁrabah contract has significant problems in terms of 
feasibility and practicality from the perspectives of the Islamic banks and their 
clients. The impediments faced by the Islamic banks in implementing profit 
sharing business are acknowledged by the local sharÐÝah scholars. It appears 
that there are significantly higher costs of placing funds on muÃÁrabah venture. 
In identifying the right investment project, Islamic bankers need to impose 
parameters, risk control measures, accounting and monitoring system that are 
costly and time-consuming317. The additional cost of monitoring entrepreneurs’ 
activities is as a result of the moral hazard hypothesis. The present economic 
condition is generally thought to be contributing to dishonest behaviour among 
business people.  In the muÃÁrabah arrangement, these types of entrepreneurs 
are likely to under-report or artificially reduce declared profit by increasing 
business operational expenses318. Considering the settings in which Islamic 
                                                 
315 ÝUmar ÝAbd Allah KÁmil, ar-RukhÒah al-SharÝiah fÐ Usul wal QawaÝid al-Fiqhiyyah, Mecca: 
Maktabah al-Makiyyah, 1999, pp. 327. 
316 Interviewed with Dr. Shamsiah Mohammed, 13 August 2008, University of Malaya, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
317 Munawar Iqbal, Ausaf Ahmad & Tariqullah Khan, Challenges Facing Islamic Banking, 
Occasional Paper no. 1, Jeddah: Islamic Research Training Institute, 1998, pp. 50.   
318 Md. Abdul Awal Sarker, Islamic Business Contracts, Agency Problems and the Theory of 
Islamic Firms, International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, vol.1 no.2. 
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banks are operating, the local sharÐÝah scholars try to balance between the ideal 
and the practice of Islamic banking industry.          
In view of the practical issue of muÃÁrabah investment, the local sharÐÝah 
scholars adopt a 'form over substance' approach in developing Islamic banking 
instruments. The approach focuses on changing the legal terminology rather 
that the essence of the conventional banking products. As is evident in the case 
of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah, the contract is analogous to a usurious transaction. Financing 
products created through bayÝ al-ÝÐnah economically has similar effects to the 
conventional banking loans. Perhaps the local scholars' primary concern in 
adopting such an approach is to demonstrate the usefulness of various medieval 
Islamic commercial contracts in today's modern world. In other words, 
knowing the various risks in implementing the muÃÁrabah, they shift to less 
risky medieval commercial contracts. Hence, by adopting the contracts of bayÝ 
al-ÝÐnah, bayÝ murÁbaÎah, bayÝ bithamanin 'ajil and others, at least they have 
proven that Islamic commercial law has solution to the ribÁ problem even in the 
sophisticated banking environment319.  
However, critics of the Islamic banking disagree with the approach. Its 
implementation is seen as a kind of deception which manipulates the religious 
notion of Muslims for banks' economic profit. This is evident in the case of 
Islamic credit card created through the application of dubious bayÝ al-ÝÐnah 
contract. The legal trick in legalising ribÁ in the product is obvious as Islamic 
banks repeatedly use the same piece of land to create thousands of credit cards. 
As a result banking products created through this approach look 'Islamic' in 
their appearance but maintain the element of ribÁ in their fundamental nature. 
Therefore, the objectives (maqÁÒid) of Islamic banking will never be achieved 
if sharÐÝah experts continually evaluate new Islamic banking products on this 
basis.  
 
                                                 
319 Muhammad Anwar, Islamicity of Banking and Modes of Islamic Banking, Arab Law 
Quarterly, vol. 18, No. 1, 2003, pp.62-80. 
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Conclusion 
The pioneer scholars of Islamic banking clearly set forth the application of 
muÃÁrabah contract as the primary basis of the establishment and the operation 
of interest-free banking institutions. Since interest in conventional banking is 
prohibited for being a guaranteed return on capital, it is only logical for Islamic 
alternative to base on profit and loss sharing principle. MuÃÁrabah is chosen as 
the alternative because the contract certainly comply with this essential Islamic 
economic rule. As Islamic banks were established rapidly in the late 1970’s, the 
pioneer scholars hoped to see the emergence of distinctive financial institutions 
which predominantly operate on muÃÁrabah contract. However, their wish was 
not realised as the proportion of muÃÁrabah business in the existing Islamic 
banks has remained negligible. Hence, the dichotomy between the theory and 
practice has become a major issue in this subject.  
Malaysian Islamic banking experience unfortunately has been a good example 
with which to illustrate this "dichotomy" problem. There is no doubt that 
through numerous incentives and encouragement from the government 
(through the Central Bank), Islamic banking industry in the country has grown 
tremendously. Its target to capture 20 percent of total banking market share by 
2010 is on track. The framework of Malaysian shÁrÐÝah governance is arguably 
one of the most advanced as compared to other Muslims countries. Besides, 
with the assistance from local shÁrÐÝah scholars, Islamic bankers have managed 
to offer various complex banking and financial products. However, most of the 
advancements made in particular at the operational level have been critically 
argued as insufficiently different from the conventional banking practices. This 
is partly due to the over reliance on the duplication and the ‘form over 
substance’ approaches undertaken by the Islamic bankers and banks’ shÁrÐÝah 
advisors. The latter party appear to have an over emphasis on the consideration 
of actual banking problems in supervising shÁrÐÝah compliance matters. They 
interpret Islamic commercial law according to bankers’ needs and present 
business demands.  
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As we will demonstrate in the next chapter, the ‘market-driven’ approach is 
clearly adopted by the Malaysian shÁrÐÝah scholars in issuing ijtihÁd related to 
muÃÁrabah products. Some of the ijtihÁd rulings are controversial as they 
contradict the prevalent rules of the contract.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF 
MUÂÀRABAH IN MALAYSIAN ISLAMIC BANKS 
 
Introduction 
As indicated in the previous chapter, BIMB is the pioneer of Islamic banking 
institution in Malaysia. Being a pioneer, the bank has become focus of many 
empirical studies. The issues most often studied at the operational level are 
related to bank's financial performance320 and selection criteria321. With regard 
to the first issue, researchers are keen to examine whether BIMB is capable of 
offering a viable alternative for conventional banking system. Studies on the 
selection criteria observe customers’ patronage factors in choosing BIMB 
banking products. There is no doubt that the findings of these studies have in a 
way enhanced the financial and marketing aspects of the bank. However, from 
my personal observation, research that critically analyses the sharÐÝah 
compliance of bank’s products has not been given adequate consideration. It is 
appear that the decisions made by BIMB’s sharÐÝah advisors are accepted 
without much analytical deliberation.    
The present chapter attempts to challenge the prevalent assumption by 
examining BIMB current practice of muÃÁrabah contract. It tries to evaluate the 
extent in which the current practices comply with the rules of muÃÁrabah as 
described by the classical jurists.  As a case study, the chapter analyses the 
modus operandi of deposit and wealth management products offered by the 
bank. The focus of the discussion is to point out some critical issues arising 
from ijtihÁd made by the local sharÐÝah scholars in modifying muÃÁrabah 
contract into modern banking practices. The ijtihÁd is broadly examined under 
two main subjects; (1) the utilisation of muÃÁrabah capital and (2) the profit 
distribution method.  Under the first subject, we will analyse how far the 
financing, Islamic bonds (sukÙk) and Islamic money market products uphold 
                                                 
320 See for example Abdus Samad & M. Kabir Hasan, The Performance of Malaysian Islamic 
Bank During 1984-1997: An Exploratory Study, International Journal of Islamic Financial 
Services, vol. 1 no. 3.  
321 See for example, Haron S, Ahmad, N, Planisek, S.L, Bank Patronage Factors of Muslim and 
non-Muslim Customers, International Journal of Bank Marketing, vol.12, no.1, pp.33-40.  
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the profit and loss sharing principles. Meanwhile, in the second subject we will 
examine the ijtihÁd on profit equalisation reserve (PER), indicative profit rate, 
interim profit payment and capital guarantee.  
The Milestones, Vision and Core Values of BIMB 
BIMB has been in operation for more than a quarter of century. Since its 
inception, the bank has chartered various milestones establishing a feasible 
Islamic banking system that operates in parallel with conventional banking. 
Besides Islamic banking industry, BIMB also plays pivotal role in developing 
other complementary sectors such as Islamic insurance (takÁful), Islamic unit 
trust and Islamic securities. A subsidiary company was set up in 1984, 1993 
and 1994 respectively to undertake these distinctive businesses. As each 
subsidiary experienced accelerated growth, BIMB Holding Berhad was formed 
in 2000 to consolidate and further strengthen the group’s businesses322.        
As far as the capital is concerned, BIMB has recorded tremendous growth. 
From only RM80 million initially, the bank's paid up capital rose to RM1.73 
billion in June 2009323. The figure however is considered as a moderate success 
as compared to the total capital of Malaysian Islamic banking which reported at 
RM16.8 billion in the same period324. In terms of product offering, it is claimed 
that the bank has developed more than 150 sophisticated banking products and 
services. These products do not only created to meet the traditional banking 
needs such as financing, saving and basic investment accounts but also to 
satisfy the needs of micro financing, wealth management and capital market. 
The latest innovative products are al-Awfar saving and investment accounts as 
well as cross-currency swap transaction. Driven by a comprehensive strategic 
business plan, the bank recorded the highest ever profit of RM308.27 million in 
2008.  
                                                 
322 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad Annual Report, Kuala Lumpur, 2008, pp. 3. 
323 Bank Islamic Malaysia Berhad, Who are we?, www.bankislam.com.my, Accessed on 24th 
December 2009.  
324Monthly Statistical Bulletin November 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 
www.bnm.gov.my/files/publication/msb/2009, Acessesed on 1st January 2010.  
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The achievement however has not succeeded without encountering challenges. 
In 2006, BIMB shocked the nation by announcing a massive loss of RM479.8 
million. The losses were largely due to the unexpected provision of non-
performing loan (NPL) which totalled at RM2.2 billion. Out of the total NPL, 
35 percent was contributed by the poor credit management of its offshore 
branch in Labuan325, 3o percent from the bank's commercial units and the 
remaining came from consumers and corporate clients. Commenting on the 
Labuan case, BIMB admitted that the financing was given generously without 
sufficient understanding of the risks involved including country and project 
risks326. As response to these substantial losses, the ownership structure of 
BIMB group has gone through a major revamp. In order to raise cash injection, 
40 percent of the group's stakes were sold to foreign shareholder namely Dubai 
Investment Group (DIG) of United Arab Emirates. And another 9 percent 
stakes were sold to a local Islamic financial institution, Lembaga Tabung Haji 
(LTH). The initial shareholders maintain a marginal control of the group with 
51 percent stakes. In addition, the revamp course brings in a new management 
team, led by Datuk Zukri Samat.     
The new management team is committed to make BIMB as a global leader in 
Islamic banking. The vision aims to establish BIMB as the ultimate guidance 
and source of reference for innovative sharÐÝah-based products and services. 
The new management team proudly claims that the strength of the bank lies in 
the word 'Islam'. According to them, the word expresses the bank's commitment 
to uphold shÁrÐÝah principles in all values, activities and transactions327. Hence, 
banking products offered by BIMB are assured as 100 percent shÁrÐÝah 
compliant. A comprehensive list of the products is presented in figure 3.   
As shown in the figure, BIMB's banking products are generally divided into 
two groups; consumer and business. The first group is created to satisfy the 
needs of individual customers whereas the second is designed to meet the 
                                                 
325 One of BIMB investment branch located in West Malaysia.  
326 Anil Netto, Islamic bank's woes highlight problems, Asia Times Online, 5 November 2005, 
www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/ Accessed on 27 December 2009.  
327 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Our Logo Rationale, www.bankislam.com.my, Accessed on 
24 December 2009. 
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requirements of corporate clients. Consumer banking products are further 
organised into three types; deposit, financing and wealth management. Deposit 
products comprise of typical or basic banking facilities which are saving, 
current and investment accounts. Similar to conventional banking, these 
accounts function as the main sources of funds to support bank's operations. 
One of the core operations is to provide financing. For individual customers, 
the financing products offered include home financing, vehicle financing, 
personal financing and Bank Islam Card-i. Meanwhile, the wealth management 
products are recently introduced by BIMB as response to the increasing 
demand of sharÐÝah compliant asset management products. The wealth 
management products aim to draw more funds from institutions and individuals 
of high net worth. At present, two types of products are being offered under this 
category; unit trust and structured investment instruments.  
As for business and corporate clients, the banking products offered are 
classified into three groups; trade financing, asset-based financing and treasury 
services. Trade financing products focus on providing short-term financial 
assistance to businesses that require additional working capital i.e. to fund cost 
of imported raw materials. BIMB will offer financing facility to these clients 
and help them accomplish their business projects. This types of products 
include letter of credit, trade working capital financing, accepted bills, bills of 
exchange purchased, export credit refinancing, shipping guarantee, bank 
guarantee, bilateral payment arrangement and cash line. On the other hand, 
asset-based financing products are offered to fund commercial property 
acquisition, purchase of equipments or refinancing assets. Financing facilities 
provided under this category normally are executed over a long-term period. 
The current products of asset-based financing are hire purchase, leasing, 
equipment & commercial property financing, project bridging and business 
financing. Treasury services are the most sophisticated Islamic banking 
products created. It offers liquidity management products for corporate clients 
such as Islamic bonds (sukÙk), foreign exchange (Islamic FX forward), 
derivatives/hedging and money market instruments.                    
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Despite numerous innovative banking facilities offered by BIMB, in this study, 
we shall concentrate only on the deposit and wealth management products. 
These products become the focus of this study because they are the main 
BIMB’s banking facilities that apply the muÃÁrabah contract. In contrast, 
products of consumer financing, trade financing, asset-based financing and 
treasury services are mainly operated on debt-like contracts such as bayÝ al-
murÁbaÎah, bayÝ bithaman ‘ajil (BBA), bayÝ al-ÝÐnah, wakÁlah and ijÁrah. The 
classification of the products based on Islamic commercial contracts applied is 
presented in table 8.  
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Figure 3: List of Banking Products Offered by BIMB 
 
Banking Products 
Consumers Businesses 
Deposit Financing Wealth Management Trade Financing Asset Based Financing Treasury Services 
Saving Account 
Current Account 
Investment Account 
Home Financing 
Vehicle Financing 
Personal Financing 
Unit Trust 
Structured Investment 
Letter of Credit 
Trade Working Capital 
Financing 
Accepted Bills 
Bills of Exchanged 
Purchase 
Export Credit 
Refinancing 
Shipping Guarantee 
Bank Guarantee 
Bilateral Payment 
Arrangement 
Cash Line 
Hire Purchase 
Leasing 
Equipment & Property 
Financing 
Project Bridging 
Business Financing 
Money Market 
Instruments 
Islamic Bonds (Sukuk) 
Foreign Exchange 
Derivatives Bank Islam’s Card 
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Table 8: Classification of BIMB products based on Islamic commercial contracts applied 
 
No. MuÃÁrabah MurÁbaÎah BBA WakÁlah al-ÝÏnah IjÁrah BayÝ al-Dayn KafÁlah IÒtiÒna’ WadÐÝah 
1. Saving 
account 
Letter of 
credit* 
Home 
financing 
Letter of 
credit* 
Personal 
financing 
Hire-
purchase 
Bills of 
exchanged 
purchase 
Shipping 
guarantee 
Project 
bridging 
Current 
account 
2. Investment 
account 
Trade 
working 
capital 
financing 
Vehicle 
financing 
 Bank Islam 
Card 
Leasing Export credit 
refinancing* 
Bank 
guarantee 
  
3. Unit trust Accepted 
bills 
Equipment & 
property 
financing 
 Cash line   Bilateral 
payment 
arrangement 
  
4. Structured 
investment 
Export credit 
refinancing* 
Business 
financing 
       
* Applied hybrid contracts 
As clearly shown in table 1 above, BIMB implements 10 Islamic medieval commercial contracts in devising its banking products. 
Noticeably however, out of the ten contracts, muÃÁrabah is the only contract that advocates profit and loss sharing principles. The rest 
of the contracts are based on debt-like transactions. The current practices obviously deviate from the theory of Islamic banking as 
expounded by early Muslim economists. This due to the fact that muÃÁrabah contract is only implemented to draw funds from 
depositors and investors. In theory, these funds should be invested in viable business projects also on profit and loss sharing basis. 
However, as evident in the case of BIMB these funds are utilised in banking transactions of minimal risks which identical to 
conventional banking instruments. The virtually 'risk-free' banking products are created by adopting the debt-like contracts such as 
murÁbaÎah, BBA, wakÁlah and etc.         
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BIMB's Deposits and Wealth Management Products 
This section discusses the salient features of deposit and wealth management products 
of BIMB. In general, BIMB adopts Siddiqi's model of interest-free bank in running 
both types of products. Depositors or investors are regarded as rabb al-mÁl (capital 
providers) while the bank is considered as muÃÁrib (agent-manager). The bank will 
invest the deposited money by providing financing to appropriate clients. As part of 
the bank’s marketing strategies, the products are categorised as follows:  
Table 9: The categorisation of BIMB deposit and wealth management products 
No Deposit Wealth Management 
 Saving Account Investment Account Unit Trust Structured Product 
 MuÃÁrabah General al-Fakhim  an-Najah 
 Wadi SakÐnah al-Munsif Ziyad 
 Ijraa Al-Awfar al-Falah  
 Pewani  al-Mubin  
 al-Awfar    
Saving Accounts 
BIMB creates four types of saving accounts to capture different segments of 
consumer deposit market. There are called as muÃÁrabah, wadi, ijraa, pewani and al-
awfar saving accounts. MuÃÁrabah, wadi and ijraa accounts are differentiated mainly 
on the basis of age requirement. MuÃÁrabah saving account is the most basic account 
intended for general savers aged 12 years old and above. Meanwhile, wadi saving 
account is created to encourage saving among children of below 12 years old and ijraa 
for teenagers between 13 and 18 years old. Pewani saving account is a unique deposit 
product designed to help women aged 18 years and above prepare for their future.   
In terms of benefit, the muÃÁrabah saving account holders perhaps are the most 
advantageous. They are entitled bankcard facilities that enable them to access to ATM 
withdrawal, fund transfer, statement request, internet banking and other uses. In 
contrast, due to age factor, holders of wadi and ijraa accounts are not entitled to such 
benefits. Depositors of these accounts depend on their guardians to make any 
transaction such as withdrawing their money. Pewani account holders are not also 
offered the bankcard facilities but they have the right of takÁful (Islamic insurance) 
coverage. However the coverage is not automatically granted. In order to be entitled 
the coverage of up to RM25,ooo, pewani account holders should maintain the 
monthly average balance of RM50,ooo. All depositors will share profit from their 
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savings based on pre-determined ratio. Normally the profit ratio agreed is 25:75, in 
which the former ratio belongs to customers328.    
Al-Awfar saving account is recently launched to further promote saving among the 
public. The account is distinctive as it gives depositors opportunity to win cash prize 
draws in every quarter as follows:  
Table 10: Cash prizes draw in al-Awfar saving and investment accounts 
No. Cash Prize No. of Quarterly Prize 
1. RM100,000 1 
2. RM10,000 1 
3. RM5,000 1 
4. RM1,000 3 
5. RM5,00 5 
6. RM250 18 
7. RM100 500 
Source: www.bankislam.com.my 
In al-Awfar account, every RM100 deposit entitles one unit of draw entry. This means 
the more deposits put in the account the larger chance for depositors to win the prize. 
It also implies that a minimum balance of RM100 should be maintained at all times to 
be eligible for the draw. It should be noted that for some conscious Muslims the 
modus operandi of al-Awfar account appeared to be surrounded with contentious fiqh 
issues. They view that the quarterly prize draw involves the element of gambling. This 
is due to the thought that muÃÁrabah profit is distributed only to a few draw winners 
whereas the losers will get nothing from their investment. If this is truly happens, al-
Awfar saving accounts clearly exemplifies unfairness type of profit distribution.  
Replying to this scepticism, BIMB asserts that the cash prizes are not taken from 
profit of al-Awfar funds but are derived from bank's own money. In other words, all 
depositors of al-Awfar saving account are assured to earn their respective shares of 
profit if any. The cash prizes are just additional incentives given by the bank from 
external financial sources as a marketing strategy to attract more funds from the 
general public. Since the original profits are shared between all depositors, the 
questions of gambling and unfairness distribution of profit do not arise. On this basis, 
                                                 
328 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Pewani Accounts, www.bankislam.com.my, Accessed on 25 Febuary 
2010.  
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the SharÐ‘ah Supervisory Council of BIMB approved this product in its 102nd meeting 
dated 7th April 2008329.  
Despite this clarification, I am still wondering how BIMB could afford to give such 
commitment in paying the cash prizes drawn in every quarter. My suspicion becomes 
a bit clearer when I look at the profit ratio agreed between depositors and the bank. 
For the purpose of comparison, I reproduce the profit ratios and the indicative profit 
rates of all types of deposit accounts as advertised in the bank's website.  
Table 11: Profit rates of BIMB deposit accounts from 16 November to 15 December 
2009. 
Deposit Products Profit Sharing Ratio  
Customer : Bank 
Profit Rate % p.a. 
MuÃarabah saving account 25:75 1.11 
Wadi saving account 25:75 1.11 
Ijraa saving account 25:75 1.11 
Al-Awfar saving account 2:98 0.04 
Pewani saving account   
Exceeding RM5,000 30:70 1.33 
Below RM5,000 25:75 1.11 
*This is indicative rate of return based on the previous month’s performance. 
The actual rate can be higher or lower than the indicative rate.      
Source: www.bankislam.com.my 
Information on the profit ratio and the indicative profit rate of al-Awfar saving 
account give us some clues regarding the trick of how the draw mechanism is actually 
worked out. As clearly shown in the table above, the profit ratio of customer is 
somehow unreasonable; 2 ratios against 98 enjoyed by the bank. The profit ratio is 
notably lower comparing to the other types of deposit products. What is the 
explanation for this significance variance? Why the bank could offer relatively higher 
customer profit ratio in other deposit accounts but not al-Awfar account? There must 
be solid justification for this condition. I personally think that the enormous share of 
profit enjoyed by the bank is used to maintain the cash prizes draw. Having 98 percent 
of profit sharing ratio, the bank will use some of them to pay what they claim as an 
‘additional incentive’ to depositors. There is no doubt that all depositors will earn 
their respective shares. However, given the 2 percent ratio which equal 0.04 percent 
of indicative annual profit rates330, their shares are virtually nothing. Therefore, the 
bank’s claim that it uses its own money to pay the cash prizes could be thought of as a 
                                                 
329 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Al-Awfar Accounts, www.bankislam.com.my, Accessed on 25 
Febuary 2010.  
330 A detailed discussion concerning the indicative profit rate will follow in the next section.  
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misleading statement. The bank artificially attains almost all the profits from saving 
funds and then reallocates them to certain lucky depositors.    
Furthermore, the fact concerning the division of profit sharing ratio is not highlighted 
by the bank when promoting al-Awfar account to potential customers. Unless 
carefully studied, customers will not aware of their negligible share of profit. The 
most important elements presented to the customers are the chance to win the grand 
cash prizes. In addition, the bank’s personnel will stress that the draw is free from 
gambling activity and the product is sharÐÝah compliant.  
Investment Accounts 
An investment account is one of the most basic accounts through which one can 
establish a relationship with a particular bank. The main advantage of having an 
investment account is the opportunity to maximise profit from our idle funds. This is 
because normally an investment account offers higher rates of return as compared to 
saving account. In BIMB, the investment accounts are divided into three types (1) 
general investment account (2) special investment account called sakÐnah and al-
Awfar investment account.  
Table 12: The salient features of general investment account. 
Product Salient Features 
Investment term: 
                                1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48 or 60 months 
Minimum investment:  
RM500 for 3 months and above tenure 
                                RM1000 for 1 month tenure 
Age requirement: 
                               Open to all aged 18 years and above 
Types of accounts: 
                               Individual account 
                               Trusted account 
                               Joint account 
                               Partnership account 
 
 
General Investment 
Account 
                               Private company account 
Source: www.bankislam.com.my 
In order to open the general investment account, depositors have to fulfil certain 
requirements, imposed by the bank as investment contract guidelines. Firstly, the 
depositors are required to deposit their money for a specific term, ranging from 1 to 
60 months. The term is determined by depositors at the beginning of the contract. 
They must keep their money within the agreed term to be eligible for any potential 
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profit. Premature withdrawal will cause them to lose the chance to share the profit.  In 
addition to the investment terms, BIMB requires certain amount of minimum deposit. 
Depositors who wish to invest for only 1 month are required to deposit at least 
RM1000. Whereas those who wish to invest 3 months and above tenure, the minimum 
deposit is RM500.  
The bank creates four types of general investment account to satisfy different needs of 
investors. Basically, the accounts are open to all Malaysians aged 18 years and above. 
Adult of 18 years and above can open and own an individual account. Children under 
18 years old can open trusted account with the condition that they name an individual 
adult as a trustee. Besides this, depositors who jointly share a sum of money (i.e. 
husband and wife) can open joint or partnership accounts. In order to cater the needs 
of businesses, BIMB also creates private company account. The account is designed 
for a private company who wishes to invest its idle funds in the bank. 
The SakÐnah investment account is specially created for retirees. As claimed by the 
bank, the sakÐnah account holders will have an opportunity to enjoy higher profit 
sharing ratio and obtain special rates of Bank Islam card and other financing facilities. 
This however comes with conditions. The minimum investment is stipulated at 
RM50,000 and the money should be kept in the bank at least for one whole year. 
Meanwhile, al-Awfar investment account has similar salient features to those of other 
general investment accounts except for the ‘additional’ cash draw prizes. In tandem 
with the minimum investment requirement, al-Awfar’s account holders are required to 
maintain a minimum of RM1000 for 1 month investment tenure and RM500 for 3 
months tenure and above to be eligible for the draw331. The following table shows the 
profit sharing ratios and the indicative profit rates of all investment accounts 
discussed earlier.   
Table 13: Profit sharing ratio and indicative profit rate of BIMB’s investment 
accounts 
Profit rate for general investment account maturing from 1st June 2009 onwards 
Period Profit Sharing Ratio  
Customer: Bank 
Indicative Rate % p.a. 
1 month 45:55 1.99 
3 months 45:55 2.04 
6 months 45:55 2.04 
9 months 45:55 2.04 
                                                 
331 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Al-Awfar Accounts, www.bankislam.com.my.  
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12 months 50:50 2.27 
15 months 52:48 2.36 
18 months 52:48 2.36 
24 months 54: 46 2.45 
36 months 56:44 2.54 
48 months 58:42 2.63 
60 months & above 60:40 2.72 
   
Profit rate for sakinah investment account maturing from 1st June 2009 
Period Profit Sharing Ratio  
Customer: Bank 
Indicative Rate % p.a. 
12 months 50:50 2.27 
24 months 54:46 2.45 
36 months 56:44 2.54 
48 months 58:42 2.63 
60 months 60:40 2.72 
   
Profit rate for al-Awfar investment account maturing from 16 November to 15 
December 2009 
Period Profit Sharing Ratio  
Customer: Bank 
Indicative Rate % p.a. 
1 month 30:70 0.49 
3 months 30:70 0.51 
6 months 30:70 0.54 
9 months 30:70 0.58 
12 months 30:70 0.62 
15 months 30:70 0.63 
18 months 30:70 0.64 
24 months 30:70 0.65 
36 months 30:70 0.69 
48 months 30:70 0.73 
60 months 30:70 0.76 
Source: www.bankislam.com.my 
Information shown in table 13 above reveals two arguments. Firstly, for the same 
period of investment tenure (12 months onwards), the profit ratio offered to general 
investors and retirees of sakÐnah investment is indistinctively varied. As a result, both 
types of investors attain similar indicative rates of profit from their investment. Thus, 
the bank's claim that the sakÐnah investment account offers a higher rate of profit is 
debatable. From the retirees' point of view there is no significant advantage to put 
their money in sakÐnah investment account as compared to the general investment 
account. Secondly, as pointed out in the previous discussion, the profit sharing ratio as 
well as the indicative profit rate of al-Awfar account is much lower comparing to the 
others. Thus, similar argument could be suggested here. Investors of al-Awfar account 
receive lower rates of profit not because their money was invested in non-profitable 
business but to maintain the cash prizes draw which take place in every quarter.  
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Wealth management products 
BIMB offers two types of wealth management products to investors - unit trust and 
structured investment instrument. To date, there are four funds of unit trusts - al-
FakhÐm, al-MunÒif, al-FalÁh and al-MubÐn and two of structured investment - an-
NajÁÎ and ZiyÁd had been created.   
In general, unit trust is sometimes referred to as mutual funds, and is a collective 
investment product which pool investors' capital in a fund managed by professional 
managers. A unit trust is considered as a relatively safe investment tool for investors 
to participate indirectly in equity market. As investors are always advised not to put 
all their 'eggs in one basket', investment in unit trust offers diversification 
opportunities. Unit trusts facilitate this by taking advantage of the pooled funds to 
purchase diversified portfolios of authorised investments. The diversification spreads 
the investments around a variety of assets in a portfolio to produce a better yield, 
more consistent return and reduced risks. The majority of unit trust investors are 
typically those with relatively small amount to invest, who neither have the expertise 
nor the inclination to hold portfolios on direct investments or shares. The ownership 
of unit trust fund is divided into units of entitlement, which will increase or decrease 
in net asset value (NAV) as the fund's value fluctuates. In our case, the institutional 
fund manager who is responsible in investing the investors’ money is BIMB Unit 
Trust Management Berhad (a subsidiary of BIMB group).   
Al-FakhÐm, al-MunÒif, al-FalÁh and al-MubÐn funds are mainly distinguished based on 
the trade off between risk and return. According to the bank, al-FakhÐm fund is 
suitable for investors who prefer a regular annual income with a relatively low risk to 
principle capital. This is due to the fact that 70-90 percent of the funds would be 
invested in fixed income securities i.e. government bonds and corporate Islamic debt 
securities which are relatively secure and reasonable risk tolerance. Only a small 
fraction of funds would be invested in risky types of investment instruments such as 
in the money market. In addition, to secure the stability and security of the funds, 
BIMB would adopt a defensive strategy.  This means, instead of taking an active 
trading approach the bank will hold the bonds for long term until it matures. As 
investment risks of the al-FakhÐm fund are low, the investors would also earn just 
reasonable return.   
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Meanwhile, al-MunÒif funds attempt to attract investors who seek a steady and 
consistent income over the medium to long term period. To achieve these goals, the 
funds would be invested equally in two sectors, equity and fixed income securities. 
Investment in equity market aims to generate high dividend yields. For al-MunÒif 
fund, the investment in equity market is primarily made to purchase blue chip stocks- 
the stocks of well-established companies having stable earning and no extensive 
liabilities. Investment in fixed income securities is made to generate the recurring 
income from expected regular annual dividend payment. Given the nature of stocks in 
which the fund is invested, the risk profile of al-MunÒif fund is considered between 
low to moderate. Hence, the fund is expected to generate an average return.  
Al-FalÁÎ is designed for investors who have long term investment plan and ready to 
bear a higher degree of investment risks. In line with this objective, up to 70 percent 
of the fund would be used to purchase stocks of companies that could offer potential 
increase in value rather than steady incomes. Contrary to al-MunÒif, the focus of 
stocks selection is the future earning growth.  Thus, the fund may be used to purchase 
stock of small and mid-size companies that are undervalued which normally could 
generate higher than the average return. Since the focus of the fund is investment in 
growth stock, al-FalÁÎ unit trust carries moderate to high risks. Nevertheless, the 
higher risks imply higher expected returns.  
Al-MubÐn fund shares similar characteristic of al-FalÁÎ fund except in the portfolio of 
equity investment. In the former, between 70-90 percent of the funds would be 
allocated to purchase stocks whereas in the latter, the allocated funds are only 
between 30-70 percent. Besides, BIMB would adopt active trading approach in which 
more funds would be utilised to purchase shÁrÐÝah compliant stock if the equity market 
outlook is expected to be positive. Only a small fraction of the funds would used in 
the investment of money market especially in the event of a severe downturn of equity 
market. Since al-MubÐn fund bears a high risk of investment, its expected return is 
also anticipated to be high.    
As the basic characteristic that distinguishes Islamic unit trust from its conventional 
counterparts lies in the investment in portfolios of a shÁrÐÝah compliant stock, the 
process of stock selection as pursued by BIMB sharÐÝah committees become the most 
pertinent to our investigation here.  
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Islamic Stocks Screening Method 
 
A company that undergoes a selection process has to pass two stages of screening 
process. The first stage is to scrutinise the core activities of the company. If the core 
activities are sharÐÝah compliant then, the company passes the first test. The core 
activities are considered as sharÐÝah compliant if they do not involve any of the four 
main criteria below:  
1. Operation based on ribÁ i.e. commercial banks, merchant banks and other 
types of conventional banking institutions. This is based on the prohibition of 
ribÁ in the Qur'Án (2:275). 
2. Operation that involves gambling which is defined as any game where the 
winning party takes all profits/benefits at the expense of the losing party. 
Gambling activities are clearly prohibited in the Qur'Án as stated in (3:90).  
3. Operation that involves the production of or sale of prohibited commodities 
such as liquor and non-ÎalÁl meat. This is based on the verse 3:90 of the 
Qur'Án. 
4. Operation that involves activities based on gharÁr (uncertainties) i.e. 
conventional insurance business. This is based on ÎadÐth on the prohibition of 
gharÁr transaction. 
 
The next stage is to scrutinise the other side activities of the company i.e. subsidiaries 
and other business activities. In cases where a subsidiary's revenues are mixed with 
unlawful elements (for example, the core activity of the parent company is lawful i.e. 
engaging in real property sector but the subsidiary company operates a hotel which 
sells liquor), then the company can still be recognised as sharÐÝah compliant provided 
that the unlawful revenue is minimal. The sharÐÝah committee of Securities 
Commission332 had ruled that the percentage of unlawful income must be negligible 
compared to that of company's core business activities. They determine that the 
income derived from unlawful activities should not be more than 5 percent of the total 
income of the company. In addition to that, it is emphasised that the unlawful income 
should go through a 'cleansing' process by being removed, which is normally done 
                                                 
332 SharÐÝah committee of Securities Commission is another body set up at national level which function 
as the most authoritative institution in the sharÐ‘ah compliant stock screening process matter. The role 
of the committee is very much similar to that of National SharÐÝah Advisory Council of Islamic 
banking.  
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through donation to charities. BIMB sharÐÝah committee members agreed to this 
particular ijtihÁd. 
 
However, there is a possible objection to it. One may argue that the ijtihÁd is 
contradictory to the understanding of the word ÎarÁm (unlawful) as stated in the 
Qur'Án (see for example 16:116). According to the understanding of the verse, what is 
unlawful in large quantity is also unlawful in small quantity. Scholars who criticise 
this ijtihÁd demand that the revenues of sharÐÝah compliant stocks should be 100 
percent derived from lawful sources. In addition, the basis of determination of 5 
percent of the unlawful income is also unknown. It is understood that the 5 percent is 
determined to represent insignificant amount of unlawful income. However, the 
question is why 5 percent is chosen as the determining level. Can the percentage 
increases or decreases in the future?  
 
According to Dr. Engku Rabiah, the decision for allowing 'mixed-companies' to be 
included as sharÐÝah compliant is made for temporary period. She views the ijtihÁd is 
based on the maÒlaÎah principle. This is because, in reality it is hard to find public 
listed companies which completely free from unlawful income. Because of the ever 
changing business circumstances, there are certain unlawful situations that are 
unavoidable or difficult to avoid (termed in fiqh as ‘umÙm al-balwÁ). For instance, 
due to the acquisition and merging activities, a sharÐÝah compliant company may 
become non-compliant when it acquired/merged with company that involves in 
unlawful activity. Besides, the unlawful income commonly derived from interest paid 
by conventional banks. This is due to the fact that the majority of public listed 
companies still do not place their idle funds or make investments through Islamic 
banks333.  
 
I personally can accept the temporary justification as an excuse to allow the 
insignificant amount of unlawful income. However being a temporary excuse, there 
must be a time framework established (e.g. 10 year transitory period) to allow 'mixed-
companies' to adapt into strict sharÐÝah requirement. Furthermore over the 10 years, 
the percentage allowed should be reduced gradually from 5 to 4 and so forth. 
                                                 
333 Interview with Dr. Engku Rabiah Engku Ali, 11 August 2008, International Islamic University of 
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.  
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However, this has not happen in the Malaysian Islamic capital industry. In the absence 
of any indication that the percentage will be removed from the Islamic stock screening 
process, it is strongly felt that the temporary excuse would become permanent 
resolution. This would continuously allow companies to conduct unlawful 
transactions though in small division.   
 
The task to ensure the sharÐÝah compliance of unit trust funds is under the 
responsibility of the same sharÐÝah committee of BIMB bank. This means the sharÐÝah 
committee members are not only responsible for authenticating the compliance of 
Islamic banking products to the classical commercial contract rules, but are also 
answerable for monitoring the investment of unit trust funds. As different skills and 
experience are required to conduct both tasks, such a practice is viewed as insufficient 
to some scholars334. Although BIMB's sharÐÝah committees could argue that they do 
not need to go through the detailed stock screening process, as the list of sharÐÝah 
approved companies is produced by the Malaysian Securities Commission335, I still 
think that they have to observe the operation of existing funds especially those of 
active trading category. Every investment transaction must be audited to ensure that 
investors’ money has been utilised in lawful business.  In order to carry out such a 
meticulous task, full time sharÐÝah scholars need to be employed. An external sharÐÝah 
committee who just meet several times during a year arguably could perform the audit 
process efficiently.  
 
Structured Investment Instruments                               
The second product created under the category of wealth management is the 
structured investment instrument. This product is designed in the form of Islamic 
Negotiable Deposit (NID-Ð). It refers to a sum of money deposited with the bank and 
repayable to the investors on a specified future date at the nominal value of the NID-Ð 
plus declared dividend. Contrary to the deposit and investment accounts, the NID-Ð is 
based on the application of restricted muÃÁrabah (muÃÁrabah muqayyadah). Under 
                                                 
334 Rodney Wilson, Islamic Asset Management, SGIA Research Working Papers Series, No.1, June 
2007, University of Durham, pp. 3.  
335 The list is produced by Securities Commission for free to assist public and institutional investors to 
invest in sharÐÝah compliant companies. The stock screening process is undertaken its own sharÐÝah 
committee.    
 202 
this contract, the scope and the nature of business in which NID-Ð funds would be 
utilised is identified at front. To date, BIMB has launched two NID-Ðs called as an-
NajÁÎ and ZiyÁd. The former focus on investments in the health care industry whereas 
the latter concentrate on the Asian equity market.  
NID-Ð instrument is distinct from a unit trust product since it offers capital protection 
when held to maturity. This means investors of NID-Ð are assured that they will not 
lose their money regardless of the outcome of investment. The capital is guaranteed 
provided that the investors do not redeem their NID-Ð instruments prior to maturity. If 
the instruments are redeemed prior to maturity, the investors may face fees or costs 
which could result in the investor losing part of, or the entire initial capital. How can 
muÃÁrabah capital been protected? Is this something against the established rule of the 
contract? We shall discuss this issue in detail in the following sections. At present, our 
focus of attention will be the salient features of both an-NajÁÎ and ZiyÁd NID-Ð 
instruments.       
An- NajaÎ NID-i   
An-NajaÎ NID-i was officially launched in August 2008. It aims to attract RM300 
million from institutional, corporate and individual investors. As indicated earlier, the 
fund would be allocated to purchase stocks of companies that specialise in health care 
products and services. The investment would be made for 3 years duration. The health 
care and its sub sectors (i.e. biotechnology) are chosen as the mediums of investment 
because they are expected to bring in good returns. This is as a result of the growing 
number of people over the age of 65 and above worldwide. The income and 
consumption pattern of the aging group is significantly different from those of the 
younger group. The aging group tends to spend more time in life-prolonging treatment 
and hence consume more health-based products336. This would benefit the 
pharmaceutical, medical equipment and biotechnology product suppliers as well as 
retailers. Even material companies are expected to benefit given the interest retirees 
often have in recreational activities such as gardening337. The growing demand for 
these products is not limited within the developed countries but also spread to the 
                                                 
336 An-NajaÎ NID-i Pamphlet, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Kuala Lumpur. 
337 Playing the baby-boomer trade: J. P Morgan Aging Population Index, 7th November 2008, 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/104772, Accessed on 10 January 2010.  
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developing economies. As such, the health care industry is believed to be a good place 
to invest the An-NajaÎ NID-i funds.  
BIMB would invest the funds on companies which listed in the Baraka Aging 
Population Index. It comprises 30 stocks, carefully selected from a basket of 2,400 
stocks from the Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index. The following information 
shows portfolio investment of an-NajÁÎ NID-Ð fund as at 30th October 2009.  
 
Table 14: Stocks within Baraka Aging Population Index as at 30th October 2009. 
Sub Sector Names 
Amgen Inc Biotechnology (6.67%) 
Grisols S.A 
Drug Retailer (3.33%) Shoppers Drug Mart Corp. 
Health Care Providers (3.33%) Rhoen-Klinikum AG 
Beckman Coulter Inc. 
Covidien PLC 
Elekta AB Series B 
Medtronic Inc. 
Smith and Nephew PLC 
Synthes Inc. 
 
 
Medical Equipment (23.33%) 
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. 
Baxter International Inc. Medical Supplies (6.67%) 
Owens and Minor Inc 
Astellas Pharma Inc 
Astrazeneca PLC 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
CSL Ltd. 
Endo Pharmaceutical Holdings Inc. 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC 
Johnson & Johnson 
Merck & Co. Inc 
Novartis AG 
Novo Nordisk A/S Series B 
Pfizer Inc 
Roche Holding AG Part Cert. 
Sanofi Aventis S.A 
Shire PLC 
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.  
Valeant Pharmaceutical International 
 
 
 
 
 
Pharmaceuticals (56.7%) 
Yuhan Corp. 
Source: www.bankislam.com.my 
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In terms of geographic allocation, the companies within the Baraka Aging Population 
Index are as follow: 
Figure 4: Geographic allocation of an-NajÁÎ NID-Ð fund investment   
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 As clearly shown in table 7, 56.7 percent of an-NajÁÎ funds is invested in the 
pharmaceutical companies. The remainder of the funds is used to buy stock of 
companies that produce medical equipments (23.33%), biotechnology (6.67%), 
medical supplies (6.67%), health care (3.33%) and drug (3.33%) products. Most of the 
companies are based in the United State which represents 43.33 percent. The next 
largest invested countries are United Kingdom (3.33%), Switzerland (10.00 %) and 
Japan (6.67%). The funds are also used to purchase stocks of companies from 
Sweden, Spain, Korea, Germany, France, Denmark, Canada and Australia (3.33 
percent each respectively). The financial performance of the instrument however can 
not yet be evaluated since its maturity will only end by October 2011. 
 
ZiyÁd NID-Ð 
 
After the introduction of an-NajÁÎ NID-Ð, BIMB came out with the second structured 
investment instrument called ZiyÁd. Basically, ZiyÁd NID-Ð has similar features that 
of an-NajÁÎ NID-Ð. Both instruments offer capital-protected investment products with 
the opportunity to share high yields dividend. In the latter product, the minimum 
investment is determined at RM65,000 and subsequent investments are in multiples of 
RM5,000. Contrary to the global strategy adopted in an-NajÁÎ NID-Ð, ZiyÁd NID-Ð 
fund focus exclusively on the Asian equity market. According to BIMB, the strategy 
is taken to take advantage from the massive stimulus plans embarked on by various 
Asian governments. The stimulus plans is expected to recover the Asian equity market 
within the medium to long term. Hence, ZiyÁd NID-Ð funds would be used to purchase 
selected stocks at low prices today and sell them at higher prices after 5 years. The 
selection of stocks would also be based on a particular Index which pools together 
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high performance companies in a basket. Since at the time this thesis is prepared, 
ZiyÁd NID-Ð is still accumulating its funds, no investment transaction can be reported. 
However, BIMB has hinted that the deposited funds would be utilised to purchase 
stock of companies such as China Mobile Ltd and CNOOC Ltd. of China, Panasonic 
Corp. and Canon Inc. of Japan as well as BHP Billiton Ltd. of Australia338.   
 
Our discussions on structured investment instrument raise an important fiqh enquiry. 
What are the justifications relied on by BIMB sharÐÝah committee members in 
allowing such capital-protected investment instruments? How do the products confirm 
to the principle of muÃÁrabah which advocates the loss sharing principle? The 
subsequent section is devoted to examine this issue in detail.  
 
Capital Guarantee in MuÃÁrabah Banking Products 
 
As we may recall from our discussion in chapter 2, one of the basic elements in a 
muÃÁrabah contract is the risk taking/sharing concept. The concept implies that a 
capital provider (rabb mÁl) and an agent-manager (muÃÁrib) must be willing to bear a 
certain degree of risk to ensure the validity of a muÃÁrabah contract. A capital 
provider must be willing to accept the possibility of losing his capital partly or 
entirely in the event of business loss unless it is caused by gross negligence of agent-
manager. An agent-manager, though not accountable for the monetary loss, must be 
ready to accept the risk of wasting his expended time and effort. The risk-taking 
concept is derived from the two classical legal maxims which become the 
fundamental of Islamic commercial law. The legal maxims state that (1) al-kharÁj bi-
dhamÁn - gain comes with the liability for loss and (2) al-ghunmu bi al-ghurmi - gain 
is the result of risk taking.  
 
Based on the concept of risk sharing, earlier jurists and Muslim economists advocated 
the muÃÁrabah contract as the ideal basis for Islamic banking operations. Under the 
contract, depositors are expected to share the risk-return with the Islamic banks as 
well as the entrepreneurs. Hence, in the event of financial difficulty, depositors in 
Islamic banks theoretically will not only face the possibility of obtaining zero return 
                                                 
338 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, ZiyÁd NID-I, www.bankislam.com.my, Accessed on 25 Febuary 
2010. 
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from their investment but also face the possibility of losing their initial deposit. The 
concept of guaranteed return in the conventional investment products is arguably 
contrary to the spirit of Islamic commercial law. As borrowers are obliged to repay 
the lenders (depositors) regardless of whether their businesses succeed or fail, the 
guaranteed return mechanism is viewed as an unjust economic system. Hence, the 
establishment of interest-free banks among other things is to establish the risk 
taking/sharing principle between depositors, banks and the fund users. 
 
However, the concept remains entirely in the theoretical writings of the early jurists 
and the Muslims economists. In reality, all deposits in Islamic banks (all types of 
deposit accounts, investment accounts, an-NajÁÎ and ZiyÁÃ NID-Ðs) are guaranteed 
and protected. This means depositors and investors of these accounts/instruments are 
assured that they will not lose their money in the event of a bank’s business failure or 
even bankruptcy. In Malaysia, the deposited money is guaranteed by a special 
institution set up for this purpose namely the Malaysian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (MDIC). Islamic banks in the country are obliged by the Central Bank 
(BNM) to pay an annual premium based on their total deposits to the institution which 
will then provides depositors with coverage and ensures payout in the event of 
banking failure339. The coverage limit provided by the MIDC is up to RM60,ooo for 
each depositor. However, depositors with deposits in more than one Islamic bank will 
be insured separately for their deposits in each bank. Besides, various types of account 
such as joint, trust, sole proprietorship and partnership will also be separately insured.  
 
It is noteworthy that the idea of deposit guarantee has been put forward by many 
scholars prior to its implementation in the Malaysian Islamic banks. Among 
prominent scholars who advocated this idea include MuÎammad Baqer al-Ñadr, Sami 
Hamud, Abdullah Saeed, Al-TeghÁnÐ and Fahim Khan 340. The scholars generally 
argue that there is a genuine need for deposit guarantee even in the PLS-based 
banking system. They come to the conclusion after considering the actual behaviour 
of the majority of depositors in the present economic system. Islamic banks are 
                                                 
339 International Association of Deposit Insurers, vol. 1 issue 3, 18 July 2006.  
340 RafÐq Yunus al-MisrÐ, Hal Yajuz fÐ al-MuÃÁrabah an Yadmana al-ÝAmil Ra’su al-MÁl?, Journal of 
Islamic Economics, University of King Abdul Aziz, 2003, pp.73-78 and Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, 
Islamic Bank Corporate Governance and Regulation: A  Call for Mutualisation, 
www.ruf.rice.edu/elgamal/files/IBCGR.pdf/, Accessed on 26 Jun 2009. 
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operating in the environment where the number of risk-averse depositors is much 
more than the risk-taker depositors. Even though, up till now there is no statistic 
which could prove the argument, the common belief indicates that not many 
depositors are willing to take risks with their investments. This is true particularly 
among depositors of the lower income population. The majority of them are not ready 
to take any risk at all when investing their hard earned savings. Hence, if Islamic 
banks do not provide a deposit protection scheme, this group of depositors will walk 
away from the Islamic banking system. Hence, in order to attract these depositors, 
Islamic banks should be allowed to provide deposit guarantee scheme similar to the 
conventional banks341.  
 
In the early discussion of this issue, al-TeghÁnÐ proposed that Islamic banks should 
voluntarily provide the guarantee of deposit. He was of the opinion that his ijtiÎad 
does not contradict with any prevalent classical muÃÁrabah rules. According to him, 
the prominent classical jurists never ruled on the impermissibility of such an action 
(where an agent-manager himself pledges guarantee of capital entrusted to him). The 
case in which AbÙ ÍanÐfa, MÁlik, al-ShÁfiÝÐ had given their judgments was when a 
capital provider make a condition compelling an agent-manager to guaranty 
muÃÁrabah capital. Al-TeghÁnÐ argued that the guarantee enforced by a capital 
provider is dissimilar from voluntarily guarantee made by an agent-manager. The 
former is considered as an unfair deal whereas the latter is regarded as an admirable 
decision342. Since the matter was not clearly discussed by the classical jurists; it leaves 
rooms for contemporary interpretation. Al-TeghÁnÐ disagreed with the argument, 
claiming that the implementation of deposit guarantee scheme will make investment 
in Islamic banks comparable to their conventional counterparts. He contended that the 
distinction which differentiate the two banking system remains on the fact that return 
in the former is not guaranteed while return in the latter is secured. He asserted that 
the deposit guarantee is just to assure the depositors that they held a very minimal risk 
when investing in the Islamic banks343.         
 
                                                 
341 Muhammad Fahim Khan, Guaranteeing Investment Deposit in Islamic Banking System, Journal of 
Islamic Economics, University of King Abdul Aziz, 2003,pp.45-52. 
342 Al-Teghani ÝAbd al-QÁdir Ahmad, ÂamÁn al-MuÃÁrib lil Ra’ Sul al-MÁl fi al-WadÁÝÐ al-
MaÒrafiyyah, Journal of Islamic Economics, University of King Abdul Aziz, 2003, pp.61-72 
343 Ibid.  
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Al-TeghÁnÐ’s idea regarding this matter was criticised by many jurists including RafÐq 
Yunus al-Misri. The implementation of deposit guarantee indicates that the Islamic 
banks and depositors will share any profit made if their venture is successful. 
However, in the event of business failure only Islamic banks will be responsible for 
the losses incurred. As argued by RafÐq, such a condition tried to combine between 
loan (al-qarÃ) and muÃÁrabah contracts. This cannot be done since both contracts are 
contradictory (mutaÃÁdÁni). Al-qarÃ is a contract executed and based on a charity 
(tabarruÝ) basis, whereas muÃÁrabah is implemented and based on monetary exchange 
(muÝÁwaÃah) premise. RafÐq refuted al-TeghÁnÐ, claiming that the classical jurists 
never rule on the agent-manager's guarantee. Quoting a case from al-Mudawwanah as 
an example, RafÐq proved that MÁlik had disapproved of such a deal. Based on the 
classical jurists' rules against the practice of capital guarantee, RafÐq asserted that 
muÃÁrabah deposit in Islamic banks should be implemented in its purest form by 
applying the risk taking/sharing concept344.     
 
As already noticed, the deposit guarantee scheme practised in Malaysia is quite 
different from the suggestion made by al-TeghÁnÐ. The deposit guarantee is not 
provided by the Islamic banks, but by a third party institution set up for this special 
purpose. Since the guarantor is neither the capital provider nor the agent-manager, the 
Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars believe that the scheme does not contravene with any 
classical jurists’ rules345. Hence, there is no issue whether the agent-manager provides 
the capital guarantee voluntarily or as a result of forced influence from a capital 
provider. The deposit guarantee scheme as proposed by al-TeghÁnÐ may be viewed as 
an unfair dealing particularly for the Islamic banks. This is because during a financial 
crisis, although the Islamic banks suffer huge losses, they are still obliged to 
compensate depositors’ initial deposit. However, such phenomenon will not happen in 
Malaysia as MIDC will provide the guarantee and protect the Islamic banks from 
banking collapse. As the deposit insurance mechanism does not cause harm to any 
party in the muÃÁrabah, therefore the sharÐÝah scholars in the country have approved 
its practice. In addition to that, the Islamic deposit insurance is permitted because its 
mechanism is based on the kafÁlah concept. It refers to the mutual guarantee among 
                                                 
344 RafÐq Yunus al-MisrÐ, Hal Yajuz fÐ al-MuÃÁrabah an Yadmana al-ÝAmil Ra’su al-MÁl?, Journal of 
Islamic Economics. 
345 The decision to approve the deposit guarantee scheme is decided on the 26th NSAC meeting held on 
26th Jun 2002.  
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the Islamic banks agreeing to contribute to the kafÁlah funds which will be used 
whenever any participants of the scheme faces fearful of banking collapse. The 
contribution to the funds is considered part of the Islamic banks’ obligation to 
preserve the stability of the Islamic banking industry as a whole346.  
 
In my personal opinion, ideally speaking muÃÁrabah investment in Islamic banks 
should be carried out without a deposit guarantee scheme. Depositors should be aware 
of the risk taking/sharing principle when deposit their money in the Islamic banks. 
However, considering the reality of depositors’ behaviour (being usually risk-averse) 
plus the pressure from the conventional banks (which are able to provide the capital 
protection scheme), perhaps the concept is too idealistic. In order to ensure the 
competitiveness of Islamic deposit products, I could argue the deposit insurance 
scheme should be in place. The deposit insurance scheme is a better alternative when 
compared to with al-TeghÁni’s recommendation. The scheme is free from the classical 
jurists’ objection since neither one of the contracting parties is involved in 
guaranteeing the deposit.    
The Utilisation of MuÃÁrabah Funds 
Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars are of the opinion that the unrestricted muÃÁrabah agreed 
at the beginning of the contract has given absolute power to the bank in investing the 
deposited money in saving and investment accounts347. According to them, once 
depositors agreed to entrust their money under the terms of an unrestricted muÃÁrabah 
(muÃÁrabah muÔlaqah), the bank is considered to have obtained full authority in 
making any investment decision. After meeting the statutory reserve requirement and 
holding the required liquid asset, BIMB is free to invest the remainder of the 
depositors’ funds based on its experience and skill348. It is obvious that in this regard 
the Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars adapt the ÍanafÐs framework of muÃÁrabah contract. 
As can be recalled from chapter two, the ÍanafÐs, in determining the scope of 
empowerment of a muÃÁrib (agent-manager), had classified it into three categories, 
depending on the expression (ÒÐghah) used by the investor at the beginning of the 
                                                 
346 Bank Negara of Malaysia, SharÐÝah Resolutions, 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/microsites/financial/pdf/resolutions/08_kafalah.pdf/, Accessed on 29 Jun 
2009. 
347 Interview with Dr. Shamsiah Mohammed, University of Malaya Kuala Lumpur, 9 August 2008. 
348 Guidelines of MuÃÁrabah Deposit, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Kuala Lumpur.  
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contract. If the investor used a general expression (ÒÐghah muÔlaqah) such as "start a 
business with my initial capital of 1000 and we will share equally the profit", absolute 
power is given to the agent-manager to execute various types of business transactions 
provided that they are beneficial and customary practised by traders349. Thus, in 
running the both accounts, BIMB neither seeks depositors/investors' approval nor 
consults their opinion before investing the money. The only source of information for 
depositors/investors to know where their money had been invested is through the 
bank's financial statements published annually. However, it can be observed that the 
information given in the annual report is far from adequate and the terms used are too 
complicated for most of the general public to understand.     
Let us examine BIMB's annual report in 2008 as an example. During that year, the 
total muÃÁrabah deposits were recorded as RM6,878,049. The division of the deposits 
is as follows:  
Table 15: MuÃÁrabah funds by type of deposits 
No. Type of Deposit Amount (RM) 
1. Savings Deposit 536,629 
2. General Investment Deposit 2,411,039 
3. Special Investment Deposit 3,930,146 
4. Others 235 
 Total 6,878,049 
Source: BIMB Annual Report 2008 
From the deposits, the bank managed to generate a total of RM919,496 of profit. 
RM112,086 of the profit is derived from investment of general investment deposits 
whereas other deposits contribute RM807,495.  
Table 16: Income derived from investment of depositors’ funds 
No. Type of Deposit Profit (RM) 
1. General Investment Deposit 112,001 
2. Other Deposits 807,495 
 Total 919,496 
Source: BIMB Annual Report 2008 
 
 
                                                 
349SarakhsÐ, al-MabÒuÔ, vol. 22, pp. 20. 
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Profit derived from investment of general investment and other types of deposits are 
further elaborated in table below:  
Table 17: Profit from General Investment Deposit 
Profit Derived from Investment of General Investment Deposit 
No. Source of Income Profit (RM) 
1. Financing, advances and other 79,067 
Securities:  
i. Held for trading 314 
ii. Available for sale 6,331 
2. 
iii. Held to maturity 262 
3. Deposit with other financial institutions 23,593 
4. Accretion of discount less amortisation of 
premium 
2,519 
5. Net loss from sale of securities held-for-
trading 
(109) 
6 Net (loss)/gain on revaluation of 
securities held-for-trading 
(26) 
7. Net gain from sale of securities available-
for-sale 
7 
8. Gross dividend income from 
quoted securities in Malaysia 
43 
  112,086 
 
Profit Derived from Investment of Other Types of Deposits 
No. Source of Income Profit (RM) 
1. Financing, advances and other 570,075 
Securities:  
i. Held for trading 2,263 
ii. Available for sale 45,646 
2. 
iii. Held to maturity 1,869 
3. Deposit with other financial institutions 170,233 
4. Accretion of discount less amortisation of 
premium 
18,130 
6 Net (loss)/gain on revaluation of 
securities held-for-trading 
(781) 
7. Net gain from sale of securities available-
for-sale 
239 
  807,495 
 Total 919,496 
Source: BIMB Annual Report 2008 
Based on the information in table 10 above, we can safely assume that the muÃÁrabah 
funds were invested in three main activities; (1) financing activities (2) securities 
(Islamic bonds) and (3) inter-bank money market instruments. The financing activities 
contributed approximately RM649,142 of profit while the securities and money 
market investments generated RM56,874 and RM193,826 respectively. A question 
arises then, of how these activities (financing, securities and inter-bank money 
market) are carried out by BIMB? Do they support profit and loss sharing principles 
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as emphasised by the classical jurists when formulating the theory of muÃÁrabah? The 
following discussion attempts to answer the questions by studying some applications 
of Islamic commercial contracts in the financing, securities and inter-bank money 
market products.     
Financing Facilities of BIMB 
Financing activities are the main source of profit not only for muÃÁrabah fund 
depositors/investors but also for BIMB shareholders. In 2008, the total net financing 
advanced to customers was recorded as RM10,458,831. The largest component of 
financing extended by the bank was for the purchase of individual property which 
accounted for 56.2 percent of the total financing. This is followed by personal 
financing (23.1 percent) and trade bills discounted financing (16.1 percent). Table 18 
below gives detailed information on this matter, though it is not clear what the exact 
amount of muÃÁrabah funds invested in each type of financing were.   
Table 18: BIMB financing by type 
No. Type of Financing Amount (RM) 
1. Cash line 175,463 
2. House financing 5,878,379 
3. Syndicated financing 107,339 
4 Leasing receivables 208,234 
5. Bridging financing 242,504 
6. Personal financing 2,425,401 
7. Other term financing 3,951,604 
8. Staff financing 295,785 
9. Credit cards 340,100 
10. Trade bills discounted 1,684,209 
11. Trust receipts 175,518 
12. Less: Unearned income (5,025,705) 
 Total 10,458,831 
Source: BIMB Annual Report 2008 
These financing products are created through the application of several Islamic 
medieval commercial contracts. As indicated by table 19, the most widely applied 
contract was bayÝ bithaman Ájil (52.8 percent), bayÝ al- ÝÐnah (21.9 percent) and bayÝ 
murÁbaÎah (17.6 percent). As the contract of bayÝ al- ÝÐnah was already discussed in 
chapter three, we shall focus in this section on the application of bayÝ bithaman Ájil 
(hereafter termed as BBA) and bayÝ murÁbaÎah as the core principles in utilising the 
muÃÁrabah deposit. In chapter three, we found that the application of bayÝ al- ÝÐnah is 
surrounded by many fiqh controversies. The financing products based on the contract 
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were shown to be insignificantly different from the conventional banking loan. Thus, 
in this section we will try to assess whether the application of BBA and murÁbaÎah 
contracts is free from such controversy.  If both contracts are applied in tandem to the 
spirit of profit and loss sharing principle, therefore we would conclude that the 
muÃÁrabah deposit was utilised in legally right manner.  
Table 19: BIMB financing by contract 
No. Type of Financing Amount (RM) 
1. BayÝ bithaman Ájil 5,526,409 
2. IjÁrah 243,063 
3. IjÁrah Muntahia bi al-TamlÐk 30,334 
4. MuÃÁrabah 9,249 
5. MurÁbahah 1,848,075 
6. bayÝ al- ÝÐnah 2,291,713 
7. IÒtiÒna’ 509,988 
 Total 10,458,831 
Source: BIMB Annual Report 2008 
 
The contract of BBA is applied largely by BIMB to create Islamic home financing. 
Since its inception, the product has been criticised by many scholars. The legality of 
the product has not only been disputed amongst the academics (sharÐÝah and economic 
background) but also involved judges of Malaysian civil courts350. In September 2008, 
the Malaysian High Court Judge, Datuk Abdul Wahab Patail ruled that the application 
of BBA contract in the Malaysian Islamic home financing is contrary to the Islamic 
Banking Act 1983. He was of the opinion that the sale contract in the BBA is not a 
bona fide sale. In other words, from the judge's point of view, the so called Islamic 
home financing is just a duplication of conventional housing loan. Since the contract 
was structurally faulty, the judge ruled that the defaulters of Islamic home financing 
need not to pay more than the original financing amount that they received351.  
 
Following the High Court ruling, the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM) has urged all 
17 Malaysian Islamic banks to review their BBA contract application. In response to 
the advice of BNM, several Islamic banks such as Maybank Islamic and RHB Islamic 
have shown interest in replacing the BBA contract. In December 2008, both Islamic 
banks launched a new version of Islamic home financing, based on the contract of 
                                                 
350 Note that in Malaysia, the shari’ah court does not have authority to judge dispute between Islamic 
banks and their customer. Therefore, such cases are brought to conventional courts which have superior 
authority.   
351 Habhajan Singh, Time for Bank to Study BBA Further, http;//Islamic 
financeupdates.wordpress.com, Accessed on 21 April 2009.  
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mushÁrakah mutanÁqiÒah (diminishing partnership) which is claimed to be more able 
to comply with the profit and loss sharing principle. At that time, it is felt that the 
Islamic banks in the country will gradually introduce more "authentic" Islamic 
products which not only focus on the changes of products’ terminologies but their 
inner or substance.  
 
However, in April 2009, the Court of Appeal (a higher level of court) revoked the 
earlier judgement of the High Court.  Datuk Md Raus Sharif, Datuk Abdul Hamid 
Embong and Datuk Ahmad Maarop, the judges of the Court of Appeal, unanimously 
agreed that the application of BBA contract in the Islamic home financing is valid and 
binding. Therefore, according to them, the Islamic home financing product must not 
be compared to the conventional loan agreement352. It is not certain whether the recent 
ruling brings adverse implications to the transformation of Islamic banking products 
in Malaysia. However, what is certainly the case is that the BBA contract remains the 
dominant concept of Islamic home financing in the country.  
 
What is the basis of this disagreement? Why did the judge of High Court deny the 
legality of the product while others admitted it?  In order to analyse this issue, it is 
pertinent to understand how the BBA contract is applied in the said product. Figure 5 
below shows the modus operandi of Islamic home financing offered by BIMB:  
Figure 5: The modus operandi of BIMB's home financing 
 
                                                 
352 Association of Islamic Banking Institution Malaysia, Court of Appeal Reverse High Court BBA 
Ruling http://aibim.com/content/view/, Accessed on 22 April 2009.  
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Suppose Ahmad wants to buy a house valued at £100,000. Firstly, he needs to sign the 
Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) and pays 10 percent (£10,000) of the selling 
price to the house owner. The SPA is necessary to confer a beneficial right of the 
property to Ahmad. After signing the SPA, Ahmad becomes the owner of the house. 
Then he will go to BIMB seeking financing of the remaining £90,000. In doing so, 
Ahmad sells the house to BIMB in cash for £90,000 and buys back the house on 
deferred payment with mark up price, say £120,000. At this juncture, the concept of 
bayÝ al-ÝÐnah is applied. Now, Ahmad is considered as buying the house from BIMB 
on deferred payment (bayÝ bithaman Ájil) and will pay instalments to the bank for an 
agreed period. Ahmad will settle the remaining £90,000 to the initial house owner 
while the bank will make £30,000 profit from the transaction.  
BIMB contends that the distinguishing feature between the Islamic home financing 
and the conventional housing loan lies in the fact that the former is based on a sale 
(bayÝ) transaction whereas the latter is based on a loan (qarÃ) contract. According to 
them, the transaction of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah and BBA clearly demonstrate the sale contract. 
However, not everyone agrees to this claim. The critics, including the judge of High 
Court, view the transaction as no more a legal trick rather than a true sale contract. 
They are of the opinion that the bank in the Islamic home financing transaction, 
merely act as a financier rather than a seller/trader. They argue that if the bank wishes 
to act as a seller/trader, in the first place, it should actually buy the house from the 
owner and then sells it to customer with a mark-up price. By doing so, profit (mark-up 
price) earned by the bank is justifiable from the sharÐÝah perspective. This is because 
the bank has borne certain degree of business risk i.e. the possibility of loss should the 
house is unsold.  
However, in this transaction the bank seems to become a risk-free party which is too 
much similar to a lender. On the other hand, the buyer bears all risk associated with a 
borrower. Perhaps, the problem of a delayed housing project is a good example to 
highlight this point. In Malaysia, developers are legally permitted to sell house 
entirely under construction. The developers can just set up property development 
company and launch new housing project; promise potential house buyers to build 
houses based on the agreed specifications in specific duration. This rule has led to 
serious problem of incompletion housing projects especially during the economic 
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recession. When a housing project is abandoned, the buyers will suffer; they must pay 
the home mortgage to the bank despite their incomplete house. Unfortunately, the 
buyer under the Islamic home financing also faces similar problem.  Should BIMB 
truly apply the sale contract the buyer will not have to pay for an incomplete house. 
As a seller, it is the bank’s responsibility to bear the risk of an incomplete house. As 
such, the problem of abandoned housing project proves that the Islamic bank 
generally acts as a financier not seller/trader.  
The other most popular contract adopted in creating BIMB’ financing products is bayÝ 
murÁbaÎah. Basically, it is a sale contract whereby the seller will inform explicitly the 
cost and the mark-up price to the buyer. Contrary to the BBA contract which is used 
to create long term financing products of individual customers, bayÝ murÁbaÎah is 
applied to structure short-term financing products of business customers. In BIMB, 
the murÁbaÎah short term financing products include letters of credit, trade working 
capital financing, accepted bills and export credit refinancing. Although the products 
have different names they have something in common; they are meant for traders who 
are in need of capital to purchase raw material, machinery, stock or inventories. 
Through the combination of wakÁlah and bayÝ murÁbaÎah contracts, these products 
are created to assist business customers in obtaining their needs. Let us examine the 
modus operandi of BIMB’s working capital financing in figure 6 below353.  
Figure 6: The modus operandi of BIMB's working capital financing 
 
                                                 
353 Islamic Banking Practice from the Practitioner’s Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad, 1994, pp.113. 
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Suppose a manufacturer needs money to purchase raw material in the course of his 
business. He may approach BIMB to provide financing through the working capital 
financing product. Using this facility, firstly BIMB will appoint the manufacturer to 
purchase the required raw material on its behalf. From a fiqh point of view, at this 
stage the relationship between the bank and the manufacturer involves a wakÁlah 
(agency) contract.  When the supplier delivers the raw material to the manufacturer, 
the bank will pay the supplier its cost on a cash basis based on the invoice value. 
Then, the bank will sell the raw material to the customer comprising its purchase price 
and a profit margin, and allow the manufacturer to settle it on deferred terms of 30, 60 
or 90 days (or, indee, any other period).   
 
The reason for the criticism of murÁbaÎah product is essentially due to the similarity 
between the mark-up rate charged by Islamic bank and the interest rate of the 
conventional bank354. Often an Islamic bank uses the conventional benchmark such as 
the LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offer-Rate) to determine the mark up rate for its 
murÁbaÎah product. As a result, by the maturity date, customer of both banks will pay 
about similar price for their purchases. This has led to the conclusion that there is no 
difference between the murÁbaÎah financing products and the conventional interest-
based loans. It is also argued that by referring to LIBOR, Islamic bank faces a similar 
rate of return risk as the conventional banks. As the LIBOR rate always fluctuates, 
every contract benchmarked with it will inherit the interest-rate risk, albeit indirectly.      
To conclude, our analysis on the BIMB financing activities has shown that they are 
not operated on the basis of profit and loss sharing principles. The bank adopts a risk 
adverse approach in creating its financing products. All the products seem very much 
similar to debt-like products of the conventional bank. In other words, looking at it 
from the economic perspective, the effect of Islamic financing products is similar to 
that of conventional interest-based loan. Therefore, I think it is inappropriate to invest 
the muÃÁrabah deposit into this kind of investment.  
                                                 
354 Nagoaka Shinsuke, Beyond The Theoretical Dichotomy in Islamic Finance, Analytical Reflection 
on MurÁbaÎah Contract and Islamic Debt Securities, Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, 2007, pp. 
72-91.  
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In the following discussion, we will investigate the other two investment activities 
that generate income for the muÃÁrabah deposit. They are the so called Islamic 
securities and Islamic inter-bank money market instrument.  
Islamic Securities  
Securities are referred to as investment certificates representing evidence of 
ownership of debt issued by a corporation or government. They could be in the form 
of bonds, stocks, shares, options and futures. The main reason for a corporation or 
government to issue securities is to raise additional capital to fund business expansion, 
specific development projects, repay business debt and finance government deficit. 
Investors purchase securities with the understanding that the issuers will pay back 
their original principal plus any interest at a maturity date. As far as investors are 
concerned, investment in securities has two main advantages. First, it offers the most 
secure types of investment, particularly securities issued by a government.  It rarely 
happens that a government fails to honour its debt obligation issued in its own 
currency. Second, securities are marketable and liquid as they can easily be bought 
and sold in the secondary market. Perhaps because of these two factors, investment in 
securities has become a popular choice among commercial banks. By purchasing 
securities, the banks can invest their surplus funds in the most secure manner and if 
necessary, they can sell back the securities to supplement the cash resources355.  
However, Islamic banks are prevented from investing in the conventional securities 
since they are based on ribÁ transaction. Investors who purchase conventional 
securities are considered as lending their money to the issuers (corporation or 
government). From the sharÐÝah point of view, as lenders, the securities holders can 
not receive any additional payment from their initial investment as it will be regarded 
as ribÁ. However, such a restriction causes liquidity problem to Islamic banks. This is 
because generally Islamic banks have 50 percent excess of liquid asset as compared to 
their conventional counterparts356. The abundance of liquid assets implies that the 
structure of Islamic banking business is less competitive. It demonstrates the failure of 
                                                 
355 Ali Arsalan Tariq & Humayon Dar, Risk of Sukuk Structure: Implication for Resource Mobilisation, 
Thunderbird International Business Review, vol. 49(2) 203–223, March–April 2007. 
356 Abdul Rais Abdul Majid, Development of Liquidity Management Instrument: Challenges and 
Opportunities, paper presented at the International Conference on Islamic Banking: Risk Management, 
Regulation and Supervision, Jakarta: September 30-October, 3.  
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the banks in maximising returns from their idle funds. According to Islamic banks, 
this problem occurs due to the limited availability of sharÐÝah compatible liquidity 
management instruments. Hence, Islamic bankers in Malaysia have taken the 
initiative to develop ‘Islamic’ securities known as sukÙk which are claimed to be 
interest-free investment tool and more importantly capable to produce competitive 
rate of return for depositors. 
In 2008, BIMB in particular had invested more than RM3 million in the Islamic 
securities. It is not declared however, the total deposit of muÃÁrabah general account 
invested in the securities but over nearly RM200,000 of profit was allocated to the 
account from the investment357. Generally there are three types of Islamic securities 
purchased by BIMB; (1) securities held for trading (2) securities available for sale and 
(3) securities held to maturity. The first and the second types of securities are 
purchased mainly as liquidity management measures. The bank held these securities 
temporarily to gain profit for a certain period. They will be sold in the secondary 
market after sometime. Meanwhile, the third type of securities is purchased with the 
intention of holding them to maturity. Normally, the securities are held between 3 to 5 
years and potentially bringing higher rate of profit as compared to the other two types 
of securities.  
A prompt question arises then, how the Malaysian Islamic bankers structure the 
Islamic securities which comply with the principle of sharÐÝah. Are they really 
distinctive from the conventional securities or just like any other Islamic banking 
products; appear to be ‘Islamic’ in their form and legal technicalities but indifferent in 
its economic substance? To begin our analysis of the said product let us have look at 
the answers given by the Malaysian Inter-bank Money Market (hereafter termed as 
IMM) to such similar question358.  
1. What is the difference between Islamic bonds (securities) and conventional 
bonds? 
Islamic bonds are similar to conventional bonds in Malaysia. It always has a 
fix term maturity, can bear a coupon, and trades on the normal yields price 
relationship. For conventional investors, the structuring of the bonds by the 
                                                 
357 Annual Report of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, 2008. 
358 Bank Negara Malaysia, Islamic Inter-bank Money Market, http://iimm.bnm.gov.my/, Accessed on 5 
May 2009.  
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issuer is immaterial. The difference lies in the way the issuer structure the 
bonds. 
An Islamic bonds is structured such as that the issuance is not an exchange of 
paper for money consideration with the imposition of an interest as per 
conventional. It is based on an exchange of approved asset for some financial 
consideration that allows the investor to earn profit from the transaction. 
Approval of the assets and the contract of exchange would be based on 
sharÐÝah principles, which is necessary to meet the Islamic requirement.  
The various types of Islamic-based transaction structures used for the creation 
of Islamic bonds are sale and purchase of an asset based on deferred payment, 
leasing of specific assets or participation in joint venture businesses.  
2. Is there any difference in term of investors’ protection against default? 
The Islamic bonds share the same criteria as the conventional bond in the 
matter of non-payment/late payment of the profit portion and the principal 
amount.  
Table 20: Comparison between Islamic and conventional bonds 
Items Islamic Conventional 
Issuance 
Process 
Must be approved by 
sharÐÝah scholars and 
Securities Commission 
Must be approved by 
Securities 
Commission only 
Structure 
Types 
leasing, equity and debt 
based contracts 
Debt based contract 
only 
Issuers Government, semi-
government and private 
sectors 
Government, semi-
government and 
private sectors 
Investors Both conventional and 
Islamic Investors 
Only conventional 
Investor 
The IMM openly admits that there is no distinctive difference between the Islamic 
and the conventional securities traded in Malaysia. Both securities have similar 
characteristics; (1) offering investors a stable income and (2) are tradable in the 
secondary market. The only thing which differentiates between the two, as 
claimed by the IMM is the way they are structured or securitised. Conventional 
securities are structured based on a loan (qard) contract. They are merely debt 
certificates in which the holders have no relationship to the issuers’ business or 
property. Upon the maturity date, the issuers are contractually obliged to pay the 
money they owed to the securities holders plus the interest, regardless whether the 
business venture was profitable or otherwise.  
In contrast, the Islamic securities are structured on the basis of an asset-backed 
principle. The principle means Islamic securities are back up by physical assets 
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that have real monetary values. The Islamic securities represent ownership of 
issuer identified assets. In other words, investors who purchase Islamic securities 
are actually buying issuer identified assets in a collective manner359. 
Theoretically, there are three types of contracts applied in the Islamic 
securitisation process. There are leasing (ijÁrah), partnership 
(muÃÁrabah/mushÁrakah) and debt based contracts (murÁbaÎah/BBA). Compared 
to the debt based contract, the leasing and the partnership based contracts are 
viewed as the most accurate contracts in meeting with the spirit of Islamic 
commercial law. Leasing and partnership based contracts are widely used by 
securities issuers in the Middle East.    
However in Malaysia, although there is growing tendency to adopt both types of 
contracts (in order to attract Middle East funds), debt-based contract remains the 
favourite concept among the Malaysian securities issuers. Hence, due to the over-
reliance on the debt-based contract, we will once more see the similarity between 
the Malaysian version of Islamic securities and the conventional bonds. It is 
noteworthy to mention that the securities issuers in Malaysia commonly claim 
that their Islamic securities are based on the contract of murÁbaÎah. But, in my 
opinion a detail analysis of the securitisation process reveals that the claim is 
misleading. The main contracts applied in the process are actually bayÝ al-ÝÐnah 
and bayÝ al-dayn (debt trading contract). Example of the securitisation process is 
shown in the figure 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
359 Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, Sukuk and Their Contemporary Application, 
www.muftitaqiusmani.com/Downloads/Publications/Articles/Sukuk.pdf, Accessed on 25 Febuary 
2010. 
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Figure 7: The modus operandi of Malaysian sukÙk 
 
Suppose a corporation intends to issue Islamic securities to finance it business growth. 
In doing so, firstly, the corporation must identify its properties to be used as securities 
(the underlying assets). These assets could be the corporation’s factory, stocks or 
inventories. Then, the underlying assets will be sold to financier (normally a bank) 
and bought back from the same party at a credit price. This buy-back agreement (bayÝ 
al-ÝÐnah) will ensure that the corporation will receive the money in cash while the 
financier will be paid a prefixed or contracted amount in a future date. The payment 
for the buy-back transaction is delayed through the instalment mechanism known as 
bayÝ bithaman Ájil or deferred payment. The securitisation process occurs when the 
corporation issues its certificates known as securities representing its debt to the 
bank/financier. These securities are sold to investors, based on the application of bayÝ 
al-dayn as part of the corporation’s plan to settle its debt. 
     
Because of these two controversial contracts, the Islamic securities introduced by the 
Malaysian government (Government Investment Issue-GII) in 2001 have failed to 
attract fund from the Middle-Eastern investors360. As generally known, sharÐÝah 
scholars in the region oppose the application of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah as they view it as 
camouflaged ribÁ. In the above case, although the issuer had identified specific assets 
as back up to the securities, they become insignificant due to the buy-back agreement 
                                                 
360 Saiful Azhar Rosly & Mahmud M. Sanusi, The Application of BayÝ al-ÝÐnah and BayÝ al-Dayn in 
Malaysian Islamic Bond: An Islamic Analysis, International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, 
vol.1 no.2.  
 Issuer 
(Corporation) 
Issuer’s Asset 
Financier 
1. Issuer 
identified assets 
2. Sell the 
asset to bank 
in cash 
3. Sell back the 
asset in credit  
4. Creation of debt 
5. Sell the securities based on bayÝ dayn 
to investor  
6. Settle debt through 
instalments (BBA) 
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(bayÝ al-ÝÐnah). At the end of the process, the Islamic securities appear to be similar to 
conventional bonds. Both types of securities denote debt certificates.  
 
In addition to bayÝ al-ÝÐnah, the Malaysian version of Islamic securities are criticised 
because of bayÝ al-dayn issues. When debt certificates are securitised, they become 
objects of sale. A juristic question arises then; can a corporation (as debtor) sells its 
debt to investors from the sharÐÝah perspective? Did classical jurists consider debt as 
legal commodity or mÁl mutaqawwam?  It is found that the issue happened to be 
subject of disagreement among the classical jurists.  SarakshÐ of the ÍanafÐs was the 
opinion that debt was not regarded as mÁl mutaqawwam. The reason was because 
debt is an undeliverable item361. As the deliverability of debt can not be guaranteed, 
its sale to other party will lead to uncertainty (gharÁr). Hence, the sale of debt to a 
third party (like in our case to the investors) is not permissible from the ÍanafÐ point 
of view. The majority of the ÍanbalÐs also agreed to the ruling. They had issued ruling 
on the problem of bayÝ as-ÒikÁk which is in modern time very much similar to the sale 
of cheques. According to them, debt documented in a piece of paper (termed as as-
ÒikÁk) can not be traded because if otherwise will lead to ribÁ al-nasÐÞah362.  
 
Meanwhile, the ShÁfiÝÐ jurists had two different views in this matter. The most 
prevalence view, according to al-NawawÐ was that it was impermissible. Their 
justification is similar to the ÍanafÐs and ÍanabalÐs that debt is not mÁl mutaqawwam.  
However, the other group of ShÁfiÝÐs jurists including al-ShirÁzÐ and al-SubkÐ 
differentiate between secured debts (al-dayn al-mustaqir) and unsecured debt (al-dayn 
ghair al-mustaqir)363. They allowed the sale of the former and prohibited the latter. As 
explained by al-ShirÁzÐ, secured debt refers to debt that is likely to be delivered or 
paid. Since, the payment of secured debt is almost certain, it can be recognised as a 
commodity for sale. The MÁlikÐs, generally allowed the sale of debt. They outlined 
several conditions before a sale of debt could take place such as (1) debtor is aware of 
                                                 
361 SarakshÐ, al-Mabsut, KitÁb al-Sarf, vol.14, pp. 35. 
362 ÝAlÁ’ al-Din AbÙ Íasan SulaymÁn al-MardÁwÐ, al-InÒÁf fÐ MaÝrifat al-RÁjÐh min al-KhilÁf, DÁr IÎya’ 
al-Turath al-ÝArabÐ, vol. 5, pp. 84.  
363 MuÎammad ibn AÎmad al-RamlÐ, NihÁyah al-MuÎtÁj ilÁ SharÎ al-MinhÁj, Cairo, MuÒtafÁ al-BÁbÐ 
al-ÍalabÐ, 1967, vol.3, pp. 92,  
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the sale and assure the settlement of debt (2) debt is sold for cash and (3) the sale is 
not intended to cause harm to any contracting parties364.  
 
The contemporary sharÐÝah scholars of the Middle East largely support the rulings 
against sale of debt. The Islamic Fiqh Academy (Majma‘Fiqh IslÁmÐ) discussed the 
issue in its 16th convention in Mecca on January 2002 and decided on the 
impermissibility of the said contract. On the other hand, the Malaysian sharÐÝah 
scholars approve the application of the sale of debt in the issuance of Islamic 
securities. Their main argument lies in the view that Islamic securities are secured 
debt. Since they are issued by government or corporations with high credit rating, the 
likelihood of default payment of the securities is very minimal. Hence, gharar is not 
an issue in the securities trading as their payments are almost certain365.  
 
The Malaysian sharÐÝah authority went further by allowing discounted debt trading. It 
takes place for example when a corporation issues security at discount, say RM800. 
The security is redeemable at par value of RM1000 after one year. This means an 
investor who purchases the security will obtain RM200 of return when he/she sells 
back the security to the issuer. The Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars recognise the RM200 
as profit deriving from a valid sale of debt contract. According to them, the sale is 
valid since the security is not currency; rather it is a paper worth RM800 now and is 
sold for RM1000 in a year's time366. The element of ribÁ in the transaction does not 
exist because it similar to any other commodity trading; bought as a commodity at 
RM800 and sold it for RM1000 in the future. However, the justification is rejected by 
the Middle East sharÐÝah scholars.  They do not consider the return as profit but a 20 
percent of interest like the practice of conventional bond.  
 
Obviously, the issue of bayÝ al-dayn again demonstrates the divergent interpretations 
of the classical jurists’ ruling between Malaysians and the Middle East sharÐÝah 
scholars. I personally think the argument to accept the legality of securities trading on 
                                                 
364 AbÙ ‘Abd Allah MuÎammad bin MuÎammad bin ‘Abd Rahman al-Ra‘ÐnÐ, MawÁhib al-JalÐl Sharh 
MukhtaÒar al-KhalÐl, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, vol.4, pp. 369 
365 Umer Chapra and Tariqullah Khan, Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks, Islamic Research 
Training Institute, Occasional Paper 3, Jeddah, 2000.  
366 Ishak, Dato  Othman Hj, Developing Dha‘ wa Ta ‘ajjal in Structuring Islamic Instruments, Paper 
presented at the International Capital Market Conference held at Kuala Lumpur on 15-16 July ,1997.  
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the ground that they are secured debt is not convincing. No matter how big a 
corporation or how strong a government is, they are still exposed to default payment 
risk. The current credit crunch in the United States and the European countries; as a 
result of the bankruptcy of their giant financial institutions, is an obvious example to 
this situation. Hence, Islamic securities issuers in the Muslim country are also face 
similar possibility. As security of the debt is questionable, Islamic securities can not 
be regarded as mÁl mutaqawwam and be traded in the secondary market.  
 
In addition to the justification of secured debt, the Malaysian sharÐÝah authority allows 
the practice of bayÝ al-dayn based on the maÒlaÎah (public interest) principle. In this 
case, the maÒlaÎah is referred to the maÒlaÎah of Islamic banks. Islamic bankers 
always argue that they need such securities instruments to manage their liquidity 
problem. As securities are tradable in the secondary market, they provide flexible 
investment instruments for any banking institutions. The banks could invest in the 
securities when they have surplus funds and sell them back to the issuers when in 
need of liquidity (i.e. to supplement their cash resources). Moreover, as argued by the 
Islamic bankers, failure to create such investment instrument may lead to banking 
collapse and by extension the instability of the Islamic banking system367.  
Considering this maÒlaÎah, the Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars had taken raÝfah and 
takhfif (lenient and relaxed) approaches, to permit the bayÝ al-dayn contract in 
creating the Islamic version of securities. Although their decision may be viewed as 
adopting the weaker juristic opinion, it was taken as promoting the Islamic banking 
industry which is more important. However, the decision poses crucial questions. Is 
the maÒlaÎah justifiable in adopting the lenient and relaxed approaches? Can we 
possibly contravene the Islamic commercial law rulings for the sake of the Islamic 
banks’ interest? We shall discuss these questions in the following chapter.  
 
However, at this point, we shall come back to our initial investigation in this section; 
does the investment of muÃÁrabah deposit in the Islamic securities comply with the 
principle of profit and loss sharing? Based on our preceding discussion, it is clear that 
the Malaysian version of Islamic securities is a replication of conventional bonds. 
                                                 
367 Abdul Rais Abdul Majid, Development of Liquidity Management Instrument: Challenges and 
Opportunities, paper presented at the International Conference on Islamic Banking: Risk Management, 
Regulation and Supervision, Jakarta, September 30-October. 
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Despite the Islamic contract modification, the element of guaranteed return still 
prevails in the Islamic securities. Therefore in my opinion, the said product has failed 
to uphold the profit and loss sharing principle as it should be in a muÃÁrabah contract.   
 
Next, we will examine the activities carried out by the Malaysian Islamic Inter-bank 
Money Market in which has generated considerable income for the muÃÁrabah 
general investment account. 
The Malaysian Islamic Inter bank Money Market (IIMM) 
Islamic Inter bank Money Market (IIMM) is one of the renowned innovations of 
the Malaysian government in Islamic banking sector. The IIMM was established 
to facilitate the local Islamic banks in managing their liquidity. As explained 
earlier, for bankers, managing liquidity is essential if banks are to maximise their 
earnings and control their risks. In the conventional banking system, the banks’ 
liquidity is managed through investment in the inter bank money market. The 
investment is made through various short and medium termed liquidity 
instruments. The instruments allow banks to borrow and lend among themselves, 
through which banks with surplus funds can invest with those with liquidity 
deficit. Such an investment mechanism has been beneficial in maintaining the 
balanced liquidity of the commercial banks in which is the key factor in 
promoting the stability of the banking system. However, since the investment 
instruments are operated on the basis of interest (ribÁ), Islamic banks are 
forbidden from utilising them.  
Hence, during the first decade of the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia, the 
local Islamic banks had to rely on the Central Bank (BNM) to resolve their 
liquidity problem. At that time, the only sharÐÝah compatible liquidity instrument 
available was the Government Investment Certificate (GIC). The Islamic banks 
would purchase the GIC when they have surplus capital and sell them back to the 
BNM when they have asset-liability mismatches. However, the option has proven 
insufficient to facilitate the rapid growth of the industry. The need for wider range 
of liquidity investment instruments that comply with the sharÐÝah principles was 
clear. Therefore, in January 1994 the Malaysian government established the 
IIMM to function similar role of the conventional inter bank money market.  
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The IIMM was set up with three main components; (1) Inter-bank deposit product (2) 
Islamic money market instruments and (3) Islamic Cheque Clearing System 
(ICCS)368. For the purpose of this thesis, we will concentrate only on the muÃÁrabah 
inter bank investment (MII) product. The product is relevant to our preceding 
discussion since it has generated considerable amount of profit for the muÃÁrabah 
general investment account. The MII refers to a mechanism whereby a deficit Islamic 
bank can obtain investment from a surplus Islamic banks based on a muÃÁrabah 
contract. The minimum amount of investment in the MII is RM50,000, while the 
period of investment can vary from overnight to 12 months.  The profit sharing ratio 
is negotiable among both contracting banks. The investor bank at the time of 
negotiation would not know what the return would be, as the actual return will be 
crystallised towards the end of the investment period. The principal invested shall be 
repaid at the end of the period, together with a share of the profit arising from the used 
of the fund by the deficit (receiving) bank369. 
 
The rate of return for the MII is based on the rate of gross profit before distribution for 
investment of 1-year of the surplus (investing) bank. To see how an MII transaction 
would be settled at the end of the investment period, let us study an example 
illustrated by Obiyathullah. Suppose, Ambank Islamic has a surplus of RM5 million 
that it wishes to place out for 3 months in the IIMM. Bank Muamalat on the other 
hand is in need of liquidity. Assume it needs the same amount of fund for similar 
period. Both banks then agree to embark on the MII product. Let say they agree on a 
profit sharing ratio of 75:25, which means Ambank Islamic as the investing bank will 
receive 75 percent of Bank Muamalat’s declared gross profit before distribution of 1 
year investment that it has had. Based on this agreement, Ambank Islamic will place a 
RM 5 million deposit with Bank Muamalat. 90 days later, Bank Muamalat will have 
to return the principal of RM 5 million plus a profit amount. Let us say, Bank 
Muamalat declares a gross profit of 6 percent before distribution on its 1 year 
                                                 
368 Obiyathullah Isma Batcha, The Islamic Inter bank Money Market and a Dual Banking System: The 
Malaysia Experience, International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 
vol. 1, no. 3, 2008, pp. 210-226.  
369 Bank Negara Malaysia, Islamic Inter-bank  Money Market, http://iimm.bnm.gov.my/index, 
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investment. Thus, the profit amount to be paid by Bank Muamalat to Ambank Islamic 
would be370: 
X = [RM 5,000,000 (6%) (90)][.75] 
365,000 
= 2,700,000,000 x [.75] 
365,000 
    = 2,025,000,000 
             365000 
    = RM 55,479.45 
 
So, on day 91, Bank Muamalat would have to return an amount of RM 5,055,479.45 
to Ambank Islamic, being the principal plus profit due.  
Having reviewed the method of the MII product, we will then try to answer our basic 
analysis question; does this type of investment suit the principle of profit and loss 
sharing (PLS) as embedded in the classical muÃÁrabah contract. In other words, it is 
appropriate to invest the muÃÁrabah general deposit into the MII product? The 
proponents of Islamic banking surely agree with the investment decision. They would 
argue that the investment fulfil the salient features of a muÃÁrabah contract since 
BIMB as muÃÁrib (agent-manager) had invested the muÃÁrabah deposit into a 
muÃÁrabah investment. In fact, the investment in MII product is closer to meeting the 
PLS principle when compared with the investment in financing activities and Islamic 
securities. 
 
Looking from the legal contract perspective, at least on paper, the investment in the 
MII product can be viewed as in accordance to the principles of Islamic commercial 
law. Both, the general investment account and the MII product are operated on the 
basis of a permissible contract (muÃÁrabah). However, if we analyses deeply this sort 
of investment, it can be argued that it lacks of risk sharing element. The MII product 
is such a passive investment. BIMB who is expected to role as an active muÃÁrib 
(agent-manager) has preferred not to expose itself in the risky business but to place 
the deposit money in a secured place while waiting for return.  In my opinion, this 
action is against the core value of the muÃÁrabah contract which emphasises on the 
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risk taking element. As we have pointed out in chapter three, it is the risk taking 
element embedded in the muÃÁrabah which made the earlier jurists and Muslim 
economists thought that the contract was the ideal basis on which to replace the 
interest-based transactions. As recalled, Islamic commercial law always emphasises 
on the principle of ‘al-ghunm bil ghurm’ which means one is entitled to a gain if one 
agrees to bear responsibility for loss. Therefore, if one analyses the issue of MII 
product within a confined legalistic paradigm, he/she will have no objection to the 
legalisation of the investment. However, if one analyses the issue within the 
framework of maqÁsid (objective) of the contract, the MII product would appear fail 
to uphold the profit and loss sharing principle.  
 
In conclusion, BIMB adopts the concept of unrestricted muÃÁrabah (muÃÁrabah 
muÔlaqah) in investing the muÃÁrabah funds. Based on this concept, the bank is given 
absolute power in managing the depositors’ money. It is totally under the bank’s 
discretion to make the investment decision. On the other hand, the depositors are 
fairly ignored. The only means for the depositors to know where their money had 
been invested is through the bank’s financial report published annually. 
Unfortunately, we notice that the information given is inadequate and difficult for the 
general public to understand. Despite the lack of information circulated to the 
depositors, the current practise appears to be an accepted standard among all Islamic 
banking institutions in the country. Islamic banks argue that the practice confirms 
with the behaviour of most of the depositors. This is because generally depositors of 
Islamic banks are not significantly different from those in conventional banks. They 
are also profit oriented investors. In other words, the main concern of the Islamic 
banks’ depositors is not ‘where’ the investment has been made rather ‘how’ much 
profit could they earn.  
 
Given this type of depositors, therefore the Islamic banks investment portfolio is 
found to be very similar to their conventional counterparts. The Islamic banks have 
invested most of the muÃÁrabah deposit into debt-like products. In our case, for 
instance BIMB has invested the general investment deposit mainly into three types of 
investment; (1) to provide funds for bank’s financing products, (2) to purchase Islamic 
securities and (3) investing in MII product. The problem with these investments is that 
they contradict to the theory of interest-free bank expounded by earlier jurists and 
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Muslims economist. This is because the investments do not uphold the profit and loss 
sharing principle. Even worse, some of the investment products are carried out based 
on dubious Islamic commercial contracts namely the bayÝ al-ÝÐnah and bayÝ al-dayn. 
The application of these contracts only changes the legal technicality of the 
conventional loan but maintains its interest (ribÁ) consequences. Therefore, I 
personally think that the current practice of the Malaysian Islamic banks and their 
utilisation of the muÃÁrabah deposit beset with confusion and ambiguities. The 
Islamic banks did not genuinely comply with the muÃÁrabah principles as described 
by the classical jurists.  
After explaining the ways BIMB utilises the muÃÁrabah deposit, I would now 
explain how the bank distributes the muÃÁrabah investment profit to the 
depositors.  
Profit Distribution of the MuÃÁrabah General Investment Account  
A few studies have been conducted by researchers to examine the practice of 
profit distribution in Islamic banks. Their main purpose in examining the subject 
is to asses the ability of Islamic banks to establish a more equitable wealth 
distribution system. Perhaps, the earliest empirical study in this subject was 
conducted by Norhayati Ahmad and Sudin Haron371. Based on the analysis of 10 
years financial statements of 15 Islamic banks from various Muslim countries 
including Bahrain, Bangladesh, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Sudan, Tunisia, 
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, they found that there was a positive 
relationship between the interest rate of the conventional banks and the profit rate 
of the Islamic banks. Their study shows that the former influences the latter. 
Besides, Obiyathullah also found similar findings372. Studying the Malaysian 
commercial banks (conventional and Islamic) rate of returns for a period of 13 
months, Obiyathullah again proved that the changes in conventional banks’ 
interest rate had influenced the profit rate of the Islamic banks.  
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Our understanding of the muÃÁrabah rules indicates that this phenomenon should 
not be the case of Islamic banks. The rate of profit received by Islamic banks’ 
depositors should be totally independent of the interest rate offered by the 
conventional banks. The logic is simple. As the relationship between depositors 
and Islamic banks is based on muÃÁrabah ventures, any potential profit is greatly 
depends on the business skill of the Islamic bankers as agent-managers (muÃÁrib). 
If bankers in the Islamic banking institutions perform well in the course of their 
business, there is a possibility for depositors to receive higher rates of profit far 
exceeding the conventional interest rate. On other hand, there is possibly a time 
when the muÃÁrabah or banking business suffers losses. During such financial 
difficulty, the depositors will not be expected to receive any return from their 
deposit.   
The pegging of profit rate to the interest rate implies another issue. Since the 
former is always tied up to the latter, depositors are arguably received lower rate 
as compared to the actual profit generated by the Islamic banks373. The matter 
seems more problematic when researchers found that there was significant 
variance between profit paid to the depositors and shareholders even though their 
money was invested in similar muÃÁrabah investments374. As mentioned earlier, 
the muÃÁrabah capital in Islamic bank comprises of depositors’ money and 
shareholders’ fund. Combining together the capital, Islamic bank put them in 
various kinds of investments to generate profit. In principle, profit generated from 
the investments should be distributed between the Islamic bank and the capital 
providers according to a pre-determined ratio. In this case, the capital providers 
are the depositors and the shareholders. Both parties should be treated equally by 
receiving similar rate of profit for their capital contribution. However, analysis of 
the return received by the depositors and the shareholders of the Islamic banks in 
Malaysia reveals a different situation. It was found that the return on equity 
(ROE) given to shareholders was higher than the return on muÃÁrabah deposit 
(ROMD) given to depositors. On average the variance between the ROE and the 
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ROMD was 3.69 percent375. Why is there a distinction between the two rates? By 
right the depositors should get higher profit rate since they collectively contribute 
larger sum of money as compared to the shareholders. 
Considering the above issues, I think it is pertinent to look back how muÃÁrabah profit 
is distributed by the Islamic banks. Based on the earlier findings; (1) the existence of 
conventional banking theories in determining the profit rate of Islamic banks and (2) 
the unequal treatment to the depositors, the current practice of profit distribution in 
Islamic banks appears to be surrounded with fiqh issues. This section intends to 
discuss these issues by highlighting the Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars’ decisions to 
permit the practices of Weighted Method (WM), Profit Equalisation Reserve (PER), 
indicative profit rate and interim profit payment.  
 
However, before we embark further into the discussions, it is necessary to note an 
important point. From the outline proposed by earlier jurists such as MuÎammad 
Baqer as-Sadr, we notice that the profit distribution in an interest-free bank was 
viewed as a complex issue.  The complexity exists as a result of dissimilar business 
environment in which muÃÁrabah contract was implemented. During the classical 
period, muÃÁrabah was applied in circumstance where a capital provider (rabb al-mÁl) 
will provide the entire capital to an empty handed entrepreneur. Using the capital, the 
entrepreneur will buy saleable items and try to sell them for profit. The classical 
jurists defined profit as any surplus from the capital. Hence, in order to identify the 
surplus, the agent-manager (muÃÁrib) was required to return the capital to the investor 
when the business is about to be liquidated. Anything exceeding the capital would be 
considered profit and would be shared between the two parties based on a pre-agreed 
ratio. All these procedure are straightforward because the muÃÁrabah was 
implemented in a simple business setting.  
 
However, the way a muÃÁrabah deposit is managed nowadays is quiet different. The 
differences lie on two main points. Firstly, Islamic banks receive deposit from their 
customers at different times through out a year. The deposit is then placed collectively 
and invested in various types of investments which vary in their completion period. 
For example, money deposited in June and July in a particular year was commingled 
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together and invested to buy short-term Islamic securities, one matures in December 
and the other in April376. Considering this dissimilarity, one will wonder how Islamic 
bank determines profit rate for every single depositor in such a muÃÁrabah 
arrangement. Secondly, normally Islamic banks do not invest the muÃÁrabah deposits 
into small businesses of empty handed entrepreneur. Through the Islamic securities 
and MII investment product, the muÃÁrabah deposits are channelled to large 
corporations that have long eclipsed small proprietary businesses. In other words, the 
muÃÁrabah deposits are used to provide additional funds for ongoing business. So, 
how profit is calculated in this business situation?   
 
Weighted Method (WM) 
 
The most common profit distribution method adopted by Islamic banks in Malaysia is 
known as the Weighted Method (WM). Table 21 below shows an example of its 
application in which an Islamic bank is supposed to distribute RM5800 of profit from 
total deposit of RM900,000 to depositors based on 50:50 profit sharing ratio377. 
Table 21: An Example of Weighted Method in Islamic Bank 
Distributable Profit  Depositors’ Portion Bank’s Portion Deposit 
Placement 
Tenure  
Monthly 
Average 
Balance 
Weighted 
Average 
Ratio 
(WAR) 
Weighted 
Proportion 
of Profit Actual  
Gross 
Profit 
Allocated 
Actual 
Gross 
Rate of 
Return 
PSR Profit 
Amount 
% PSR Profit 
Amount 
% 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) 
1 100,000 0.80 80,000 515.56 6.74 0.50 257.78 3.37 0.50 257.78 3.37 
3 100,000 0.85 85,000 547.78 7.16 0.50 273.89 3.58 0.50 273.89 3.58 
6 100,000 0.90 90,000 580.00 7.58 0.50 290.00 3.79 0.50 290.00 3.79 
9 100,000 0.95 95,000 612.22 8.00 0.50 306.11 4.00 0.50 306.11 4.00 
12 100,000 1.00 100,000 644.44 8.43 0.50 322.22 4.21 0.50 322.22 4.21 
15 100,000 1.05 105,000 676.67 8.85 0.50 338.34 4.42 0.50 338.34 4.42 
18 100,000 1.10 110,000 708.89 9.27 0.50 354.44 4.63 0.50 354.44 4.63 
24 100,000 1.15 115,000 741.11 9.69 0.50 370.55 4.84 0.50 370.55 4.84 
36 100,000 1.20 120,000 773.33 1o.11 0.50 386.66 5.05 0.50 386.66 5.05 
 900,000  900,000 5800.00   2900.00   2900.00  
 
The underlying principle of the WM is the use of Weighted Average Ratio (WAR). 
The WAR ratios are applied based on the assumption that long term deposit 
placement gives more opportunity for the bank to generate bigger profit. For example 
a 12-month deposit could be invested in various profitable investments with higher 
returns as compared to a 1-month deposit. Based on this premise, as indicated in 
column iii, a higher ratio is assigned to longer deposit tenure. The WAR ratios are 
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then multiplied by monthly average balance (column ii) to determine the weighted 
proportion of profit in column iv. In order to calculate the actual gross profit (column 
v) of each deposit, the following formula is applied; balance in column iv divided by 
total in column iv multiplied by RM5800 of profit. This means the gross profit 
allocated for 12-month deposit, for instance is:  
100,000 X 5,800 = RM644.44 
900,000 
 
After that, the gross percentages in column vi are computed by dividing the profit of 
RM644.44 over the original deposit amount in column ii, multiply 100, multiply 365 
days in a year and divide by number of days in the month, say 31. Hence, the rate of 
return of the 12-month deposit is: 
644.44 X 100 X 365 = 8.43 
900,000               31 
 
Having determined both the actual gross profit (column v) and their percentages 
(column vi), the profit portion of depositors and the bank can now be calculated. 
Since in our example, the profit sharing ratio (PSR) is agreed at 50:50, the depositors 
and the bank’s   portion is calculated by dividing the gross profit into two ( RM644.44 
÷ 2 = RM322.22). The same formula is applied in computing the effective rate of 
return for both parties (8.43 ÷ 2 = 4.21).   
Based on the above example, perhaps we now have a clear idea on how the Islamic 
banks could come out with the so-called indicative profit rate. It refers to the rate of 
return described in percentages (as in column ix) which give indication to the 
depositors regarding the return they may receive from their muÃÁrabah general 
deposit investment. For instance, a person who opens a muÃÁrabah general account 
may expect to receive profit rate of 3.79% for his 12-month deposit. The Islamic 
banks claim that the indicative profit rate is just a reference of the expected return that 
would be received by the depositors. The profit rate is quoted based on the regular 
rates paid to the depositors. The actual profit rate paid to the depositors will be the 
real profit earned from the banks’ business operations. This practice is approved by 
the Malaysian National SharÐ‘ah Advisory Committee (NSAC) in their 9th meeting on 
25 February 1998378. In addition to the indicate profit rate, the Islamic banks in 
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Malaysia apply monthly interim profit payment. This means preliminary profit is paid 
to the account holder each month before the actual term of the contract is due. This 
practice is permitted by the SharÐÝah Committee of the Islamic banks, for example by 
the SharÐÝah Committee of BIMB during their 14th meeting on 7th Jun 1985379. 
Beginning in 2004, the Islamic banks in the country introduced another new 
mechanism in distributing profit for the muÃÁrabah investment. The new mechanism 
is known as Profit Equalisation Reserve (PER).  The PER is introduced to stabilise the 
rate of return paid to the depositors380. In the real banking business, the monthly rate 
of return recorded by Islamic banks through out a year is inconsistent. This is because 
an Islamic bank tends to generate a huge profit at the end of its financial year due to 
the flux of bad debt income, provisioning and total deposit. The pressure of the 
closure of bank’ financial account makes bankers work harder during that time to 
generate high profit. Meanwhile, during the middle of the year such a pressure eases 
during which a fairly low profit is produced from the bank’s businesses381. Hence, in 
order to mitigate the fluctuation of the rate of return, the Central Bank of Malaysia has 
demanded that all the Islamic banks in the country to implement the PER mechanism. 
The PER allows the Islamic banks to save up to 15 percent of the total gross income 
in a separate provision. This provision/reserve will be used whenever Islamic banks 
record a low profit. As such PER is viewed as a reserve that is built up in good times 
to cater for need in bad times382. As argued by the Islamic banks, the PER is essential 
to ensure a stable and competitive rate of return for the depositors.  
Analysis of the Current Practice of Profit Distribution in Malaysian Islamic Banks 
 
It is clear that the present practice of profit distribution method in the Islamic banks is 
different from the rules explained by the classical jurists. The application of the WM 
method emphasises the investment period rather than the nature/activity of the 
investment. The amount of profit which depositors may receive is determined by their 
deposit placement tenure. The longer the investment period the higher rate of return 
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will be offered. This explains why the rate of return of the muÃÁrabah general 
investment of the same investment tenure383 is similar despite the fact that the funds 
were invested in various types of investments. In principle, the rate of return should 
vary as different investments carry dissimilar degree of business risks. Nonetheless, 
for the Islamic bank, the issue of whether one investment is more profitable from 
another is insignificant. This is because the bank will pool together all the profit made 
during each year and distribute them based on the weighted average method. As far as 
the Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars are concerned, the method does not contravene the 
muÃÁrabah rules since all depositors had given consent to share the profit on a 
weighted basis. Their approach in solving this problem is similar to the solution 
suggested by MuÎammad Baqer al-Sadr384.  
 
However, although significant effort have been made to design the WM method in 
which an attempt is made to distribute profit in the most equitable manner (given the 
sophisticated banking business circumstances), in my opinion there still a number of 
fiqh issues need to be addressed. As duration becomes the crucial factor in 
determining depositors’ share of profit, muÃÁrabah investment appears to be 
indifferent from the conventional deposit investment. In principle, the muÃÁrabah 
profit should be measured by the nature/activity of the investment rather than its 
duration. The assumption that long term investment always generates more profit is 
debatable. If investment is made in a correct business manner, it may generate more 
profit in a short period. The problem with the current system is that it may not 
distribute the actual profit to the depositors. This is because by mingling together all 
the profit and distributing it based on the investment duration; the bank may deny 
some depositors the chance to earn a bigger share of profit which was made with their 
money.  
 
In this regard, I am inclined to agree with the model of an interest-free bank proposed 
by the earlier scholars. Instead of receiving deposits through out a year, Siddiqi for 
instance had proposed that the Islamic banks take the deposit in a specific time i.e. 
quarterly. The suggestion was made to distinguish one investment from another, so 
any potential profit could be distribute in a more accurate manner. However, the 
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model does not attract the attention of Islamic bankers presumably because it restricts 
the bank’s opportunity in maximising its capital/fund. Open deposit taking is 
preferred and viewed as more practical because it would bring more funds to the 
Islamic bank as opposed to having a specific deposit time limit.   
 
In addition to that, the argument regarding “depositors’ consent” needs further 
clarification. An important question needs to be asked before one wishes to accept the 
argument. Do depositors have any negotiating power in determining the profit 
distribution matters within the Islamic banks? In other words, do they have choice not 
to give their consent?  Based on the implementation of standard form contract, the 
present practice seems to be a ‘take it or leave it’ affair. The negotiating process as 
advocated by the classical jurists does not take place between the depositors and the 
Islamic banks.  All decisions regarding the profit sharing ratio and the rate of return 
are decided by the Islamic banks. Depositors, on the other hand look like a neglected 
party. Clearly, the present practice contradicts the situation in which muÃÁrabah was 
originally implemented. During the classical period, the capital provider (rabb al-mÁl) 
seemed to have more negotiating power. This fact was expressed by the jurists when 
illustrating the commencement of a muÃÁrabah contract. A capital provider frequently 
quoted as saying to an agent-manager (muÃÁrib) ‘I entrust you 1000 dinar as a 
muÃÁrabah contract with 50:50 profit ratio’. The sentence indicates that the profit 
ratio was suggested first by the capital provider. As an empty handed entrepreneur, 
the muÃÁrib may accept the offer or negotiate the profit ratio. However, in the current 
banking practices, the situation has turned the other way around. The Islamic banks 
will offer the probable rate of return, and it is down to depositors to make investment 
decision.  
 
Although the implementation of the indicative rate of return is viewed as sharÐÝah 
compliant385, I personally think it could mislead the true application of a muÃÁrabah 
contract. This is obvious when the Islamic banks regularly use the indicative rates in 
their advertising to attract new depositors. The matter seems no better because Islamic 
bankers while promoting the muÃÁrabah investment normally do not clearly explained 
the issue of ‘indication’ unless critically asked by a potential depositor. Hence, from 
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my personal observation, the majority of the depositors commonly expect to receive 
the indicative rates of return from the Islamic banks. The indicative rates have led the 
general public to think that Islamic banks offer a guaranteed return from their 
investment. Such a perception clearly contradicts the underlying concept of a 
muÃÁrabah contract in particular and the objective of the establishment of Islamic 
banking institutions in general.     
The practices of interim profit payment and the PER are undoubtedly controversial. 
They appear to contravene the principles of the muÃÁrabah contract as elaborated by 
the classical jurists. As discussed earlier, the classical jurists unanimously disallowed 
neither the capital provider nor the agent-manager to take an accrued profit before 
muÃÁrabah business is to be liquidated. They stressed that the profit distribution 
procedure is only completed when the capital is handed over to the rabb al-mÁl. The 
justification of this rule is to avoid any ambiguity in the profit determination. Even if 
one of the contracting parties receives the profit while the business is still in progress, 
he/she is obliged to return the profit in case the business suffers losses. Perhaps, the 
main reason why the Malaysian Islamic banks practice interim profit payment is to 
match with the conventional banks practices.  
This replication policy is clearly seen when they introduce the PER. The practice of 
having a certain amount of profit as a reserve for bad business periods is totally alien 
to the classical muÃÁrabah concept. To the best of my knowledge, none of the 
classical jurists had allowed such practice. As argued by the Islamic banks, the PER is 
introduced to enable them to offer a stable and competitive rate of return to the 
depositors. Although the purpose of PER is undeniably important, its implementation 
however causes more confusion. The PER may provide steady return to depositors but 
it also brings a fiqh problem. Let us consider an illustrative case as an example. 
Suppose a depositor put his money in a muÃÁrabah general investment account for 3-
months, commencing from January an ending in March. During these months, the 
actual profit generated by the Islamic banks is substantially high. However due to the 
PER practice, some of the profit is taken as a reserve for the bad business period. 
What is the bank’s justification in taking this action? The Islamic banks may argue 
that they obtain the depositor’s permission based on the standard form signed at the 
beginning of the contract. But, as I highlighted earlier the level of transparency 
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pertaining to this matter is very low. The Islamic banks do not explain the PER 
mechanism clearly to the depositors. The negotiating element as emphasised by the 
classical jurists apparently does not take place between both parties. 
To conclude, the present practice of profit distribution in Malaysian Islamic banks is 
not without fiqh issues. Given the sophistication of the modern banking business, 
Islamic bankers and local sharÐÝah advisors face challenges in applying the classical 
theory of muÃÁrabah contract. Some of their decisions differ from the established 
rules founded by the classical jurists. The practice of WM method is arguably 
indentical to the conventional method which emphasises the duration of the 
investment rather than the investment activity itself. The indicative profit rate has led 
to the public assumption that the Islamic banks also offer a fixed return on investment. 
Meanwhile, the interim profit payment clearly contravenes the classical rules which 
disallowed profit distribution before liquidation of muÃÁrabah business. On the other 
hand, the PER policy bring injustice to some depositors. In addition to that, the profit 
distribution matters has become exclusively in the hands of the Islamic banks. They 
make decisions and determine the profit ratio and the amount of profit to be 
distributed. The level of transparency in providing adequate information to depositors 
regarding the profit earned is far from satisfactory.  
Conclusion 
MuÃÁrabah contract is adopted primarily by BIMB to create deposits and wealth 
management products. For strategic marketing purpose, the products are named with 
different Arabic terminologies such as sakÐnah, al-awfÁr, al-falaÎ, al-mubÐn etc. 
However in terms of their roles, all products function as the main sources of fund in 
support of bank's operations. Theoretically, the muÃÁrabah funds should be invested 
in profit and loss sharing business. BIMB supposes to grant the funds to trustworthy 
entreprenuers to run various profitable projects. Profit generated from the business 
will be shared between the three parties (depositors, bank and entreprenuers) 
according to pre-determined ratio. Due to some practical concerns however, BIMB 
prefer to invest the funds in virtually risk-free investment instruments. Most of the 
funds are used to advance financing for the bank's clients; individual as well as 
corporate. These include financing in purchasing house, vehicle and numerous 
businesses' needs i.e. letter of credit and working capital financing. A large part of the 
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muÃÁrabah funds are also invested in securities and inter-bank money market 
products. From the bank's sharÐÝah committee perspective, all transactions conducted 
by BIMB are legitimate. They view that the way muÃÁrabah funds is been utilised is 
undisputedly in accordance to the principles of sharÐÝah.      
However, my analysis of the current practices suggests different conclusion. The 
philosophy of muÃÁrabah contract has not been comprehended fully by the Islamic 
bankers. MuÃÁrabah funds are utilised in investment instruments which are not 
supporting the notion of profit and loss sharing. Moreover, I find out that some of the 
ijtihÁds made by BIMB sharÐÝah committee contradict the prevalence principles of 
muÃÁrabah contract expounded by the classical jurists. The local sharÐÝah scholars in 
general can not be considered to be applying either the ÍanafÐs or the Shafi‘Ðs 
muÃÁrabah ethical framework as discussed in chapter 2. As we may recall, the 
ÍanafÐs despite being lenient in empowering the agent manager did not violate the 
principle of profit and loss sharing embedded in the contract. However, the sharÐÝah 
committee's approval concerning al-AwfÁr accounts, indicative profit rate and profit 
equalisation reserve (PER) suggest that they had gone beyond the classical boundaries 
in accommodating bankers' needs.  They are driven by market demands in modifying 
muÃÁrabah rules to suit modern banking practices. The market driven approach is 
pursued by emphasising the change of terminologies rather than the ethical framework 
underlying behind the muÃÁrabah contract. A new banking product is recognised as 
sharÐÝah compliant as long as it fulfils the legal technicalities though indistinct and 
identical to the interest-based banking products in its substance.                      
In relation to this, I personally think that the issue of the independency of sharÐÝah 
committees in the Islamic banks is still relevant and valid despite been denied by a 
few local sharÐÝah scholars. I argue that the enhancement of the regulatory framework 
of sharÐÝah governance undertaken recently by the Central Bank of Malaysia is 
inadequate to assure a greater confidence regarding the lawfulness of Islamic banking 
products offered in the country. In my opinion, the main problem does not lie on the 
structure of sharÐÝah governance system but rather on the legal orientation advocate by 
the local sharÐÝah scholars appointed. The controversy of ijtihÁd in Malaysian Islamic 
banking is not a result of disorganised chain of authority within the sharÐÝah advisory 
committees but it lies in the market driven approach adopted by their members.  
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The local sharÐÝah scholars appear to be inconsistent when assessing the compliance of 
Islamic banking products. They are very liberal in the sense that they would remove 
many restrictions in Islamic commercial contracts on the basis of maÒlaÎah (public 
interest). Sometimes, they also can be too rigid by advocating the implementation of 
controversial medieval contracts ignoring their consequences to the Muslims 
economic affairs at large. Such inconsistency in the methodology is been criticised 
because it leads to the problem of lack of authenticity in the current practice of 
Islamic banking. It is strongly viewed that the approach is taken just to accommodate 
the Islamic bankers. Since most of Islamic banking products have similar economics 
effects as the conventional banks, the objective of abolishing ribÁ is doubtful and 
remains the main concern of the sharÐÝah scholars. In view of this issue, I personally 
think that there is need to develop a comprehensive guideline to assist the scholars in 
achieving more precise decisions which in line with the objectives of the sharÐÝah.   
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   CHAPTER FIVE: MAÑLAÍAH-MAFSADAH CALCULUS IN 
ASSESSING THE COMPLIANCE OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
PRODUCTS 
 
Introduction 
Figure 8: Inter-relationships between Fiqh Doctrine, ShÁrÐÝah Advisors and Islamic 
Banking Sector 
 
The establishment of Islamic banks provides a platform for Muslims to implement 
some aspects of the sharÐÝah in their daily life. By having these institutions, Muslims 
have the opportunity to demonstrate the actual workings of an equitable financial 
system based on the application of Islamic legal traditions which have long been 
advocated by Muslims economists. In realising the project of Islamic banking, the 
vital role played by the sharÐÝah advisors is of significance. As illustarted in figure 8 
above, they function as mediators between the classical fiqh doctrine and the real 
operation of the Islamic banking sector. The Islamic bankers rely on them to 
authenticate the conformity of proposed products to the principle of sharÐÝah and 
subsequently make the products saleable in the market.  
 
However, our previous analyses on the muÃÁrabah products indicate the incoherent 
orientation adopted by sharÐÝah advisors of Malaysian Islamic banks. It is found that 
the local sharÐÝah scholars are highly driven by the banking market in modifying the 
classical rulings. The ethical framework of the muÃÁrabah contract and the objective 
of the sharÐÝah are often neglected in the need to satisfy the demand of sophisticated 
financial requirements. They inconsistently apply the principle of sharÐÝah when 
assessing the compliance of Islamic banking products. 
 
The scholars can be very rigid by concentrating solely on the technical aspect of the 
medieval commercial contract. A proposed product is legally recognised when it 
Classical Fiqh 
 
SharÐÝah Advisors Banking Sector 
 243 
merely satisfies the salient features (arkÁn) and conditions (shurÙÔ) of a particular 
contract. The creation of al-AwfÁr accounts provides a good illustration of this matter. 
If one analyses the accounts from a purely technical contractual perspective, no fiqh 
issues arise. The accounts do not contravene any core rules of a muÃÁrabah contract. 
As the quarterly cash draw prizes are claimed to be derived from the bank's own 
resources (not from the profit of the deposited money), the modus operandi of the 
account is viewed as free from any gambling element. However, a closer look at the 
profit ratio offered by the bank to depositors reveals the trick. The unreasonable profit 
ratio (2 for depositors against 98 enjoyed by the bank) clearly suggests that the bank's 
claim is deceptive. Nonetheless, the trick is beyond the observation of the sharÐÝah 
scholars as their emphasis is on the technicality of the contract not the overall picture 
of the product.  
 
However, sometimes the local sharÐÝah scholars can be too liberal in the sense they 
would remove the classical boundaries of medieval contracts simply by using the 
maÒlaÎah excuse. They are much more liberal than even the ÍanafÐs in pleasing the 
Islamic bankers. Their acceptance on Profit Equalisation Reserve (PER) method is a 
case in point. PER empowers Islamic banks to take certain amount of muÃÁrabah 
profit as reserve for bad business time. This implies that depositors do not necessarily 
obtain the full amount of profit generated from their funds. Such a practice is totally 
alien to the muÃÁrabah doctrines propounded by the classical jurists. It contradicts the 
prevalent ruling which emphasises the distribution of exact amount of profit earned 
from a muÃÁrabah venture. However, the Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars ignore the 
classical ruling as they give priority to the present maÒlaÎah of Islamic bankers. As 
argued by the bankers, the PER method is crucial to maintain the competitiveness of 
Islamic banks in facing stiff competition from conventional banks.   
 
In view of both flawed orientations, I strongly feel that there is genuine need to 
develop comprehensive parameters (ÃawÁbiÔ) in assisting the sharÐÝah scholars 
reaching more appropriate ijtiÎad in the banking and finance areas. I personally think 
that the rigid approach is unsuitable because its outcomes usually overlook the 
objectives (maqÁÒid) of sharÐÝah. As evident in the case of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah, the contract 
fails to abolish the element of ribÁ in its transaction. Meanwhile, the application of 
maÒlaÎah theory can not be completely ignored. The problem of the current 
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application of maÒlaÎah theory lies in the absence of a well-defined doctrine. The 
sharÐÝah advisors seem to manipulate the concept of maÒlaÎah in the interest of 
Islamic banks.  
 
The rest of this chapter explains briefly why the maÒlaÎah approach is worth 
considering in overcoming the "authenticity" problem of the Islamic banking. Firstly, 
I begin with a discussion regarding what is happening within the Islamic banking 
sector after the sign of a recovery in the recent financial crisis. The discussion 
describes the orientations of Islamic bankers and sharÐÝah advisors who maintain their 
duplication and market-driven approaches despite the obvious failure of giant Western 
financial institutions. As the current approaches prolong the authenticity issue, I 
incline to support Siddiqi's idea concerning the adaptation of maÒlaÎah-mafsadah 
calculus in assessing the sharÐÝah compliance of Islamic banking products. Hence, I 
will present historical sketches of the maÒlaÎah theory in Islamic law. It should be 
noted however, the section is only a preliminary discussion concerning the juristic 
debate in recognising maÒlaÎah as an independent source of Islamic law. It shows the 
tendency of contemporary jurists to apply the theory based on the MÁlikÐ and ÍanbalÐ 
schools' arguments. In addition to that, the section also highlights ShÁfiÝÐ's concern 
over the possibility of manipulating the maÒlaÎah principle for the sake of human 
interest. Lastly, I explain my position in rejecting the application of bayÞ al-tawarruq. 
The analysis regarding bayÞ al-tawarruq is relevant in our discussion because it is a 
good example of how the maÒlaÎah theory can be applied as a tool to attain more 
appropriate ijtiÎad in the banking and finance matters.          
 
Have Islamic Banks Learnt from the Recent Financial Crisis? 
 
The market-driven orientation adopted by the sharÐÝah advisors is likely to continue 
despite the recent global financial crisis. The severity of the crisis clearly shows the 
catastrophe of excessive debt financing. As the practice of charging interest is viewed 
as the crux of the problem, the crisis proves that the capitalist financial system is a 
fallacy. Although factors contributing to the crisis are still debated, one can not deny 
the major role played by credit-default swap (CDS). CDS is a credit derivative 
instrument purchased by investors to insure against default on corporate bonds. The 
instrument guarantees the repayment of investment in bond plus its bearing interest to 
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its holders when the issuer company goes bankrupt. However, the CDS is different 
from a typical insurance instrument in the sense that it allows investors who do not 
own a corporate bond to purchase it. This means the insurance company or banks 
which sells the CDS is not necessarily insuring against real assets. If a person thinks 
that a particular issuer bond company is going to default, he can buy CDS to seize 
profits.  
 
As a result of this practice, CDS has turned into a pure speculation instrument 
departing from its primary hedging purpose386. The ability to sell risk of default to a 
third party makes the banking institutions reckless. They tend to offer more CDS 
instruments to less creditworthy clients and fail to monitor their behaviour in ensuring 
payment387. As time passes, the volume of CDS in the financial system increases in 
which create interdependency situation between all major insurance companies and 
banks. They are all caught in CDS's web. Everyone is counting on others to meet 
payment obligations. With so much debt floating in the market, the financial system 
becomes so vulnerable. It lastly explodes and affects the entire financial institutions.  
 
Islamic banking industry is considered lucky because at the time the crisis occurs, the 
so-called Islamic credit-default swap instruments were yet been introduced in the 
market. The validity and permissibility of the derivatives instruments were under 
discussion among sharÐÝah scholars when the crisis struck the conventional financial 
institutions. This explains why the impact of the crisis is considered manageable 
within the Islamic banking industry. However, it is noteworthy that Islamic bankers 
have long argued that they need such hedge funds instruments in order to remain 
competitive. Their demand was supported by the fact that in 2009, there were 10 
defaults reported in Islamic bonds (sukÙk). This call for the creation of a similar 
mechanism of credit-default swaps to protect investors against sukÙk risk. The 
magazine of al-IqtiÒÁdiyah wa al-maÒrifiah published an interesting article in this 
matter. The transalation of the article was produced by Mahmoud el-Gamal as 
follows: 
                                                 
386 Edib Smolo, Financial Derivatives from Islamic Perspective, Islamic Finance Bulletin, Kuala 
Lumpur: IBFIM, Issue 24, June 2009, pp. 18.  
387 MuÎammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Dealing with the Financial Crisis: an Islamic Approach, April 
2009.http://siddiqi.com/mns/. Accessed on 28 Febuary 2010.  
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A group of informed experts on the Islamic finance industry called 
for a "partnership" between Islamic takÁful (insurance) industry and 
sukÙk, toward the end of assisting the latter in providing 
"protection" for investors against losing their funds that they 
invested in these Islamic instruments. Those calls became louder 
after the recent registration of the Pakistani cement company Maple 
Leaf as the last company with defaults on its Rupis 8 billion Islamic 
bonds. The experts suggested during their interview with "al-
iqtiÒÁdiyah" that TakÁful (Islamic insurance) companies should find 
a new insurance instrument for sukÙk, which can protect the sukÙk 
holders from the risk of default, by providing "partial" 
compensation in the case of default388. 
 
The new development in the industry indicates that the Islamic banking institutions 
are aiming to offer derivatives instruments. As we may anticipate, Malaysia has 
become the leader in such 'innovative' financial engineering. Dr. Mohd. Daud Bakar, 
the chairman of National SharÐ‘ah Advisory Council (NSAC) is one the proponents of 
the instruments389. Speaking at the 5th International Islamic Finance Forum Asia 2009 
in Kuala Lumpur, he asserted that: 
"We can not ban Islamic derivatives. They are required. Some 
speakers tend to give extreme example of CDS as one of the reasons 
that brought down some large financial institutions in the US (in 
arguing against allowing derivatives instruments in Islamic finance). 
But CDS is a remote example. It is not reflective of derivatives on 
the whole390". 
 
He suggested the application of bayÝ al-ÝurbÙn (deposit payment), bayÝ al-salÁm 
(forward sale), al-waÝd (unilateral binding promise) and tawarrÙq contracts as the 
underlying principles of the Islamic derivatives mechanism. The main argument in 
support of such an instrument is to protect investors' interest. It is claimed that the 
Islamic legal traditions never prohibit the act of managing risk in investment. In fact, 
it is essentially acceptable from the Islamic legal perspective to prevent investors from 
suffering huge losses.  
 
                                                 
388 MaÎmod el-Gamal, Have we learned nothing? Here come the 'Islamic Credit Default Swaps', 3rd 
January 2010. http://elgamal.blogspot.com/, Accessed on 29 Febuary 2010. 
389 Mohd. Daud Bakar, Islamic Hedging Mechanism: The Emergence Trend, 
www.bnm.gov.my/microsites/giff2007/pdf/iif/Session4_c3.pdf-,Accessed on 1st Febuary 2010.  
390 Habhajan Singh, Hedging permissible in Islamic Finance, Malaysian Reserve, Kuala Lumpur, 6th 
July 2009.  
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Although the claim that the Islamic legal traditions never prohibit the risk 
management is right, many wonder how the Islamic derivatives instruments would 
depart from speculative gain. This is because, without speculators the derivatives 
market is impaired391. According to the proponents of the instruments, the speculation 
issue would be simply resolved by applying the said Islamic medieval commercial 
contracts. However, as duplication and market-driven orientations become the basis of 
the instruments, I strongly suspect that they would not carry any significant economic 
substance. The instruments may look 'Islamic' as they apply various classical 
commercial contracts but are indifferent in their underlying mechanism compared to 
the conventional derivatives products. Thus in the future, it would not be surprising if 
the Islamic banking institutions encounter similar crisis of the current conventional 
financial institutions. 
 
To overcome the authenticity issue, I support Siddiqi's recomendation that the sharÐÝah 
scholars should adopt a maÒlaÎah-mafsadah calculus. It advocates the use of well-
defined maÒlaÎah principle as the basis in determining the sharÐÝah compliance of 
Islamic banking products. It should be noted however, the description of well-defined 
maÒlaÎah principle is beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, I shall elaborate 
briefly the classical discussion concerning the principle and then discuss the issue of 
bayÝ al-tawarrÙq as its practical example. 
 
Historical Sketch on MaÒlaÎah Theory in Islamic Law 
 
Literally, the word maÒlaÎah is derived from the verb ÒaluÎa, which denotes a good, 
right, just or honest person or thing. Legally, ShÁÔibÐ defined it as: 
 
 'all concerns that promote the subsistence of human life, the completion 
of man's livelihood and the acquisition of all his physical and intellectual 
qualities which are required for him'392.  
 
Its antonym, mafsadah indicates anything that is harmful and destructive. The use of 
maÒlaÎah as an independent legal source has been advocated by many contemporary 
jurists and reformists such as MuÎammad ÝAbduh (d.1905), Rashid RiÃÁ (d.1935), Ibn 
                                                 
391 Saadiah Mohamad, Islamic Hedge Funds: Hedging or Speculating? Islamic Finance Bulletin, Kuala 
Lumpur: AIBIM, issue 23, March 2009, pp.8.  
392 AbÙ IsÎÁq al-ShÁÔibÐ, Al-MuwÁfaqÁt FÐ UÒÙl al-ÀÎkÁm, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, 1990, vol.2, pp.15. 
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ÝAshur (d.1973) and MuÎammad SaÝÐd RamaÃÁn al-BÙÔÐ. They support the principle 
based on the notion that Islamic law was revealed to serve, inter alia, human 
welfare393. Hence, all matters which preserve the well being of the society are in line 
with the objectives of the sharÐÝah and therefore should be pursued and legally 
recognised.    
 
However, there was disagreement among the classical jurists in adapting the maÒlaÎah 
principle as the determining factor in Islamic law. Due to the ambiguity in defining its 
limit (how far human welfare justification could be used to determine law), the 
classical jurists had differed in recognising the validity of maÒlaÎah as a source of 
law. Some scholars claim that ShÁfiÝÐ did not employ the maÒlaÎah as independent 
legal evidence (dalÐl) because he strictly confined the use of personal opinion (raÞy) to 
qiyÁs. To ShÁfi‘Ð, applying the concept of maÒlaÎah would exceed the limitations of 
permitted use of human legal reasoning in deducing a new hukm394. Perhaps, ShÁfiÝÐ 
attempted to portray his legal methodology (the Qur'Án, sunnah, qiyÁs and ijmÁÝ) 
explained in al-RisÁlah as the perfect sources of law which are able to answer all 
questions in Muslim life. ShÁfiÝÐ believed that these sources of law are sufficient to 
cover the maÒlaÎah of human being. He felt the shÁrÐÝah takes full cognisance of all 
maÒlaÎah and there is no maÒlaÎah outside its framework.  
 
In the sixth century Hijri, al-GhÁzalÐ refined the ShÁfiÝÐs concept of maÒlaÎah by 
defining its parameters. Al-GhÁzalÐ acknowledged the validity of maÒlaÎah as 
independent legal evidence with the condition that it fulfilled three elements; ÃarÙrah 
(necessity), qaÔÝiyyah (absolute certainty) and kuliyyah (universality). In elucidating 
the parameters, al-GhazÁlÐ illustrated a classical example from the law of war whereby 
Muslim soldiers encounter predicament whether to attack unbelievers' army who were 
shielding themselves with a group of Muslim captives or to refrain from attacking. 
The first course of action would kill the innocent Muslims whereas the second would 
give opportunity to the unbelievers to conquer more Muslim territory. In such a 
situation, al-GhazÁli thought that the Muslim soldiers should attack the unbelievers in 
view that the action would preserve a more important maÒlaÎah. In addition, the attack 
                                                 
393Nazly Hanum Lubis, al-TÙfÐ's Concept of MaÒlaÎah: A Study of Islamic Legal Theory, Master 
Dissertation, University of McGill, 1995, pp.10.     
394 Ibid, pp.32. 
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is considered ÃarÙrÐ because it protects Muslim life, qaÔÝÐ as it the only method of 
saving Muslims and kullÐ because it takes consideration of the whole community395.           
 
In the other schools of Islamic law, the principle of maÒlaÎah was generally received a 
wider acceptance. Although, there is no textual evidence indicating AbÙ ÍanÐfah's 
consent to maÒlaÎah being one of the sources of law, his whole legal theory supports 
the pursuit of maÒlaÎah in solving new legal problem396. Being the leading rationalists 
(aÒÎÁb al-raÞy) of his time, AbÙ ÍanÐfah appeared to be inevitably employing the 
maÒlaÎah principle in developing his fiqh doctrine. The adaptation of Ýurf (custom) 
and istiÎsÁn (legal preference) strongly suggests the inclusion of maÒlaÎah in the 
ÍanafÐ legal paradigm397.  
 
In contrast, the adaptation of the maÒlaÎah principle in MÁlik's doctrine is much more 
explicit. In fact, some scholars had accused him of over reliance on the principle 
which to a certain extent had prioritised maÒlaÎah over the textual sources. Cases in 
point are MÁlik’s approval of killing a zindÐq who had declared the commitment to 
convert to Islam and his fatwÁ permitting a woman to abstain from breast-feeding her 
baby without any reasonable cause. The first case appears to contradict the saying of 
the Prophet; ‘I have been ordered to fight against people, until they testify that there is 
no God but AllÁh, and believe in me (that) I am the Messenger and in all that I have 
brought. And when they do it, their blood and riches are guaranteed protection on my 
behalf except where it is justified by law, and their affairs rest with Allah398. 
Meanwhile, the second case opposes the verse 2:233; 'And the mothers should breast-
feed their babies for a period of two years'.   
 
Supporting MÁlik’s approach to the maÒlaÎah, al-BÙÔÐ contends that none of the two 
cases was ruled as abusing the principle. Al-BÙÔÐ argues that the zindÐq group was 
excluded from the meaning of unbelievers stipulated in the ÎadÐth. He was of the 
opinion that the ÎadÐth indicates unbelievers who lived during the Prophet's time 
                                                 
395 MuÎammad bin MuÎammad al-GhazÁli, al-MustaÒfÁ, Beirut: Dr al-KutÙb al-ÝIlmiyyah, 1993, 
pp.177. 
396 MuÎammad Sa‘Ðd RamaÃÁn al-BÙÔÐ, ÂawÁbiÔ al-MaÒlaÎah FÐ al-SharÐ‘ah al-Islamiyyah, Damascus: 
DÁr al-Fikr, 2005, pp. 391.   
397 Wahbah ZuhailÐ, UÒÙl Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ, Damascus: DÁr al-Fikr, 2005, vol. 2, pp.775.  
398 SaÎÐh al-MuslÐm, 1:31 [see also 1:130, 1:32, 1:33] 
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which include al-mushrikÙn, the people of Holy books; Jews and Christians and al-
munÁfiqÙn (hypocrites). Although these unbelievers differed in their manifestation of 
God, they still believe in religion.  However, the zindÐq were distinct from these 
groups of unbelievers since they did not have faith in religion at all. Therefore, the 
rule to allow killing the zindÐq did not contravene with the ÎadÐth but was made on the 
basis of the principle of maÒaliÎ al-mursalah (maÒlaÎah which has no basis either in 
the Qur'Án or the sunnah)399. On the other hand, MÁlik's fatwÁ regarding the breast-
feeding is based on his understanding that the verse does not imply any obligation on 
behalf of a mother. Hence, there is no issue which arises over whether the fatwÁ 
contradicts the verse or otherwise. In the classical Muslim society, the perception that 
a mother is obliged to breast-feed her baby is merely based on Ýurf (custom) and is not 
derived from textual evidence400. 
 
The above discussion clearly illustrates MÁlik's adaptation of the maÒlaÎah principle 
in developing his fiqh doctrine. Subsequently, the theory of maÒlaÎah was enhanced 
further by the later MÁlikÐs notably ShÁÔibÐ (d.790/1388) in his masterpiece al-
MuwÁfaqÁt. ShÁÔibÐ emphasised that the concept of maÒlaÎah applied by the MÁliki 
jurists is not just a matter of consideration of human interest in determining the law. 
Rather it is a practice of ijtiÎad in understanding the Lawgiver's intentions 
(maqÁÒid)401. In relation to this, it is noteworthy that the maÒlaÎah which is referred to 
by the MÁlikÐs is the maÒlaÎah which has a basis in the textual sources. In other 
words, in considering a human interest as maÒlaÎah the MÁlikÐs did not rely solely on 
opinion (al-‘aql) but tied it to the Qur'Án and sunnah. Based on this fact, the 
contemporary Muslim jurists depict the maÒlaÎah as an undisputed source of law 
acknowledged by all classical jurists (including ShÁfiÝÐ)402.          
 
However, al-TÙfÐ (d.716/1316) of the ÍanbalÐs emerged with a more liberal concept. 
The controversy of al-TÙfÐ's concept of maÒlaÎah lies on several ideas which depart 
from the general theory of the majority jurists. In this study however, I would mention 
                                                 
399 MuÎammad Sa‘Ðd RamaÃÁn al-BÙÔÐ, ÂawÁbiÔ al-MaÒlaÎah FÐ al-SharÐ‘ah al-IslÁmiyyah, pp.360. 
400 Ibid, pp. 353.   
401 Ahmad al-Raysuni, ImÁm al-ShÁÔibÐ's Theory of the Higher Objectives and Intents of Islamic Law, 
London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005, pp.45-50. 
402See for example MuÎammad Sa‘Ðd RamaÃÁn al-BÙÔÐ, ÂawÁbiÔ al-MaÒlaÎah FÐ al-SharÐ‘ah al-
Islamiyyah.  
 251 
only two of them. Firstly, he recognised opinion as the sole determining factor in 
judging human interest as maÒlaÎah. Secondly, al-TÙfÐ propounded a view which 
prioritised maÒlaÎah over the textual sources in deducing a new hukm403. Because of 
these controversies, al-TÙfÐ's idea was not welcomed and received severe criticism 
from his contemporaries. The concept of maÒlaÎah articulated by al-TÙfÐ went beyond 
the accepted standard of the majority jurists. Despite the criticism, one can not deny 
al-TÙfÐ's contribution in augmenting the idea that maÒlaÎah principle should be 
applied only in the muÝÁmalat (man-man relationships) and not ÝÐbÁdÁt (God-man 
relationships). While the latter is the prerogative of God, the former is down to the 
discretion of mankind.    
 
The previous discussions clearly indicate that the majority of classical jurists upheld a 
middle position in adapting the maÒlaÎah principle in solving new fiqh problem. They 
chose to be in between the strict rejection of ShÁfiÝÐ and the liberal opinion of al-TÙfÐ. 
Certainly, the works of al-GhÁzalÐ and al-ShÁÔibÐ provide grounds on how to apply the 
principle. However, such classical works are considered to be general without 
outlining a specific method in solving real Muslim affairs. Hence, to apply the 
principle in Islamic banking matters, contemporary scholars have to develop a 
distinctive method. For instance, the question on how to deduce an accurate ruling 
when there is a contradiction between the two maÒlaÎah should be clarified clearly. 
The controversy of bayÝ al-tawarruq contract is an interesting example with which to 
address this issue. As the proponents and opponents of the contract argue for using the 
maÒlaÎah principle, the sharÐÝah scholars have to have a sound understanding of the 
theory in order to make correct judgement.   
 
Adapting MaÒlaÎah Principle in Assessing BayÝ al-Tawarruq Issue 
 
Basically, the salient features of bayÝ al-tawarruq are very much similar to bayÝ al-
ÝÐnah. Both contracts are identical in the sense that they are executed to attain 
liquidity. The contracting parties in the contracts have no intention to own the 
purchased assets but use the sales technicalities as a means in obtaining cash. The 
distinctive feature between the two is that the modus operandi of the former involves 
                                                 
403 Wahbah ZuhailÐ, UÒÙl Fiqh al-IslÁmÐ, pp.817-818.   
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three parties whereas the latter includes two parties. Hence, the classical form of bayÝ 
al-tawarruq is described when a person who buys merchandise at a deferred price sells 
it in cash at lower price to a third party. As we may re-call in chapter three, bayÝ al-
ÝÐnah is strongly viewed by the majority of classical jurists as a contract which 
analogous to ribÁ transaction. With the exception of the Íanbalis, all other jurists did 
not discuss the rule of bayÝ al-tawarruq separately from bayÝ al-ÝÐnah404. The majority 
of ÍanbalÐ jurists approved bayÞ al-tawarruq as they did not notice any element of ribÁ 
embedded in the contract405.  Since bayÝ al-tawarruq is less controversy among the 
classical jurists, the Malaysian Islamic bankers and sharÐÝah scholars are keen to 
promote the contract as alternative to bayÝ al-ÝÐnah in creating cash financing products. 
In fact, they had introduced commodity murÁbaÎah programme (CMP) which deemed 
to be an innovative approach in solving liquidity problems among Islamic banks.  
 
However, the application of bayÝ al-tawarruq has been slammed by a recent 
declaration of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) Fiqh Academy. In April 
2009, the Academy had passed a resolution that ruled against the practise of what they 
called 'organised' tawarruq implemented by most Islamic banks. The Academy 
sharÐÝah members differentiate between the classical form of bayÝ al-tawarruq and its 
contemporary practices406. They are of the opinion that the cash obtained from the 
classical bayÝ al-tawarruq is determined purely by market forces. There is no prior 
arrangement between al-mustawriq who first buy merchandise with deferred price and 
the third party who buy back the merchandise at lower spot price. In contrast, the 
contemporary tawarruq is organised whereby the transaction involving the three 
parties (client, banks and third party company) are previously set up to provide cash. 
While the former is allowed according to the ÍanbalÐ jurists, the latter is viewed to be 
analogous to bayÝ al-ÝÐnah and hence impermissible. In many cases, this arranged 
transaction would result in non-satisfaction of receipt condition (al-qabÃ) that is 
required in Islamic commercial law407.       
                                                 
404 Al-Mausu‘ah al-Fiqhiyyah, Kuwait: WizÁrah al-Awqaf, n.d, vol.14, pp. 147.  
405 MansÙr bin Yunus al-BuhÙtÐ, KashÁf al-QinÁÝ Ýan-Matn al-‘IqnÁÝ, Beirut: DÁr al-Fikr, 1982, vol. 3, 
pp.182.    
406 OIC Fiqh Academy Ruled on Organised Tawarruq Impermissible, ISRA Portal, Kuala Lumpur, 
http://www.isra.my/index.php:oic-fiqh-academy-ruled-tawwaruq-impermissible. Accessed on 4th 
Febuary 2010.   
407 Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki, Commodity MurÁbaÎah Programme (CMP): An Innovative Approach to 
Liquidity Management, 5th International Islamic Finance Conference, Monash University Kuala 
Lumpur, 3rd – 4th September 2007.  
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In assessing the compliance of bayÝ al-tawarruq in Islamic banking practices, Siddiqi 
applies the maÒlaÎah-mafsadah calculus. He is of the opinion that the harmful 
consequences of bayÝ al-tawarruq are much greater than the benefits generally cited by 
its proponents. Arguing from the macroeconomic perspective, he contends that the 
application of bayÝ al-tawarruq will support an economic system based on debt 
creation. This is based on the fact that bayÝ al-tawarruq is manipulated by Islamic 
banks to create debt instruments. As one of the founders of Islamic economic 
discipline, Siddiqi opposes the excessive of debt creation instruments in governing 
Muslim financial affairs. He warns against the creation of debt market instruments 
under the banner of Islam. This is because the market of debt instruments created 
through the adaptation of bayÝ al-tawarruq will inherit similar problems of the 
capitalist economic system i.e. speculation activity, inefficient allocation of funds and 
inequitable wealth distribution. He contends that the application of bayÝ al-tawarruq 
will broaden the dichotomy between the theory and practice of Islamic economic, 
therefore should be avoided408.       
 
However, the proponents of bayÝ al-tawarruq argue that Islamic banks and their clients 
need the contract to solve the problems of liquidity and cash financing. By adopting 
bayÝ al-tawarruq, Islamic banks could develop various liquidity management products 
which are essential in ensuring their survival. Failure to manage the liquidity risk 
efficiently will probably cause the collapse of the entire banking system. As for the 
clients, the contract of bayÝ al-tawarruq is important as a makhraj (mode of problem 
solving) in creating financing products to meet their basic needs i.e. to purchase 
houses, vehicles and etc. Hence, the proponents claim that there are prudent needs (al-
ÎÁjiyyat) to adopt some controversial contract like bayÝ al-tawarruq without having 
resort to ribÁ-based transaction409. Hence, the adaptation of bayÝ al-tawarruq is seen as 
the act of choosing between the lesser of two evils; between ribÁ which is absolutely 
prohibited and bayÝ al-tawarruq which is disputed. The decision to take a lesser harm 
action is supported by a legal maxim in Islamic jurisprudence; yuzal ad-Ãarar al-
ashaddu bid-Ãarar al-akhaff- a greater harm is eliminated by means of a lesser harm.   
                                                 
408 Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Economics of Tawarruq, how its mafÁsid overwhelm the maÒÁliÎ, 
Workshop on Tawarruq and its methodological issues, London School of Economics, Febuary 2007.  
409 Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki, Commodity MurÁbaÎah Programme (CMP): An Innovative Approach to 
Liquidity Management.  
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Having reviewed the arguments of opponents and proponents of bayÝ al-tawarruq, it is 
clear that both parties have justified their opinions using the maÒlaÎah concept. The 
opponents agree with the application of the contract considering the maÒlaÎah of 
Islamic banks and their clients. Meanwhile, Siddiqi and others rule against the 
contract in view of the maÒlaÎah of Islamic economic system as a whole. So which 
maÒlaÎah is more justifiable?         
 
In view of the theory of maÒlaÎah propounded by the classical jurists, I think the 
resolution of OIC Fiqh Academy and its supporters is more correct. The justifications 
put forward by Siddiqi are more convincing in achieving the objectives of sharÐÝah 
and the original aims of the establishment of Islamic banks. The harmful 
consequences of bayÝ al-tawarruq to the whole Islamic economic system are much 
more important and to be avoided than its temporary benefits. The acceptance of bayÝ 
al-tawarruq will prolong the debate regarding the authenticity issue in the Islamic 
banking system. Therefore, I think the time has come for Islamic bankers and their 
sharÐÝah advisors to re-think their approach in carrying out the Islamic banking 
operations. Semantic modification is no longer viewed as an appropriate orientation. 
Instead, the 'Islamic' alterations are required to encompass genuine economic 
substance. By abandoning the legal artifice of bayÝ al-tawarruq, it is hoped that the 
Islamic banks will be able to create investment instruments that truly uphold the 
notion of profit and loss sharing as embedded in muÃÁrabah contract. It is strongly 
believed that the notion of profit and loss sharing is the only principle representing the 
true spirit behind any effort to circumvent ribÁ in the current financial system.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter recommends the use of a well-defined maÒlaÎah doctrine in assisting the 
sharÐÝah scholars producing more precise ijtiÎad in Islamic banking and finance 
matters. The recommendation is made after considering the incoherent orientation 
adopted by the current sharÐÝah advisors in Malaysian Islamic banks. They can be too 
rigid by emphasising solely on the technicality aspect of medieval contract as well as 
be too liberal by using unregulated maÒlaÎah principle. Such incoherent legal 
methodology has resulted in authenticity issues within the Islamic banking sector. 
Islamic banking products created through this approach do not really exhibit the 
Islamic ethical framework and the objectives of sharÐÝah.  
 
The need of a well-defined maÒlaÎah theory is obvious when examining the state of 
Islamic banking sector after the episode of global financial crisis. Despite the massive 
impact of the crisis towards the Western financial institutions, the Islamic bankers and 
sharÐÝah advisors maintain their duplication and market-driven approaches. Their 
tendency to introduce the so-called Islamic derivates instruments clearly suggests that 
they do not learn anything from the catastrophe of a financial system which is based 
on excessive debt creation. As the incoherent legal methodology becomes the basis 
for approving the Islamic derivative instruments, the present chapter doubts any 
significant economic substance carried out by the products. The instruments may look 
'Islamic' in appearance but are indifferent in their underlying mechanic when 
compared to the conventional derivatives products.  
 
Meanwhile, the discussion regarding the maÒlaÎah theory in this chapter is 
preliminary in nature. It only sketches the historical discussions among the classical 
jurists in recognising maÒlaÎah as independent source of Islamic law. The majority of 
classical jurists including the MÁlikÐs, ÍanbalÐs and ÍanafÐs supported its application 
in resolving contemporary Muslim problems. However, ShÁfiÝÐ was reported as 
rejecting the application of maÒlaÎah due to the possibility of human manipulation. 
The historical sketch of the maÒlaÎah theory indicates good grounds for philosophical 
discussions laid down by the classical jurists such as al-GhÁzalÐ and al-ShÁÔibÐ. 
However, to apply the theory in Islamic banking and finance matters there is a need to 
develop a distinctive method to ensure its application does not deviate from the 
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original concept. As an example, the chapter also discusses the issue of bayÝ al-
tawarruq. It illustrates the importance of having a sound understanding of the 
maÒlaÎah theory when judging the contradiction of two interests.   
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CONCLUSION CHAPTER 
 
The Islamic legal traditions prohibit ribÁ in loans for consumption and production 
purposes. The wisdom behind the prohibition is to advocate an economic system 
based on the notions of equality and fairness. This is because ribÁ has been viewed by 
the classical jurists as the root cause of economic exploitation. It allows the rich 
creditors to manipulate the poor debtors. To solve the problem of consumption loans, 
Muslims are encouraged to offer benevolence advances to those who in need of 
financial assistance. The advance is offered purely based on the spirit of kindness and 
brotherhood. Lenders of such advances are forbidden from receiving any 
compensation. They are only promised huge rewards in the Hereafter. Meanwhile, to 
avoid the injustice of production loans, the Islamic legal traditions recommend risk-
sharing principle in mobilising Muslim financial resources. Money (capital) is not 
recognised as the factor of production within an Islamic economic framework. The 
classical jurists rejected the notion that ‘money could yield money’ without bearing 
any risk. For money to generate money, the lenders and entrepreneurs are required to 
bear certain degree of probability of loss.  
 
The risk-taking principle is strongly embedded in a muÃÁrabah contract. The contract 
promotes an equity partnership between investors and entrepreneurs in venturing 
business projects. MuÃÁrabah takes place when investors provide capital while agent 
managers contribute work. Any realised profit will be shared between the two parties 
based on a profit ratio agreed at the beginning of the contract. Monetary loss will be 
borne solely by the investors. The agent managers will only lose their expanded times 
and effort. Inspired by the notion of risk sharing, the early modern Muslim economists 
proposed muÃÁrabah as the basis in establishing Islamic banks. Its practical model is 
based on the triangular relationship between depositors, Islamic banks and 
entreprenuers. According to the model, Islamic banks act as middle-parties between 
depositors as capital providers (rabb mÁl) and entrepreneurs as agent managers 
(muÃÁrib). 
 
The founders of Islamic banking theory are determined with regard to the ability of 
muÃÁrabah in running the Islamic banking operations. Their belief in the contract is 
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based on the successful implementation of the contract during Muslim economic glory 
of the medieval period. This is evident in the works of the classical jurists. All major 
schools of Islamic law contain comprehensive doctrines of the muÃÁrabah contract. 
The jurists developed the doctrines throughout a few centuries in response to the 
changes of business and economic context. Influenced by different methodologies in 
interpreting the sharÐÝah, the detailed outlines of practical conduct of muÃÁrabah vary 
between the schools notably between the ShÁfiÝÐs and the ÍanafÐs. 
 
The former school appeared to be more rigid as it upheld 'law determines market' 
approach. For the ShÁfiÝÐs, the contract of muÃÁrabah should be implemented 
according to strict observance of the original rules in order to achieve its desired 
objective. In contrast, the ÍanafÐs were more flexible and lenient. They paid 
considerable attention to market forces in deciding the scope of empowerment to the 
agent manager. In many cases, the customary practices of traders (‘urf al-tujjÁr) were 
used as the determining factor. It should be noted however, despite the relaxed and 
lenient approach, the ÍanafÐ jurists were consistent in maintaining the spirit of the 
contract. 
 
Analyses the muÃÁrabah banking products in Malaysian Islamic banks confirms the 
previous allegations that the current practices have deviated from its original theory. 
MuÃÁrabah contract has not become predominant in the daily Islamic banking 
transactions. Through the creation of deposits accounts and wealth management 
products, the contract is mainly applied to accumulate funds for the Islamic banks. In 
investing the funds however, the Islamic bank prefers to invest them by adopting 
debt-based contracts such as bayÝ al-ÝÐnah, bayÝ al-murÁbaÎah, wakÁlah and ijÁrah. The 
problem with this investment method is that it does not truly exhibit the spirit of risk 
sharing. Financing products, Islamic money market instruments and Islamic securities 
where the muÃÁrabah funds are invested, are designed by mimicking the conventional 
banking facilities. They do not genuinely encompass significant economic substance.  
 
In the so-called Islamic home financing, the relationship between the Islamic banks 
and the clients is very similar to the lenders-borrowers connection rather than traders-
buyers arrangement. Islamic banks appear to be risk-free parties similar to lenders 
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wheras the house buyer bears all the risk associated with borrowers. The use of Arabic 
term in representing the product i.e. bayÝ bithamanin 'Ájil is just a 'cosmetic' 
modification. On the other hand, the Islamic money market instrument is such a 
passive investment. Investing in the money market means muÃÁrabah funds are placed 
in the deficit banks for guaranteed returns. The investment strategy contradicts the 
philospohy of the muÃÁrabah contract which emphasizes the risk-taking element. 
Meanwhile, the Malaysian version of Islamic securities is sorrounded with fiqh 
controversies. This is a result of the local sharÐÝah scholars' acceptance of bayÝ al-ÝÐnah 
and bayÝ al-dayn as the underlying contracts of the products. The application of both 
contracts receives much criticism because it demonstrates the obvious example of 
manipulating the sharÐÝah for the sake of Islamic bankers' interest.           
 
The Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars adopt incoherent legal methodology in modifying 
muÃÁrabah classical doctrine to suit into modern banking practices. They can not be 
considered as applying either the ShÁfiÝÐ or the ÍanafÐ approaches. They are much 
more liberal than even the ÍanafÐs by justifying certain actions of Islamic banks based 
on unregulated definition of maÒlaÎah. At the same time, the sharÐÝah scholars also are 
very rigid and fail to look at the appalling consequences of proposed banking products 
from wider perspective. It is strongly viewed that the incoherent legal methodology is 
undertaken to accommodate the requirements of Islamic bankers.  
 
In view of the increasing awareness regarding the authenticity of the Islamic banking 
operations, such incoherent orientation is no longer justifiable. As the question 
regarding the controversy of Islamic banking resolutions is becoming more obvious 
among researchers and concerned Muslims, the credibility of Islamic banks' sharÐÝah 
advisors will be slowly decline if they continue to favour the Islamic bankers. Hence, 
the time has come for the sharÐÝah scholars to re-consider their approach when 
analysing the compliance of Islamic banking products. This study proposes the 
implementation of a well-defined maÒlaÎah doctrine as a guideline in assisting them 
attaining more precise ijtihÁd in this matter.    
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